

M A H A D J I S H I N D E.

A Political Career in India.

(Early Phase).

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INTRODUCTION.

The title of the Thesis is Mahadji Shinde - A political Career in India (Early Phase).

A reconstruction of the Maratha History by the scientific method began towards the close of the 19th century, but till recently the material, on account of the slowness of its publication could not be adequate for a correct re-valuation of the historical personalities and events. The state-papers and letters are the raw material of history and indeed its very flesh and blood. Thanks to the advance in our knowledge of such original documents in the last quarter of a century, especially from the publication of the selections from the Peshwa Daptar, a chronological arrangement of the papers can now be made, and lives of great and prominent historical personalities like Mahadji Shinde, for instance, can be re-assessed.

Though Mahadji Shinde contributed much to the spread of the Maratha power, justice has not been done to him so far. He has, in fact, been under-rated and what is more no attempt¹ has been made to work out his consistent life-story by any historian of renown. True, the difficulties for such a task were immense. But now an immense mass of correspondence has been published relating to those event-full years from 1730 to 1794: the volumes of Satara Historical Society relating to Mahadji's activities in all spheres, Moroba's revolution, Raghoba's dispute, Mahadji's activities in Northern India and the Deccan his Karvir (Kolhapur) campaign and Gujarat Campaign: Historical papers

1. though H.G. Keene's "Madhavrao Scindia of Gwalior" is there in the Rulers of India Series.

published by Rao Bahadur Sardesai included in the famous Menavali Bundles of Parasnis: Phalke's Shindeshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, with four highly important volumes relating to Mahadji's times: Thakur's Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane; Sane's Kavyetihas Patren Yadi etc., not to speak of the earlier works like the Satara Rajas' Diaries (which throw more light especially on incidents of Mahadji's early life, financial transactions and presentation of Nazirs in the Courts of the Peshwas and the Rajas of Satara), Khare's Itihasik Lekh Sangrah (of which first ten volumes are relevant to the subject) and Parasnis' Itihasik Tipane, Marathyanche Vakil, Maratha Politics in Delhi: Sardesai's Itihasik Patravayavahar and Rajwade's Marathyancho Itihasachi Sadhane.

Again the material is also available not only on the Maratha side viz: the Poona State, Nagpur Bhonsles, Holkars, Shindes, Gaikwads and others, but also from the Nizam's Court and the English Company Records, such as the Poona Residency Correspondence, Forrest's Maratha Series and the Selections from Foreign Department with the Imperial Series of the Governors-General, Memoirs of Hastings and others compiled by prominent historians, Dodwell's letters of Macpherson, all of which depict English intrigues, planning and reactions, thanks to the minutes recorded of the meetings of the secret select committees. To these may be added the relevant records (unpublished) in the Bombay Secretariat - the Secret and Political Department Diaries (48 volumes) which I had the privilege of consulting. Chandrachud Daptar, Hingane Daptar and other family records have also been very useful. The Calendar of the Persian Correspondence in very many volumes reveals the working of the Courts of Delhi, Poona and Calcutta and all the prominent principalities, simultaneously. And it is for the first time

that an attempt has been made to co-ordinate this mass of material.

"These letters reveal, in brilliant and true light, the heroic personality of Mahadji Sindia. He dominates the North Indian History of his time like a Colossus (as I have said elsewhere). But the general and rather hazy notion of his greatness that we possessed before, is here replaced by a masterly portrait showing the lineaments of his character in the minutest detail, with almost daily illustrations from his sayings and doings. The veil which the greatness of historic position places between a superman and posterity is here rent asunder; we see the innermost thoughts and secret aspirations, the anxieties and plans, the sorrows and joys, of Mahadji Sindia, as intimately as if we had been privileged to enter the inner circle of his four personal friends. The cross-currents of political intrigues - by the British Residents, the Mughal grandees, the Rajput princes and even the jealous rivals of his own nationality are unfolded before us with amazing frankness and fulness".¹

And "from such an intimate study the man emerges even greater than we supposed him before. We see here the appalling difficulties and obstructions, - some from the most unexpected domestic quarter, - that he was called upon to overcome and did succeed in overcoming. We see how defective his resources were, how his instruments and allies often played him false, how many an anxious crisis he had to face, and yet how in the end he triumphed over all. We see the intense religious feeling, - modern rationalists may call it superstition, - which formed the essence of his being. We see the deep family affection, the habitual meekness of spirit, the respect for venerable persons,

1. Sarkar Sir Jadunath, Forward - Historical Papers Relating to Mahadji Sindia - edited by G.S. Sardesai, pp. 8-9.

which this strong and busy man of action displayed even at the height of his earthly glory".¹

With the introductory paragraph, the First Chapter traces the early beginning of Mahadji Shinde to the Battle of Panipat, covering the period from the birth of Mahadji to 14th January 1761. The controversies about his birth date are weighed. The early rise of the Shindes and the career of Ranoji and the establishment of control over Malwa is noted. Mahadji was already calling "Patan" his Swaraj, in his teens. Shinde's glory is analysed in the background of the Durrani Invasions, culminating finally in the clash at Panipat; Shinde's famous project of taking Ghazi-ud-din to the Deccan was abortive. Mahadji was leading the Maratha forces in the Battle of Ghodnadi - 27th November 1751 - in connection with the affairs of Salabat Jang. Sir Jadunath Sarkar's publication of the French Soldier's Diary - (translated) gives help in noting the details of the war with Salabat Jang. References about Mahadji Shinde in the Deccan about this time prior to Panipat found in the Satara Rajas' Diaries and other sources are critically examined. Shinde's struggles with the grandees of the Mughal Empire who secured the military aid of the Abdali is traced to the battle ground of Panipat. The details are forwarded as regards the position of the Shinde Camp, Shinde's exploits and the momentous escape of Mahadji Shinde therefrom, in a crippled condition with the help of Ranekhan.

The Second Chapter deals with Mahadji's career from the Battle of Panipat - 14th January 1761 to 31st December 1767, which period may be termed the period of his political tutelage. The battle

1. Ibid., p.9.

presented him with an opportunity to establish his own dynasty and eventually his supremacy over Hindustan. There is scarcely a parallel incident which shows such a career as that of Mahadji. The claims for the recognition of the head of the House of Shindes were under consideration in the Court of Poona. In this Chapter, Mahadji's movements and activities are traced though the whole period is shrouded in mystery. Mahadji's anxieties and sufferings consequent on the procrastinating tactics of the Poona Court in declaring him the Chief of the Shinde House are described and the repercussions on the Maratha as well as the Indian history are discussed.

The Third Chapter discusses, at length Mahadji's career when he was acclaimed as the Shinde Chief and his crowning achievement in placing Shah Alam on the throne at Delhi on 27th December 1771. The period here covered is from 31st December 1767 to 27th December 1771. The Maratha army led by Mahadji, Tukoji, Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji marched to the North. The long drawn out struggle for existence by a kingless state, torn by internal discord and menaced by relentless enemies on all sides, brought to the forefront the statesman and organiser, Mahadji Shinde. The internal disorder, the British intrigues and the Wazir's selfish projects with the final triumph of Mahadji over Najib's formidable strength form the subject matter of this chapter.

The Fourth Chapter deals with the dissensions among the Maratha leaders leading to Raghoba's acceptance of the British protection: The formation of the Bara Bhai, the ministerial party with the express object of supporting the Young Peshwa, Madhavrao II and the intrigues of the English with Raghoba against this party, revealed

in the secret and political department diaries are described.

The Fifth chapter continues the narrative, presenting Mahadji in his role of defender of the Bara Bhai. He is now the pillar of the Maratha State and his diplomacy finally saved the Maratha State from the internal disruptions - The Pretender's Revolt and Karvirkar's disobedience and Moroba's Solicitation for the British help to support Raghoba. The Satara Historical Research Society publications of original documents and Khare's Lekh Sangrah have fully established Mahadji's important contributions in crushing these two major revolts.

The Chapters that follow viz: three in number fully bring out the issue of Moroba's revolution in Poona and his final submission to Mahadji: Mahadji's successful efforts in organising the confederacy of the Maratha Chiefs for a bold stand against the English: his punishment of all the disturbing elements and his final triumph over the British Army at Wadgaon when the British general gave him a carte blanche for the terms of the treaty. From this convention of Wadgaon, Mahadji's military career is described in detail leading to the fall of the Fort of Gwalior and Mahadji's secret understanding with the English which became the basis of the treaty of Salbai.

Throughout these pages Mahadji is seen breaking "through the successive nets of intrigue woven around him by his foreign enemies and nominal allies. He triumphed in the end",¹ in the sense that he contrived, at length to achieve his objective". "He towers over Maratha history in solitary grandeur, a ruler of India without an ally, without a party, without even an able and reliable civil and diplomatic service or strong and honest advisers".² Had he been vouchsafed more co-operation, the history of the Marathas would have surely run on a different course.

1. Ibid, p.10.

2. Ibid.

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study.

Just Agarwal

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CHAPTER - I

From the Early Beginning To The Battle of Panipat.

(Date of birth - 14th January 1761)

The period from 1707 to 1803 is one of the most remarkable periods in the Indian History. This is the dawn of Modern India. In this century, the political destiny of India was re-shaped. She was drawn into the currents and cross-currents of the world-politics and her enforced isolation was broken. On account of the world forces, new powers appeared, creating new problems. The whole of the 18th century was shaped by two forceful under-currents : 1) The fall of the Mughal Empire on account of the double attack of the Marathas and the North- Westerners; and 2) The struggle between the Marathas and the English for the empire of India and the ultimate triumph of the latter.¹ In the post - Panipat period, the scene opens with the rise of Mahadji Shinde who bestrides the plains of North India like a Colossus for two decades or more. Of course the path between the grave of the old power and the cradle of the new was beset with interminable conflicts and strifes, between the petty chiefs and the glorified pro- consuls; but on account of the many opportunities to genius and ambition for the establishment of dynasties that presented themselves in India of the 18th century, there is

1. Sinha, H.N., "Main Currents of the 18th century Indian History", J.I.H., vol.IX, PP.37,39,40.

scarcely a comparison that shows a more meteoric career than that of Mahadji Shinde.¹

The family of Mahadji Shinde was descended from the younger branch of the Shindes, a decadent family from Kunneirkheir, a village fifteen miles east of Satara. They belonged to the Koonbee or the cultivator class.² Families such as Yadav, More, Pawar, Shinde and Salunkhe had settled since long in Maharashtra and had established marital connections with the Bhosles who had attained to regal status and had the title of 'Raje' on that account. Two families of Shinde are often referred to before 1724, but we find Ranoji Shinde, the head of the Sesvansi or Nagar vansi branch of the family as the patel of his village. He was, however, reduced to such hard straits that he had to join the Peshwa's service. The Peshwa was struck by the sense of loyalty in his servant and promoted him first to the position of a stable boy in the cavalry³ and then to that of a trooper in his body-guard.⁴ Ranoji distinguished himself by his valour and steadfastness and rose to the position of the officer-in-charge of the cavalry (Paga) and eventually carved out for himself a principality of his own.⁵

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1. Abdul Ali, "Mahadji Scindia of Gwalior", I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, pp. 108-109.
 2. Malcolm, Memoirs of central India, vol. I, (1823), p. 95.
 3. S.P.D., vol. XXVIII, No. 27; Oturkar, Maharashtra Patrarupi Itihas, p. 36.
 4. Parasnis, Itihasik sohut Lekh, vol. II, No. 6.
 5. Phalke, Shindeshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol. I, No. 1; Sardesai, Maratha Rivasat, Shivaji, p. 1; Franklin, Shah Alam, p. 120; Duff, History of the Marathas, vol. I, pp. 13, 357.

Ranoji had five sons - Jayaji, Jotiba, Dattaji¹, Tukoji and Mahadji. The first three were by his legally married wife, Nimabai² and the latter two were born outside regular wedlock, of Chimabai, who was a Rajput by descent³. Mahadji, therefore, had in his veins the martial blood of two races, the Maratha and the Rajput; and he must have been born in 1727.

The date of Mahadji's birth, however, cannot be determined with certainty. H.G.Keene thinks that he was born in 1730, though he admits that there have been doubts raised about it. But the same author mentions that Mahadji was thirty years old at the time of the battle of Panipat and was supposed to be nearly sixty years of age, when he came back to Poona. This would establish 1732 as the year of Mahadji's birth which is again contradicted when it is pointed out that he was sixty-seven years old at the time of his death, which fixes 1727 as the plausible date of his birth. Sardesai however, accepts 1733 as the year of Mahadji's birth⁴, but gives no authority for his statement.

While Mahadji was passing his early years of childhood, his father with the co-operation of Holkar was extending the Maratha conquests further in the North as far east as the Chambal. Though attempts for the annexation of Malwa had been made as early as 1715 under Davalji Somvansi⁵, it was only Bajirao, the Peshwa,

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1. The controversies as to whether Dattaji was second or third son of Ranoji are now settled by the publication of the geneology of the Shinde family found in the official records of Kshirsagar, who was the secretary of the family. Jotiba is referred here as the second son, a fact corroborated by the official correspondence of the Shindes.
 2. She has been called as Meenabai by Malcolm (op.cit., p.96) who is followed, among others, by Sardesai (op.cit., Madhyavibhag, vol. II, p.62).
 3. Phalke, op.cit., vol. I, pp.1-4 and Nos.254, 263, 295, 107. (Appasahib was Jayaji's name) so was Babasahib of Jankoji and Nana Sahib of Mahadji Shinde).
 4. Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, pp.36, 52, 184; Sardesai, Currents of Maratha History, p.132
 5. Rajwade, Marathyanhya Itihasachi Sadhane, vol. VI, Nos.49, 583-624.

with his organised leadership who could accomplish the Maratha ambition of the Northern conquests. Before he entered upon his office, the territory which stretched from Burhanpur to the Doab of the Ganges and the Jumna had already been overrun. In the next decade, Ranoji and Malhar Holkar brought about the overthrow of Nandlal Mandloi of Indore and in the early thirties, they penetrated into the Doab and were expected, if not checked in time, to threaten Agra itself.¹ The Mughal Emperor, therefore, ordered Muzfar Khan, the governor of Ajmer to set out against the Marathas on 24th February 1734. But before he could start on the campaign, they had already ransacked Bhadawar, not far away from Agra, and returned to their base by the beginning of March, 1734. After the rains of 1735, they opened their offensive again but this time towards the North - west, into Rajputana, collecting tribute from Udepur, Medta, Nagor, and Ajmer. They also secured the Sanad from the Emperor granting them the right of Chowthai in these states. They persuaded the Emperor through the mediation of Jay Sing to alienate to the Maratha state, the Subhedari of Malwa which was made over to them for the purposes of administration. Bajirao met Jay Sing at Manoharpur near Jaypur on 5 March, 1736 along with Ranoji, Malhar, Powar and his own son Janardan Pant. After the Dasara of 1736, the Sardars (Ranoji and Malhar) were received in audience by the Chatrapati at Satara². Balaji Bajirao, on his succession to the Peshwaship, opened his second offensive in

1. Rajwade, Marathyanvcha Itihasachi Sadhana, vol.VI, Nos.49, 583-624; Sardesai, Currents of Maratha History, p.132.

2. Sardesai, op.cit, Madhya-Vibhag, vol.I, pp.51,121,322-323, 137, 351 et seq. 359. .

the north in June 1741 and Ranoji accompanied him, as far as Gwalior. On 21 April 1743, Ranoji, along with Malhar Holkar, Yeshwant Jadhav and Pilaji Jadhav accepted the zamindari status under the Mughal Emperor, promising to serve the Emperor directly. They also stood guarantee to him for carrying out the terms of the agreement of the Peshwa with him.¹ After the invasion of Nadir Shah in March 1739, the weakness of the Central government was duly exploited by the Marathas. In 1745, Jayaji Shinde made a bold claim to Patan and the adjacent territory and Mahadji Shinde, who must be now in his late teens, was insisting on including the same in his "Swaraj".²

The Emperor of Delhi dispatched presents of garments of honour to the Peshwa who received them in a stately Durbar at at Bhelsa,³ but earlier Ranoji Shinde had breathed his last at Shujalpur, on 19th July 1745⁴. The army of Shinde proceeded to Bundelkhand, in February 1746, on account of the bitter struggle for the succession rights in Jaypur. Jayaji Shinde and Malhar Holkar attacked Jaypur, defeated Iswar Sing in 1749 and declared Madhav Sing as the successor. The Shinde army, reaching Delhi, had obstructed Nasirjung's march towards the capital city.⁵

1. Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol.I, No.8.

2. Sardesai, *Shindeshahichi Rajkarne*, S.H.S., vol.II, No.265; Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol.I, No.38; Gupta Hari Ram, "Adina Beg Khan, the last Mughal viceroy of the Punjab," *I.S.C.*, vol.XIII, p.326.

3. Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol.II, No.39 and p.3.

4. Sardesai, *Kayvetihis Patren*, No.49; Sardesai, *Shinde Raj*, S.H.S., vol:II, 277; Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol.I, No.37., Abdul Ali, "*op.cit.*", *I.H.R.C.P.*, vol XII, p.110.

5. Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol.III, No.196 and vol.I, No.72; Parasnis, *Itihasik Charitre, Surai Mal*, vol.II, p.3; Sardesai, *Mar History of the Marathas*, vol.II p.360.

Jayaji Shinde and Malhar Holkar were called to the South at the end of 1749, on account of the serious illness of Shahu and his eventual death and thence the urgency to support the Peshwa at the time of the succession of Ramraja. But by the end of 1750, they returned with renewed vigour, responding to the repeated solicitations from the Wazir, Safdarjang, who was paralysed by the activities of the insatiable Rohillas.¹ In the disputes that followed in the North, Suraj Mal Jat had to contract a treaty with the Peshwa by payment of 30 lakhs of rupees to Shinde, though, however, the Peshwa himself had to intervene to reconcile Malhar to Shinde, on account of the disputes which arose, perhaps, out of the issue.²

Ahmed Shah invaded Hindustan, by forced marches in 1750 and Adina Beg courted help from Malhar, Raghunath and other Maratha chiefs, from the Deccan, offering fifty lakhs of rupees. The Peshwa accordingly issued the Sanads, specially to Malhar and Jayaji and dispatched Naro Shankar with army to their succour against the Jats. Malhar and Jayaji, exploiting the situation "ransacked the whole country, not allowing a single man to escape and they carried away every article as booty".³

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1. S.P.D., vol. II, Nos. 14, 19, 20, 24; Sardesai, op.cit., vol. II, p. 361
 2. Parasnis, op.cit., p. 3 et seq., Rajwade, op.cit., vol. VI, pp. 53-54.
 3. Elliot, Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah, vol. VIII, pp. 114 - 115; Elliot, Farhatu - Na Nazirin, vol. VIII, pp. 169; Sat. Raja Diaries, vol. III, No. 135; Rajwade, op.cit., vol. XI, No. 75; Heras, "Durani Influence in North India", Is.C., vol. XI, p. 498; Kincaid-Parasnis, History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 53.

1+ The name of Mahadji Shinde happens to be mentioned in the correspondence of Ramraja, consisting of three letters dated 18 August 1750, addressed to Shivaji Salunkhe, Santoji Shinde and others. Ramraja urged these chiefs to march quickly to Miraj against Antoji Sivdev. This Mahadji Shinde appears to be another name - sake of Mahadji Shinde of Gwalior as there is another complaint lodged by one Mahadajirao Shinde to Tarabai against Udaji Chavan for having deprived him of his Jagir rights. It has been rightly ascertained that although Shahu had earlier conciliated Sambhaji by the Treaty of Varna in 1730, Udaji Chavan, Chimnaji Damodar and many other leaders of small bands used to create trouble, now for Shahu and again for Sambhaji, whose rivalry they fully exploited for their own personal interests. The Peshwa had even reported to Chimaji Appa, on 5 March 1730, The actual words of Shahu regarding the appointment of Udaji Chavan as the Senapati by Sambhaji of Kolhapur. Probably Mahadji Shinde of Torgal or Mhysal is referred to here and not Mahadji Shinde of Gwalior.¹

In 1751, Ahmad Shah Durani invaded Hindustan and Safdar again appealed to the Marathas. Jayapa and Malhar joined their forces in the beginning of 1751 and marched against the Rohillas, inflicting a severe defeat on Sadulla Khan in March. A plan for a Maratha subsidiary alliance against Abdali was formed, and Safdar, leaving Delhi had met Jayapa and Malhar to engage their services. In the battle of Qadirganj fought on 20 March, they routed Bangash and a bitter struggle followed. In the battle near Farrukabad on 28 April, ten thousand pathans were cut down and

1. S.P.D., vol.26, Nos.80,248 and vol.11, p.1 and 2 and No:59.

the power of Ahmad Khan Bangash was extinguished only to be rekindled later on by Najib who invited Abdali from Kabul to help the Pathans. Throughout May, the Marathas achieved triumphs and in June, on 3rd, Jayaji met Safdar and Ghazi-ud-din in Delhi with the effect that Ahmad Shah Abdali went back when he perceived the assemblage of armies.¹ The most important project undertaken by Jayaji Shinde and Malhar Holkar, now, was to persuade Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of the Nizam to proceed to the Deccan to claim his father's dominion, while Hingane, the Peshwa's Vakil in Delhi carried on intrigues to that effect, the Shinde army was fighting against the Pathans and the Rohillas across Ramganga. Jayaji stayed for fifteen days in Delhi for the settlement of affairs and leaving Delhi took Ghazi-ud-din with him, who was now given the Subedari of the Deccan, by his interference. But the Peshwa wrote to Malhar and Jayaji in June that Salabat Jang was expected to reach Aurangabad very shortly there after. The Peshwa reinforced his army by summoning the Shinde contingent which was led by Dattaji and Mahadji Shinde. It was here that the disciplined battalion of Monsieur de Bussy attracted the attention of the Marathas, at the Battle of Kukdi (21 Nov. 1751) and they tried to win over De Bussy from the services of the Nizam, Salabat Jang but failed to effect it. The Peshwa attacked the Mughal army and in the battle of the Ghodnadi, which was

1. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren, No.79, p.86., Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, No.86; S.P.D., vol.II, p.2; Purandare Daptar, vol.I, p.284; Oturkar, op.cit., p.125; Farhatun-Nazirin, op.cit. p.167; Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah, op.cit. pp.122-123; Heras, op.cit. p.499; Sardesai, History of the Marathas, vol.II, p.354.

fought on 27 November 1751, the Maratha forces were led by Mahadji Purandare, Dattaji and Mahadji Shinde and Khanderao Trimbak Ekbote, a native of Purandar. The Marathas were at Supet (in Pargana Parner) on 2 December, at Arangaon - Sarola on 3rd which was the night of the lunar eclipse and on the 8th on the Ghod river somewhere near Phakle. They next shifted to Mudai - Talegaon in the Pabal Sub-division where they halted from 9th to 11th (Arangaon is a railway station seven miles south of Ahmadnagar, on the Manduka, a feeder of the Sind; while Sarola, another station, is 16 miles further south).

"Salabat Jang had set out from Aurangabad on 31 October 1751, had encamped at Ahmadnagar and thence marched into the Maratha country. By December 15, the Muslim army had driven the Marathas back, near Poona. In this campaign the French with their fire-arms subdued the Marathas. Particularly, on the night of the 3rd December, while there was a total eclipse of the moon, they made a surprise attack and slew many of their enemy. The Peshwa who was engaged in Puja, fled away bareheaded on a bare-backed horse. His gold Puja utensils (Hadiqah adds " and idols ") were plundered, by the Muslims. But by reason of dissensions created by mischief - makers, all these exertions ended in the making of peace." On 8th December, Balaji had rallied his troops, attacked the Nizam's army, when it was dispersed in marching and a severe fight was fought; the invaders' further advance was to Talegaon, which was sacked and the Muslims after their retreat made a fresh advance and surprised and sacked the village of Sinner. Sadashivarao Bhau was the Peshwa's peace envoy and

Mahadji played his role in the battle that was fought at Mandavgad on 9 December.¹

The Peshwa had explained his difficulties to Shinde and Holkar, in March 1752 and they left Delhi, taking Ghazi-ud-din with them in April. But Abdali had set out from Kabul in December 1751 on his fourth invasion of Hindustan and had captured Lahore on 15 March 1752. In April, the Peshwa had taken upon himself the responsibilities of guarding the Mughal north-western frontier from the perpetual danger of an Afgan invasion in lieu of the Imperial recognition of the Maratha claims (Chowth) on almost all the provinces of the Empire. The Peshwa thus incurred the hostility of the Abdali monarch of Kabul who claimed the Subah of the Punjab by inheritance from Nadir Shah. Since that time the Marathas and the Afgans contested, as two chief rivals, for mastery over the Punjab and supremacy at Delhi. Meanwhile the Mughal Emperor on 23 April ratified Mir Mami's arrangements with the Abdali and the latter returned to his country from Lahore. On the same day, Shinde and Holkar had reached Delhi and demanded the execution of their agreement. They made arrangements to the effect that the Emperor conferred Ghazi-ud-din as Subah of the Deccan. Finalising these

1. Purandare Daptar, vol.II, p.372; Sat.Raj.Diary, vol.III, No.52., Sarkar, "Salabat Jung's First war with the Peshwa (French MSS)", Is.C., vol.XI, p.187; Kincaid, Parasnis, History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.16; Abdul Ali, "The Pindaris", Is.C., vol.XI, p.370; Keene, op.cit., p.34; Sardesai, Kavyetihās patrā, Nos. 84, 85, 82, 86, 97 and 90; Gulgaule Letters, BHRI; 1923-29, Nos. 9 and 10; S.P.D., vol.II, p.2; Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, No.86 and 90; Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.17.

affairs by 29 April, Shinde and Holkar could now set out for the Deccan with Ghazi-ud-din on 14 May 1752.¹

The Mughal court was now, with regard to Ghazi-ud-din and the Marathas, in the position of a necromancer who has to furnish his familiars with employment on pain of their destroying him. And an escape seemed to be afforded them by this projects of Ghazi-ud-din who agreed to draw off the dangerous auxiliaries to aid him in wrestling the lieutenancy of the Deccan from his third brother Salabat Jang.²

Sabaji Patil and Ranoji Bhoite marched to Marwar from Delhi on 1 June 1752 and Jayaji with Ghazi-ud-din reached Gwalior on 18 July, on his way to the Deccan. By the end of July, Lashkarkhan who had joined Salabat Jang approached the Peshwa for the considerations of treaty on latter's behalf but the Peshwa discreetly called upon Vasudev Dikshit to win over Sayed Lashkar by diplomacy to favour Ghazi-ud-din. The scheme was to declare Ghazi-ud-din as Subha in Ahmedabad when he was actually expected in Burhanpur on 20th. On the 9th August, Shinde, Holkar and Ghazi-ud-din crossed the Nerbada, expecting the Peshwa there. Now Salabat Jang was surrounded on all sides by the enemy forces, but on 16 September, Nizam Ali's mother invited Ghazi-ud-din for a feast and poisoned him. On the very previous day the Peshwa had met Shinde and Holkar at Raksasbhavan in his war council for

1. Purandare Daptar, vol.I, No.223., Phalke, op.cit., vol.III., No.203., Srivatsava, "The Marathas and Najib-ud-Dowlah," Is.C., vol.XX, p.49., Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren, Nos.99 and 102., Oturkar, op.cit., No.124; Heras, "Durani influence in North India", Is.C., vol.XI, p.499.

2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.30., Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit., vol. III, p. 54.

planning further movements. Salabat Jang declared his firm determination to go on war with the Marathas and the Peshwa asked his sardars (Shinde and Holkar) to bring Ghazi-ud-din II to the Deccan. But the disputes were settled down and a treaty of the Peshwa with Salabat Jang was ratified on 20 November 1752. Malhar Holkar was with the Peshwa from October 1752 to January 1753 and Shindes were present in the Durbar of the Peshwa, on the occasion of the Makar Sankrant - 13 January 1753. They were then given Conge¹ with ceremony by 22nd or 23rd to expedite their marches towards the North. The army commanded by Raghoba set out for Gujrat on 10 December 1752 and was joined by Vithal Sivdev Vinchurkar, Malhar Holkar and Jayapa, and Raghoba wrote to Dattaji on 22 October to join him, too and render the Maratha position strong before the Abdali's arrival in Hindustan.¹

The third campaign against the Nizam was started after 1752. Ramchandra Jadhav, leading the disturbing elements fought against Dattaji Shinde but finally, he had to take shelter in the fort of Sindkheda. One Shidoji Shinde explained that the army of Daphle had attacked the village, which resulted in a fight; whereupon he himself was directed to join the force at Miraj and repulse the enemy. Udaji Chavan had taken Sonai and was about to attack Miraj. There upon Dulbaji Pisal, Khalroji Shinde, Sambhaji Shinde, Mahadji Shinde, Posji Gaikwad,, Girappa

1. Chandrachud Dantar, vol.I, No.19; Banerji, "Balaji Baji Rao", I.H.Q., vol.IV, p.434; Rajwade, op.cit., vol.vi, pp.86-87., Sardesai, Kavyetihas natren, Nos.103, 105-107, 109, 104, 108 and 112., B.H.R.I., "Gulgule Letters, "1928-29, No.11; S.P.D., vol.II, p.2., vol.34, No.1465., sat.Raj.Diary, vol.I, No.116., Purandare Dantar, vol.I., No.377.

Desai of Pargana Raybag and Kalnak and Sidnak Mhars were directed to protect Miraj. Curiously enough Udaji Chavan himself had represented that the Chief of Miraj was causing disturbances in his territory. Orders were, again sent to the sardars by the Chatrapati, among whom Mahadji Shinde's name happened to be the seventh, to join the Pandit Pratinidhi with their armies and to attack the Raja of Karvir who had encamped at Bhilavadi with the army of Udaji Chavan. In this dispatch again, Mahadji Shinde a sardar who supported Udaji Chavan has been clearly differentiated from Mahadji Shinde as both are mentioned with their divergent inclinations, in the same letter. It cannot be still ascertained whether Mahadji referred to in all these dispatches, as engaged in action against the rebels, is definitely Mahadji Shinde of Gwalior.¹

Ramaji Anant Dabholkar was with the Shinde family since the rains of 1750. The Peshwa called Jayaji in February 1753 and urged him to send Ramaji, ahead of him. In January 1753, Salabat Jang had started negotiations with the Peshwa through Bussie but Dabholkar had defeated Salabat Jang in February and was given an Inam of two towns by the Peshwa.²

Viswas-rao was accompanying Jayaji Shinde who was at Srigonda on 15 March 1753, preparing to proceed to the North, in order to join the forces of Raghoba. He had reached Gondia on

1. Nanarji, op.cit., I.H.Q., vol.IV, p.435; Sat.Raj.Diary, vol.I, Nos.228, 226, 84,232, 227.

2. Datta, "The Marathas in Bengal after 1751," I.I.H., vol.XI, p.387., Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patren, Nos.114,115., Phalke op.cit., vol.III, No.143. :

28 April but Mahadji was not in his camp. Bijesing Raja of Marwar was an old ally of the Marathas. His feudatory Ramsing Raja was plotting against him and the Peshwa had directed Malhar and Jayaji to remonstrate with Ramsing and to assist Bijesing as far as possible. From the early beginning of the year 1753, the Peshwa was endeavouring to manage Delhi intrigues. After 24th May, Antaji Mankeshwar was fully busy in hatching internal revolutions in Delhi and though he was opposed in his endeavours by Hingane, he took good care to report duly to Jayaji. The main Maratha army, led by Raghunath, was joined by Malhar on the Nerbada (22 September - 5 October), traversed a part of Malwa and then crossed the Mukundara pass on 29 October into Jaypur territory. Raghunath had heard that peace had been negotiated between the Emperor and Safdar Jang. Raghunath and Malhar spent two months, from 9 November to 18 January securing payments from Jaypur and several other states and collected the tribute worth twelve lakhs of rupees.¹

A body of 4000 horse under Khandoji, the son of Malhar, arrived near Delhi and encamped at the Tank of Kishandas on 21 November and on 26 December Khandoji had his audience with the Emperor. Suraj Mal and Madho Sing jointly tried to oppose the Marathas and when Malhar demanded two crores of rupees as tribute from Suraj Mal, he only offered four lakhs. On 3 November Raghunath and Malhar marched to Kotah and Dattaji left Ujjain to join them. The Maratha contingent under Khandoji approached the Jat forts - Dig,

1. Sarkar, "Delhi during anarchy (1749-1758)", Delhi Chronicle, I.R.R.C.P., vol.III, pp.6-7., Sardesai, Itihasik Patravaihar, No.39; Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.23., S.P.D., vol.II, No.34; Sardesai, op.cit., Nos.116-17; Sat.Raj.Diary, vol.I, No.206.

Bharatpur and Kumbher. Khandoji was shot dead when standing in a drunken state. Jayaji, thereafter, persisted in his attack on Kumbher and compelled the Jats to open negotiations on 28 April. In June, Malhar plundered the royal family at Sikandara and on 5 June, Ghazi-ud-din with the Marathas, was all powerful in Delhi, with effect that Alamgir II was proclaimed Emperor in August.¹

On 12 June, Jayaji had left Delhi and reached Narnol. Thence reaching Sambhar via Karwad, he marched towards Medta by 25, well reinforced by the ten to twelve thousand State-army of the Peshwa, under Raghunath. Raghunath and Malhar remained in Delhi and Jayaji reorganised his artillery in August and encamped at Wadgeo - south of Medta by six kos, planning to start for Kotah on 31, leaving Medta on his left. In September, Shinde and Holkar were not on good terms themselves and Ghazi-ud-din had not been able to pay anything to the Marathas. But in this Marwar campaign, Khumarsing offered twenty five lakhs of rupees to Shinde in October. Mahadji Shinde was also engaged in his campaign against Marwar and earlier crossed over into Bundelkhand.²

1. Sarkar, Fall of Mughal Empire, vol.I, pp.515-522., S.P.B., vol.34, No.1963; BHR, I, Gulgate Letters, 1928-29, Nos.12,13,14., Maheshwar Dur.Batamipatre, vol.I, No.110., Sarkar, " Delhi during anarchy (1749-58)," Delhi Chronicle, I.H.R.C.P., vol.III, p.7; Tarikh-i Alamgirisi, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.140., Parasnis, Itihasik Charitra, Suraj Mal Jat., Keene, op.cit. p.34; Chahar Gulzar Shujai, Elliot, vol.VIII, pp.208-209.

2. BHR, Gulgate Letters, 1928-29, Nos.15,16,19., Bhalke, op.cit., vol.III, p.153, Nos.208, 58,279,271., Kingana Dantar, vol.II, No.32; Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren, Nos.122,130; Bat. Raj. Diary, vol.III, No.229.

The year 1754-55 was a momentous year for Raghunath in Hindustan. An agreement with the rival parties was at last patched up and by February the Maratha army marched away from the Delhi region for its southern home. But Jayapa did not like Raghunath to join him in March 1755. Malhar, too, had come with his army near kotah in March 1755 and in April, he had joined Raghunath on the river Banas; where from he went to Gwalior via Khatoli. Jayapa Shinde was called back to the Deccan by the Peshwa in June but he was assassinated on 25 July at Tavsar in the siege operations at Nagore. Dattaji had to harness all his energy and skill in declaring a bold front thereafter. Jankoji was the only son left by Jayaji and he was at Medta, at the time of his father's murder.¹

Malhar had left Jankoji (one of his generals) and a considerable part of his army, with the charge of affairs to prevent fresh insurrections and to collect the revenues assigned to him as a recompense for his late services, in the court of Delhi. The English were inclined to treat Abdali's intended invasion of Hindustan as definitely menacing their peace. The Marathas were masters of greater part of Hindustan, a nominal king sat on the throne of Delhi, the administration of the Mughal court was usurped by a man who derived his influence and establishment entirely from the Marathas, the chiefs of the Empire had already declared their

1. S.P.D., vol. XXVII, Nos. 79, 92, 106, 81, 89, 90; Phalke, *op. cit.*; vol. III, Nos. 281, 284, 209, 212, 73, 324.; Phalke, *op. cit.* vol. I, Nos. 129, 131, 133, 140. Hingane Dantar, vol. II, No. 36., BHPI, Gulgate Letters, 1928-29, Nos. 20, 21., S.P.D. vol. II, No. 50, 48; Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patren, No. 159; Rajwade, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 15.

resolution of joining the invader, and Lahore, the key of Hindustan was governed by a woman.¹

Najib Khan was appointed Bakshi by Abdali who left Hindustan, but the perverse Ghazi-ud-din deprived Najib of his post and appointed Ahmad Khan of the Bungash race, the Bakshi of the Empire. Najib had to retire to Saharanpur. Raghunath levied contributions from the chiefs of Rajputana and Malwa. He joined Ghazi-ud-din and the confederates besieged Delhi. The Shindes were most supreme in Hindustan by the beginning of 1756 even when Govind Ballal Kher had to wage a hard struggle in capturing important stations in the Doab.²

1. Sarkar, "Life of Najib," Is.C., vol.VII, p.432; Sinha, "Durand Menace and the British North-west Frontier in 18th Century," I.H.Q., vol.X, p.624 et seq; Hingane Daptar vol.II, No.37; Hari Ram Gupta, "Adina Beg Khan, the Last Mughal Viceroy of the Punjab," Is.C., vol.XIII, p.331; Oturkar, op.cit., No.127.; Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patra, No.141, p.129; Franklin, Shah Alam, pp.4-5.

2. Shaik Ghulam Husain, "Samin - Narrative," In.Ant., 1907 pp.10, 43, 55.; Sarkar, "Rise of Najib," Is.C., vol.IX, pp.866-871; Sarkar, "Najib-ud-Daula as the Dictator of Delhi, 1761-70," Is.C., vol.VII, pp.431-456; Hingane Daptar vol.II, p.40.; Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patra, No.143.; Sardesai, Shindeshahichi Rajkarna, SHS., vol.II, No.287; Franklin, Shah Alam, pp.7-8.; Kincaid, Parasnis, History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.56.

The Peshwa asked Spencer who had gone to Poona, to assist him with troops and artillery in his intended invasion of the Carnatic. The request was, however, declined by the British envoy on account of "the uncertain state of affairs in Europe regarding the French". But not deterred by this refusal, the Peshwa also requested aid in his expedition against the people about Delhi. Again, Spencer evaded this as gently as he could by representing the English situation which would not admit their sending the army, so far.¹

On Monday, 29 November 1756, Nana Phadnis was given officially and with ceremony, the post of Phadnis on the death of his father in Hindustan. Nana accompanied the army of the Marathas on the Srirangpatan campaign in 1757.²

By the end of 1756, Mirza Salah who had been appointed Deputy-Governor of Orissa entered into intrigues with the Marathas against the Nawab of Bengal and the Marathas "imprisoned the person sent to pay them their annual chowth" from Bengal.³

The Maratha policy during 1757 was, firstly, to secure i) influence in Delhi through Imad, crushing Najib, the protege of Abdali, ii) to bring the Punjab under effective Maratha control and also iii) to reduce the rich eastern provinces of Bihar and Bengal. For the third, the Peshwa suggested two or three methods to Dattaji Shinde: 1) Putting the Emperor and the Wazir at the head of the expedition and conquer the Eastern provinces,

1. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, Intro.

2. Khare, Life of Nana, p.10. :

3. Kalikinkar Datta, "The Marathas in Bengal after 1751," I.I.H., vol.XV, p.388.

2) Simultaneous march of two Maratha armies upon Bengal in two different directions viz: Shinde from Delhi and Raghunathrao via: Bundelkhand and Allahabad, (3) Formation of an alliance with Shuja-ud-Daula by promising him half of Bengal and Bihar, in case the Wazir refused.¹ The first object of the Maratha policy was not only to humble Najib but also to cripple him permanently so as to make him impotent for evil and to allow Imad to rule peacefully, every year filling the Peshwa's treasury.² The Marathas demanded Allahabad, Benares and Ajodhya from Shuja who promised to comply but did nothing to keep his word for two years. The Peshwa repeatedly wrote to Shinde about Allahabad and suggested to make Shuja Wazir if he would pay fifty lakhs of rupees and cede Benares and Allahabad within six months.³ The Emperor was labouring under a sorry plight and he had to walk from the harem to the mosque on foot for want of any conveyance or horse. The Rohillas looted Jasawantpura and other adjacent villages. Alamgir invited Durani and Ahmad Shah invaded Hindustan for the fifth time. The Mughal Wazir was a quiescent pliable tool in the Maratha hands but the Mir Bakshi Najib-ud-Daula was secret supporter of the invader with whom he was linked up by racial and religious ties and with whose armed assistance, he desired to establish his own influence at the court. Raghunath and Shinde were ...

1. Srivastava, "The Marathas and Najib-ud-Daula, 1757-1760", I.C., vol.XX, pp.49-50; S.P.D., vol.XXI, No.143.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Finally we do find Shuja being saved, for he gave Benares and Faizabad to the Marathas-Rahman Kalikar, "Shuja-ud-Daula as a diplomat, 1754-65", I.H.Q., vol.XIX, pp.38-41; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, pp.231-32.

together with their armies at Ujjain. They carried on depredations in Udepur and started for Delhi.¹

The Peshwa made proposals for an alliance with the English at Calcutta in May 1757, promising that Shamsheer Bahadur and Raghunath would enter Bengal with 120,000 horse; that the trade of the province would be entirely in the English hands and that the English forces would keep the French out by sea, and the Marathas would keep them out by land. The Maratha forces, to a little extent were also successful over the Durani opposition. Thus the Maratha idea of Hindu Padshahi embraced the whole country including the North Western Subah of the Punjab and the Eastern-most province of Bengal.²

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1. Sarkar, "Delhi during the anarchy (1749-88) Delhi Chronicle Translated," I.H.R.C.P., vol. III, p.7., Farhatun Nazirin - Elliot, vol. VIII, pp.163-69., Ibratnama - Elliot, vol. VIII, pp.340-41., Srivatsava, "The Marathas and Najib-ud daula (1757-60)", Is.C., vol. XX, p.49., Rahman, "Shuja-ud daula as diplomat, (1754-65)", I.H.Q., vol. XIX, p.40., Srivatsava, Shuja-ud daula vol. I, p.41., Tarikh-i Ibrahim Khan - Elliot, vol. VIII, pp.264, 266-67; Sardesai, Shinde Shahichhi Rajkarne, SHS., vol. II, No.290; Rajwade, op.cit., vol. II, No.97, p.76., Phalke, op.cit., vol. III, No.89; Heras, "Durani Influence in Northern India," Is.C., vol. XI, p.500.
 2. Franklin in his edition of 1798 (The History of the reign of Shah Alm) has favoured the triumph of the Marathas. "They met the Marathas; were defeated," While in the 1915 edition, the comma has been misplaced, which entirely alters the meaning and the sentence runs, "They met, the Marathas were defeated". - p.16 kalikinkar Datta, "The Marathas in Bengal after 1751," I.I.H., vol. XV, p.388.

Certain demands were made by the Shindes but the Peshwa, not paying heed to them, even confiscated some of the Shinde property. However in March 1757, the fort of Asher was transferred over to the Shindes. The Peshwa supported the intrigues of Shah Nawaz Khan against Salabat Jang and a Maratha force under Mahadji Shinde attacked and defeated Ramchandra Jadhav and besieged him in the town of Sindhkhed. Jadhav was marching to aid Salabat Jang and Nizam Ali pretended to march against Mahadji Shinde. Mahadji, under the Peshwa's instructions, allowed Nizam Ali to relieve Sindhkhed. The Peshwa and Nizam Ali then marched as friends, as a secret understanding was already formed between them. In this campaign against the Nizam, Viswas Rao was given the command and Dattaji and Jankoji who had just returned from their Mazwar entanglements were asked to train Viswas and to conduct the expedition to a successful issue. The Shinde forces were engaged in this campaign from August 1757 to 2 January 1758. The Nizam was brought to terms finally at Sindhkhed and a territory worth 25 lakhs of Rupees revenue was won by the Marathas and Sindhkhed was transferred to Shinde regime. Jankoji had marched to Aurangabad, which had driven the Nizam to contract the treaty. When the Nizam went back to Aurangabad, the Shinde army was at Kasaba Patdur, in April 1758.

Arriving at Lahore, Ahmad Shah gave his son Taymur, the title of Shah and conferred upon him the government of Lahore

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1. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, Nos.221,84 and vol.II, No.8; BHAI, Gulab Letters, 1928-29, Nos.23, 24, Parasnis, Itihas Sangraha - Itihasik Tipane, vol.V., No.25; Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit., vol.III, p.38., Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, Maratha Riyasat vol.II, pp.378,385; Sardesai New History of the Marathas, vol.II, p.333.

and Multan and left Jahan Khan as his minister with him. Ahmad Shah had "cut off the very nose of Hindustan," and the Southern border of his dominion advanced to 50/60 miles north of Delhi. But this situation did not last long. A few months later, Adina Beg appeared with a Maratha army before Lahore.¹

Adina Beg had invited Raghunath from Delhi (March-April 1756) promising him one lakh of rupees for every day and Rs.50,000 for halting. In April, Raghunath sent urgent messages to Jankoji who was then in Rajputana to proceed to the Punjab. Jankoji with Dattaji reached Delhi by the end of December 1756.²

Raghunath arrived in Delhi on 11 August 1757, drove out of Delhi, Najib's forces on 6 September and banished him to his estate in the modern Bijnor and Saharanpur districts. Inad exerted himself against the Crown Prince Ali Ghar and hounded him out into exile. The Marathas after a few months marched on Sarhind and on March 21, 1758 wrested it from the hands of Abdus-Samad Mohammad. Lahore was occupied on 20 April 1758. Taymur fled on the previous day. Adina Beg agreed to pay 75 lakhs of rupees per year but he died on 15 October and confusion and chaos ruled in the whole

1. Heras, "Durani influence in Northern India", Is.C., vol.XI, pp. 501., Ibrat-Nama, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.241., Franklin, Shah Alam, pp.6-7., Tarikh-i Ibrahim Khan, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.265; Farhatu-N Nazirin, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.168.
2. Farhatu-N Nazirin, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.169; Sinha, "Durani Menace and the British N.W.Frontier in 18th century," I.H.Q., vol.X, p.625., Hari Ram Gupta, "Adina Beg Khan, the last Mughal viceroy of the Punjab," Is.C., vol.XIII, pp.335-36., S.P.D., vol.XXVII, No.218., Srivatsava, "The Marathas and Najib-ud daula, (1757-60)," Is.C., vol.XX, p.52., Sarkar, "An original account of Ahmad Shah Durani's campaigns in India and the Battle of Panipat," Is.C., vol.VII(1933), p.436.

province.¹ The Marathas did not carry on the pursuit across the Chenab. They came back to Lahore whence Adina Beg constructed in the Shalimar garden a magnificent platform at the cost of one lakh of rupees. Raghunath was seated on the platform and was given a public reception. The fountains of the garden were made to play with rose water and the whole city was illuminated.² But the Marathas in invading the Punjab had taken a step too far. They committed a grave mistake when without securing their base, without alliances with powerful states like Rohilkhand and Gadh, they ventured to seize the territories of Aḥdali. Already the Maratha domination was becoming irksome to those who had favoured their rise. Even the Rajputs were treated with supreme contempt and the result of these proceedings was sure to be unpleasant.³

Jankoji and Dattaji collected fresh contributions from the wazir, for the Peshwa's treasury and moved on to the Punjab. In April 1759, they arrived at Machiwara on the Sutlej and decided to put the province in charge of a Maratha officer. They appointed Sabaji as Governor and stationed him at Lahore. The Shindes returned to Delhi in May 1759.⁴

Thus Hindustan lay like a carcase and south of India flamed like a volcano. Sadashiv Rao Bhau's scheme was to acquire the universal rule of India for the Marathas. The Maratha army

1. Srivastava, "The Marathas and Najib-ud-daula (1757-60)", Is.C. Vol.XX, p.51.
2. Gupta, "Adina Beg, the Last Mughal Vice-roy of the Punjab", Is.C. (1939), vol.XIII, p.336.
3. Sinha, "Main currents of the 18th century Indian History", I.I.H. vol.IX (1930), pp.45-46.
4. Kincaid, Parasnis, History of the Marathas, Vol.III, p.59.

no longer consisted merely of foraying riders. It included a large force of well-mounted cavalry drawing regular pay from the State and a considerable body of infantry imbued with the French discipline. The Marathas in Hindustan were under the command of Dattaji and Mahadji.¹

The Marathas had chased Najib and forced him to seek safety in the fort in the Bawani Mahal. The new vice-roy of Oudh raised the Rohillas and his own immediate followers in the name of Abdali. The Marathas were driven out of Rohilkhand and the Afgans, crossing the Jumna in Najib's territory to the north of Delhi, arrived once more at Anup Shahr in September, 1759.²

To save Rohilkhand from Dattaji and "to save Islam from the frequent onslaught of the Marathas," Najib and others wrote to Abdali, inviting him to Hindustan. The invitation to Abdali was also sent from Shuja. "Thus while Hinduism was uniting for a grand effort, Islam was rallied into cohesion by the necessity of resistance." Of course, Suraj Mal Jat discerned the speedy down-fall of the Marathas which explains his anti-Maratha activities.³

Abdali reoccupied Lahore and Sabaji escaped to Delhi on 8 November 1759, when Suraj Mal sent troops and Ahmad Khan Bangash arrived in person to help Dattaji. Shinde advised Govind Ballal Kher to cross the Ganges and devastate Rohilkhand. Shuja,

1. Keene, Madhav Rao Scindia, 34, 35, 36.

2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.41.

3. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.II, p.387., Heras, "Durani Influence in Northern India," Is.C., (1937), vol.XI, p.502; Abdul Ali, "Shuja-ud-daula, Nawab vazir of Oudh, (1754-75)," I.H.R.C.P., vol.IX, p.118; Keene, Fall of Mughal Empire, p.46; Tarik-i Ibrahim Khan, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.268 and pp.277-78

however, crossed the Ramaganga on 1 November, hastened to Chandpur and sent advanced guards of 10,000 under Ampgiri and Uraogiri who defeated Govind Ballal Kher. Kher, thereafter joined Dattaji at Sukratal. Shuja sent a message to Dattaji on 4 November that he would reconcile the Marathas with Najib but there ensued forth no response from the Marathas. Najib had offered 20 lakhs of rupees towards indemnity to the Marathas but Dattaji would not raise the siege and retire. In the last week of November, Abdali was the master of the Punjab and Multan.

The wazir had Alamgir treacherously murdered on 29th and Intizam-ud-daula was strangled to death, next day. Dattaji raised the siege on the 8th December and marched towards Delhi where Abdali was expected. Shuja set out on 10th to quench the Rajput revolt in his estates and crossing the Ramganga, he reached Bilgram on 17th and entered into Lucknow on 19 December.¹

The Marathas were anxious to make the Ganges their boundary. This religious weakness of the Peshwa cost much; because both the Rohillas and the Nawabs of Oudh though natural and hereditary foes, could agree on one point, namely, to keep the Marathas to the South of the Ganges which was strategically essential for the defence of their respective possessions. Shuja would not have joined the Abdali if the Marathas were to entertain no such design against this part of his territory. Najib "the snake" was scotched but not killed. Shinde wanted Najib

p. 56;

1. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit., vol. III; Srivatsava, "Marathas and Najib-ud-daula (1757-60)," Is.C., vol. XX, pp. 56, 57., Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, pp. 42, 43., Tarikh-i Ibrahim Khan, Elliot, vol. VIII, 269-270., Rjwade, op.cit., vol. I, Nos. 139, 140, 141, 146.

to support him against Bihar and Bengal and hence met him in a conference at Shamli but the Rohilla suspected treachery and the conference broke down. Dattaji then had marched to Miranpur and demanded certain districts of Saharanpur which Najib refused. The hostilities were opened in June 1759. Najib defended Sukratal well and a long war was commenced, wherein, he made Sukratal "a perfect sunken fort, which only starvation could have ^{made} untenable in the age before the invention of modern shells." Dattaji fell in action on 10 January 1760. Jankoji also received a bullet on arm and retreated to Kot putli in Jaypur where Malhar joined him and declared his intention to march towards Delhi, in a day or two thereafter. The Shinde army was all routed but still could muster eight to ten thousand troops, though all "trembling as cane" and Holkar had 20,000 troops.¹

Sadashiv Bhau with Viswas moved out of Poona on 14 March 1760 and in the April, had crossed the Nerbada. Bhau first met Malhar near Dholpur and Jankoji Shinde, a little later, on his march to Agra, in the last week of June 1760.²

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1. Qamungo, "Some Sidelight on the History of Benares," I.H.R.C.P., vol.XIV, pp.66-67; Srivatsava, op.cit., Is.C., vol.XX, pp.52-53., Sarkar, "Life of Najib - Ahmed Shah Durani's campaigns in India and the Battle of Panipat," Is.C., vol.VII, p.439; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, p.206., Rajwade, op.cit., vol.I., No.165; S.P.D., vol.XXIX, No.56, and vol.XXI, Nos.182, 183; Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, No.220; seir Mutagherin, vol.II, p.166., Farnatu-N Nazirin, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.170., B.H.R.I., Gulshala Letters, 1928.29, No.25; Franklin, Shah Alam, pp.13, 14, 15; Kincaid, Parasnisi, op.cit., vol.III, p.57.
 2. Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patran, No.183; Phalke, op.cit., vol.II, No.10, B.H.R.I., op.cit., No.26., Sardesai, Shinde Shahichi Baikarn, vol.II, Nos.296, 297.

Yaqub khan, a nephew of Shah Wali Khan, the Afgan Wazir, surrendered the fort of Delhi to Bhau. Abdali sent proposals of peace to the Marathas through Shuja. The Jats, too, were anxious to act as mediators. Shuja was actually recognised as Wazir by the Marathas and the Royal mother gave her jewels worth five lakhs of rupees as a pledge to Viswas, for declaring Shah Alam as Emperor. Abdali was highly incensed against this, but the Marathas had already captured Kunjpura. The negotiations were opened by Hafiz Rahmat and under the instructions of Abdali, Ahmad Khan Bangash sent Sher Andaz Khan to reconcile Bhau. Bhau also solicited peace, insisting nevertheless on the sphere of Maratha influence, as far as Sarhind. Viswas offered peace to Abdali on the same conditions which were formerly forwarded to Nadir Shah. Abdali rejected these conditions with disdain and gave his own terms. He was, however, fully conscious of the Maratha power and almost to the last, tried his utmost to come to an understanding with them.¹

The Marathas attacked Abdul Samad Khan, Monim Khan of Abdali and Kutab Shah of Najib, after reaching Kunjpura. Monim was killed by shot and the other two were captured and put to death.² On 28th November Jankoji made a brilliant attack on the

1. Heras, "Duraji Influence in Northern India," Is.C., vol. XI, p.502., Franklin, op.cit. p.19., 20-21., Seir Mutaqherin, vol. II p.407., Phalke, op.cit., vol. III, No.234, 391., Rajwade, op.cit. vol. I, No.265, p.371., Oturkar, Maharashtra Patrarupi Itihas, No.135., Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, p.38., Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C. vol. VII, p.449., Irvine William, "Ahmad Shah Abdali, and the Indian Wazir, Imad-ul-Mulk (1756-57), Ind.Ant., vol. XXXVI, (1907), p.12., S.P.D., vol. II, Intro. p.3, also No.16.

2. B.H.R.I., Gulguile Letters. (1928-29), N.28.

Abdali camp, drove out the out-post, inflicted severe loss on Najib's Rohillas and captured several guns.¹ However, the Marathas, in November, were not sure of the success, in the impending battle at Panipat.²

The experienced Jat, however, soon perceived that the unwieldy assemblage under Bhau, clogged with the cumbersome artillery and suiting their movements to those of an attendant body of infantry, were ill-adapted to the purpose of war. Gangadhar Chandrachud and his master, Malhar Holkar agreed with his opinion, but Bhau had an aversion to Holkar, the enemy of Ramchandra Shemvee.³ Bhau began to exercise his authority, caring little for the views of others. In all public business, he showed a capricious and self-conceited conduct, totally excluding from his council, Malhar and all other chiefs who were experienced in the affairs of Hindustan.⁴ Bhau had seen the effect of discipline and guns in the Southern wars and not without a shrewd foresight of what was afterwards to be accomplished by a man then in his train, resolved to try the effect of scientific soldiership, as he understood it.⁵

The Mohammedan force consisted of forty-one thousand eight-hundred horse, thirty-eight thousand foot and about seventy pieces of cannon. These were choice troops and the irregulars were very numerous and probably amounted to as many more as the mustered ones. The Marathas had been reckoned at forty-five thousand horse

1. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit., vol.III, p.66.

2. B.H.R.I., Gulgate Letters, (1928-29), No.27; Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, N.262; vol.III, No.392, Note 197.

3. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.519., S.P.D., vol.II, Intro.p.4 and No.126.

4. Ibid; Parasnis, Itihasik Charitre, Suraj Mal Jat; S.P.D., vol.21, Int.p.1.

5. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.47; Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, p.37., B.H.R.I., (1925-26), p.97; "Panipat Re-examined", Banerji, "Balaji Baji Rao - Retrospect, " I.H.Q., vol.IV, (1928), p.442.

and fifteen thousand foot with two hundred pieces of cannon, besides their Pendharris and followers, of whom there were supposed to have been upwards of two hundred thousand souls.¹ The Shindes had ten thousand soldiers in the field.² Abdali was at Sahaleh, four cose east of Panipat and the Marathas at Seghr, a cose towards Panipat. In December, Abdali was reinforced by 15000 men and the Marathas, too, were supplied with a treasure of 47 lakhs of rupees, conducted by an escort of 8000 men from the Deccan.³ On perceiving the advance, the Shah formed a similar line. The part of it consisted of Najib and the Rohillas on the left who faced Shinde and Holkar. The sagacious Najib had recourse to the expedient of creating earth-works and he "was heard to say that ; he, for one, could not afford to make any blunders."⁴ Till noon, he continued to keep off the attacks of Shinde's horse by discharging rockets from his entrenchment. It is here that we are to picture Mahadji, fighting by the side of his nephew, amidst the roar of great guns, the whistling of the musket balls and the low-roar of the rocket-batteries, while the cries of the followers of Siva and Vishnu crossed in the air with those of Din ! Din ! (for the faith) from the other side.⁵ Bhanu and Viswas, in the early part of the engagement, made such incessant assaults that Abdali was under the apprehension that he would not be able to withstand them and despatched a person to

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1. Duff, op.cit; vol.II, p.521., Parasnis, Itihasik Tipana, vol.I, No.14; Misar-Nama-I Hind, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.398-400.
 2. Duff, op.cit, vol.II, pp.518, 139, 144., Parasnis, Jurva Itihasik Goshti, vol.III, pp.1-3., Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, pp.330.31., Tarikh-I Manazily-1 Futu'H, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.147.
 3. Franklin, Shah Alam, p.32.
 4. Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, p.41.
 5. Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, pp.42-43.

mount the ladies of his household on fleet steeds, swift as the wind and keep them ready, inside his private pavilion.¹ At length, by Ahmad's good fortune, one Zamburak ball struck Viswas on the forehead and another hit Bhau on the side.² Jankoji, himself severely wounded and enveloped in front, right and rear, was driven with the broken remnant of his division towards his left which was the only path, then lying open to him and reached the rear of Bhau's division (The centre). There he fell into the hands of Barkhurdar Khan, who after the annihilation of the Gardi troops and the consequent disappearance of the entire Maratha left wing, had turned round the Maratha Centre and got himself behind Bhau.³

This battle of Panipat was fought on Wednesday, 14 January 1761.⁴ The Marathas were completely defeated and Abdali struck coins in Shah Jahanabad to commemorate his victory.⁵ Malhar

1. Tarikh-I Manazilu-L Futuh, Elliot, VIII, p.153.
2. Elliot, op.cit., vol.VIII, p.156., S.P.D., vol.II, N.148., Rajwade, op.cit., vol.VI, Nos.407,408; Sarkar, "Panipat, 1761 (Kashiraja's account).", I.H.Q., vol.X, (1934), p.272.
3. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, p.367., Keane, Fall of the Mughal Empire, pp.56, 58., Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.328., Sarkar, "op.cit.," I.H.Q., vol.X, (1934), pp.259, 263., Sarkar, "Kashiraja's account-upto 1761", I.H.Q., vol.XI (1935), p.549.
4. C.P.C., vol.I, Nos.968, 1012, 1444, 1532 (Abdali's Capture of Delhi); Sinha, "Durand Influence and the British North-west Frontier in 18 century, vol.X, p.627. I.H.Q. (1934). Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit., vol.III, p.60; Sardesai, op.cit., vol.II, p.501., Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patren, N.489., S.P.D., vol.II, p.1., Phalke, op.cit., vol.II, N.12., Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, XIV, N.2., Purandare Dantar, vol.I, N.402, 417, 395., Rajwade, op.cit., vol.I, p.382, Note No.324., Tarikh-I Manazilu-L Futuh, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.153 (The date given in F.N.is 12-1-1761); Sarkar, op.cit., I.H.Q., vol.XI, (1935), p.555 et seq; Heras, "op.cit.," Is.C. (1937) vol.XI, p.503.
5. Heras, "op.cit.," Is.C. (1937). vol.XI, p.503.

escaped in safety, by special kindness of Najib, and the Shinde contingent followed his suit, leaving their chieftain to his fate.¹ Shuja endeavoured to extend the protection to the head of the house of Shindes but Jankoji was slain, the next day on account of Najib's cruelty.² Amid the rout, Mahadji urged on his light Deccan mare, stimulated by the lopping paces and roaring breath of a boxy north-country horse behind him on which was mounted a gigantic Afgan trooper eager to plunder. Long was the chase or seemed so to the anxious mind of the young Maratha chief; at length his mare fell at a ditch that he attempted to clear and all hope of escape was lost. The pursuer came up, and leaping from his horse, spat in Mahadji's face and dealt him a blow on the knee which crippled him; then stripping off his costly apparel and ornaments the Afgan rode off in the fallen man's high-bred charger without doing any further harm.³ Mahadji was, however, saved from death by the opportune arrival of a Musalman water-carrier, driving a bullock on whose back was the Pakhal or ox-skin, used for transporting the water. This man whose name was Harekhan lifted the wounded chief to the back of the bullock and conveyed him to a place^{of} safety for which piece of humanity, he ultimately received a munificent reward. The young Shinde who never forgot either a benefit or a wrong always called the Musalman water-carrier,

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1. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, p. 345., S.P.D., vol. 27, N. 271., Sarkar, Najib-ud-daula, as the dictator of Delhi (1761-1770), I.A.C., (1933 July), p. 454; Phalke, op.cit., vol. I, p. 222.
 2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, pp. 60-61., Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan, Elliot, vol. VIII., p. 282-283., Sinha, op.cit., I.R.Q., vol. I (1934), p. 267.
 3. Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, p. 43., Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, p. 351., Hope, House of Scindia, pp. 15-16., Abdul Ali, "Mahadji Scindia of Gwalior", I.H.R.C.P., (1929), vol. XII, p. 110; Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p. 60.

his "brother" and on the latter entering the military career, watched his career to such purpose that Ranekhan rose to be a general officer and commanded armies in several subsequent actions of importance.¹

Among the fugitives was Janardan Balaji, afterwards to be famous as Nana Phadnis.²

Though Panipat was a repetition of Nadir's tactics, "it was the first occasion of an Asiatic power using resources of the scientific warfare against the medieval methods. The latter, it is true, prevailed, in spite of the employment of artillery and regular infantry. The Abdali won the victory of reiterated charges of mailed men-at-arms. Yet, for all that, the behaviour of the Gardis, imperfectly trained and without European officers as they were, was sufficiently remarkable to have afforded instruction to such a mind as the youthful Scindia (Mahadji Shinde). On his own future fortunes, the campaign was destined to exercise a still more direct influence. By the temporary depression, it deterred the Marathas from an attack upon Bengal, in which they would probably have been joined by Shuja and Shah Alam in extirpating the still slender and struggling power of

1. Mahadji himself had explained thus to Muhammad Beg Khan Hamadani Irani, in later times - Tarikh-I Manazilu-I Fatah, Elliot, vol.VIII, pp.153-157; Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, p.51.; Malcolm, op.cit., vol.I, p.97. (The escape of Mahadji, however, is attributed to Trimbakji Ingle, one of his Shiledars, who is said to have carried him off behind him on his horse - Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.185. Another version is forwarded wherein it is explained that he was desperately wounded and was, even, unable to follow the survivors of the Maratha army; was secretly taken care of in the camp of Abdali and when recovered, was privately removed and conveyed to the Deccan-Franklin, Shah Alam, p.117.)

2. Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, p.43.

the British Company".¹ "Had they been successful in Bengal, there would have nothing to arrest the Marathas in Northern India; whatever wars might have awaited them in the South, there would have been no opening for the peculiar ambition of Mahadji Shinde; he might have distinguished himself against Hyder or the Nizam; but he would have never had the opportunity of coming to an understanding with Warren Hastings or of making himself the master of the Mughal Empire in Hindustan."² "Although historians are not agreed as to the ultimate effects of the battle of Panipat on the destiny of the Marathas, there is no doubt that its immediate result was the eclipse of the Maratha power in the North".³ It appeared as if the French and the Marathas had been eliminated from the equation of political powers of India; and as if the prize of India was ultimately to be fought out between the Afgans and the English; the victors of the North and the victors of the South. They had planted their powers on the two extremities of India, Bengal and the Punjab. They had firmly secured the two gate ways of India, the one on land and the other on sea. But the Afgans were divided among themselves and the rise of the Sikhs effectively checked their further progress. The Marathas on the other hand retained so much vitality that they could not yet be overthrown after their discomfiture at Panipat".⁴ Again, "in tact, in combination of first-rate military

1. Keene, Madhav Rao Scindia, p.45.

2. Keen, op.cit., p.45 et seq.

3. Banerji, "Revival of the Maratha Power in the North, 1761-69," I.H.Q., vol.XVII, (1941), p.311.

4. Sinha, "Main Currents of 18th Century Indian History," I.L.H., vol.IX, (1930), p.46.

and administrative capacity, diplomatic skill and tact in dealing with others and above all in his instinctive perception of the realities of the politics of his day and concentration on the essentials, Najib-ud-daula, had no equal, in that age, except Ahmad Shah Abdali."¹ "But Mahadji was " to cut a great figure in Indian history, to establish one of the most powerful and lasting Hindu monarchies in India and to play a paramount role in the drama of Anglo-Scindia (Anglo-Shinde) relations in India."²

1. Sarkar, "Najib-ud-daula as the Dictator of Delhi, (1761-70)", Is.C., vol.VII, (October 1933), p.613.

2. Abdul Ali, "Mahadji Scindia of Gwalior, " I.H.R.C.P., vol.XII, (1929), p.110.

CHAPTER- II.

FROM PANIPAT TO TUTELAGE.

(14th January 1761 to 31st December 1767)

"After the victory of Panipat, Ahmad Shah Durani became the de jure Shahan Shah not only of Afganistan but of Hindustan as well and it was only with his express permission that the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II could issue his own coinage or even have the Khutba read in his name¹. This Durani hegemony continued in Northern India, till his death. All eyes instinctively turned towards Afganistan, the moment a new danger appeared on the political horizon of India.² The Durani influence, however, suffered a set-back with the succession of Taymur Shah, to the Afgan throne. Taymur Shah was not a conqueror and preferred the easy-going life of the court to the strenuous hardships of a military campaign. Ahmad Shah left the Government of Delhi to Najib-ud-daula who continued the negotiations with Suraj Mal and collected the enormous revenue which went to the support of the royal family.³

The Battle of Panipat cost the lives of seventy thousand Marathas who died on the spot, eight or ten thousand more were dispersed by the victorious army and only a few could escape.⁴ The House of the Shindes was severely hit by the disaster and it collapsed utterly after the shock.⁵ The Maratha policy, in general, was, however, shaped by two under-currents: (1) The Marathas were hard put to revive their lost power and prestige. (2) But, they were

1. Heras, "Durani Influence in Northern India, Is. G., (1938), Vol XII, p.137-138.

2. Ibid.

3. Sarkar, "Najib-ud-daula as the Dictator of Delhi", Is. G., (Oct-1933) Vol VII, pp.614-615.

4. Seir Mutaquerin, vol II, p.404.

5. Khare, Itahatik Lekh Sangraha, vol III, No.593.

also constantly quarrelling among themselves. The latter tendency had become chronic in the Maratha policy and after the Panipat disaster, assumed a more acute form. There was no love lost between Shinde, Gaekwad, Holkar and Bhosle and all of them, already jealous of the Peshwa, now tried to defy his authority. The power of the Peshwa was the only substitute for the central authority in the Maratha confederacy, where the descendants of Shivaji had ceased to rule, though not to exist after 1752. These centrifugal forces had set in after the Panipat disaster and that more than any other factor, weakened the Maratha Policy and accelerated its fall.¹

Law declared his opinion to Ghulam Husain Khan, "As far as I can see, there is nothing that you could call government between Patna and Delhi. If men in the position of Shuja would loyally join me, I could not only beat off the English, but would undertake the administration of the Empire".² The French, under Law, had even helped the Emperor against the Nabob.³ But Shah Alam had, by this time, heard of the battle of Panipat and the ensuing plans formed by Abdali for the restoration of the Empire and there is reason to believe that but for the jealousy of Mir Kasim, when a recent revolution wrought by the English, had installed in the place of Mir Jafar, the Emperor would have been at once reinstated at Delhi under the British protection. The Emperor was to have an annual tribute of £ 2,40,000/-.⁴

1. Sinha, "Main Currents of the 18th Century Indian History", I.L.H. (1930), vol IX, p.47.

2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.68.

3. Ibid, p.67

4. Ibid, p.68.

Shah Alam, who was at times, only 'denominated' 'Shahazada', probably on account of his not having been yet enthroned in Delhi, sought aid of the English in February 1761 to recover his throne and hence dispatched his Bakshi with the proposals to the English authorities. The Chief of Patna even referred in his letter of 7 February, that the Princes had joined the English army. The "Shahazada" had applied to Col. Clive for an asylum in Calcutta while the Colonel was, at the same time, in receipt of a letter from the minister at Delhi - the unscrupulous, Ghazi-ud-din - calling on him to arrest the "Prince", as a rebel and forward him to Court in custody. Clive wrote to Lord Chatham, recommending the issue of orders, sanctioning his demanding the viceroyship of the Eastern Subhas, on behalf of the King of England. Although nothing came of those proceedings, they are here noted as the presage of the future events.² Although, Shah Alam followed the career of an adventurer, from 29 November 1759, to his final invasion of Bundelkhand in January, 1762,³ Clive, in his reply to the orders of Abdali, respectfully pointed out that the English, firstly, obeyed Shah Alam. Vansittart, succeeded Clive and wrote to Abdali, on 1 March 1761: "Shah Alam is brought to the fortress of Patna and he (Vansittart) is ready to accompany him to Delhi".⁴ On 13, March, Mir Kasim informed Vansittart of "Shah Abdali's taking possession of the Sultanat".⁵

1. S.P.D.P., Vol VII, No. 10, (sel. Com. Bengal to Mad. 10-2-1761).

2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p. 62.

3. Banerji, "Revival of the Maratha power in the North (1761-69) I.H.Q., (1941), vol XVII, p. 313; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol II pp. 509, 525, 537, 544, 509; S.P.D. vol XXIX, Nos. 22, 37, 45, 46, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38; Seir Mutakhirin, vol IV, p. 26.

4. Heras, "Durani Influence in Northern India, I.S.C. (1937), Vol XI, p. 504; C.P.C. Vol I, p. 70, No. 982.

5. Heras, op. cit., p. 505; C.P.C. p. 75, No. 1013, p. 77, No. 1026; p. 69 No. 963; p. 69, No. 979; p. 71, No. 991.

The Marathas soon recovered from the shock of the Panipat and they certainly out-witted the English, later-on, by carrying the Mughal Emperor from Allahabad.¹ But as its immediate reaction the battle of Panipat was followed by "a revolt against the Deccani domination everywhere in Hindustan - in the Gangetic Doab, Bundelkhand, Rajputana and Malwas States alike. Everywhere, the dispossessed or humbled original chieftains and even petty landlords raised their heads and talked of shutting the Southern invaders out of their country in future".² For three or four months after, following the disaster, the situation was most critical for the Marathas, north of the Vindhya; everywhere they were pushed to the wall, without a single friend or dependant, and along with others,³ the reason for this may be pointed out as the delay and vacillation which took place in appointing a successor to Jankoji, as the head of the Shindes.⁴ Bapuji Naik was to be sent to Ajmer to investigate the whereabouts of Sadashiv Bhau on 7th March⁵, and similar inquiries were carried on, in February, regarding Jankoji.⁶ Other issues were also brought forward which complicated the matters, when the pretenders of Bhau and Jankoji, insisted on political importance matters being attached to them.⁷ The insolvent Poona Government had to have recourse to the confiscation of the property of the

1. Banerji, op.cit, I.H.Q., 1941, vol. XVII, p.311

2. Ibid; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, pp.502-503.

3. Sarkar, op.cit, p.505; Rajwade, op.cit, vol.VI, p.635, No.565.

4. Sardesai, Kavyetihās Patra, No.137.

5. Sardesai, Kavyetihās Patra, No.137.

6. BH.R.I. Gulgule letters, No.29-30.

7. Parasnis, Itihasik Tippani, XIV, No.2; Purandare Daptar, Vol.I, Nos. 417, 399, 401-406, 410; Phalke, op.cit; Vol.II, Nos.12, 13.

fallen Sardars,⁴¹ and Holkar's Diwan complained of the confiscation carried out by the Peshwa's agents.² It was a crisis in the history of the Shindes, too. It was feared that the then Peshwa would, under the plea of il-legitimacy, deprive Mahadji of his father's possessions; which, in its turn would have caused the name of the Shinde family to be buried in oblivion.³ Shinde and Holkar had planted this power firmly in Malwa and Rajputana⁴ and this policy of the Peshwa was naturally to lead to far-reaching effects on Indian political history as Mahadji was, at once, crippled when he was not immediately recognised as the heir.⁵ Naturally enough, the question of the succession to Janoji, the intrigues and the rebellion of Raghunath, the revolt of Janoji Bhosle, the invasions of the Nizam and the long struggles with Hyder, kept the Marathas away from the North.⁶

Najib, Suraj and the rest profited from the Maratha discomfiture at Panipat. Abdali, however, was inclined to be friendly. But his attempts to conclude peace with the Peshwa failed due to the intrigues of Tatyā Gangadhar, Holkar's Diwan.⁷ As a result of the Shia-Sunni riots between the troops of Shuja and Abdali, Shuja returned to his province on 7 March 1761.⁸

1. Banerji, *op.cit.*; I.H.Q. (1941), vol. XVII, p.312; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol.II, p.503.

2. Kincaid, *Parasnis*, *op.cit.*, vol.III, p.73.

3. Abdul Ali, *op.cit.*, I.H.R.C.P.; (1929); vol.XII, p.110.

4. S.P.B., vol.II, p.2.

5. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, vol.II, p.502.

6. Banerji, *op.cit.*; I.H.Q. (1941), vol. XVII, p.312.

7. *Ibid.*, p.311; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol.II, pp.373-31; 444-445.

8. Sinha, "Durani Menace and the British N.W. Frontier Policy in the 18th Century," I.H.Q. (1934), vol.X, pp.627-28; Sarkar, *op.cit.*, vol.II, p.376.

On 26, Vansiliart wrote to Abdali, "If it should be the Shah's pleasure, he (Shah Alam) will be escorted by some (British) troops to Delhi".¹ The Peshwa planned for the defence in April and ordered Malhar to march to Udepur for subsidy and the succession fees but Malhar was detained in the Hada country till the rains by his entanglements at Gagrani and thereafter, in November, by his war with Jaypur.² Again, Holkar's troubles with the Shindes were not over, even in May, but many Sardars under the Shindes, were in Holkar's camp with their force amounting to four thousand horse.³ Bhaskar Ballal, in the employ of the Shindes wrote to the Peshwa, suggesting that a large amount, accumulated for years by the Shindes could be acquired by the State, if the Sardars were properly checked.⁴ While there were attempts to consolidate power in Delhi under Shah Alam, to whom Mir Kasim supplied money and whose coins were struck by the end of May, the Maratha officers under Holkar, captured Rampura and advanced further in Malwa.⁵ Nimabai and Chimabai survived the onslaught of Panipat but the Patilki rights belonging to the former were confiscated by the Poona Government.⁶ Raghunath in June, declared his aversion to the Shindes and desired to confiscate their Mutaliqui rights. However, the Shindes had carved out a name for them. Banawati, the daughter of Rana of Udepur and the Rani

1. Heras, op.cit., Is.C., (1937), vol.XI, pp.505-506.

2. Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.43 (14-4-1761); Sarkar, op.cit. vol.II, p.515.

3. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.400, F.N.No.201; S.P.D., vol.27, No.271.

4. Ibid.

5. Heras, op.cit., Is.C. (1937), vol.XI, p.506; Banerji, "Revival of the Maratha Power in the North", (1761-1769), I.H.Q. (1941), vol.XVII, p.312.

6. Phalke, op.cit. vol.I, No.223.

of Maharao Durjansalji of Kotah declared herself "Rakshabandhak" sister of Shinde. Mahadji respected her till the end.¹

The claims of Naro Shankar and Mahadji were under consideration in July, in Poona and it was suggested that Ramchandra Ganesh should be appointed as the Diwan of Mahadji.² Nimbabai however objected to Mahadji's claim and herself took the responsibility of raising a large force on the return of Sabaji from the North.³ The piece of information that Jankoji was perhaps still alive must have its own effect on her mind. Shinde, Holkar and Najib planned a joint enterprize in the North and Ghazi-uddin tried to win for himself, the office of the vazir.⁴ In July, Gangadhar Yeshwant and Chinto Krishna intrigued for the re-establishment of Ali Gohar in Delhi and Ali Gohar declared that Madhavrao Peshwa was like Teymur to him and that Raghunath was his brother.⁵

Malhar was defeated by Madhosing in August and the victor was entertained by the Emperor and Holkar and Shinde army had to fight another battle on 5 September near Kotah.⁶ In October, the English were preparing for an expedition against Cuttack to stop the Maratha incursion there, which they expected and Ali Gohar, accompanied by Shuja, advanced towards Lucknow, on his way to Delhi.⁷ Thus, in November, Malhar's attention was diverted from Jaypur,⁸ and

1. Ibid, vol. I, Ns. 223, 179 and Note, 194.

2. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, IV, pp. 2, 237.

3. S.P.D. vol. 29, N. 11.

4. Ibid, No. 28

5. Hingane Daptar, vol. II, Ns. 44, 45.

6. Syed Hasan Ansari, "Unpublished correspondence relating to Madhosing of Jaipur and some of his contemporaries", I.H.R.C.P. (1948), vol. XXIV, pp. 76-77; Phalke, op.cit. vol. II, N. 65.

7. S.P.D. vol. 7, No. 116 (19-10-1761).

8. Banerji, op.cit., I.H.R., (1941), vol. XVII, p. 313; Sarkar, op.cit. vol. II, pp. 508-509.

and he set from Indore to the Mukundara Pass with 600 men - probably his own contingent and partly some Shinde force which was led by Khanaji Jadhav and Chinto Krishna.¹ While this Shinde family contingent boasted of their glory at the Battle of Mangrol as to have wiped out the disgrace of their flight from Panipat, Nizam Ali dug up Shinde's palaces at Shrigonda for obtaining hidden treasures there.² The suggestions were again forwarded to Poona, in November, to confer Mahadji's title and to appoint Ramachandra Ganesh, who was in the service of Raghunath, as his Diwan.³

The low state of affairs in the Poona Government and the backwardness of the officers who looked upon the situation of the Peshwa's family as desperate, encouraged Tarabai and the Marathas for activities, for the proper control of which the Peshwa had not any power, in the beginning to apply to for aid and he looked to the English Company for that purpose, as his natural ally.⁴ The overtures were sent to the English for getting the aid of 2000 Europeans, 20 pieces of cannon and war-like stores in proportion against the Nizam who had approached within twelve or fifteen Cos. of Poona. The English even thought it a most fitting opportunity for acquiring Salsette by sending the Peshwa the assistance he desired though it was observed in the consultation that the English did not mean to interfere further than to make up matters between

1. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.II, p.506.

2. Sarkar, op.cit., p.508.

3. Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, N.224; Rajwade, op.cit., vol.I, pp.396-397, No.292.

4. Secret and Political Department Diaries; vol.vii, p.120.

the Peshwa family and Nizam Ali by their good offices, unless the latter should obstinately persist in refusing the English mediation and at the same time, to establish the power of the family properly with the Marathas themselves, but at no rate to engage against the Mughals in general¹. But the negotiations forwarded on behalf of the Marathas by Ramaji Pant were withdrawn, on account of the death of Tarabai and the retreat of the Nizam.²

Throughout January of 1762, the Marathas carried on their activities in the North with one devoted aim - to make amends for the preceeding failure.³ But Malhar was wounded in the Battle of Mangrol and the Poona Government as yet showed no desire to profit by the abilities of Mahadji Shinde. It was going to take a long time before the young Peshwa's advisers could recognize the fact that Mahadji was the coming man and that their delay in filling up the vacancy caused by the death of Jankoji was really ruinous to the Maratha cause in the North.⁴

In the meanwhile, Abdali set out on his seventh invasion, by the beginning of 1762 and came against the Sikhs⁵ in the Punjab and ordered some of the Rajas there to join him immediately. On 19th February, he had defeated the Sikhs and he came up to Lahore.⁵ Hingane suggested that he would go there and instigate ill-feelings between Abdali and Ali Gohar and Shuja; as

1. Ibid, p.120, (consultation of 13-12-1761); pp.117-119.

2. Ibid, vol.8, p.5.

3. Banerji, op.cit, I.H.Q. (1941), vol.XVII, p.314;

4. Ibid, Sarkar, op.cit, vol.II, p.510.

5. Heras, op.cit, Is.C., (1937), vol.XI, p.506.

Shah Walikhan had written, for help, to him (Hingane) and others.¹ On 13, February, Ali Gohar and Shuja were on the plains of Kalpi and Suraj triumphed in the Agra Fort.² Raghunath asked Hingane not to proceed, as Ali Gohar and Shuja did nothing more and that instead Hingane should go to Gwalior where Kedarji, Mahadji, Naro Shankar and Vithal Sirdar had been despatched, with their armies. Malhar was to join them there and Hingane would get his instructions from Shinde.³ Malhar himself who was at Jejuri in March, looked to Mahadji and others to manage Ajmer, in his absence.⁴

Mahadji had remained for four months near Hadoti and returned on 10 April to Ujjain from Saweri and it was absolutely clear that the balance of power in Hindustan was re-established and that the Marathas would meet Abdali, without fail, if he intended to march further.⁵ However, Hingane visited Abdali's court. Naro Shankar was ordered by the Peshwa to march into Hindustan and he reached Malegaon with 20,000 troopers. Mahadji saw Naro Shankar, here, urging on him to give him also a share of the official recognition in this campaign and even touched his feet to persuade him but Naro Shankar refused to accommodate him. Mahadji wrote to the Peshwa, complaining against him and the Peshwa, was displeased with Naro Shankar. Naro Shankar sent Achyut Ganesh to Poona and himself refused to march which fanned the Peshwa's anger more. Hingane had, again, his difficulties as he did not know whether to stay with Naro Shankar or Mahadji. Mahadji's army underwent precarious

1. Hingane Daptar, Vol. II, Nos. 46-47.

2. Ibid.

3. Hingane Daptar, vol. II, 47.

4. Phalke, op. cit., vol. II, No. 67.

5. Phalke, op. cit., Vol. II, No. 74; vol. I, Nos. 227-28; vol. II, No. 71; Chandrachud Daptar, vol I; Nos. 65, 69; Hingane Daptar, Vol. II, 48.

conditions and was even starving. The Peshwa had already defeated the Nizam and now thought that the chief of the Shinde's should be a capable Maratha leader and hence selected Mahadji for its head. It was suggested again that Naro Shankar would be Mahadji's - karbhari. But when the Peshwa called upon Naro Shankar, he protested against this new appointment, forwarding his claim for the payment of the debt of forty lakhs of rupees which he had incurred. Jankoji's mother, too, was opposing Mahadji's claims but the Peshwa insisted on his own plans. Naro Shankar, even after having marched a few marches, sent back Achyut Ganesh and finally settled Mahadji as chief. Naro Shankar saw Malhar, too, when the latter was proceeding to Jejuri and returned to Malegaon. Thereupon, he offered the robes of chieftainship to Mahadji and despatched all army to his command, staying himself behind at Malegaon.¹

Mahadji marched to Burhanpur, captured it and went to Ujjain.² Kedarji, too, hoped to reach Ujjain with eight to ten thousand army on 14 April;³ and the Shindes opened up the guerilla tactics against Madhosing on 18th.⁴ Bapuji Mahadeo and Purshottam Hingane reported in April that they had established good relations with Shah Walikhan at Lahore. The presents were soon to be dispatched by Abdali to Raghunath and the Peshwa.⁵ But Abdali had also written a Taliquah to the Governor-General on 23 May⁶ and the Bombay Government reported to Fort William on 7 June that the plan of

1. Hingane Dantar, vol. II, 49.

2. Ibid.

3. Phalke, op.cit. vol. I, No. 273.

4. Ibid. No. 274,

5. Hingane Dantar, vol II, 50.

6. Heras, op.cit., Is. G. (1937), vol. XI, p. 506.

attacking the Marathas in Orissa was not to be carried out as the Orissa Marathas were independent of the Poona Government.¹ The Shindes insisted in September that Gulgule of Kotah should be loyal to them and allotted a jagir of rupees 1400 a year, to his family. Malhar, setting himself for Jejari, instructed Khanaji Jadhav to oppose Madhosing and the Raja of Kotah, and Lallaji Ballal of Patan was ordered to organise the military property and the Shindes gave him assignment of Rs.34,340 per year, for that purpose.²

An elephant named Bhadra-gajawas presented to Abdali³ and his Vakils had come to Jaypur on 23 September 1762.⁴ Mahadji informed the Peshwa on 28th of the arrival of these envoys⁵ and the orders were issued to Ganesh Vithal to feed the camels, horses and bullocks of Gulraj and Anandram (Abdali's envoys)⁶. In the agreement by the latter, that Abdali would assist in establishing the authority of the Peshwa over certain paraganas which were under the sway of the late Balaji Peshwa and Sadashiv Bhanu, Kedarji and Mahadji were directed to grant a Jagir of Rs.40,000/- to the envoys in the Anterved (Doab)⁷.

1. S.P.D.D., Vol.8, p.26.

2. Phalke, op.cit, vol.I, Nos.229,230,231,232.

3. Sat Raj. Dia, Vol.IX,7.

4. Hingane Daptar, Vol.II, 51.

5. S.P.D., vol.29,42.

6. Sat. Raj. Diar. vol.IX,6.

7. Ibid, vol.IX, 1.

Mahadji, however, suffered much in the dispute that followed between Raghoba and Madhavrao. The disputes that arose between Shinde and Holkar, over the revenue matters, were referred to Raghoba, by the end of 1762 and we find that Miraj was given in military Saranjam to Mahadji Shinde (?) along with others and the Shiledars were ordered by the Peshwa to serve with the troops under him.¹ In November, Madhavrao was defeated by Raghoba and the latter invested Miraj when on 29 December, Mahadji Shinde and Damaji Gaikwad joined him.²

Mahadji paid Rs. 25,000/- to Antoji Mahadev and perhaps this sum was handed over to Rairikar to settle finally the chieftainship in his favour.³ Again, the Majmu-ship (head of the accounts department) was conferred by Mahadji on Ramchandra Hari, a man favoured by Rairikar, who expected to be paid Rs. 500/- a year, for his services.⁴ Again, when by 6 February 1763, the presents from Abdali arrived, Kedarji and Mahadji who were at Chikodi, on the bank of the Krishna, presented to Raghoba, on 13th, one lakh of rupees perhaps to induce him to settle the chieftainship finally in Mahadji's favour.⁵ Madhavrao Peshwa had settled his disputes with Raghoba, but both of them recommended conflicting arrangements for the family succession.⁶ Raghoba proposed to send Mahadji Shinde and Holkar jointly to the front and to

1. Sat Raj. Diar. Vol. IX, 203; Phalke, op. cit., vol. I, No. 276.

2. Chandrachud Dantar, vol. I, 141; Sardesai, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 463, 494; Rajwade, op. cit., vol. X, p. 4, No. 8.

3. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. 13, p. 1, No. 1.

4. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. 13, pp. 1-2; No. 2, 3.

5. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, I, 56; Rajwade, op. cit., vol. 13, p. 2, No. 4.

6. Sardesai, op. cit., vol. II, p. 495.

appoint Kedarji, as the head for the Shinde estates.¹ Mahadji had made arrangements with Sarvottam Pant to pay Rs.5,000/- to Naranji, Sar Patil of Salsette, and we find a simultaneous agreement between the Poona Government and Mahadji Shinde being reached and the chieftainship was to be conferred upon him.² Holkar, Kedarji and Mahadji jointly took upon themselves to pay Govind Shamrao for the settlement of Gwalior.³ It was finally arranged, it seems, that the Saranjam enjoyed by Jayaji, Dattaji and Jankoji Shinde was to be continued to Kedarji and Mahadji. Achyut Ganesh, in the employ of Naro Shankar Raje Bahadur, was appointed their Diwan, in place of Ramchandra Malhar.⁴ The Nazar or tribute from Kedarji was fixed at Rs. eight lakhs.⁵

Mahadji was involved in the affairs of Gopal Sambhaji of Pant Piploda⁶ and in March, he manouvred Narsing gad affairs.⁷ On 23 March, Raghoji Thorat Chandollikar, the pretender of Jankoji was joined by Kasiba Veer, but Mahadji befriended Kasiba and exposed Raghoji⁸ in November 1763.⁹

In May, Mahadji and Kedarji were ordered by Madhavrao to march into Berar against Bhosle and Mahadji set out from Ujjain, after 10 May and by 16th had confiscated, under the instructions of the Peshwa, the property of Trimbakrao Nana.¹⁰ The Nizam's forces

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1. S.P.D., vol. 29, 130.
 2. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. X, p. 9, No. 18; Parasnis, Peshwa Records, IV, 46.
 3. Sat. Raj. Diar, Vol. IX, No. 161.
 4. Ibid, vol. IX, No. 160.
 5. Ibid, vol. IX, No. 159.
 6. Khandekar, "House of Scindia and Pant Piploda Jagir", I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 102.
 7. S.P.D. vol. 29, Nos. 45, 46.
 8. Phalke, op. cit., vol. I, No. 277.
 9. Ibid, vol. I, No. 273.
 10. Sardesai, Madhyvibhag, vol. III, pp. 48, 49; Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. II, p. 478; Phalke, op. cit., vol. III, No. 413.

devastated Poona City on 4th June¹ but the Peshwa completely triumphed over the enemy forces in the Battle of Rakasbhan in August². Mahadji was at Ujjain till 5th August³, and after 25 September by about the Dasara, he presented himself before the Peshwa at Tonke and the Peshwa heartening himself, cherished high hopes of his own prospects, on account of the mutual understanding established between them, on this occasion⁴. He was particularly pleased with the grand army of Mahadji. But this must have alienated Raghoba completely. Raghoba himself intended to march to Aurangabad⁵ but on 19 September, Gangadhar Yeshwant declared that as Mahadji could not settle matters amicably with Sakhubai Shinde, the robes of honour were conferred on Manaji Shinde. Mahadji, thus being insulted, returned to Ujjain⁶.

Raghoba conferred the Phadnishi office on Nana and Moroba on 5 October⁷. But Raghoba had repaired to Nasik⁸ and the young Peshwa, meeting Mahadji on the Godavari banks in October, along with Nana, formed a trio upon whom, now, depended the destiny of the Maratha nation.⁹ But still Raghoba had entrusted the Shinde estates to Kedarji, and Mahadji was busy in collecting Rs. five lakhs from Kotah¹⁰. He left Ujjain and came to Toka on 6

1. Chandrachud Dantar, vol. I, 77.

2. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. X, p. 5, No. 9; Hingana Dantar, Vol. II, 52.

3. Sardesai, Madhyvibhag, vol. III, p. 56.

4. Sardesai, op. cit., p. 61.

5. Sardesai, Kayvetihas Patren, No. 201.

6. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 48.

7. Khare, Life of Nana, p. 21.

8. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. II, p. 464.

9. Ibid, p. 482.

10. Sardesai, op. cit., vol. II, p. 483; Phalke, op. cit., vol. III, No. 415.

November. He had already punished the pretender of Jankoji and it was, finally expected that the Peshwa would bestow the office of the head of the Shinde family on him¹. Kedarji and Mahadji went back to Poona on 2 November 1763² and Mahadji alone returned to Srighonda in December³. On 2 December, he was at Bir and stayed there for fifteen days when the pretender was declared punished.⁴

Suraj Mal Jat decided on war with Najib⁵ and on 12 December 1763 captured Faruknagar,⁶. Bapuji Mahadev Hingane reached Delhi and the Peshwa instructed Malhar and Mahadji, regarding the Udepur politics⁷. The Sondhekar Chief applied for help to Mahadji, by this time, too.⁸ When Suraj Mal Jat was killed in action, Jawahir Jat secured the aid of the Sikhs and the Marathas to avenge Suraj Mal's death. The Sikhs plundered the area, near Delhi; Najib immediately entered into Delhi,⁹. Jawahir sent Ruprani Kothari to Malhar, knowing which, Najib, himself pleaded Malhar for reconciliation with Jawahir. Jawahir's army at this time consisted of house-hold troops, composed of the Rajputs, Jats and Musalmans, numbering thirty-thousand cavalry and fifty-thousand infantry, with a full equipment of artillery.¹⁰. It must be noted that the total force of the English Company in Bengal, a

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1. Phalke, op.cit.
 2. Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, No.278.
 3. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.419.
 4. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.417.
 5. Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C. vol.VII; (1933), p.622.
 6. Hingane, Daptar. vol.II, 53.
 7. Parasnis, Peshwa Daptar, vol.V, 14.
 8. Itihas Sankirna Sahitya, vol.II, 261.
 9. Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C., vol.VII, (1933), p.626.
 10. Sarkar, op.cit.



a rising political power, consisted, by the end of 1763, of 6600 men of whom as many as 4000 were Indian Sepoys and the company was to meet all its military requirements in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.¹

The Shindes in Hindustan were accompanied, in January 1764, by Mahadev Govind Kakade (a rich man who was favoured by Raghoba) and Moro Vithal Rairikar. They managed the Udepur affairs well but had their own internal differences². Madhavrao Peshwa had approved of this arrangement and preferred Moro Vithal to Ramaji Anant Dabholkar³. But the Peshwa still thought of dispatching Hare Shankar to Hindustan and Sakhubai and Chinto Vithal were interested in knowing sure of the pretender of Jankoji⁴. Kedarji on 23 February proposed to return to Hindustan after his campaign - against Patwardhan, Bhosle and the Nizam in the Deccan.⁵ Mahadji about 25th, visited Malhar near Kurkuba and explained his financial difficulties⁶. However, in February, ¹⁷⁶⁴ Mahadji met the Peshwa's demands by the payment of four lakhs of rupees and collected troops and appointed new generals for his own army.⁷

Carnac took command from Munroe, on 13 February and occupied Fyzabad, but Shah Alam was reported to have been taken prisoner by the Marathas under Malhar, whom the Nawab had called in for his aid.⁸ By the end of February, Ahmad Shah had encamped in the famous Pinjer

1. Banerji, "Early Military establishment of Company in Bengal", I.H.R.C.P., vol. XXIII, (1946), p.18.

2. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.13, p.4, No.6.

3. S.P.D., vol.29, 53.

4. Hingane Daptar, vol II, 54.

5. Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, No.279.

6. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, Nos.421,423.

7. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, N.422.

8. Sir Evan Cotton, The Memoirs of Gentil, I.H.R.C.P., vol.X, (1927), p.21.

Garden situated near Kalka on the Simla road, at the foot of the hills. Here, he stayed for two days, enjoying the tiger-hunt in the neighbouring hills and by the way of Corhi Kotah reached Kunjpura, situated on the banks of the Jumna near Karnal in two months' time.¹ There he came to know that Najib had made peace with Jawahir². Mahadji wrote on 3 March, from Hindustan to Raghoba in Poona, while Madhavrao was in the Carnatic, requesting that he should be given five cannons from the lot which had come to Nagor, as he was on his march.³ However, Sakhubai, Jayappa's wife complained to Raghoba, on 15th that she was systematically harassed by Mahadji. Malhar, again was not paying any heed to Peshwa Madhavrao's legitimate demands and till the 26th of the same month, Mahadji was busy in collecting funds by the distribution of offices and intrigues.⁴

The Nizam had despatched his army in April against Karande and Muradkhan was imprisoned. Mahadji set out from Srironda against Nizam Ali to avenge the devastation of his residence and property.⁵ In May, Shah Alam, Shuja and Kasim Alikhan marched against the English; Madhavrao Peshwa fought against Hyder; Malhar was preparing to meet Abdali when Abdali himself thought of a descent on Delhi; Mahadji was facing the Nizam.⁶ Madhavrao enquired

1. Gupta, "Ahmad Shah Abdali's eighth invasion", Jang Nama (Extracts), 1764-65, J.I.H., vol. XVIII, (1939), pp. 90-98.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

3. Sardesai, *Kavyatihar Patren*, No. 202.

4. S.P.D., vol. 29, 53; Rajwade, *op.cit.*, vol. 13, p. 64, No. 79; Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol. III, No. 426.

5. S.P.D., vol. 38, 126.

6. *Chahar Gulzar Shuhai*, Elliot, vol. VIII, pp. 216-217; S.P.D., vol. 38, 128.

about Mahadji¹ and perhaps gave instructions to him, whereupon Mahadji left Jottirling for Srigonda on 3 May. The Peshwa ordered him not to see Raghoba and in spite of the fact that Sakhubai was carrying on intrigues against Mahadji, tributes were paid to him and Naro Ballal had paid him Rs.50,000/-². Mahadji with his army was on the banks of the river Dudhna, when Madhavrao had established his victory over Hyder by 17 May³.

Mahadji was intending to proceed to the North. On 20 May, Malhar was defeated by the English at Kalpi⁴. Chimabai, Mahadji's mother requested Raghoba on 20th, to assign her a jagir for residence and maintenance⁵. Mahadji and Kedarji asked Malhar to pay Rs.9,816/- to Gawade, out of the amount promised to be lent to them,⁶ and when Ranchandra Hari proposed to inform Mahadji of the affairs of his mahals, on 28 May, Mahadji instructed him to march with the army.⁷

Mahadji marched to Ujjain, in protest against Raghoba by the end of May.⁸ There were strict orders for him not to leave the Capital and when Mahadji actually left Poona, Naro Krishna, the Subhedar of Burkanpur instructed his officers as to how Mahadji's march into the North was to be circumvented at various strategic points on the different routes which he was likely to take.⁹

1. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.13, pp.65-66, No.80.

2. S.P.D., vol.38, 128; Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, 427, 429, Note No.216, 428.

3. S.P.D., vol.38, 144.

4. Sir Evan Cotton, op.cit.; I.H.R.C.P.; vol.X, (1927), p.22.

5. S.P.D. vol.29, 59.

6. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, Vol.I, 200.

7. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.13, p.4, No.7.

8. Sardesai, New History of the Marathes, vol.II, p.483.

9. S.P.D., vol.29, 62.

Raghoba conferred the chieftainship of the Shinde family on Manaji Phakade and accepted Rs.3 lakhs as a present on 1st July. This was, of course, not approved of by Madhavrao¹. Manaji was a great personality and the nation had attributed to him the name 'Phakde' for his valour. Mahadji Govind was appointed his karkhari.² Raghoba ordered Prabhakar Krishna to join Naro Krishna to watch the movements of Mahadji who had escaped to Ujjain dissatisfied.³ The Peshwa, contradicting these orders, imparted his own instructions to restrain Naro Krishna⁴. Raghoba also wrote to Hari Damodar to obstruct Mahadji in his attempt to proceed to the North and Devji Bajaji was asked to close on his heels at Sendhave and he had thereupon collected the Bhils for that purpose but Mahadji with dexterity evaded him by using the Ghat of Chachare Patti⁵ by about 15 July, when Naro Ballal, reiterated his orders to intercept his march.⁷ Even when Mahadji was publicly honoured, Raghoba wrote letters to Mahadji and Kedarji imploring them that even though Manaji was appointed the chief of their house, they should not be displeased and that they should join him as he himself had to face the family dispute.⁸ Mahadji, nevertheless, collected revenue, without caring to submit the accounts⁹. The orders were also issued to Manaji for the payment of Chaudana

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1. Paresnis, Itihasik Charitre, 13, p.148 (Manaji Phakde)
 2. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.429, Rajwade, op.cit, vol.14, p.44, No.71.
 3. S.P.D. vol.39, 32.
 4. S.P.D. vol.29, 77.
 5. S.P.D. vol.39, 33.
 6. Sardesai, Kavyatinas Patren, No.204.
 7. S.P.D., vol.29, 64.
 8. Sat. Raj. Diar; vol.IX, No.163; Hingane Dantar, vol.II, No.108.
 9. S.P.D., vol.29, 77.

dues.¹ On 3 August, Naro Ballal Bhuskute requested Raghoba to reinforce Barwa without loss of time as the place was threatened by Mahadji.² Kedarji informed Raghoba on 4 August that whatever commands were to be communicated, should be delivered to Mahadji with whom he had no difference of opinion and since, he added, Mahadji himself was with the addressee, there was no need of Kedarji's presence there.³ The Peshwa, in the meanwhile, had cancelled the surety for Manaji Phakade and Sabaji Shinde, earlier granted to them, now that they had deserted the Peshwa and had gone over to the side of Janoji Bhosle and the Nizam.⁴ On 16th August, Naro Ballal reported that Mahadji eluded his attention by crossing the Tapti at the Maheshwar ford and that he was not able to collect the revenue in Khandesh.⁵ Sakhubai reported to Raghoba on 22 August, her safe arrival at Srigonda.⁶ Raghoba wrote to Chinto Vithal to win over Mahadji to his cause and gave him a draft of a letter to be addressed to Mahadji, requesting him to join his forces in the expedition into the Carnatic, along with the Bhosle and the Gaikwad armies.⁷ The Peshwa ordered Manaji on 16 September to pay off the debts of Malpurkar by fixed instalments as he was now the recognised lawful claimant to the Shinde estates.⁸ Mahadji marched into Hindustan with ten thousand army and joined Malhar.⁹ Manaji, in

1. S.P.D. vol.29; 65.

2. S.P.D. vol.29, 72.

3. S.P.D. vol.29, 66.

4. S.P.D. vol.29, 143.

5. S.P.D. vol.29, 67.

6. Ibid. 68.

7. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol.IV, p.98; S.P.D. vol.19, 9.

8. S.P.D. vol.29, 70.

9. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.14, pp.12-13, No.16.

the name of the Shinde family ordered that Ramchandra Hari was to be given the Majma-ship at Yeldabad, in October¹.

In the dispute of Madhosing and Jawahir Jat, Madhosing was helped by Najib and Madhosing was attacked by Malhar for dues, as per advice from the Peshwa²; in spite of the fact, that earlier in 1761-62, Malhar had carried out a plan in favour of Madhosing when the Poona Government had sent the army under Trimbak Sirdar to Holkar's assistance. The expenses of the army amounting to Rs. 3½ lakhs, when received, were divided among Malhar, Kedarji, Khanderao and other Pawars.³ The Maratha position had much improved in 1764 when Abdali ratified a formal peace with them, which in itself was a much needed relief.⁴

In October 1764, Najib defended Delhi against Jawahir who with 40,000 horse and 50,000 foot was encamped, within two or three cos. of the city and was joined by Malhar with 30,000 Marathas⁵. Jawahir passed word to Najib that it was unworthy of a man of courage to shut himself up within the walls of the city and that he should march out to the distance of five cos and thence come to an engagement, so that the city might not be perturbed⁶. But Malhar was simultaneously interested in settling the dispute between Jawahir and Naval Sing Jat⁷. Inad and Malhar were lukewarm towards Jawahir, who desired to seize the city and fort of

1. Rajwade, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 5, No. 8.

2. Banerji, "Revival of the Maratha power in the North, 1761-69" *I.H.Q.* vol. XVII, (1941), p. 315.

3. *Sat. Raj. Diar*, Vol. IX, No. 42.

4. Banerji, *op. cit.*, *I.H.Q.* vol. XVII, (1941), p. 314.

5. Sarker, "Najib-ud-daula, as the Dictator of Delhi, (1761-70)" *Is. C.* Vol. VII, (1933), p. 331.

6. *C.P.C.* vol. I, No. 2457.

7. *Hingane Daptar*, vol. II, 55.

Delhi after the victory and hence secret overtures, of Imad and Malhar were forwarded to Najib behind Jawahir's back¹. On 24 Oct. Malhar wrote, from Jawahir's camp, to Najib that he should be allowed to secure money from Jawahir to which Najib readily agreed². Jawahir said, "The Maratha had taken a large sum from me, but he is not at all giving his heart to the fight"³. Malhar when he arrived at Bahadurgar, sent a message to Najib and Zinat Mahal to restore all the effects, they had seized⁴. Najib had accepted Imad as his master, as a result of the secret negotiations between them⁵. Jawahir bombarded Delhi from the east bank of the Jumna on 17 November while Najib himself took refuge by excavating an underground room in Bullund Bagh, placing planks of wood and earth on its top and resided within it for safety⁶.

When Jawahir was fighting his last battle with Najib, the news came of Abdali's return to Peshawar, who had set out on his eighth invasion to India to punish the Sikhs and Jawahir, who had besieged his plenipotentiary Najib in Delhi⁷. Malhar was in a hurry to go and peace was made with Najib when Nuruddin Husain Khan was sent for the second time, for the purpose⁸. Shah Alam II, had entered into an alliance with the English in Bengal against

1. Sarkar, op.cit., p. 636.

2. Ibid., p. 627.

3. Ibid., p. 634.

4. C.P.C., vol. I, No. 2459.

5. Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C. vol. VII (1933), pp. 636-637.

6. Ibid., p. 631.

7. Ibid., p. 637; Srivatsava, "Failure of Shah Alam's II first expedition to Delhi, 1765-66", I.H.R.C.P. vol. XVII, p. 195.

8. Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C. (Oct). 1933, vol. VII, p. 637.

Shāya and the Wazir had sued for peace on 31 December 1764, but the Marathas had refused to assist¹. But the restoration of Shāya was already decided by Clive, which shattered the Emperor's hopes². Shuja with the Emperor had earlier set out against the Bangashes to take their country which was seized by the Marathas when Najib had come with forced marches and advised Shāya not to fight. Shah Alam wrote secret letters to both of them and Shāya returned and Najib, knowing this, retired to Delhi³. Again, by the Treaty of Buxar, the Company's alliance with Shuja sanctioned military assistance in case his dominions were attacked, when a part or the whole of the Company's forces would be employed⁴. Thus the Islamic and English alliances were organised for powerful defence.

Gangadhar had already, in November 1764, settled the chieftainship of the Shinde family in Mahadji's favour and was paid, on that account, Rs. 32,000/-⁵. Raghoba, at the time, was about to proceed to the North⁶. One Ragho Krishna who was in the service of Ali Bahadur, had gone over to Shinde and his house at Nimb was confiscated⁷. Mahadji explained to Chinto pant Tatya

1. Srivatsava, *op.cit.*; C.P.C., vol. I, Nos. 2516-2521, 2524A.

2. Srivatsava, *op.cit.*

3. Sarkar, *op.cit.*, p. 617.

4. Panikar, "The Ring fence system and the Marathas", *J.I.H.* vol. VIII, (1929), p. 336.

5. Chandrachud Dattar, vol. I, 94.

6. Sat. Raj. Diar, vol. IX, No. 112.

7. *Ibid.*, No. 166.



that he was silent for a year, as per advice but then, his mother was short of funds and hence a loan of Rs.25,000/- should be secured for him and that he would concede to all that was settled. He requested further that Pedgaon should be given in Jagir to his mother¹. Instead more orders were issued to confiscate Shinde mahals². Adal Beg was summoned by Baghoba and the orders were issued to confiscate Mandasar, Ujjain Vase, Surkhed³. Again, Harbajiram was summoned by Baghoba and further orders to confiscate Shahajapur, Badvande, Umargan, were issued⁴. Mahadji requested Naro Pant to reconcile him to the State officials. Mahadji was near Kotah and collected the tributes from Kotah and Marwar, proceeding to join Malhar near Datia⁵. He repeatedly pleaded that his mahals should be released and urged the State would make use of his army of 25000 troopers. He had agreed to pay six lakhs of rupees and the Durbar expenses for his Chiefship, along with the Mahals in the Deccan and even was prepared to raise the limit upto ten lakhs of rupees and implored that Naro Shankar, Chinto Vithal and Vishnu Mahadev would fix up the sum⁶. Naro Shankar, again was sent to Mahadji to inform him of the expectations of the Government and he was told that if he presented himself at the Court and acted as desired, his offences would be condoned.⁷ An agreement was also

1. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.12, p.45, No.72.

2. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.12, p.46, No.74.

3. Ibid., Sat. Raj. Diar., vol.IX, No.165.

4. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.12, p.46, No.75.

5. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.12, p.47, No.79.

6. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.13, pp.13-14, No.18.

7. Sat. Raj. Diar., vol.IX, No.167.

entered into with Bhagirthibai and Sangunabai Shinde, granting them the Inam villages formerly enjoyed by the Shinde family, which had the yearly revenue of Rs.1,22,293, for their support and for keeping up a body of two-hundred horse for service with the Peshwa¹. Mahadji had opened up correspondence with the Nizam and this fact was communicated to the Peshwa by his news-agent, at the Nizam's Camp.² Again, we find that an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- was received on account of Nazar due from Mahadji³. Still, one writer assured Ragoba to place confidence in Mahadji and Holkar whose loyalty, he explained, was above suspicion⁴.

Malhar's lukewarm attitude towards Jawahir, in the beginning of 1765, compelled the Jat Chief to make peace with Najib, in February⁵. Jawahir, it is true, had refused to pay twelve lakhs of rupees to the Marathas, out of the twenty-two lakhs that he owed to them.⁶ Again, Mirkasim, who had been defeated by the English sought an alliance with Shuja and the Marathas to win back his province⁷. Malhar and Mahadji had been near Agra, negotiating the terms of peace between Najib and Jawahir⁸. Shuja, knowing this left Bareilly, left his family there with Samru Gardi and proceeded to Garh Mukteshwar on the banks of the Ganges, 30 Eos. from Shahajahanabad. He met the Chiefs of the Maratha army there and made an

1. Ibid, vol. IX, No. 169.

2. S.P.D. vol. 38, No. 152.

3. Sat. Raj. Diar, vol. IX, No. 168.

4. S.P.D., vol. 29, No. 104.

5. Banerji, "Revival of the Maratha power in the North, 1761-69," I.H.S., vol. XVII, (1941), p. 316; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, p. 468.

6. Ibid.

7. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 52.

8. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. II, p. 504.

alliance with them.¹

Malhar brought Najib to the quarters of Jawahir; while Imad and Malhar were sitting on an elephant with covered litter, Najib had nothing with²him. Imad refused to read Khuiba in Shah Alam's name and Najib agreed³. The Sikhs hearing the news of Abdali, went away without asking leave; Malhar and Imad, too marched away by way of Anup Sehar, towards the Bangash country; Jawahir repaired to his own forts; and Najib prepared himself to go to Abdali⁴. But when in February, Malhar left Delhi and set out in the direction of Bundelkhand from Anterved, he directed on 23, Ahalyabai to look after Sendhwa and Sultanpur⁵. By 26th, Abdali had crossed the border and was heading in the direction of Delhi, whereupon she was directed to go to Sironj, without the least delay and not to join Malhar⁶. However, Malhar had reconciled Najib who promised to arrange for the settlement of the Maratha territory occupied by the Trans- ganges, Rohillas and Ahmad Khan Pathan and to help Shuja⁷.

Mahadji and Aachitrao Ganesh had proceeded to settle the Jhansi affairs, when Malhar himself was proceeding to Itawa towards Mahendi Ghat⁸. Raghoba, too, had parted company from the Peshwa

1. Chehar Gulzar Shujai, Elliot, vol. VIII, p. 221.

2. Sarkar, op. cit., Is. C., vol. VII, (Oct 1933), p. 639.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 639.

5. Kibe, "Fragments from the records of Ahalyabai", I. H. R. C. P., vol. XIII, (1930), p. 133.

6. Ibid., p. 130.

7. Ibid.

8. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 43, No. 68.

at Kolhapur in February, and taking Janoji Bhosle with him, reached Jhansi in April, where Shinde and Holkar joined him.¹ But still, Naro Shankar regretted his failure to create favourable atmosphere for the cause of Shinde, at home, his efforts being foiled, perhaps by Ganaji Kadam, in March². Mahadji was interested, in March, in Kotah affairs and referred to the death of Akheram Pacholi, the karbhari of the Kotah State³. In May, there, again, had arisen a dispute among Pairikar, Kakade and Shinde, whereupon Mahadaji Govind Kakade separated himself from them. He, however, insisted on Shinde's Diwanship which was not approved of by Naro Shankar. Naro Shankar wrote letters to Shinde, with implied meaning when as per the hint, Raghoram, Ragho Malhar, Baji Narsing- the sympathisers of Shinde, attempted to capture Kakade when he was actually killed and his son received minor injuries.⁴

Najib and Jawahir Jat were reconciled by Malhar when he returned to Amrhapur, where again Shuja pleaded for the Maratha help against the English⁵. Malhar, postponing his plan of attacking the Rohillas, agreed but in the meanwhile, Najib with 4000 horse was defeated by the English at Kora. The English thence marched against the Marathas⁶. Malhar met the English at Kora as an ally of Shuja but was defeated on 3 May.⁷ In their retreat the Marathas

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. II, p. 507.

2. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, pp. 5-6, No. 9 and Footnote.

3. Phalke, op. cit., vol. I, No. 243.

4. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, p. 9, No. 15.

5. B.H.R.I. (1928-29), No. 30.

6. Ibid, Banerji

7. Banerji, op. cit., I.H.A. vol. XVIII (1941), p. 315; Chandragand Bapat, vol. I, No. 96; C.P.C. vol. I, Nos. 2348, 2524A; Sardesai, op. cit., vol. II, p. 505; S.P.D. vol. 29, Nos. 90, 93.

blockaded the routes and the English did not advance beyond Kalpi. The Marathas after settling Kalpi and Umargao affairs, went to Gwalior, as the rains set in.¹

Mahadji was near Kotah, at the time of the early reverse of Holkar and he immediately ran to the succour of that veteran². Raghoba still insisting on his support to Manaji, kept on harassing everybody who supported Mahadji³.

Ragho Malhar and Bajji Narsinh were prepared to pay five lakhs of rupees readily to secure the Chieftainship in Mahadji's name. But on 31 May, Narsinhrao explained his difficulties of getting the promised amount from Mahadji who, at the time was investing Udepur⁴. In May and June, Raghoba himself was vehement about the partition of the Maratha State⁵ and on 14 June, Sakharam, Bapu was given the robes of office, in expectation, perhaps, that he would reconcile the disputants⁶. Naro Shankar, Chinto Vithal, Madhavrao and Raghoba were now to decide the affairs, finally and Raghoba ordered Rairikar to bring Naro Shankar to effect the settlement⁷. Raghoram and others, again appealed to Naro Shankar⁸ and Mahadji promised Raghoba that he was preparing himself for a campaign and would soon join him.⁹

1. B.H.R.I., (1928) No. 30; Sardesai, op. cit., vol. II, p. 505.

2. Sardesai, op. cit.

3. Phalke, op. cit., vol. III, No. 239; Note 141; No. 439, Note 218.

4. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, p. 6, No. 10; p. 9, No. 15, p. 14, No. 19; S.P.D. Vol. 29, No. 87.

5. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, pp. 62-69, No. 34.

6. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, pp. 7-8, No. 11.

7. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, p. 8, No. 12.

8. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, p. 14, No. 19.

9. S.P.D. Vol. 29, No. 146. Note: Mhd. Yarkhan, an agent of Malhar attempted on 23 June to persuade Bhawani, Pandit to invade Bengal. It was pointed out to Janoji Bhosle that the interests of Janoji and Malhar were the same and that it would be difficult for the English to make head against the Marathas, on both the sides. However, the Bhosle was not interested in such pursuits. C.P.C. vol. I, Nos. 2565, 2666.

On 28, June, one Jalsinghanji was jointly addressed by Mahadji and Kedarji for revenue¹ and in July, Mahadji had already settled the tribute of Kotah at fifteen lakhs of rupees and left his diwan Ashyut Rao to collect the tribute from Udepur, Shahapure, and Rupnagar².

Rana Ari Sing II, of Udepur agreed to pay a total sum of Rs. 26,30,221/- which was to be realised in quarterly instalments in four years by the diwan of Mahadji³. Mahadji had marched from Ujjain to Kotah. Out of the fifteen lakhs of rupees from Kotah, 5-3/4 lakhs were to be paid in cash and a quarter lakh in terms of elephants, horses, immediately, too, were paid to Mahadji. Only after this instalment had been paid, was the Rao allowed to visit Mahadji and embrace him "like a brother"⁴.

Mahadji was at Kotah near Mukund Bari and now he was prepared to pay five lakhs of rupees and offer his diwanship to Naro Shankar for recognition as the Chief of the Shinde House⁵. Mahadji, would, again, send two lakhs of rupees to Naro Shankar after the settlements of Kotah⁶. On 3 July, Vishnu Mahadev Gadre opened that Mahadji was prepared to pay six lakhs of rupees and that he wanted to know the reaction of the Poona Government to Kakade's death⁷. Sakhubai, wrote to Naro Shankar on 3 July to arrange for the

1. Phalke, op.cit., vol. I, No. 280.

2. Banerji, Op.cit., I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), p. 316.

3. Ibid.; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, pp. 517-518.

4. Sarkar, Op.cit.

5. Rajwade, Op.cit., vol. XIII, p. 17, No. 21.

6. Ibid., pp. 15-16, No. 20.

7. Ibid., p. 12, No. 16.

Chieftainship as desired by Mahadji, Achyut Rao and Baji Narasingh and accepted that except Sririgonda, which would be left to Balwant Gopal, all the Shinde Mahals in the Deccan, would be left over to ¹ Naro Shankar.

Mahadji marched to Bundelkhand in August, at the call of Malhar, who was besieging the fort of Mot. His diwan, Achyut Rao, stayed behind with ten thousand men and collected the Udepur tribute of five lakhs and other smaller sums from Shahapura and Rupnagar in November and then passed into Kishangad in December². Malhar in August, sent for his troops, in every part of the Deccan. The English were alarmed, that if after his (Malhar's) forces were collected, he marched to Dega and Kumbher and brought with him the Zamindars and Rajahs of those parts together with Jawahir Sing and if the Sikhs were also invited to join them, then Najib would be under the necessity of entering into the same alliance, as his country and family were in the neighbourhood of Shahajahanabad, and if these people, agreeable to their intention, would place upon the throne some one of the Princes of the Royal family and march with their united forces towards Allahabad, the Rohillas and Ahmadkhan, would also join them. By the end of September, again, Shah Alam expressed his desire to quit Allahabad³.

Mahadji's claims were vehemently opposed by Raghuba, even though Chinto Vithal, Ganoji Kadam, now, sponsored his cause and the partisans of Shinde in the Deccan were put in custody⁴. Rairiker,

1. *Ibid*, pp.12-13, No.17; p.20, No.23.

2. Sarker, *op.cit*, vol.II, pp.516, 522.

3. Banerji, *op.cit*, I.H.C. vol.XVII (1940), p.196; C.P.C. vol.I, Nos. 2713, 2731, 2588.

4. Rajwade, *op.cit*, vol.XIII, pp.18-20, No.22.

as per Raghoba's plan of collecting partisans against Madhavrao, invited Waro Shankar, in September¹. He fixed up the tribute from Shinde who wrote to him that he was prepared for anything which would exclude Ganoji Kadam and which would be settled by the cash payment and clearly explained, further, that though he was financially handicapped, he was ready to pay the sum that would be expected from him.² In September, the Peshwa's agent reported that at Malhar's instance, the Jaypur Raja was treated with every tenderness and consideration, but Mahadji had been dunning him for the arrears³. "Before the end of the year, he had then paid the current instalment of two lakhs of rupees and proposed to issue orders on bankers for the balance".⁴

A treaty was negotiated, in October, between Shah Alam and Malhar through Saif-ud-din, when Allahabad and Kora were ceded to the Marathas.⁵ The Select Committee at Calcutta advised measures to be taken against Shah Alam and to persuade him to break off his connection with the Marathas. Shah Alam himself followed a timid policy and did not declare his Maratha alliance firmly.⁶ Again, Najib had written to Shah Alam about the danger of the Sikhs occupying Delhi⁷. The Bangash Chief had promised support to Shah Alam⁸ and Kora and Allahabad were the price paid to Malhar for reinstalling Shah Alam at Delhi⁹. Clive tried to dissuade the Emperor from "the wild

1. Rajwade, *op.cit.*, vol. XIII, p. 21, No. 24.

2. Rajwade, *op.cit.*, vol. XIII, pp. 21-23, Nos. 24, 25, 26.

3. Sarkar, *op.cit.*, vol. II, p. 512, c/f, *S.P.B.* vol. 29, Nos. 99, 107, 108, 109.

4. Sarkar, *op.cit.*

5. *C.P.C.* vol. I, No. 2730.

6. Srivatsava, *op.cit.*, I.H.B., *CE.* vol. XVII, (1940), p. 197, *C.P.C.* vol. I, 2754, 2759 and 2760.

7. *Ibid.*, *C.P.C.* vol. I, No. 2735-A.

8. *C.P.C.*, vol. I, No. 2725.

9. *C.P.C.* vol. I, Nos. 2731, 2735, 2735A.

project" as it would throw him in the hands of the Marathas.¹ Mahadji himself, however, complained to the Peshwa that Malhar was not prepared to act as he had planned and opened that, perhaps, Malhar was afraid of the English Strength.²

Malhar, after leaving Delhi came, on 11 October, to Kanawar for Holi festival and sent Najib towards Abdali. Malhar instructed Ahalyabai to halt at Gwalior, where she had already reduced a fort of the Rana of Gohad.³ In November, the Peshwa, in the South made friends with the Nizam and foiled the secret intrigues of Raghoba and the Bhosle.⁴ In the North, in December, Malhar recovered Jhansi and resumed operations against the Rana of Gohad. Mahadji, who had gone to that part adopted a less conciliatory policy towards Madhosing and pressed him for the arrears.⁵

Ahmad Shah declared, "I am coming soon with the Uzbek troops and Nadir Khan who has 30,000 horse with him for Jihad and slaughter of the infidels." At this time, the news reached Ahmad Shah that Najib, in fear, had made peace with the Jats and the Marathas and the latter would soon take the road to their homes. At this juncture, Ahmad Shah made forced marches, reached Sirhind in two days and the maidan of Mustafabad- Buana, which is 60 cos. from Delhi, in two days more. Here he learnt for certain that Najib had made peace and that the enemy marched away. He now disappointed wished

1. G.P.C. vol.I, No.2730.

2. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol.IV, p.194.

3. Kibe, "Fragments from the records of Ahalyabai," I.H.R.C.P. vol.XIII, (1930), pp.134-135.

4. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.II, p.491.

5. Banerji, op.cit., I.H.Q., vol.XVII, (1941), p.315.

to march back to Qandahar. Najib made haste, set out from Delhi and encamped at Ismail Ganj where he learnt that Shah reached Lahore in ten days and without stopping, crossed the river of Attock and went towards Kabul and Qandahar.¹

Raghoba made preparations for the expedition in the North and his advanced guard even collected the tribute from Bhopal.² The invading Maratha army greatly enhanced their prestige. Jhansi and Orcha were occupied and the army under Shinde and Holkar, who were happily in complete accord, had advanced upon Gohad and proposed to join issue with Jawahir. The Jat would seek assistance from the Sikhs. The Emperor expressed a desire to be reinstated in his capital with the Maratha help. The Princes of Jaipur and Marwar also happened to be favourably inclined towards the Marathas.³ Jawahir had attacked Jajpur and Madhosing in utter helplessness appealed to Malhar and Mahadji. A Shinde contingent of 5000 horse, under Achyut Ganesh which was plundering country near Kishangad, on being promised Rs. 5000/- daily, hastened to Jaipur.⁴ Raghoba who had started northward, was urged to press onward with all possible speed as hostilities had broken.⁵ But Jawahir was reconciled and he returned to Kumbher. "Achyut, arriving near Fagi found that there was no work left for him. The Jaipur general Raj Singh Chorchara gave him and his officers presents and put them on the way of return to

1. Sarkar, "Najib-ud-daula, as the dictator of Delhi, 1761-70," I.A.C., vol. VII, (1933), p. 639.

2. Banerji, "Op. Cit." I.H.Q., vol. XVII, (1941), p. 316.

3. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 105.

4. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, p. 513.

5. S.P.D., vol. 29, No. 108.

Mahadji. During their march, these Maratha allies were beyond their officers' control plundered the country and devastated the crops.¹ Mahadji was 15 cos. away from Gwalior, in company of Malhar, in December, 1765.²

When Raghoba had crossed the Nerbada in his march to the North, the Peshwa entered into Poona³. Raghoba's plan was to secure the Pre-panipat territory but he was angry with Shinde, as he was responsible for his protégé- Kakade's death. Rairikar was also not on good terms with the Shinde as Moropant, Chinto Vithal Rairikar's brother got nothing from the Shindes. Naro Shankar, however, established some ad hoc understanding between them when Mahadji paid six lakhs of rupees and Phadnis office was given to Rairikar.⁴ Naro Shankar was called by Shinde to Hindustan and he accompanied Raghoba there.⁵ The loan of Rs.25,000/- which Mahadji had asked for his mother was sanctioned.⁶ Clothes of honour and jewelry were given by the Peshwa to Kedarji, Trimbakrao Diwan, Sakhubai and Jogilal, an envoy from Shuja.⁷ Rs.10,000/- were paid to Mahadji's mother, Chinabai, for her expenses.⁸ Villages of the value of Rs.1,50,226/- were assigned to Sakhubai for her maintenance and Sanads to that effect were issued to her, Kedarji and Mahadji.⁹ Kedarji was directed to proceed to Bundelkhand and to carry out the

1. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.IX, p.513.

2. S.P.D., vol.29, No.105.

3. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.X, p.21, No.35; Sardesai, Karvetihes Patra, No.439.

4. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIII, p.3, No.5.

5. Ibid, p.23, No.27.

6. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XII, p.45, No.72.

7. Sat.Raj.Diar. vol.IX, No.170.

8. Sat.Raj.Diar. vol.IX, No.171.

9. Sat.Raj.Diar. vol.IX, No.173.

mission which the Maratha Government had undertaken on behalf of Gunansing and Khuman Sing Bundale for the collection of Rs.6½ lakhs. The money was to be recovered by Kedarji and he was to receive two lakhs of rupees as a gift and three lakhs of rupees as a loan, and was expected to remit the rest to the Government.¹

Mahadji and Malhar captured the fort of Jhansi in December 1765 and Nahar Sing, a claimant to the Jat throne, invited Holkar's intervention, in his affairs. Malhar in Jan. 1766 was engaged in fighting the Rana of Gohad, whose resistance was stiffened by Jawahir's promise of support.² The financial claims were settled between Mewar and the Peshwa, Malhar and Shinde.³ The amount of tribute from Udepur was Rs.30,30,221; out of which Rs.4,00,000/- were remitted and the remainder was ordered to be paid by instalments.⁴ Holkar was to receive five lakhs of rupees and Mahadji's share was settled at three lakhs of rupees.⁵

Dhondo Khanderao on 3 January 1766, suggested to the Peshwa a new scheme- to invade Bengal.⁶ Raghoba, in January, too, was planning with the approval of Malhar, to respond to the Emperor in his appeal for help.⁷ Malhar's policy was directed towards three objects in February 1766. The reconquest of Bundelkhand which would open a sure basis to strike further North; to reduce the growing power of the Jat; and to punish the treacherous Rohillas.⁸

1. Sat.Raj.Diar, vol.IX, No.174.

2. S.P.D. vol.29, Nos.111, 177; Chandrachud Dantar, vol.I, No.164.

3. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.II, pp.516-517.

4. Sat.Raj.Diar. vol.IX, No.292.

5. Ibid,

6. S.P.D. vol.29, Nos.110, 128.

7. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.245.

8. S.P.D. vol.29, No.117.

The Sikhs had defeated Najib and had advanced as far as Delhi, pillaging Madhosing's territory round Rewadi, on their way. The Rajputs, while strengthening themselves in their forts, had called in Shinde and Holkar to their succour.¹ The Jat Prince of Gohad joined Jawahir and the two concerted a plan of campaign against Malhar, who sent Mahadji and Gangadhar Diwan, ahead, as he himself was a dying man.² Naro Shankar had persuaded Mahadji earlier to join Malhar³. By this time, Mahadji's marriage took place and he was reported to have been sincere to the Peshwa⁴. Mahadji, now, invaded Gohad with Holkar but he was not on the front on the 21st of March.⁵

The Jats and the Rohillas had established an understanding between themselves, and the Peshwa thought of undertaking the conquest of Bengal⁶. Naturally, the English planned an alliance with the Jats and the Rohillas to counter act the Marathas, in March.⁷ Clive and Carnac were authorised to bring out a fuller alliance of the English, Shuja and the Rohillas against Shah Alam and the Marathas.⁸ Jawahir, on his own initiative, would have attacked the Marathas, but the Sikhs in his army refused to follow on account of the intolerable heat. Nahar Sing lost his estate and was afterwards cast off by the Marathas⁹. Malhar attempted to

1. S.P.D. vol.29, No.121.

2. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.II, p.472.

3. S.P.D. vol.29, No.123.

4. S.P.D. vol.29, No.122.

5. S.P.D. vol.29, Nos.197, 124.

6. Srivatsava, "The so-called conference of Chhaprah- June 1766," Is.C. vol.XIX, (1945)p.168.

7. Srivatsava, "The failure of Shah Alam II's first expedition to Delhi, 1765-66", I.H.R.C.P. vol.XVII, (1940), p.198.

8. Srivatsava, op.cit. Is.C. vol XIX, (1945), p.168.

9. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.II, 472-73.

win over the Rana of Gohad and gave him hundis worth two lakhs of rupees, in March.¹ But already on 23, Raghoba received news of a battle near Dholpur wherein a contingent of the Maratha army suffered defeat.² Malhar's army was completely routed and this was described as a "Second Panipat"³. Mahadji joined the Holkar army in Jatwada on 26 March, with the intention to attack again and Raghoba was only fifty cos. away.⁴ Mahadji and Malhar immediately moved on towards Gohad to retrieve the position⁵. The Rana of Gohad sent full description of the battle to the Governor at Calcutta⁶. The Maratha Chiefs, including Holkar and Gaikwad had left Raghoba's Camp. Still, the Gosains in Jawahir's camp were in secret alliance with the Marathas⁷. But again, the misunderstanding between Mahadji and Raghoba over Shinde's succession rendered the siege of Gohad impossible,⁸ even though Raghoba tried to finish successfully Malhar's work against the Rana and Mahadji for his valour, was given a jagir of ten lakhs of rupees.⁹

Malhar wrote on 5 April to Raghoba that he was encamped at Keneche Sarai and that he would be glad to discuss further projects in a personal interview with the latter.¹⁰ A day was to be fixed

1. Kibe, *op.cit*, I.H.R.C.P. vol. XIII, (1930), p. 135.
2. Mingane Daptar, vol. II, No. 58; Banerji, *op.cit*, I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), p. 316.
3. Chandrachud Daptar, vol. I, No. 102.
4. Ibid.
5. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 127.
6. Banerji, *op.cit*, I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), p. 317.
7. Banerji, *op.cit*; Sarkar, *op.cit*, vol. II, p. 473.
8. Ibid; Khare, Itihasik Lekh Sangrah, vol. III, p. 1242.
9. Ibid.
10. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 129.

for Shinde and Holkar to meet Raghoba¹. Raghoba informed Madhavrao of his activities in the North.² Now the Rana of Gohad was boldly helped by Jawahir and the Peshwa sent one lakh of rupees to relieve the burdens of the Marathas³. Naro Ballal Muskatte in April explained to Raghoba his difficulties at Barwaha, reminding him of the former arrangements made by Ramchandra Bawa and Ranoji Shinde and requested him to adjust them suitably.⁴ Vishnu Mahadev and Sadashiv Gangadhar fixed the day for the meeting of Mahadji, Malhar and Raghoba.⁵ On 21, Naro Shankar informed Raghoba how he persuaded both Shinde and Holkar to meet Raghoba near Bhandar and how they readily consented to it. He, however, complained against Shinde, for his refusal to pay the dues which he felt, were necessary to cover up his own expenses of the campaign.⁶ Gangadhar Yeshwant communicated to Raghoba on 21, his arrival at Chirola near Datia with Mahadji and Malhar⁷. Soon, Raghoba was joined by Mahadji and Malhar near Bhandar but Mahadji was thoroughly antagonized by him and so Raghoba's efforts against Gohad failed to bear any fruit.⁸

Badrinath informed Raghoba on 24 April, of an interview between the Emperor and Hafiz Rahmat in which the latter requested the Emperor to rely on him and Najib Khan for support and to return to Delhi. The Emperor rejected it and went to Allahabad to

1. Chandrasahad Dantax, vol. I, No. 103.

2. S.P.D. vol. 19, No. 36.

3. Maimant Akhabar, Elliot, vol. VIII, p. 364; Banerji, op. cit. I.H.Q., vol. XVII, (1941), p. 317.

4. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 132.

5. Ibid. No. 131.

6. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 136.

7. Ibid. No. 139.

8. Banerji, Op. cit. I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), p. 316; Sarkar, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 474.

seek the protection of the English.¹ Najib fought with the Sikhs near Shamli and in the second fight, drove them out in April². The English promised Shah Alam that they would reinstate him, "after the rains". On Clive's suggestion, again, Shah Alam wrote a letter to George III and sent Aitizam-ud-din with Capt. Siviston to London.³

In May, Mahadji and Malhar were officially asked by the Peshwa to manage the Northern campaign and both the Peshwa and Raghoba had full confidence in Mahadji⁴. Gangadhar Govind was however doubtful of the legality of the letter of injunction issued by Mahadji against him.^{4-a} Malhar died on 26 May 1766⁵ at Alampur in Datia⁶ and the Peshwa expressed his grief.⁷ Malhar's grandson Maloji Holkar assumed authority but he being minor, Tukoji managed the state affairs and Malhar's saranjam excepting the pargana of Sironje in Prant Malwa, portion of Sirkar Bijagad and Tart Dapur in pargana Sanganner, was continued to him.⁸

After Malhar's death, Mahadji and Raghoba met in conference on c.27, May and Raghoba on c.9 June issued orders to all the Chawdharis and the Quanungoes to pay the revenue of Bhadawar to Kedarji and Mahadji.⁹ But still in June, the chieftenship was not settled in Mahadji's favour and Naro Pant, sometimes acted as Karbhari.¹⁰ Some still held that the son of Dattaji was the real heir to the Shinde

1. S.P.D. Vol.29, No.138; Oturkar, op.cit., No.143.

2. Sarkar, "Life of Najib-ud-daula, the last phase", I.S.C. vol.XIII, (1934), pp.242-247.

3. Srivatsava, op.cit., I.H.R.C.P., vol.XVII, (1940), p.138.

4. S.P.D. vol.29, No.142.

4-a. S.P.D. vol.39, No.65.

5. Banerji, op.cit., I.H.R. vol.XVII, p.315.

6. Phalke, op.cit. vol.I, No.281.

7. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhana, vol.I, No.254.

8. Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, No.282-281; sat.Raj.Diaf. vol.IX, No.175.

9. Chandrachud Daptar, vol.I, Nos.104, 105, 167; S.P.D. vol.39, No.66.

10. Chandrachud Daptar, vol.I, No.165.

estates.¹ In June, the Shindes were hardpressed for by monetary difficulties and their army clamoured for payment² and hence, Raghoba granted two provinces - Kachwa and Bhadawar to Mahadji and Kedarji for the maintenance of the army and asked them to render loyal service to the Peshwa in return³. Manaji also assured Raghoba of his full support and informed him of his preparations and those of Babaji Govind, Bahiro Anant and Viswas Laxman whom he expected to join at once.⁴ And on c.24. August, Raghoba had conferred the Phadnishi office of Kedarji on Moro Vithal Rairiker⁵.

The conference at Chaprah, on 8, June, was attended by Clive, Shuja, Balwant Sing, Shitab Rai, Munir-ud-din (Emperor's representative) and the agents of the Rohilla Chiefs and the Marathas and of the Jats.⁶ A firm alliance of the English and Shuja was established⁷ and Clive gave up the idea of an alliance with the Rohillas and other chiefs⁸. By the end of June, Hafiz's artillery crossed the Ganges and he approached Farukabad, but the Maratha army had not arrived⁹. Ahmad Khan had paid two lakhs of rupees to Raghoba and it was expected that when Raghoba would cross the Jumna, Hafiz would be brought to terms. Raghoba, siding with the Wazir had already asked Holkar, Gaikwad and Bhosle to join him¹⁰. But Himmat Khan and Ahmad Khan joined together in alliance of Kuran's faith. Najib marched to

1. Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol.III, No.116.

2. *E.P.D.*, vol.29, No.145.

3. *Ibid.*, vol.39, No.67.

4. *Ibid.*, vol.29, No.150.

5. Rajwade, *op.cit.*, vol.XIII, p.24, No.28.

6. Srivatsava, "The so-called Chapra Conference, June 1766", *I.A.C.*, vol.XIX, (1945), pp.168-69.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p.169.

9. *Hingane Daptar*, Vol.II, No.59.

10. *Ibid.*, vol.II, No.60.

Najibabad where Dundi Khan also would march.¹

Malharao Holkar, Janoji Bhosle and Damaji Gaikwad were, on 3, October, called by Raghoba² while the armies of the Peshwa, Mahadji and Naro Shankar were engaged in a severe battle before Gohad on 5 October³. Mahadji when he met Raghoba, intrigued for the Shinde chiefship and in that settlement Naro Shankar lost his diwanship, Shinde got Jhansi formerly held by him and it was secretly arranged that when Raghoba would go back, Kedarji would be excluded and Mahadji would be declared chief. Rairikars were paid for their loans given to Shinde and were given Karars for Bhusawal, Chopadgaon⁴. Aba Purandare must have worked for this arrangement, on behalf of Mahadji.

Clive wrote to the Secret Committee at Fort St. George about the only power in Hindustan (the Marathas) who had either the means or the inclination to disturb the English and advised the Committee to form an alliance with the Nizam against the Marathas.⁵ Raghoba was fighting the Gohad Rana in November but the Kararnama sent by Raghoba to Ahmad Khan in November was changed by Hingane and sent to Hafiz Rahmat's army. It was ordered that Hingane's sons would send back both these copies of the kararnama to Gohad.⁶ In October, the pretender of Jankoji gave Majma to Trimbakrao Chintaman.⁷

When Hingane, on 17, November, enquired whether Naro Shankar's

1. Ibid, vol. II, No. 61.

2. Ibid,

3. Ibid, No. 62.

4. Rajwade, op. cit, vol. XIII, pp. 24-25, No. 29.

5. Srivatsava, "The so-called Chopra Conference, June 1817-68", I.A.S. vol. XIX, (1945), p. 168.

6. Hingane Dantar, vol. II, Nos. 63, 64, 65.

7. Rajwade, op. cit, vol. XIII, p. 25, No. 30.

mediation was responsible for the negotiations being opened on the part of the Rana of Gohad, Raghoba replied that they were opened by the Rana through Mahadji and that they were all very busy over the settlement, for the five days preceeding.¹ Moro Baburao wrote, too, about the submission of the Rana and his desire to send his envoys to effect an agreement with the Marathas². The Rana had repulsed one of the Maratha attacks but he was prepared to settle the affairs by the payment of four or five lakhs of rupees to the Marathas in case they would march against Jats; but the Jats, too, had opened negotiations and Purshotam Mahadev Hingane had on 3, December gone to Farukabad to bring in Bangas. Hingane did not return in the early part of December. Naro Shankar being displeased left his practice of attending the Durbar regularly and was only seen there, after every four or eight days.³ On 24 November, it was reported that Raghoba, in spite of the advice otherwise, had attacked Gohad and it was then, with the mediation of Mahadji that the Rana agreed to pay fifteen lakhs of rupees to the Marathas⁴ and the siege operations were withdrawn⁵. Raghoba actually collected ten lakhs of rupees from Gohad and proposed to march to Deob⁶. Shinde submitted in December, the two provinces- Bhadawar and Kachhavadan to the Peshwa⁷.

1. Hingane Daptar, vol. II, No. 66.

2. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 160.

3. Hingane Daptar, vol. II, No. 67.

4. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol. IV, p. 203.

5. Ibid; Banerji, op. cit., I. H. 9, vol. XVII, (1941), p. 318; S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 160.

6. Chandrachud Daptar, vol. I, No. 120.

7. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 154.

The plan for a meeting between Raghoba and Jawahir was ineffective.¹ Raghoba, instead informed Balaji Govind, of Hingane's scheme, namely to attack Itawa fort of Hafiz Rahmat Khan with the help of Musa Mudad Phirangi.² Balaji was expected to proceed to Itawa with 2000 army. Mahant Ramkisan and Umsogir Gosawi, in the meanwhile, opened negotiations, on behalf of the Jat chief. Raghoba intended to proceed against Jawahir, who, however, concluded peace by surrendering the Maratha commanders, captured in March 1766.³

The English, the Marathas and the Nizam entered into an alliance against Haider Ali in December 1766⁴ and it was felt, "The allies having proposed a joint attack on Haider, it would be unwise to break with Raghoba, lest while peace reigns in the Deccan, Bengal should become the seat of war". It was again assured that the Marathas would not disturb the English though they might, by watching a proper opportunity, lay the petty zamindars under contribution.⁵ The abdali menace revived,⁶ and the British negotiated with Raghoba.⁷

Gohad lies between Etawa and Gwalior, twenty eight miles north-east of the latter;⁸ Trimbak Krishna reported on 1 February 1767 to Nana

1. Banerji, op.cit.

2. Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.68.

3. Ibid, No.69; Banerji, op.cit.

4. C.P.C. vol.I, Nos. 2783, 2784.

5. C.P.C. vol.I, Nos.2783, 2784.

6. Banerji, op.cit. vol.XVII, (1941), p.318; Srivastava, "Was the Abdali invasion of 1766-67 a real menace to Bengal", J.I.H. vol.XIX (1940) p.64; Sarkar, op.cit. vol.II, pp.496-501; Sardesai Memorial volume, pp.17-26.

7. Sinha, "Durani Menace and N.W.Frontier in 18th Century", I.H.Q. vol.X, p.632.

8. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.556.

Phadnis that Raghoba gave up the siege of Gohad and came to an understanding with the Rana through Mahadji, on 2 January 1767¹. Reza Khan and Shitab Rai informed the English that Ahmad Shah was invading India at the instigation of Mir Kasim and the Rohillas; that he had crossed the Attock and ^{was} within 60 cos of Lahore and Shitab Rai further informed that Mir Kasim had entered into Shahajahanabad with the intention of going to the Shah². Abdali, firstly, coming to the Punjab, naturally threatened Raghoba³. The Governor of Bengal wrote to Shuja on 15, January, that Abdali was marching and that "he may penetrate towards these parts as far as Shahajahanabad", but, "his progress would not extend further, should he bend his march this way, all the English forces would unite with Shuja's and inflict upon him an utter defeat".⁴ Shuja and the English asked Raghoba not to return to the Deccan⁵ and an alliance with him was pleaded⁶. Nana himself, too, wrote to Shuja and the Governor for the defensive alliance against Abdali.⁷ But Najib-, Dundi Khan, Hussain Rahamat Khan were to join Abdali and Col. Barker recommended forward policy when the English and the Wazir suspected the Emperor.⁸ Clive fixed up even the plan to meet Abdali on battlefield and was determined not to buy him⁹. However, Abdali had written to Nana that he was only marching to Patna and that he had no

1. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 164; G.P.C. vol. II, No. 12-B; Sardesai, op. cit., vol. II, p. 508;

2. Sinha, op. cit., I.H.Q. vol. X, (1934), p. 628.

3. Banerji, op. cit., I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), p. 318.

4. Heras, op. cit., Is.C. vol. XI, (1937), p. 502.

5. Banerji, op. cit., I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941) p. 318.

6. Ibid., p. 319.

7. Ibid.

8. Sinha, op. cit., I.H.Q. vol. X, (1934), p. 630.

9. Ibid., p. 639.

intentions against the Marathas¹. But nevertheless, Raghoba's wakil, Nilu Pandit was on 2 February on his way to Calcutta and Shitab Rai was asked by the Governor not to prevent him². Again, in February, the Rohillas, too were determined to join the Marathas and the Jats.³ Abdali wanted to punish the Sikhs and Raghoba did not exploit this opportunity for his own purpose⁴. But Janoji Bhosle, too, had negotiated with Calcutta for help against the Peshwa.⁵

On 4, February, the news arrived that Abdali had crossed the Attock and arrived at Behegi, ten cos from Rohtas on the other bank of the Jhelum and had a skirmish with the Sikhs. Raghoba, by repeated letters explained that if the desire of friendship was common, it was necessary that all the chiefs should contribute their quotas and enter into firm and faithful engagements. The vakils from the Emperor and the English came to Raghoba's camp for friendship⁶. Raghoba marched from the fort of Konwal and encamped opposite Churrah. Again, on 14, February, he set out on foot negotiations between the Rohillas, and the Jats and a meeting took place, in the proceedings of which Jawahir and Naro Shankar participated. Two cos beyond Raghoba's camp were encamped Naro Shankar and Megh Raj Shinde. Raghoba, Mahadji and Subal Rao had already taken up their positions.⁷

Jawahir had sent presents to Raghoba⁸, but the English judged well that if Abdali could not defeat the Sikhs, he would not penetrate

1. Banerji, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

2. *C.P.C.*, vol. II, Nos. 9, 23, 48.

3. *C.P.C.*, vol. II, No. 12, A.

4. Banerji, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

5. R.D. Banerji, "History of Orissa from the earliest times to the British period", *J.I.H.*, vol. XII, (1933), p. 139.

6. *C.P.C.*, vol. II, No. 16-A.

7. *Ibid.*, Nos. 12-A, 12-C, 12-D, 12-E.

8. *C.P.C.*, vol. II, 12-E.

further¹. Nevertheless they, too prepared themselves and gathered arms². Raghoba sent proposals to the Governor and hoped that he would move to that way with his army with all speed and that being united, Raghoba and the Governor might regulate the affairs of the empire³. Janoji however insisted that the Governor should send him the Chowth- as much money as possible, through Udepurigossain and whatever would be received by his hands at the river Narbada where Janoji was going to join Raghoba, would give him the highest satisfaction⁴. Raghoba offered to cooperate with the Wazir and the English to serve the Emperor and was elated when the Shuqast, Khilat and the jewels arrived from the Emperor. He proposed to share half and half all conquests with the Emperor but demanded the Doab, exclusively for the Marathas⁵. By the end of February, the English had already established an alliance with the Wazir; the Emperor, the Jat, the Rohillas and the Marathas against Abdali⁶. Raghoba's brother-in-law came to Allahabad and was in audience with the Emperor who gave him presents. He proposed to proceed to Gaya, after three days, thence, on c.1 March,⁷ On 1 March, the English sent two battalions to Sherajpur to remain there on the frontiers of Kora and the proposals offered by Raghoba to the Emperor were declared unacceptable on 7 March⁸. Najib had been in audience with

1. Sinha, op.cit., I.H.Q. Vol.X, (1934), p.632.

2. Ibid, pp.631-632.

3. C.P.C. vol.II, No.78.

4. Ibid, (17-2-1767).

5. Ibid, vol.II, No.107=A, 107-B (27-2-1767).

6. Sinha, op.cit., I.H.Q. vol.X, (1934), p.630, 629.

7. C.P.C. vol.II, 130-B.

8. Ibid, vol.II, 145.

Abdali and Abdali with Najib's brother, Afzal Khan, punished the Sikhs from the banks of the Sutlej¹. Shuja suggested to the English on 24, March to invite the Marathas to conquer the Rohillas, so that the Rajputs would join them against Abdali but Col. Barker feared that Shuja himself would join Abdali and hence suggested new plans². The Company proposed to raise the Mughal Cavalry to meet Abdali's superiority in cavalry³. By 25, March, the Marathas and the English were firmly united in the North and the English and the Wazir were determined to oppose anyone who would attempt to invade their part of the territory. Raghoba was advised, lest Abdali would think that he was running away to the Deccan through fear and lest he be disgraced in the eyes of the world, that immediately on the receipt of the letter from the Governor, he would return to the North⁴, as Raghoba on report of Abdali's approach had moved to Siroaj⁵. The English again had assured the Emperor against the Marathas⁶ and curiously enough Nana was extremely glad, as can be perceived from his letter of 27th March, to learn that the English desired to enter into an alliance with the Marathas and longed impatiently to attain the honour of a personal interview with the Governor⁷. The Wazir recommended on 30 March to the English, an alliance with the Marathas and the Jats, the bribing of Abdali and the punishment of the Rohillas, for their going over to Abdali⁸. George Vansittart

1. Sarkar, "Life of Najib-ud-daula, the last phase, 1761-70, I, 2, C. vol. VIII, (1934) p. 248.

2. Sinha, *op. cit.*, p. 631.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 632.

4. C.P.C. vol. II, No. 207.

5. C.P.C. vol. II, No. 213.

6. C.P.C. vol. II, No. 227.

7. C.P.C. vol. II, No. 224.

8. C.P.C. vol. II, No. 234.

explained the rumour to Mrs. Ann Palk on 3, April that Abdali had advanced within a few cos. of Delhi, at the head of one lakh horse. Abdali had written to the chiefs of the Empire to attend his court with money and troops and that it was his intention to occupy the throne of Hindustan¹. There was another rumour, too, that Abdali had set out from Delhi to invade the British possessions in Bengal². Shah Alam and the Nawab of Bengal had undertaken to pay Rs. 15000 cash every month on account of the expenses of the brigade, which was sent to Allahabad to defend the Emperor's lands and the Nawab's dominions.³ By 1, April, the Marathas were ready to cooperate, but had not concluded any treaty with the English and the English promised Shuja to conquer the Rohillas afterwards and not till the Abdali affairs were over.⁴ Col. Barker, in the meanwhile reported that Abdali was marching back⁵ and Abdali actually took on his project of going back and the Sikhs triumphed after him in the Punjab⁶.

Mahadji on 9, January 1767, had explained to Chinto Vithal that whatever that was settled at Mandawa had been fulfilled and that he was on good terms with Raghoba⁷. Raghoba carried intrigues with Mahadji and Holkar⁸ and the Peshwa instructed Naro Shankar to watch the situation and the insisted that Mahadji must remit money at once to the Maratha State⁹. Raghoba was forwarding regular reports of

1. Heras, op.cit., Is.C. vol. XI, (1937), p. 507.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. C.P.C. vol. II, No. 255.

5. Sinha, op.cit., I.H.Q. vol. X (1934), p. 633.

6. Heras, op.cit., Is.C. vol. XI, (1937) p. 507-508.

7. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. XIII, p. 26, No. 31.

8. S.P.D. vol. 19, No. 47.

9. Ibid., vol. 19, No. 46.

of his activities to the Peshwa¹ but the Peshwa had already suspected the evil designs of Raghoba². Mahadji, Kedarji and Kedarji's younger brother Ravloji were in correspondence over a domestic issue, a concubine by name Chapi, in February 1767³.

Gohad had been peacefully settled; the Jats were attacked and the revenue was collected from Kerowlikar Raja; Rajgad, Ravichi-wada and other various passes were secured. The Raja of Khichi offered the revenue, too to the Marathas. The Kurwai Bhavavagwalle Pathans had killed a Brahmin and so the fort was attacked and captured. Masangad, 6 cos. towards Bhalsa also surrendered. The Raja of Bhopal submitted, along with Kotah⁴. The Peshwa demanded that Mahadji must clear his accounts and asked him to pay - Rs.18,31,537½, threatening, that otherwise, the mahals of Mahadji would be confiscated⁵. Sindkhed was offered for management to the new Kamavisdar by Kedarji for Rs.22,000/-⁶. But Kedarji's wife and two female servants were imprisoned in the fort Lohgad⁷. The Peshwa asked Chinto Vithal why Mahadji was not proceeding to the Deccan and insisted that he must then go to Poona within eight days, thereof⁸. The Peshwa assured Chinto Vithal, further, that Mahadji would be relieved within twenty days, from Poona and still wondered

1. Ibid, No.44.

2. Ibid, No.45.

3. Phalke, op.cit, vol.I, Nos.283, 284, 285.

4. Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.70.

5. Parasni's Peshwa Records, vol.IV, No.48.

6. Rajwade, op.cit, vol.XII, p.49, Nos.82, 83.

7. Sat.Raj.Diar, vol.IX, No.178.

8. Rajwade, op.cit, vol.XII, p.50, No.85.

as to why Mahadji had not even started for the Deccan and finally declared that Mahadji was dangerous for his side, as well as, that of Raghoba. Thus it is revealed that Mahadji was, now, not at all keen about the settlement and that the Peshwa, however, was looking upon him as a new general for the Northern campaign¹. Still we find that Ragho Ram, Ragho Malhar, and Baji Narsinh were appointed to serve as Karbhari under Mahadji and a Nazar of Rs. five lakhs was levied from them. They were however, promised that in case they were deprived of their office before they could go out on a campaign, the Nazar would be returned by the Peshwa².

Mahadji donated a grant for religious purposes³ and he carried a transaction (?) involving Rs. 75000/- by this time⁴. Mahadji was referred to in the representation on the part of the Pawars for the settlement of percentage on revenues collected in the North⁵ and new Sanads were given to Krishoraji and Jivaji Pawar to have Rs. 12 share and they were instructed by the Peshwa to work under Mahadji⁶. Mahadji was buying the rifles from one Thakur Siva Singji in April⁷ and as regards the Shinde jagirs, Kedarji was invested with all powers and was to work under the nominal leadership of Mahadji⁸.

On 1st May, Janoji insisted on the Chowth from the English and awaited the treaty between the Marathas and the English and

1. *Ibid.*

2. Sat. Raj. Diar. vol. IX, No. 179.

3. Parasnis, Peshwa Records, Vol. VI, No. 10.

4. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. X, p. 25, No. 45.

5. Sat. Raj. Diar. vol. IX, No. 155.

6. Parasnis, Peshwa Records, Chap. II, No. 13.

7. Phalke, op. cit. vol. I, No. 286.

8. S. P. D. vol. 29, No. 176.

and there being several matters of importance being arranged to be discussed with Raghoba, he was accordingly advancing further and was then already encamped on the banks of the Nerbada¹. Jaywant Yeshwant Panse, in May, requisitioned Mahadji's forces in order to attack Pahadga². Mahadji and Kedarji, too, in May, were not on good terms and Tukoji Holkar was already given the robes of his office³. Trimbak Narayan reported these disputes to Vishwasrao Lakshman on 18 May,⁴. And Govind Raghunath reported to Vishwasrao Lakshman on 21, May, Mahadji's proposals to pay big sums to Raghoba and Naro Shankar⁵. Raghoba on 22, made arrangements for presenting the dresses of office to Mahadji, Kedarji, Baji Warsi and others, but, at the eleventh hour, cancelled the ceremony which caused great disappointment to all concerned⁶. Kedarji again referred to Chapi, the concubine whose affairs had been felt to be pressing as she had eloped with the ornaments of the Shinde family⁷ and gave orders to arrest all connected to Balaji Govind⁸. In June, the Peshwa at Poona was reported of the spirited attitude of Ahalyabai against the insinuations of Mahadji and possibly Raghoba; and the declaration of Tukoji as the chief of Holkar house, after the death of Malerao on 27, March 1767, which set aside his mother's claims, was referred to the Peshwa, too⁹.

1. C.P.C. vol. II, No. 381.

2. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 173.

3. Ibid, vol. 39, No. 84.

4. Ibid, vol. 29, No. 180.

5. Ibid, vol. 29, No. 181.

6. Ibid, vol. 39, No. 85.

7. Phalke, op. cit. vol. I, No. 287. .

8. Ibid, vol. I, No. 288.

9. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 186.

Mahadji appealed to Raghuba to settle the chiefship on him, and the Peshwa examined Mahadji's accounts, specially the Phadnisi accounts of Rairikar. Tukoji had gone to the Deccan, accompanied by Gangadhar Yeshwant alias Gangoba Tatya Chandrachud. Chandrachud was not on good terms with Ahalyabai and himself desired for the diwanship of Mahadji and hence tried to settle the Sardari disputes in Mahadji's favour, in the Court of the Peshwa. Mahadji, however, did not approve of this and wrote to Rairikar to keep his promise and informed the Peshwa that he was poor and pointed out that Rairikar, ~~was~~ alone would speak in his behalf. He had given the Sanads for all his mahals in "Swadesh" to Rairikar and had actually handed them over to Sadashiv Keshav. The Peshwa however, gave the Mutalaji of the Shinde family to Gangoba Tatya and the diwanship to Baji Narsi but Mahadji did not like the appointment of Gangoba¹. Kedarji gave accounts of Rs. 25000, on 7 June to Chinto Vithal Rairikar and this perhaps was a bribe to Rairikar to win him over to his side.² Devji Shamrao communicated to the Peshwa on 7, June, the investiture of Kedarji and Tukoji by Raghuba. Baji Narsingh demanded Rs. 12 lakhs from Kedarji but Raghuba resenting it, sent his forces against him. Mahadji, too, was in his camp, ready for any military action.³ Raghuba on c. 9th June gave Phadnisi of the Shindes to Rairikar.⁴ The Governor's letters were forwarded to Raghuba by this time⁵ and Viswas Lakshman explained

1. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, pp. 37-39, Nos. 45, 46, 47.

2. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, pp. 26-28, Nos. 32, 33 and Note on pp. 28-29.

3. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 182.

4. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIII, p. 29, No. 34.

5. G.P.C. vol. II, No. 429.

to Achyut, the newly appointed diwan of Mahadji, the conditions in Bundelkhand.¹

Raghoba had demanded the partition of the Maratha State on his return from Hindustan, but he could not stand against Madhav-rao Peshwa, in June 1767². Raghoba's vakil, Nilu Pandit was moving from Murshidabad to Allahabad³ and Raghoba's representations were considered in July at Calcutta⁴, Delhi,⁵ and in the Court of the Wazir, Kedarji on 1 July issued orders, warning everybody who would write to Mahadji in favour of Balaji Govind⁶. In July, Sakhubai transferred the Majma of Yedabad from Ramchandra Hari to Shauraj Hari⁸ and on 6 July, Kedarji gave Kamavisi of Sindkhed to Rairiker for Rs.22000/-⁹. Mahadji asked for a loan of Rs.25000/- from Chinto Vithal to provide his mother Chimabai with daily provisions and requested that Pedgaon should be given to her, for her maintenance.¹⁰ Mahadji, again, complained bitterly that his own mother had no means of livelihood and that she had to contract heavy debts to sustain herself and knew not how to repay them.¹¹

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1. S.P.D. vol.29, No.185.
 2. S.P.D. vol.19, No.49.
 3. G.P.C. vol.II, Nos.471-72.
 4. Ibid., vol.II, Nos.463, 638.
 5. Ibid., vol.II, Nos.466.
 6. Ibid., vol.II, Nos.467.
 7. Phalke, op.cit. vol.I, No.291.
 8. Rajwade, op.cit. vol.XIII, pp.29-30, No.35.
 9. Rajwade, op.cit. vol.XIII, pp.30-31, Nos.36, 37, 38.
 10. Ibid., vol.XIII, p.32, No.39.
 11. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.II, p.495.

Rezakhani was ready with his presents for the vakil of Raghoba, in July¹ and Madhavrao Peshwa had declared that he was satisfied with the accounts of Rairikar². Hundis for Rs.19,045/- were given to Chinto Vithal on Mahadji and Kedarji's accounts³ and the dissensions in the house of Shindes raged high, in August⁴. Rezakhani had delivered letters from Raghoba and Janoji to Mr. Sykes, to be forwarded to the Governor⁵. Raghoba informed the Governor that he had fixed up a day for consultation with Janoji, for regulating the affairs of the Empire⁶. The wazir was informed by the English that Raghoba had joined Janoji and that they had proposed to re-enter Hindustan and further, that Jawahir had enforced his pretensions to those districts which had acknowledged the authority of the Marathas⁷.

Janoji and Raghoba, in September, suddenly assumed hostile attitude towards the English and sent unfriendly letters to the Governor which he considered of course, as forged⁸. Mahadji, on 8 September wrote to Chinto Vithal that it was surprising how Chinto Vithal had not been able to reconcile Raghoba and the Peshwa. Mahadji declared that he was himself true to his contracts to Chinto Vithal and would proceed to the Deccan and settle all affairs⁹.

1. C.P.C. vol.II, No.483.

2. Rajwade, op.cit. vol.XIII, pp.32-35, Nos.40-41.

3. Ibid. vol.XIII, p.35, No.42.

4. S.P.D. vol.29, No.190.

5. C.P.C. vol.II, No.638.

6. Ibid. vol.II, No.540.

7. Ibid. vol.II, No.548.

8. Ibid. vol.II, No.558.

9. Rajwade, op.cit. vol.XIII, p.36, No.44.

Thereupon, Chinto Vithal wrote to Sakharan Bapu, communicating Raghoba's acceptance of the Peshwa's terms and the former's wish for an interview with the latter¹. The dispute was finally settled on 17 September², and on 19 September Chinto Vithal paid Rs.10,000/- to Chimabai³.

The Governor had not ratified till 22 September his treaty with Janoji⁴ and the English had, in the ^{last} week of September defeated Haider⁵. The Governor was prepared both for peace and war with the Bhosle⁶. The terms as regards the relation with Shinde and Holkar were settled between the Peshwa and Raghoba, in the last week of September⁷ and it was stipulated that these Sardars must see Raghoba at Anandvali everytime and take the instructions from him.⁸

The Company was afraid of the Marathas and tried to be friendly with the Nizam and the combination of the French and Haider was regarded as dangerous; hence the friendship with the Marathas was a necessity. It was stipulated again by Clive that "whatever power may be added to the Marathas by lessening that of Hyder Ali, may be recovered hereafter by an alliance with the Subah of the Deccan, who will soon begin to think coolly of his own interest"⁹. The Bombay Company was again advised to pay great attention to the position of Madhavrao Peshwa and it was to be observed if there had any family

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S. vol.II, No.315.

2. S.P.D. vol.19, No.59.

3. Rajwade, op.cit., vol XIII, p.33, No.39-A.

4. C.P.C. vol.II, No.579.

5. S.P.D.D. vol.9, 38-39 (col.Smith's report)

6. C.P.C. vol.II, No.583.

7. S.P.D. vol.19, No.62.

8. Sardesai, Itihasik Palrayvohar, 109.

9. S.P.D.D. vol.9, 18.

dispute or other objects to keep him engaged during the years to follow¹. The Bombay ^{Company} explained in September: "you may rely on our doing everything we can, consistent with our situation upon this coast, to promote the success of your operations against him and the Subah and shall immediately pursue such measures as may appear to us most eligible for answering your intentions in respect to the Marathas, which we, shall be better enabled to do from a difference which is likely to arise between Madhavrao and his uncle Raghoba and which we shall do our utmost to foment and embrace any other opportunity which may offer for drawing off their attention from the Carnatic"². Udepuri Gossain on 6 October requested the Governor of Bengal to send him to Nagpore to settle affairs³ and to set somebody against Hyder in Bednore and the Marathas, too, were approached by Mostyn for alliance against Hyder⁴. Mostyn was instructed to encourage any advances so as to draw from Raghoba some proposals, if possible⁵. The Peshwa learnt of a rupture between the wazir and the English and on 22 November offered to assist the wazir, provided he assigned Bengal to the Marathas⁶. The wazir, however, rejected such designs⁷. Raghoba followed a policy of repression⁸, but, in December, by the mediation of Sakharam Bapu, a conference took place between Raghoba and Madhavrao⁹ and Mostyn reported to Bombay that a truce was established and that Madhavrao's affairs

1. S.P.D.D. vol.9,4-19.

2. S.P.D.D. vol.9,22.

3. G.P.C. vol.II, No.595.

4. S.P.D.D. vol.9,50;

5. Ibid. vol.9,58 (Instruc.to Thomas Mostyn).

6. G.P.C. vol.II, No.667.

7. Ibid., No.668.

8. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.439, Note No.222.

9. Grant Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.556.

seemed to be in a flourishing way and that he, at least for that year, was immune from any danger or disturbances from that quarter.¹

Mostyn reported to Bombay on 5 December: "Madhavrao incensed by his mother Gopikabai had certainly intentions of seizing his uncle ~~of~~ Raghoba and keeping him a prisoner, in his last visit to him but Raghoba getting notice of it, refused having an interview with him and acquainted him, he should be upon his defence unless he met him alone. Sakharam Bapu, Madhavrao's diwan and Raghoba's secret friend then interfered and brought about a reconciliation at least for the present and Raghoba on condition he does not ever again interfere in the affairs of Government is permitted to hold possessions of forts and countries of Trimbak, Dulup, Keranda, and Puta with seven others of little note, but all situated in the districts of Trimbak, the yearly revenue of which is computed at 25 lakhs; in three months to discharge arrears due to his army. This reconciliation is by many judged, will last no longer than until Raghoba is in want of cash or Madhavrao's affairs take a different turn, for they seem now in flourishing condition."²

Raghoba had informed Ahalyabai on 10 June 1767 to carry the state affairs as per his instructions from the neighbourhood of Ujjain when he had Mahadji, Bhosle, Gaikwad, Dabhade in his camp³. Mahadji was asked by Raghoba to march to Indore but Mahadji retorted that personally he was the servant of the Peshwa and would never allow

1. S.P.D.D. vol.9,62, (Mostyn to Bombay).

2. Forest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 147.

3. Sardesai, Madhyvibhag, vol.IV, p.206.

his army¹ to be exploited for such a type of work². Gangadhar Yeshwant and Raghoba, desiring to settle the succession to Malhar, wanted Tukoji, after Malharao's death, to pay a nazar of sixteen lakhs of rupees³. Mahadji and Janoji upheld Ahalyabai's claims⁴ and Mahadji himself arrived in Indore and submitted his own accounts.⁵ The Peshwa finally accepted Ahalyabai's claims⁶. Ahalyabai earlier had humiliated Raghoba⁷ but now Gangadhar was dismissed and Raghoba was entertained⁸. Tukoji paid a nazar to the Peshwa's Government, on being appointed the commander of Malhar's troops, which amounted to Rs.15,62,000/-⁹.

Madhavrao pointed out on 9 December to Chinto Vithal that Shinde's promise to proceed to the Deccan within 1½ months was not fulfilled and that he was still at Ujjain. Baji Narsinh was declared the diwan of Mahadji and he was expected to work in the name of Naro Shankar¹⁰. The Peshwa on c.11, December confirmed the Khasgi and Daulat of Holkar on Ahalyabai and sent sanad and the dress of honour in Tukoji's name, to whom Ahalyabai recommended for the Government service¹¹. By 11 December new arrangements were also under consideration for the settlement among the Peshwa, Raghoba and Shinde¹². Mahadji on 11 December wrote to the Peshwa from

1. Ibid.

2. Banerjee, "Revival of the Maratha power in the North, 1761-69", I.H.Q. vol.XVII, (1941), p.319.

3. Sat.Raj.Dier, vol.IX, No.176.

4. Banerjee, op.cit., p.330.

5. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.441.

6. Banerjee, op.cit.

7. Ibid., p.319.

8. Ibid.

9. Grant Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.555.

10. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIII, p.46, No.69.

11. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.13.

12. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.442, Note.No.223.

Burhanpur, disapproving the Peshwa's settlement of ten lakhs of rupees for the chiefship, on the word of Ragho Ram and Baji Narsingh. He informed the Peshwa that he ought to have waited for his arrival as he was already on his way thither.¹

It was reported to Bombay Government that the common observation was, there would be no peace between Raghoba and the Peshwa and that Raghoba was waiting for Janoji and Mahadji². Shinde and Holkar had already signed the joint kararnama to pay off fifty lakhs of rupees to the Peshwa within three years and all exploits from the Hindustan campaign were to be distributed as 24 p.c. to the Peshwa, 5 p.c. to Raghoba, 23½ p.c. to Holkar, 23½ p.c. to Mahadji and 23½ p.c. to all other Sardars that might join³. Mahadji had written to Sakharan that Chinto Vithal would speak to him and the Peshwa for him.⁴ Earlier Mahadji was reconciled to Raghoba by Nilkanth Mahadev Purandars⁵. Mahadji had accompanied Raghoba on his way back to the bank of the Nerbada and thence despatched Nilo Gopal to Sakharan⁶. Kedarji was changing the Kamavisdars of the "Swadesh" and Sindhihed⁷. Madhavrao Peshwa had already written to the Company at Bombay that his power was supreme over the Maratha State as ceded by Raghoba, and the principal officers - Shinde, Holkar and Pawar were called before him and that he had given them all orders to be ready with their army⁸.

1. Rajwade, *op.cit.*, vol. XIII, pp. 45, 46, No. 60.

2. *S.P.D.D.* vol. 9, 30-31.

3. Sardesai, *Madhyavibhag*, vol. IV, p. 241.

4. Rajwade, *op.cit.*, vol. XIII, p. 43, Nos. 55, 56.

5. Rajwade, *op.cit.*, vol. XIII, p. 33, No. 48.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*, vol. XIII, Nos. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54.

8. *S.P.D.D.* vol. 9, 33.

Mahadji had earlier, even sought advice of Chinto Vithal whether he should join Raghoba at Anandwali, on his return to the Deccan, or he should proceed directly to the Deccan.¹ But by 2 November, Mahadji was sincerely loyal to the Peshwa². The Peshwa too, was befriending Mahadji³, and the last letter from Kedarji was received on 4 November 1767. Nothing is known about Kedarji's death⁴. Mahadji joined Madhavrao on c. 19 December 1767 against Raghoba⁵. The Peshwa sent the dresses of honour to the officers of Mahadji, on 31 December 1767.⁶

Jawahir conquered the new Maratha acquisitions as soon as Raghoba turned his back to Hindustan⁷ and by 6 November 1767, Jawahir and Bijesing opened the front against the Marathas and Najib. But Madhosing resented the elevation of the Jat chief and insulted him. Jawahir, at once attacked Jaipur⁸. He also sent Padre Don Pedro to Calcutta for an alliance against the Marathas but the Padre was recalled on account of the dissensions among the Jats.⁹ In December,

1. Kedarji died at Oudh near Poona and his wife had gone to Mahadji for support in June 1768, and of course, he had died earlier. Mahadji himself made a request that she should be released from Lohagad and that she should live under his protection. Mahadji assigned eight villages in the Pargana Jittur to one Tuljabai Shinde. He also gave a village in Pargana Srigonda to Sakhubai, - Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol. I, No. 296; *Sat. Raj. Bhar.*; vol. IX, Nos. 182, 183; *S.P.D.* vol. 29, No. 228.

1. Rajwade, *op.cit.*, vol. XIII, P. 44, No. 57.

2. *Ibid.*, No. 58.

3. *S.P.D.* vol. 39, 93.

4. Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol. I, No. 296.

5. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, vol. II, p. 525.

6. *S.P.D.* vol. 22, No. 187.

7. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol. II, p. 475.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 523; *Chahar Gulzar Shu'bi*, Elliot, vol. VIII, p. 225.

9. Banerjee, *op.cit.*, I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), p. 320.

Jaipur was defeated by the Jats.¹ On 1 December again, Col. Smith had reported to Calcutta that the Marathas had not yet determined to return to Hindustan². In the first week of December, Trimbakrao Hama had been to Benares and Prayag and had an interview with the English there. He proposed to enter into an alliance of the English, Shuja and the Marathas to expel the Jats, the Rohillas and other petty Rajas to the Northward.³ Mahadji, Tukoji, Naro Shankar, Shivaji Vithal (the son of Vithal Shivdev) were appointed the Commanders of about 50000 horse for that part of Hindustan, by the same time. The last three were, then near Poona but their forces were not yet assembled. It was expected, however, that they would set out in a few days thereafter as by the advices arrived few days preceeding, the Maratha forces under Mahadji had met with a small defeat by the Jats.⁴ But the Jats, in turn, too, were defeated⁵ and the English were afraid of the Marathas while Shuja wanted the English to help him to be supreme in Bundelkhand⁶. The Emperor also applied to the English on c.16, December to get the fort of Agra. Jawahir and Bijesing, the Marwar Raja, were together and had sixty to seventy thousand horse in the field. They were endeavouring to prevail on Bundelot and wanted Madhosing of Junnagar to enter into an alliance with them with an intent to march that way.⁷ Mahadji himself had marched to Bundi

1. Ibid, p.321.

2. Ibid, p.322.

3. S.P.D.D. vol.9, 65, (Mostyn to Bombay).

4. S.P.D.D. vol.9, 62; Banerjee, op.cit., I.H.Q. vol.XVII, (1941), pp.320-321.

5. Sarkar, op.cit. vol.II, p.479.

6. Banerjee, op.cit., I.H.Q. vol.XVII, (1941), p.321.

7. Forest, op.cit., vol.I, 150.

from Agra,¹ but the other Maratha chiefs, appointed for the campaign by the Peshwa, had ^{not} left Poona, in spite of the fact that they had their audience of leave. They were requesting the Peshwa for a larger force as they thought the twenty thousand horse which they were allowed to take, besides the sixteen thousand that were there already, would not be sufficient to withstand the united forces of the enemy. Shuja still was insisting, in December, on an alliance of the Rohillas, Ahmadkhan Bangash and the Jats, with the English against the Marathas². The English approved Shuja's anti-Maratha plans even though the Peshwa far from disturbing the English, sent a wakil with voluntary offers of co-operation against the Nizam and Haider³. Fortunately, for the Marathas, their enemies were too jealous of each other to combine.³

1. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.444 and Note No.224.

2. Banerjee, op.cit., p.321.

3. Banerjee, op.cit., I.H.Q. vol.XVII, (1941), p.321.

CHAPTER- III.

FROM TUTELAGE TO RENOWN.

31st December 1767 to 27th December 1774.

1

In January 1768, the Sikhs invited Shah Alam to Delhi. Chinto Vithal and other karbharis from Poona assured Viswas Lakshman, who had been soliciting the Poona Durbar to take steps against the growing menace of the Jats and others, that the forces under Shinde and Holkar would be despatched towards the North, at an earlier date.² On the morning of Monday, 4th January 1768, Mahadji, who commanded the Maratha forces in Hindustan, arrived at the Sangam and the Peshwa went to receive him.³ On Thursday, 14th, the Poona Durbar was so much engaged in settling their accounts with Mahadji and to appoint him again to the command of the troops in Hindustan that Mostyn had not it in his power to see any of the ministers, who were all the while in the Durbar⁴. On the evening of Sunday, 17th January Mahadji received his Sirpai and was given the audience of leave to return to Hindustan with the Chief command⁵. The Peshwa, however, gave to Mahadji strict orders not to loiter but to march immediately.⁶

1. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, p. 550.

2. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 168.

3. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, p. 161; Sardesai, Madhyvibhag vol. IV, p. 181.

4. Forrest, op.cit., vol. I, p. 164.

5. Ibid.

6. Banerjee, op.cit., I: H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), pp. 322-323.

Raghoba had only two hundred horse in his pay in January 1768 but since his accommodation with the Peshwa, he had discharged the greatest part of his troops so that it might appear to the world that he was sincere but, as soon as he would be sure of the assistance from the English, he had the intention to collect his troops again.¹ The Peshwa and Narayanrao had been to Kalas on 29 January to consult Mahadji and Mahadji offered them presents.² Mahadji's affairs were still discussed on 2 February and he was given a send off³. On 15 February, Balaji Shankar from Poona wrote to Viswas that Mahadji and Tukoji had received orders to march to the North and that they had already set out on their March.⁴ Mahadji on 28 February, sent Sanad for Viswasrao.⁵ When Mahadji was given conge' by the Peshwa, Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna arrived in Poona. They would be sent to Hindustan, too.⁶ The Peshwa ordered Gangadhar Yeshwant on 19 March to restore Bapuji Mahadev and Purshottam Mahadev to former duties in Delhi.⁷ Tukoji informed the Peshwa that he would start northward as soon as Mahadji and Krishnarao joined him.⁸

Mahadji gave the Majmu of Ratlam to Bapuji Gopal, taking it from Chinto Vithal on c.6 April.⁹ Mahadji Ballal informed Viswas Lakshman on 7 April that Mahadji and Tukoji were ordered by the Peshwa to march to the North to quell the disturbances which the

1. Forrest, *op.cit.*, vol.I, p.167.

2. *S.P.D.* vol.22, No.192.

3. *S.P.D.* vol.29, No.200.

4. *Ibid*, vol.29, No.210 201.

5. *Ibid*, vol.29, No.202.

6. *B.H.R.I.* (1929-1930), p.108.

7. Sardesai, *Shindeshahichi Rajkarne*, *S.H.S.* vol.II, No.319.

8. *S.P.D.* vol.29, No.205.

9. Rajwade, *op.cit.*, p.46, No.61, vol.XIII.

addressee had reported.¹ on 26 May Mahadji had set out from Bid and had gone to Srigonda.² Raghoba instructed his son, Amrutrao, to call the required individuals and finish the concerted project in the course of the day (?)³. On 31 May, the Peshwa was at Dhangar Takli and was accompanied by Gaikwad. Mahadji and Gopalrao had come nearer, too and were to join the Peshwa, on the next day Mahadji's army was already of 4000 troopers and he expected it to be of 10/12 thousand troopers, within fifteen days, thereafter. Raghoba with Tukoji was heading his army of 5/6 thousand troopers, too.⁴ The villages held in Saranjam, in Inam and by tenure, by Tukoji were confiscated by the State⁵ and the Kamavisdar of Tarna Pargana was warned by Ahalyabai against making payments of notes sent by Tukoji from his camp without her sanction.⁶

Madhavrao had now collected twenty-thousand troops, including the troops of Mahadji, at Dhodap.⁷ In this battle of Dhodap, on 11 June 1768, Raghoba was defeated by Madhavrao who was helped by Mahadji.⁸ A treaty was contracted next day and Shinde's Phadnishi was also settled.⁹ But it was stipulated that Tukoji had inclined towards Madhavrao, from the very beginning¹⁰. Mahadji now settled his problems as per his desire. Raghoram Page from Bangani near

1. S.P.D. vol.29, No.174.
2. Phalke, op.cit, vol.III, No.446.
3. Sardesai, op.cit, S.H.S. vol.II, No.322,
4. Itihas Sankirne Sahitya, vol.II, No.227; Phalke, op.cit, vol.III, No.446.
5. Sat.Raj.Diar, vol.IX, No.180.
6. Holkar Shahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.9.
7. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol.IV, p.111.
8. S.P.D. vol.19, Nos.84, 88; Oturkar, op.cit, No.145.
9. Phalke, op.cit, vol.III, Nos.448, 449.
10. Sardesai, op.cit, vol.IV, p.iii; Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren No.218.

Islampur marched on Mahadji but was defeated and killed.¹

Jawahir was assassinated in July 1768² and Ratan Sing succeeded him.³ But there ensued forth the war of succession among the Jats which solicited the Maratha intervention.⁴ Naval Sing and Bhawani Sing went with the Maratha army towards Malwa and Ujjain⁵. The Emperor forwarded on c.16 June to the Governor, the Arjis he received from Ali Naqikhan, the vakil of the Marathas and Mahadji Shinde and the Emperor, further asked for advice as regards the replies to those Arjis.⁶ Mahadji wrote to the Emperor that Malhar Rao Holkar was always ready to help the Emperor; now that he was dead, since Man is mortal, Mahadji and Tukoji had girded up their loins for the royal cause, in Malhar's place and hoped by the excellences of their services to give a new aspect to the Emperor's affairs. They, with a powerful army, would attend the Emperor's sacred presence. They had then dispatched Indra Pandit, Jaswant Rao and Abilich with a competent force towards Hindustan and that if the Emperor desired to go to Delhi for his throne, they pointed out, that was the opportunity and again pleaded that it ought not to be missed for "time is like the arrow which when once shot from the bow, returns not again"⁷.

Madhav Rao fined Malhar's former diwan, Gangadhar Yeshwant to the tune of 30 lakhs of rupees, for participating in Raghoba's

1. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.150.

2. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol.IV, p.193; Chahar Gulzar Shujai, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.226, Majmaul Akhbar, Elliot, vol.III, p.365.

3. Ibid.

4. Chahar Gulzar Shujai, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.227.

5. Ibid.

6. C.P.C. vol.II, No.1006.

7. C.P.C. vol.II, No.1007.

cause and even a corporal punishment was inflicted, at noon on 31 July.¹ Mahadji had 50,000 troops on 9 August² and the robes of honour were offered to him on 15 August 1768.³

Visaji, Mahadji, Tukoji and Ramchandra were ordered to march into Hindustan on c.19 August 1768⁴. Madhavrao had addressed on 31 August to Shitab Rai⁵ to secure passage for his mother who was to pay her devotions at Gaya and the Peshwa was satisfied in just instructing Nana to watch the movements and dealings of Raghoba⁶. On 25 November, Tukoji wrote to Ramchandra that he would soon be marching to take up his command in the North⁷. The Peshwa ordered on 6 December the confiscation of the villages assigned to the ladies of the Shinde family and made them over to his brother⁸. Mahadji on 14 December set out on march and encamped at Kalia Dev. Bajaba was expected to join him within two or three days and then the march would be resumed.⁹

Thus by the end of 1768, the Marathas, profiting by the disappearance of their enemy - Abdali and having arranged their intestine disputes, crossed the Chambal - a river flowing eastward into the Jumna from the Ajmer plateau and fell upon the Jaypur country.¹⁰ But earlier, the period of some eight years, from 1761 to

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1. Sardesai, "Present needs of Maratha History," I.H.R.C.P. vol. XII, (1929), pp. 24, 25 (Eye-witness writing from Poona on 5 Aug 1768).
 2. S.P.D. vol. 19, No. 92.
 3. Sardesai, Madhyvibhag, vol. IV, p. 208.
 4. Parasnisi, Itihasik Charitra, (Visaji Krishna Binivale) X, p. 113.
 5. C.P.C. vol. II, No. 1105.
 6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, SHS, vol. II, No. 321.
 7. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 219.
 8. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 221.
 9. Phalke, op.cit., vol. III, No. 451.
 10. Keene, Fall of the Moghul Empire, p. 87.

the end of 1768, marks the tutelage of Mahadji and in the beginning of 1769, he emerges as a man of destiny on the pages of history.¹

The Peshwa opened war on the Bhosle² and on 3 January 1769, Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna wrote to Purshottam Hingane that they were in Berar with the Peshwa's army at Sakherkheda, expecting within eight to fifteen days to settle the Bhosle's accounts and to march into Hindustan.³ In the first fortnight of 1769, Moroba Phadnis was all powerful in Poona.⁴ After this campaign, the Peshwa sent, thus, this army into Malwa.⁵ Ramchandra Ganesh was the general and Visaji Krishna his subordinate⁶. The Sardars- Mahadji and Tukoji -joined with 15000 troops each, later on.⁷ Mahadji was firmly established in power.⁸ The Marathas wanted to "frame a scheme with Shuja for conducting Shah Alam with a combined escort of the English, Maratha, Jaipur, Rohilla and Oudh troops to Agra wresting that fort from the hands of the Jats, installing the Emperor at Delhi and stripping the up-start Jat kingdom of all its annexations under Suraj and Jawahir, earlier". But, "it fell still-born from the wise refusal of the English to venture so far from their base"⁹. "The aims of the Maratha campaign were to realise the war indemnity due from the Jat kingdom according to the treaty of 26 May 1754 and to recover the lands assigned by the Delhi Government during Imad-ul Mulk's vazir-ship as the

1. Sardesai, New History of the Maratha, vol. II, p. 496.

2. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. X, p. 34, No. 61.

3. Hingane Daptar, vol. II, No. 71.

4. Khare, op. cit., vol. IV, No. 821.

5. Duff, op. cit., vol. II, p. 562.

6. Khare, Adhikar-yog, p. 84, Duff. op. cit.

7. Khare, Itihasik Lekh Sangraha, vol. IV, p. 1875.

8. Kincaid, Parnis, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 98-99.

9. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, p. 480.

price of the Maratha armed help upto 1754".¹

On 13 January 1769, it was reported that Raghoba when in custody went one day to the Parvati temple and attempted escape.² There was a false story in circulation that in the war of succession in Mewar, Mahadji was paid Rs. 1½ crores, in January³; but the Peshwa had issued orders to Nana on c. 20 January to restore to Mahadji the province of Yedlabad which belonged to him but which was confiscated by the Peshwa⁴. Sadashivrao Bhau's pretender, as per the information forwarded on 21 January was taken by Ramji Rao Jadhav to the Jat's territory-Alwar. He was released by the Jat, after one year. He was plundered and kept in prison, near Jaynagar. His retinue was ordered to be put to death but he effected his escape. Mohansing Raja, in the Deccan, recognised Sadoba and welcomed him. Two thousand Jogis were already enlisted in his army. Sadoba planned a distant project of conducting himself with these Jogis to Poona. Raghoba and the Peshwa issued orders to kill him. The Jogis accepting 60,000 rupees handed him over to Raghoba and he was brought to Nasik. The Peshwa called him to Poona and Sadoba was imprisoned in Dhangar fort. The Peshwa was convinced on trial that he was a pretender; even his officers advised the Peshwa to put Sadoba to death; however, the Peshwa sent Sadoba to Ahmadnagar fort. The Nizam and others were ready to help Sadoba. Sadoba proposed to send money, too, to the English and to present to them all the

1. Sarkar, *op.cit.*, vol. III, pp. 6-7.

2. *Itihasik Sankirna Sahitya*, vol. II, N. 228.

3. Sarkar, *op.cit.*, vol. II, p. 518.

4. *S.P.D.* vol. 39, No. 103.

country on the sea-coast formerly possessed by the Portuguese and looked upon himself as the honourable company's servant.¹ On 21 January Sadoba, however, was in Ahmadnagar fort.²

Mahadji had planned to subjugate the Rohillas and the Pathans and to humble Shuja and the English. But there were disputes about the mamlat of Patan (in Mahadji's Swaraj) and Mahadji was involved in these disputes, in January 1769;³ the Peshwa was already displeased with Ramchandra⁴. On c.30, January, the Peshwa had ordered the confiscation of the property of Raghoram who marched against Mahadji, his master but suffered death in the affray⁵. On 3 February, Mahadji Ballal (Phadke) informed the Peshwa that the Bhosle was heading towards Chanda. Ismail Khan who was all powerful in Berar was friendly towards the Bhosle. Mahadji, however, was at Ujjain, fighting Raghoram, as mentioned⁶ and was, on 16 February displeased with Vishnu Mahadev who interfered with his policy towards Udepur and advised support to the new claimant Ratansing.⁷

The Peshwa was five cos. from Dargad Chanda on 21 February and Janoji Bhosle marched towards Poona when Raghoba, Anandibai, Parvati-bai, Ramabai were to proceed to Purandar. Gopikabai and Narayan were to proceed to Trimbakeshwar. Devrao Mahadev, at this time, was appointed vakil at Shuja's court by the Peshwa⁸ and on 25 February

1. S.P.D.P. vol.X, pp.20-23.

2. Ibid., vol.X, p.20.

3. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.452.

4. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.453 and Note No.225; No.297 and No.167.

5. S.P.D. vol.29, No.229.

6. S.P.D. vol.20, No.218.

7. Ibid., vol.38, No.185.

8. Hingane, Daptar, vol.II, Nos.72,73.

news of Abdali's return was in circulation and already there were lurking suspicions from Shuja, entertained by the English¹. In March, however, Ramchandra and Visaji set out on their march² and Mahadji and Tukoji were to put an end to the Jat activities³. The English had, by 5 March, concluded a new treaty with Shuja and they also received proposals from the Peshwa to reduce Bedmore⁴. On 6th Raghoba was given some proposals by the Peshwa⁵ and Janoji made repeated appeals to Shah Alam, "for a general union and confederacy against the Peshwa", and also asked for the English help^{5B}. Haider tried his utmost to remain on terms of friendship with the English and Muha^ummad Ali⁶. A treaty was concluded by the English with Shuja to send him such force as to render his position respectable but that, of course, was in comparison to other powers in Hindustan. The Peshwa was apprehended to join Hyder, so a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Janoji by the English was under consideration⁷. Abdali led an invasion into the Punjab in 1769, but whether the news of this invasion was genuine in its nature or merely the fruit of imagination, we have no means to verify⁸. On 21 March, there was news that Abdali was going back to Attack from Lahore region⁹. In the last week of March, the treaty between the Peshwa and the Bhosle^u was ratified at Kanakpur, against the English¹⁰.

1. Sinha, *op.cit.*, I.H.Q. vol.X, (1934), p.634.

2. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, vol.II, p.509.

3. *S.P.D.* vol.29, No.224.

4. *S.P.D.* vol.10, p.45

5. Chatterji, "Failure of Anglo-Maratha relations regarding the cession of Cuttack", *I.H.R.C.P.* vol.XV, (1938), p.83.

5. Phalke, *op.cit.*, Nos.456, 457.

6. Sinha, "Haider's relations with British Government", *I.H.Q.*, vol.XV, (1939), p.64.

7. *S.P.D.* vol.X, p.53.

8. Sinha, *op.cit.*, I.H.Q. vol.X, (1934), p.633.

9. *Ibid.*, p.634.

10. Sardesai, "Treaty of Kanakpur, between Madhavrao and Janoji", *I.H.R.C.P.* vol.XI, (1928), p.37; *S.P.D.* vol.X, pp.76-77.

The Jats in Bundelkhand were powerful and Balaji Govind sustained reverses against the Jats by Dana Shah, brother-in-law of Navalsing and the Regent after the death of Jawahir.¹ In the South, Haider, on 12 April, appeared before Madras and forced the Madras Government to sign a treaty with him.² The Peshwa wrote to Nana on 15 April, highly commending the steps that he took to prevent Raghoba, breaking away from his confinement.³

It was reported by Baji Govind on 11 April, that already, Mahadji and Tukoji were viewing each other's interests with suspicion.⁴ Nevertheless on c.17, April, a kararnama was signed by both of them with Maharaoji Gumansinghaji.⁵ On 30 April, Tukoji ordered the Kamavisdar of Pargana Tarana that the management of three villages in the Pargana under Khargi was to be handed over to Givaji Bhagwan.⁶ Tukoji's highhandedness resulted in a severe dispute with Ahalya, when he was with Mahadji, in Udepur.⁷ Balaji Govind wrote on 5 April that Mahadji had collected 60 lakhs of rupees as tribute from Udepur and had encamped for cantonment.⁸ Mahadji again was soon expected to join Tukoji to proceed against the Jats.⁹ But as per the information of Khandoji Argade, a Sardar of Tukoji, Mahadji had not joined Tukoji, as late as 4th December and that it was then that he was expected to join Tukoji within eight to fifteen days.¹⁰

1. S.P.D. vol.29, Nos.173, 208.

2. S.P.D.D. vol.X, pp.77-82, (Madras to Bombay)

3. Shindeshahichi Rajkarne, SH3, vol.II, No.323.

4. S.P.D. vol.20, No.271.

5. Phalke, op.cit. vol.II, No.76.

6. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.20.

7. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.X, p.35, No.62.

8. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol.IV, p.208.

9. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol.IV, p.208.

10. Ibid, p.209.



Mahadji received the fief of Gwalior from the Peshwa.¹ In April, peace was established between the Peshwa and Raghoba². Mahadji was, on 20 April, beyond Bari near Udepur³. He had marched from Ujjain to Udepur in order to support the cause of Ratansing. He encamped at Bhaurasa, 16 m.e. of Sisodia capital.⁴ When Ramchandra had arrived on the banks of the Nerbada, on c. 16 May,⁵ Tukoji went to kotah but Mahadji invited him, whereupon Tukoji sent 2000 of his troops, leaving the rest at Separa (c.10 May). Yeshwantrao Bable tried to buy Mahadji's support to Arising and Mahadji tarried and Tukoji despatched long letters of protest against his policy and called back his contingent to Kotah on 2nd June⁶. This was a time when Ramchandra should have marched and reconciled them (c.14 May)⁷. The Marathas collected ten lakhs of rupees from Rajputana⁸.

On 21 May, the Peshwa issued instructions to his brother to restore the confiscated property to Sakhubai and Sagunabai (the wife of Jyotaji)⁹. The division of Hindustan among Mahadji, Tukoji and the Peshwa was established¹⁰. In recognition of the loyalty and faithful services of late Jayaji, some villages were granted in Inam to his widow, Sakhubai by the Peshwa¹¹ and a similar grant was made to Sagunabai¹².

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1. Abdul Ali, op.cit, I.H.R.C.P. vol.XII, (1929), p.110.
 2. Phalke, op.cit, vol.III, No.457.
 3. Ibid, No.458,
 4. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, p.520.
S.P.D. vol.29, No.234.
 5. Banerjee, op.cit, I.H.Q. vol.XVII, (1941), p.323.
 6. Sarkar, op.cit, vol.II, p.520, Ibid.
 7. S.P.D. vol.29, No.233.
 8. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit, vol.III, p.69.
 9. S.P.D. vol.29, No.235.
 10. Parasnis, Peshwe Records, V. 2. .
 11. Sat.Raj.Diar, vol.IX, No.184.
 12. Ibid, No.185.

and Bhagirthibai, the widow of Dattaji.¹ The parganas Dharangaon and Bhadawe were given to Mahadji in exchange for Sindhkhade.²

Shivaji Vithal Vinchurkar was accompanying Mahadji to help Ratanchand in May.³ But Mahadji was deciding to give up Ratansing's cause, as Ratansing had no money. On the other hand, Arising was prepared to pay 35 lakhs of rupees (25 lakhs to the Peshwa and 10 lakhs to the two Sardars). Mahadji remained inactive and took no steps to deliver an assault on Udepur. At last Arising agreed to pay 64 lakhs of rupees as contribution and five lakhs more as present to Mahadji and to alienate 1½ lakhs worth of jagir in favour of Ratansing.⁴ Thirty-three lakhs were paid immediately and for the balance some districts were left to be jointly administered by the Rajput and the Maratha officers.⁵ Ratansing died about this time, too.⁶

On his return from Mewar, Tukoji besieged Raghogad.⁷ On c.3 June, he wrote to Ramchandra and Visaji, communicating his plans and expressing his disagreement with Mahadji with whom he found impossible to co-operate.⁸ On 8 June, Dado Malhar informed Nana that the differences between Mahadji and Tukoji had not yet then been made up and that Mahadji was encamped before Udepur.⁹ The Peshwa

1. Ibid., No. 186.

2. Ibid., No. 187.

3. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 237.

4. Banerjee, op.cit., I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), p. 323; Sarkar, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 519, 521.

5. Ibid., p. 323; S.P.D. vol. 29, Nos. 87 (wrong date ?), 233, 234, 238, 239, 241, 243, 245.

6. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 237; C.P.C. vol. II, No. 1101; Banerjee, Loc.cit.

7. Banerji, op.cit.; S.P.D.; vol. 29, No. 245; C.P.C. vol. III, 128.

8. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 238.

9. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 239.

restored the village of Karadi to Bhagirthibai.¹ Mahadji joined Tukoji after the conclusion of the peace with Arising and both the armies advanced to Kerauli country in order to put pressure for tribute on Jaypur.² In July, Dhondoo Dattatraya reported that the work of realising the tribute was being pushed on.³ Ganesh Viswanath and Vinayak Moreshwar reported on 27 July that Bhopal, Ratgad and other minor places had already agreed to pay the tributes.⁴ Thus finally, Mahadji had settled the Udepur tribute but "this only left a sore, perpetually open between the Maharana and the House of Shindes."⁵

By 7 July, Haider had to demand the aid of the English arms against the Marathas, but the aid was declined.⁶ In August, Abdali invaded Hindustan for the ninth time, against the Sikhs.⁷ After crossing the Nerbada, the Marathas had marched three directions - Ramchandra in the Doab, Mahadji to Udepur and Tukoji to Bundi, Kotah and Rajputana.⁸ By the end of September, Mahadji marched away from the neighbourhood of Udepur for aiding Tukoji who was then engaged in the siege of Raghogad in Khechiwara.⁹ Ganesh Viswanath was there with Tukoji.¹⁰ Here the Marathas were met by Ranjit Sing's envoys, for his defence and they jumped at the invitation.¹¹ But 12000 troops of Abdali deserted him and he went back to Kabul.¹² Thus

1. S.P.D. vol.29, No.240.

2. Banerjee, op.cit. I.H.Q. vol.XVII, (1941), p.323; S.P.D. vol.29, No.245; C.P.C. vol.III, No.128.

3. S.P.D. vol.29, No.241.

4. Ibid. No.243.

5. Sarkar, op.cit. vol.II, p.521.

6. S.P.D.D. vol.X, 101-102 (Madras to Bombay).

7. Heras, op.cit. Is.C. vol.XI, (1937), p.508.

8. Khare, op.cit. vol.IV, p.1876.

9. Sarkar, op.cit. vol.II, p.521; Banerji, op.cit. I.H.Q. vol.XVII, (1941), p.333.

10. S.P.D. vol.29, No.245.

11. C.P.C. vol.III, 128, 161; S.P.D. vol.29, pp.302-305.

12. Heras, op.cit. Is.C. vol.XI, (1937), p.508.

after the rains, the Maratha Sardars (Mahadji and Tukeji) joined Ramchandra near Sagar where he had marched and they moved on against the Jats.¹ A few months later, Raja Shitab Ray, Naib Nazim of Bihar wrote that the Marathas were turning their attention to the country of the Afgans². The Marathas had advanced against the Jats and the Jats were willing to make liberal concessions to them.³

Shah Alam wrote to Verelst in September, that his residence at Allahabad had been the result of chance and the exigencies of the times.⁴ The Ex-Nawab Mir Kasim was trying to unite the Marathas and other chiefs of Hindustan in a league to attack the English⁵. Ramchandra had already attacked Khechi in October⁶. On 19 October Mahadaji Ballal wrote to the Peshwa that Mahadji was prepared to forego his claims to Nemawar and had instructed his officers to that effect. But the Peshwa was displeased with him and reprimanded Mahadji strongly, making it clear that he (the Peshwa) was now able to exact implicit obedience from powerful Sardars like Mahadji⁷. Mahadji was thinking of taking with him, the heir of Udepur to Udepur and Ramchandra threatened to go back to the Deccan⁸. There were, again reports that Mahadji had collected enormous wealth from Udepur and that the documents only revealed sixty lakhs of rupees⁹. But finally,

1. Khare, op.cit, vol.IV, p.1876.

2. Heras, op.cit, op.cit, p.508.

3. S.P.D. vol.29, No.250.

4. Srivatsava, "The failure of Shah Alam II's First Expedition to Delhi, 1765-66", I.H.R.C.P. vol.XVII, (1940) p.195.

5. C.P.C. vol.III, P.XXIV.

6. Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.74.

7. S.P.D. vol.29, No.247.

8. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Sangraha Patren, Nos.222, 223, 224.

9. Khare, op.cit, vol.IV, No.830.

Khandoji Argade wrote to Baba Dixit that the Marathas were seventy-five thousand strong against the Jats and Mahadji was expected to join this main force, soon¹. Visaji's policy of supporting Najib, which was detested by Mahadji was approved of by the Peshwa². On 3 October Naro Narsi sent a detailed report of the campaign in the North, to the Peshwa. He expressed his apprehensions that the course of action pursued by the generals on the strength of the advice of Najib Khan was misleading and ruinous. It was impolitic to penetrate into the Doab before finally crushing the Jat power.³ The Marathas refrained from showing any open hostility to Najib, for the time being. However, avoiding the territories of Najib, the Marathas attacked the principality of the Afgan Chief, Ahmadkhan Bengash and captured Akbarpur.⁴ Mahadji desired, in revenge for his wound at Panipat, to exterminate the Rohillas but Visaji had advised to accept Najib's offers, whose advice again was followed by the Peshwa.⁵

The adhesion of Najib to the Maratha cause, saved for the time being his own possessions, but Mahadji was given a free hand against the other Rohilla Chiefs - Hafiz Rahmat and Dundikhan in the Doab.⁶ Mahadji and Tukoji crossed the Jumna, drove the Rohillas across the Ganges and occupied the fortress of Etawa by which they overawed the entire Doab.⁷ They conceived the brilliant idea of inducing Shah Alam to leave Allahabad and to exchange the protection

1. Sardesai, op.cit. No. 223.

2. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 246.

3. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 246.

4. C.P.C. vol. III, Intro.

5. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit., vol. III, p. 99.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

of the English for that of the Marathas. They held out glowing hopes to the vain and foolish Emperor and dazzled his eyes with the promised glories of an empire swayed by him and protected from foreign aggression by the Maratha swords.¹ They moved on to Farukabad and fresh negotiations were opened for settlement between the Rohillas and the invaders. Ghazi-ud-din Khan tried to establish alliance but the disunion of the Marathas made it impossible and he departed to Ajmer.²

Even before the start from Kerauli, Mahadji had left Ramchandra and moved towards Marwar because he could not agree with him and the latter had to depute Ganoji Kadam to mollify Mahadji and bring him back.³ Mahadji and Tukoji, on 9 January 1770 compensated Kotah by payment of Rs. 2½ lakhs, for the devastation caused by their army.⁴ The Marathas were paid one crore of rupees by Mir Kasim to help him recover Bengal. The Wazir wrote to the Governor that the Sikhs and the Marathas were just squeezing money from the Ex-Nazim, Mir Kasim. The Marathas were, however, not ready to face the English. After invading Jaypur, they had marched eastward and it was rumoured they intended to invade Bengal through Bundelkhand. The Governor wrote to the Raja of the country, urging him to guard himself but the Marathas had turned upon the Jats as they were invited firstly by Rajitsing, to assist him against Naval. Ranjit Sing had appeased them. Najib, the Rohilla regent at Delhi, was terrified at their

1. Ibid; Khare, op.cit, vol. IV, pp. 1875-1890; S.P.D., vol. 29, No. 251.

2. C.P.C. vol. III, P. XXVII.

3. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. III, p. 15; S.P.D., vol. 29, No. 252.

4. Phalke, op.cit, vol. II, No. 77.

progress and dreading that they would take vengeance for their defeat at Panipat at once opened the negotiations with Visaji, the C-in-C of the Maratha army. He hoped with their alliance, he would be able to restore the Emperor to his throne at Delhi and wrote to Zinaï Mahal, the queen-mother, to urge the Emperor to leave the protection of the English and move his standards to Agra: to subjugate Koil and Navalsing's territory lying South of the Jumna and 'in order to lend an air of justice to the conquest under the shadow of royal authority,' sent words to Mirza Jawan Bakt, the Emperor's son at Delhi to join the army¹. The Emperor was on the horns of dilemma as he could not trust the Marathas, who had his bitterest foe, Ghazi-ud-din Khan in their camp, nor could he refuse their invitation to march to Delhi as they threatened to place someone else on the throne. The Emperor asked for five battalions more to escort him to Delhi from the English and sent Najaf Khan to prevent the Marathas from proclaiming anybody else.² The Emperor invested Shuja with the Wazir's office on 20 January 1770,³ and Mir Kasim encouraged by the Rana of Gohad, crossed the Jumna too.⁴ The Emperor was pleaded to reinstate Muniud-dowla, who had arrived at Allahabad.⁵ He and the Wazir, Shuja, lately appointed chief-minister, were successful in dissuading the Emperor, at least for the time being, from settling out for Delhi.⁶ Mir Kasim had made friends

1. C.P.C. vol. III, Intro.

2. Ibid; Sarkar, op.cit, vol. II, pp. 529-530; Seir Mutagherin, vol. II, p. 257.

3. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 24.

4. Ibid, vol. III, No. 31 (Shitabrai to Governor-22-1-1770).

5. Ibid, vol. III, No. 43.

6. C.P.C. vol. III, p-XXVII.

with all the chiefs of Hindustan and was in correspondence with them in February. There was not a single chief at the present moment who was not either engaged in negotiations with some other chief or in preparing for war.¹

Mir Kasim on 16 February wrote to the Wazir that the followers whom he had bought with the money were not sincerely attached to him and it was certain that they would not remain with him longer than his money lasted. The Emperor had ceased for some time to write frankly about his affairs to the English.² The sum total of everything was that Mir Kasim had projects in his mind and after uniting with the Sikhs and the Marathas in his cause, proposed to invade Bengal.³ But while the whole of Hindustan was astir with the talk of war, the Emperor showed the attitude of reverse and for a month, never wrote anything to the interested parties.⁴ Dundi Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan declared to the Governor, on 19 February, that they had no connection with Mir Kasim.⁵

On C.20 February, Tukoji made a direct payment, out of the Bijagarh revenue, to the Poona Court, without any reference to Ahalya-bai and Ahalyabai declared that she would question the Poona Government, in the matter.⁶ She sent orders on 30 February to Kamavisdar's of the pargana Indore that the note of payment sent by Tukoji from

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.69.

2. Ibid, vol.III, No.81.

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.79.

4. Ibid, vol.III, No.73.

5. Ibid, vol.III, Nos.85-86.

6. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.28.

his camp should not be accepted without her orders¹. The Governor replied to Dundi Khan that by the grace of God, the English had never turned their back upon an enemy nor had they attacked anyone gratuitously,² and to Hafiz Rahmat Khan that when his wakil, Mir Ghulam Musain Khan would go to Calcutta, they would be able to settle the terms of the treaty between the English and the Rohillas.³ Balwant Sing, again, was instructed by the English to frustrate the march of the Marathas and the Sikhs and same instructions were despatched to Hindupat, the Raja of Bundelkhand⁴. Out of regard for the joint representations of the Governor and the Wazir, in March, the Emperor forgave Munirud-din, on condition that he would settle his accounts⁵. Mir Kasim could not pay even as.4 per day to his soldiers and even the Marathas on 14 March, when he begged them to help him and to give money for the purpose of attacking Bengal, laughed at his proposal.⁶ The Sikhs had made peace with Naval Sing, in consideration of a sum of money.⁷

The Maratha vakils were received by the Emperor at Allahabad and they accompanied him to Faizabad where they received dresses of honour. They were then sent back with the presents for the four Maratha generals, in company with an envoy from the wazir. The wazir called them to Kalpi to settle matters with him.⁸ Shitab Rai took

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1. Ibid., vol. I, No. 29.
 2. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 94 (20-2-1770).
 3. Ibid., No. 95.
 4. C.P.C. vol. III, Nos. 97, 98.
 5. Ibid., No. 107.
 6. Ibid., No. 122.
 7. Ibid., No. 128.
 8. Ibid., (16-3-1770).

special precautions against the European settlers, especially the French¹. The wazir had also declared his friendship with the English with affixed oath on the Koran.² Mir Kasim also wrote to the Nizam and hoped to secure help from Abdali, declaring the Marathas and the Sikhs as worthless people³. On 19 March, the negotiations having proved futile, the two armies of the Jats and the Sikhs came to an engagement and the Sikhs were routed whereupon they fled to Delhi and Navalsing pursued them, in that direction. Mirkasim's troops were in the mutinous mood⁴. The Emperor was pleaded to appoint Najaf Khan as Faujdar of Kora.⁵ Mir Kasim was one of the first among the Indian Princes who had realised the importance of organising their troops on the western models as compared to Mahadji and Haider⁶. Shuja's diplomacy was directed to convince the Calcutta authority that he was doing everything in his power to execute their plan, while he was really following an opposite policy.⁷ He offered to march to Kora to make a demonstration against the Marathas and to check the growing power of Najib under whose guardianship Prince Jawan Bakt was reported to be proceeding towards Agra to effect junction with the Maratha army. But Shuja really did not wish to do anything; so he tarried and explained that he received no instructions from the Governor.⁸

1. Ibid, Nos. 130, 146.

2. Ibid, No. 131.

3. Ibid, No. 132.

4. Ibid, No. 133.

5. Ibid, No. 144 (23-3-1770).

6. Nandlal Chatterji, "Mir Kasim's army", I.H.Q. vol. XI (1935), p. 257.

7. Srivatsava, "Shuja-ud daula's policy during the Maratha invasion 1770-71", I.H.R.C.P. vol. XVIII, (1942), p. 332.

8. Ibid, p. 333.

"Early in 1770, the Marathas advanced to the north of the Chambal to restore the Maratha authority in Hindustan"¹. "Tukoji wrote a private letter to Najib to confirm the friendship between the two houses which had subsisted in Malhar's times and by which Najib had benefited, so often and so signally and Najib replied that he had for a long time past, renounced the world on account of age and made Zabita Khan his heir and supreme agent and that he would not deviate from Tukoji's counsel."² But, "the house of Shinde bore sleepless vindictiveness towards Najib and was sure to annihilate him" if Mahadji could find an opportunity to effect it. Thus "there was a sharp difference of opinion in the Maratha camp as to their policy and plan of war"³ and "Tukoji was the hereditary friend of Najib and used to supply him with secret intelligence about the happenings in the Maratha camp and the timely reports of Mahadji's intended treachery towards him or merely Tukoji's own suspicions of such designs"⁴. The Peshwa, however, preferred the demands of political expediency to those of blood-feud."⁵ Visaji listened to the overtures of Najib with complacency but Ramchandra and Mahadji called for vengeance on the Rohillas. On a reference being made to the Peshwa, he so far concurred in Mahadji's opinion, that Najib could never be a friend to the Marathas; but they were endeavouring to induce the Emperor to withdraw from the protection of the English, in which Najib's assistance would be useful, and the conduct of Visaji was approved.

1. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.II, p.406.

2. Ibid.; Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C. vol.VIII, (1934), p.251.

3. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.II, p.407.

4. Ibid., p.408.

5. Ibid., p.409.

Accordingly, Zabita Khan, the son of Najib, was sent to join Visaji¹. Najib who had succeeded in winning the friendship of Tukoji, attempted to reconcile Mahadji, who said, "I require vengeance, for so much desolation and so many deaths, for the blood of my brothers and my nephews and my own perpetual mutilation; nor am I satisfied because my friend chooses to make this Musalman noble, his brother. Nevertheless, I am the Peshwa's servant and if he sanctions such an alliance, my part is to obey."² Najib even threatened Mahadji and others and called them cowards.³ Najib ruined the Maratha interests and the position was explained to the Peshwa;⁴ and "Once again, in Maratha history a Holkar had ruined the national cause in the north by his selfishness and personal jealousy".⁵ "Ramchandra's own contingent was not large enough to enable him to overbear a veteran like Mahadji, at the head of a strong and compact family force." "The young chief, Tukoji, was surrounded by old ministers who played the rascally game of continuing Malhar's policy and jealously thwarting every step advocated by Mahadji, solely because he was a Shinde."⁶ "In fact, the new enterprise for undoing the work of Panipat was foredoomed to failure, because the Peshwa could spare no member of his family like Raghunath Dada or Sadashiv Bhau to lead it with unquestioned authority and dominating rank."⁷ And that hope of swift and easy

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1. Duff, op.cit., vol.III, p.573.
 2. Keene, Madhavrao Scindia, p.59.
 3. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.II, pp.413-414.
 4. Ibid, p.412.
 5. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.III, p.17.
 6. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.III, p.13.
 7. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.III, p.14. .

success for the Marathas after the Jat's defeat" proved utterly delusive in the end, through the internal quarrels and lack of state-manship and even of intelligent self-interest among their leaders."¹ Mahadji, Tukoji and Visaji had taken a favourable position with a large force to the northward of the river Chambal, in the vicinity of the town of Futtahpore.² Tukoji referred to the friendship of Malhar with Najib, again and advised him to conduct affairs with his counsel and Najib referred to Zabita to whom Najib acquainted with the fact that Abdali was no more to be expected in Hindustan and that it was in his interest to co-operate with the Marathas.³ Ramchandra replied to Mahadji that Najib must be made a friend of the Marathas, that they had arrived in the north after fourteen years and that the Rohillas and Shuja were bound to join Najib. The Marathas would collect the tribute and the territory beyond computation from the Jat in a short time and it must be regarded that whatever that was done by Najib, was the matter of past. Tukoji surmised "Whatever Najib says is true. If he joins you, he would never deviate. If he becomes our ally, Hafiz Rahmat and Dundikhan will turn to us and a great terror would seize the Jat and the other Rajas of Hindustan." This was agreed upon by the Maratha command.⁴ Najib was given a written pledge (qaul) of alliance through Tukoji and the Maratha chiefs wrote to him, "we are contemplating an expedition against the Jats. Do you come quickly from the other side of the river, you enter his kingdom and

1. Ibid, p.12.

2. Franklin, Shah Alam, p.33.

3. Sarkar, op.cit, Is.C. vol.VIII (1934) p,253.

4. Sarkar, op.cit, Is.C. vol.VIII, (1934) p.253.

advance conquering". Najib pitched his camp two cos away from Mathura, on the further bank of the Jumna¹.

Shitab Rai reported on 1 April that after the defeat of the Sikhs, the Marathas who were encamped in the territory of the Raja of Jayanagar advanced into the country of the Jats, and entered into correspondence with Ranjit Sing, a relation of Naval Sing. Consequently he met them from the fort of Kumbher, his residence. They were then pillaging in the neighbourhood of Bharatpur. A party of three hundred horse under Tukoji marched to Gohad where the commander had a private conference with Mir Kasim. On his departure he was presented with jewels and other articles by the latter which had raised the spirit of Mir Kasim's adherents who were then 3000 horse and foot². Najib with his 30,000 troopers joined the Marathas, who had 60,000 troopers and remained in the Maratha camp, which, in its way, the Marathas regarded as boon³. The Marathas, by this time, shrank from making an attempt to besiege the impregnable Jat fortress of Dig and crossed the Jumna into the Doab, where they were met by Imad, also. The allies now remained encamped in the Aligarh district, continuing timeless negotiations for realising a tribute from the Jats and the Rohillas⁴.

Instructions were issued by the Governor on 1 April, to inspect all European ships and to stop them at Kalpi.⁵ But in the meanwhile, on the 6th April, Navalsing advanced towards Ghurden, which

1. Ibid, p. 254.

2. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 155 (1-4-1770).

3. Sarkar, "Najib-ud-daula, Rohilla Chief (Bihari Lal Munshi)" Is.C., vol. X, (1936), p. 658.

4. Kibe, "Some original Maratha documents", I.H.R.C.P. vol. XVIII, (1942), p. 332.

5. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 156.



is 6 cos from Dig and it being resolved that the army should take its position there, detachments were sent to escort the baggage. As the resolution of encamping at that place was sudden and unexpected, scarcely any risalah was prepared and the army was considerably weakened by the absence of many people who returned for their necessaries to Dig. In the meantime, the Marathas began to advance and formed themselves in military array, near the fort of Sonkh, sending their heavy baggage to Mathura. Kunwar Dan Shah and Mula Nand were strongly of opinion that it would be best to risk an action as they were within two cos of the enemy and might in vain seek for an opportunity again. Consequently, notwithstanding the remonstrances of Madoe (Rene' Madek) and Sumroo (Walter Reinhard) who objected to the proposal on the score of lateness of the hour, the opinion of Dan Shah prevailed and he accordingly pushed forward from the main army with about 2000 choice horse, composed of the Rajputs and the natives of Bedawar. The Marathas opposed them with the rockets and such of their ²canon as were ready and did terrible execution amongst Dan Shah's horse. Thakur Das was killed and Kunwar Kilak was dangerously wounded. The whole party was either dispersed or slain. The troops were ordered to support Dan Shah, but the affair was decided before they could join the artillery. Hither to the battle had been fought with the rockets and the artillery but now the sword was brought into requisition. Ran Shan Khan, Shaikh Khan Muhammad and Gopalrao alighted from their horses and charged sword in hand. Ganga Prasad and Josh Rai led on the Regent's army. After two hours close engagement Naval Sing was obliged to retreat within

the lines of Sumroo who had formed a square after the European fashion and had for a long time sustained the repeated shocks of the enemy. Finding himself in a light corner, Naval Sing threw away his ornaments lest he should be recognised by the enemy and with a few attendants, reached the fort in safety. Several gardars of rank entered it immediately after and assured him of their steadiness and perseverance in the task of retrieving the defeat. As to the rank and file, it is computed¹ that 5000 horse and foot were wounded and 2000 killed. All the artillery was left on the field except two light pieces which Sumroo had brought off. The army was so completely broken that numbers returned after wandering about seven cos from the battlefield. Had it not been for the intrepid behaviour of Madoe and Sumroo in the retreat, not a single man could have escaped the swords of the Marathas. The Jats of Dig were barricaded but the Marathas had not ventured within the reach of the canon. Their loss was supposed to be considerable and they were very anxious to conceal it. It was rumoured that the Regent would send for the Sikhs once more.¹ The pursuing Marathas came up to Dig, keeping beyond the range of its guns but soon retired to Mathura where they halted at Sarai Koila, four miles south of the city to arrange for the invasion of the Doab.² After 6 April, Najib set out to capture the Jat possessions in the mid-Doab, according to an agreement made with the

1. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, p. 409; vol. III, p. 8; C.P.C. vol. III, Nos. 180, 183.

2. Parasnis, Itihasik Charitre, 10, p. 118; Kincaid, Parasnis, op. cit., vol. III, p. 99; Chahar Gulzar Shujai, Elliot, VIII, p. 227; Malcolm, op. cit., vol. I, p. 63; C.P.C. vol. III, Intro; Duff, op. cit., vol. II, p. 196; Banerjee, op. cit., I.H.Q. vol. XVII, (1941), p. 323.

Marathas.¹ Balwant Sing complained that in the Wazir's force, there were 200 sepays only.² Hindupat, too reported that he could not negotiate with the Marathas and that the Sikhs had fled to their country.³ Abaji Raghunath, Mahadji's chitnis, sent a nazar of Rs.5000, on 9 April to the court of Poona and excused himself for the delay, as it was due to Guman Sing's death and the subsequent disorder in his court.⁴ The Emperor, when pleaded promised to treat Najaikhan well, for the sake of the English Sardars.⁵

Najib on 17 April welcomed Tukoji and "more consultations were held, the next day and on the 19th Najib returned the visit. He rode to Tukoji's tent, who introduced him to Ramchandra Ganesh and then to Mahadji. Najib tried to soothe Mahadji by offering him common place condolences like, whatever God wills, happens. I did not from my side move against Dattaji Patil, but rather sought his friendship and he too did not intend fighting. But owing to Divine will, it happened in that way. Don't now entertain any idea of revenge in your hearts. Now that I have joined you, I shall repress your enemies." Mahadji remained in sullen silence for some time and then dryly replied, "The will of God has been accomplished. Let us see what He wills in future" ! They parted after exchanging the customary presents, 'but soreness of heart remained between two sides and affectionate speeches were not made'.⁶ Najib had replied again, "the safety of myself and of you will undoubtedly take place"⁷. Ramchandra

1. Srivatsava, "Shuja-ud-daula's policy during the Maratha invasion, 1770-71", I.H.R.C.P. vol. XVIII, (1942), p.332.

2. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 161.

3. Ibid., No. 162.

4. S.P.D. vol. 29, No; 253.

5. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 169 (13-4-1770).

6. Sarkar, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 410-411.

7. Sarkar, "Life of Najib-ud-daula, the last phase", Is.C. vol. VIII, (1934), p. 255.

gave an oath of friendship to Najib through Tukoji, but they did not meet with purity of heart. Before this interview, the Marathas had come towards the Par country to demand the parganas from Najib, according to their agreement; hence, Ramchandra, Tukoji, Mahadji, Babu Patil Rao, the son of Naro Shankar and other generals with the total of 70,000 men had come to Mathura but Tukoji, after assuring them, had first crossed the Jumna and Najib had sent Majdul daulah Abdul Ahad Khan to welcome him.¹

Najib, after making an alliance with the Marathas, marched out and came to the Mian Doab and encamped near Dankaur. He wrote to Zabita to obey to whatever Tukoji ordered. Tukoji treated this as boon and informed Ramchandra accordingly, who praised him on that account. When Mahadji was asked, he replied, "we have come to take vengeance on Najib. The Peshwa's lands have been enjoyed by Afgans for fourteen years. Jankoji and Dattaji, Sabaji, were killed by him, while the foot of mine was also cut. Blood of three and a half members of the Shinde family is on his head and Tukoji is going to embrace him! I will write to the Peshwa, I am his servant."² But by 24 April, Mahadji's policy was thwarted by Ramchandra's and the Peshwa supported Ramchandra, in his views. Najib had arrived at Sikandarabad and proceeded towards Akbarabad³. The Allies had formed a plan for overthrowing the power of the Jats and acquiring possession of their country in the name of Mirza Jawan Bakt.⁴

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire; vol. III, p. 16; G.P.C. vol. III, No. 178 (22-4-1770) and No. 185.

4. G.P.C. vol. III, No. 185. .

Ghazi-ud-din also had set out from Farukabad to join the Marathas.¹ They, again, had sent to the Emperor, their Arzis, professing loyalty and invited him also to move his standards towards Agra.² First Tukoji and then Ramchandra crossed over to the East bank and Mahadji joined two days later and they encamped close to Najib's camp.³

On one occasion, two mule-loads of grain belonging to some merchants in Najib's camp were carried off from their way by the Maratha troopers. At this juncture, Najib summoned Bhagwantrao, the son of Jagannath, who was Tukoji's vakil with him at midnight and told him, "My alliance with the Marathas is conditional upon their friendly conduct. If you wish to retain this friendship, restore to the merchants of my camp, the two ass-loads of grain. Otherwise, in a twinkling of the eye, I shall do more than what was done to you at Panipat". Tukoji, searching during that very night, recovered the two ass-loads of grain from the Pindharis who lived in his camp as retainers, solely for the purpose of plundering and produced them.⁴ One day, two infantry men who were coming from outside to the camp of Najib, were plundered by men of the Maratha camp. This was reported to Najib who summoned Anandrao Narsi who was in his camp as Tukoji's agent. Anandrao explained that the men were not from Tukoji but probably from Shinde's camp. Najib said, "To whomsoever they may belong, I cannot tolerate that I should live in this camp in dishonour. Don't you think that you have now a vast army with you and I have only a small force. Even when I am dead and buried in the ground, I can eat

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.185, (26-4-1770).

2. Ibid.

3. Sarkar, op.cit. vol.III, pp.18-19.

4. Sarkar, "Najib-ud-daula, Rohilla chief (Bihari Mal Munshi), Is.C., vol.X, (1936), p.658.

you up with 10,000 men. I know that Patil (Mahadji) cherishes dislike for me in his heart. Then do you tell him, "If you are a man, why don't you come into the field but are merely saying that the blood of three of your family is on his head? Either enact compensation for it or become the fourth in addition to the other three. This sort of behaviour is unworthy of a brave man." We both shall march this moment." Najib while saying this to Narsi, ordered the kettledrums to be beaten for the march. Narsi entreated him to put it off till he returned from Subedar Tukoji and Najib agreed. Next morning, at dawn, Tukoji came to Najib, begged his pardon and Najib's anger was appeased.¹

Ganga Vishnu Vaidya cured Baji Narsinh, Shinde's diwan of a serious illness and was therefore given a village in inam by Mahadji. The Jagir was later on resumed by Mahadji's officer; Ganga Vishnu, therefore, requested Nana on 26th April to intercede on his behalf with Shinde to get the Jagir restored.²

As regards Najaf Khan's dismissal, it appeared on 28th April, that it was the result of an elaborate intrigue and that Shuja could not do anything in that affair at the Court of the Emperor.³ The Governor nevertheless, pointed out to the Emperor that the Marathas were from the very beginning unreliable and that they had been always and ever be hostile to the Emperors of Hindustan for the simple reason that they owed their rapid rise of power and their conquest of the vast territories, to the very weakness of the Empire. It was plain, again that their sole object was to serve themselves

1. Sarkar, op.cit, Is.C. vol.VIII, (1934), pp.256-257.

2. S.P.D. vol.39, No.129.

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.188.

and that whatever they did, would be in the direction towards that end. Finally, they would become the masters of the whole Empire and the Emperor would depend on them for his daily bread. Again, Najaf Khan should not be sent to Delhi as it would offend Najib who was all powerful there.¹ On c.4 May, the English offered Najaf Khan, two lakhs of rupees per annum when he felt coming to Bengal- free from all deductions, exempt from all conditions. It was stipulated that in the meanwhile, he should not accept any commission which might necessitate his separation from the English.²

Najib and the Marathas carried on intrigues with the Prince (Mirza Jawan Bakt) in May and the Rohillas also intended to join the coalition, whom Najib desired to direct against the Sikhs. The Wazir solicited the Governor to write a letter of encouragement to the Emperor.³ The transganges Afgans assembled opposite Farukabad and asked the counsel of Ahmad Khan Bangash. Hafiz wrote to Najib, "to further their business, a little", and Najib replied, "If you are alive, you are 60,000; The Marathas plundered the country of Bangash and the army of Tukoji seized country upto Kasganj and compelled Ranshah Khan, the Chela of Bangash. Their foraging parties have arrived near Farukabad;" insisting that they must be bold enough to attack the Marathas.⁴ On 10th May, Najib after receiving a secret warning from Tukoji that the other Maratha Sardars were planning treachery, either fearing an onslaught from Mahadji or believing in the accusations of Tukoji, broke up his camp and marched away from the vicinity of his doubtful friends, towards Aligarh. The Marathas fell on his baggage but

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.190.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.191.

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.193.

4. Sarkar, "Op.cit." Is.C., vol.VIII, (1934), p.256.

could capture nothing.¹

The name of the Great Mughal Emperor was still a power in the land; those who could obtain his firmans and the sanctions of his authority with force, found themselves in the position of the champions of law and right as against rebels. The holder of that title was now the pensioner and dependant of the English living at Allahabad. On one side were the English who gave him security and a pension and made use of his authority: On the other, the Marathas, who held out the pleasing illusions of freedom and glory.² During their progress in the Jat country, the Marathas had made overtures to Shah Alam. Shuja assisted the Emperor in the delicate task of negotiating with the Marathas. The Wazir had to divert the Marathas against the Rohillas and Bangash chiefs, for he aimed at three things: maintaining the friendly relations with the Marathas, retaining neutrality in war between the Jats and the Marathas and between the latter and the Rohillas and weakening the Rohilla power by instigating the Marathas to invade Bundelkhand so as to subjugate that land in future with no difficulty for him. He was further anxious not to offend ^{the English} who desired the wazir not to help Shah Alam but to make a common cause with the Jat and the Rohillas against the Marathas.³

The Marathas demanded Kora and Allahabad as their price for reinstating Shah Alam in Delhi⁴ and Najib earnestly called him to Delhi⁵. Shah Alam's minister, Munir-ul-Doula who had already made two journeys to the Deccan to concert measures with the Marathas, was new

1. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, P. 411; vol. III, pp. 18-19.

2. C.P.C. vol. III, Preface.

3. Srivatsava, "Op.cit." I.H.R.C.P. vol. XVIII, (1942), p. 335.

4. Franklin, Shah Alam, p. 34.

5. Ibid.

for the last time sent by the Emperor to Calcutta to demand approbation of the English Government on his intended movement but met with a positive refusal.¹ The English instigated the Wazir, too, against the Marathas, but Shuja replied to Cartier, "The truth is that there is no one left in Hindustan to stop the career of the Marathas". For his own part, Shuja was ready to defend the dominions of the Emperor and those of himself². Shuja started for Kanpur on 10th May, setting out on twenty-five days hunting expedition, during an unusual weather; he visited with his wife and children, Bahram Ghat and penetrated into the jungle, 18 miles further north and returned to Lucknow on 3rd June³. The Emperor intended on 2nd May to send Najaf to some distant part so that he would be worn out⁴. The English policy in May was not to send any part of their own army beyond Kora but to persuade the Wazir to march to the assistance of the Rohillas against the Marathas and better still to take up the lead in organising a confederacy of the Jats, the Rohillas and other important Chiefs to drive the Marathas back to the Deccan.⁵

Ghazi-ud-din joined the Marathas and thus offended Shah Alam,⁶ Shuja and the English. The Marathas, still, had no definite plan. Gopal Ganesh Barve, father-in-law of Raghoba, was with the Jats.⁷ The Maratha army was at Govardhan for eight days and on 4 May was at Mathura when Ghazi-ud-din had joined. The Jats insisted on negotiations being opened through Mahadji, while Ramchandra and Visaji only

1. Ibid., p. 35.

2. Srivatsava, Loc. cit.

3. Ibid.

4. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 194.

5. Srivatsava, op. cit., p. 333.

6. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. III, p. 19.

7. Khare, op. cit., vol. IV, No. 970.

only solicited them through Tukoji¹. Naro Narsi Communicated to Poona that while the most of the generals were inclined to treat the Jats favourably, Tukoji under the influence of Najib had rejected the proposals and was contemplating a plan of action which was ill-advised and held no chance of success.² Meanwhile, by 5th May, the Marathas had already made up for the great loss of Panipat by obtaining several victories which revived their ambition to conquer the whole of Hindustan. "The victories that the Marathas had recently gained, have swollen their heads and unless some one curbs their ambition, they bid fare to dictate to all."³

The English army moved to Buxar⁴ and the Governor showed surprise at the complaint of the Emperor that the tribute of Bengal was not paid for the preceeding eleven months. The Governor explained further that the said tribute was already paid for five months and excused himself that for few months to come, he would not be able to pay.⁵ On 9th May, it was reported to the Governor that Najib and the Marathas invited the Emperor and in case of his refusal, would put some one else on the throne and the Emperor declared that the worldly possessions should be sacrificed to save life but life itself should be sacrificed to save honour⁶. But, again, the news from Agra of 9th May expressed the rumour that the Marathas asked Najib why he had taken possession of the royal revenues of the province of Delhi. Najib replied that if he had not taken, the Sikhs would have usurped the revenues. The Marathas said, upon this, "we will manage the Sikhs."

1. Ibid.

2. S.P.D. vol.29, No.255; khare, op.cit, vol.IV, No.971.

3. Heras, op.cit, Is.C. vol.XI, (1937), p.508.

4. C.P.C. vol.III, No.195.

5. Ibid, No.197.

6. Ibid, No.199.

We insist upon your and Naval's giving up the province. Write to the Emperor to come hither and if he refuses to come, some other plan must be devised."¹ And the Emperor made up his mind to accept the invitation of the Marathas.²

The famine raged high in the province³. The Marathas had spread themselves over the Subah of Akbarabad and made Mathura their headquarters. They were expected to march to Kora and the Wazir was to proceed with his army to Mhadi Ghat, before 16 May.⁴ The Jats and others wavered in their payments to the Marathas⁵. The Marathas demanded 80 lakhs of rupees from the Jats, while the Jats were prepared to pay only 65 lakhs of rupees to them.⁶

Tukoji with his whole army and baggage crossed the Jumna and encamped at a distance of three cos from the Ghat of Bindrahan. Two days later Ramchandra also crossed the river and encamped close to him, but Mahadji remained on "this" side of the river. It would seem that they intended to subjugate the country between the two rivers, which formerly belonged to the Jats.⁷ Mahadji had faced Jawahargad on c.18 May and the army under Ramchandra and his other officers had a battle with the Jats, in the Jatwarah in which the former proved victorious, having taken 25000 horse, 700 camels and 150 elephants.⁸

Najaf had paid one lakh of rupees to the Emperor and had to pay

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.200.

2. Ibid., No.204.

3. Ibid., No.209.

4. Ibid., No.211.

5. Sarker, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.III, p.20.

6. S.P.D. vol.29, No.257.

7. C.P.C. vol.III, No.216.

8. Phalke, op.cit., vol.III, No.460; S.P.D.D. vol.XI, 73.

two lakhs more and he was confirmed in his office.¹ On 22 and 30 May, he reported to the Governor the wavering of the Emperor's mind explaining that the Emperor was not sincere in his friendship with the Marathas.² Baburao Thakur reported on 30 May that the Maratha army was heading towards the Rohilla country³; and by the end of May 1770, the Maratha detachment had already raided the Bangarh territory of Farukabad.⁴ and it appeared that "the power of the Marathas was beyond all imagination"⁵ On c.3 June, the wazir told Harper that the Marathas were not likely to attempt further conquest owing to their internal dissension and the near approach of the rainy season would render the march to Kora useless.⁶ The Emperor's demand for the Bengal tribute was again recorded by the Governor on 6 June.⁷ Ghazi-ud-din was in the Maratha Camp⁸. The Marathas were by 12 June attempting to possess themselves of the dependencies of Hafiz Rahgat, besides Itawa. The truth was that there was no one left in Hindustan to stop the Marathas.⁹ The Zamindars underwent much hardships under the English and Balwant Sing reported that the Marathas were in the district of Ahmad Khan Bangash on 15 June and that he had sent one lakh of rupees to col. Gallies, while Shuja's wakil was in the Maratha Camp¹⁰. The wazir on 16 June was at Faizabad watching the Marathas¹¹ and due to the famine, the Governor refused to pay

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1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.222.
 2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.232.
 3. S.P.D. vol.29, No.258; Phalke, op.cit, vol.461; Note.No.227.
 4. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.III, p.21.
 5. C.P.C. vol.III, No.233.
 6. Srivatsava, op.cit, I.H.R.C.P. vol.XVIII, (1942), p.334.
 7. C.P.C. vol.III, No.241.
 8. Ibid, No.244.
 9. Ibid, No.250.
 10. Ibid, Nos.252, 253, 255.
 11. Srivatsava, op.cit, p.344.

the Bengal tribute to the Emperor¹. Instructions were simultaneously despatched by the Governor to Sayed Muhammad Khan about the French at Kalpi.² Shuja was, likewise, instantly advised to join the Rohillas,³ "in his interest before the Marathas attacked his own country".

The Emperor received an Arzi from Najib and the Queen-mother to proceed to the capital. The Emperor declared that if the Governor was really loyal, he would add four more battalions to escort him.⁴ The Queen-mother wrote to the Emperor that she was glad he understood her, that he would not separate himself from his own men. What could he expect from a handful of men (at Allahabad) and why should he depend upon them while there were lakhs of people at his service. She insisted that Najib was firm in his alliance and if the Emperor did not march to Delhi, she herself would be killed. She again assured the Emperor of the loyalty of new friends secured through Najib.⁵ The Emperor, this time, took an oath to proceed to the capital⁶ and when the Prince Mirza Husain Ali Khan, Ray kishan Narayan and Alich Khan were stopped at the gate by the force of arms and the chobdars were beaten by the English sepays, col. Gallie, explained that the wazir's orders were not final and that he himself had met many such wazirs, in his life.⁷ A big word had fallen from the lip of a little man and when Najaf Khan came to see the Emperor, he was given the escort.⁸

Najib had written, on his way to Mathura, to Tukoji that it was absolutely necessary to have the pageant of a king in Rohilla-

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.260.

2. Ibid., No.261.

3. Ibid., No.263. (18-8-1770)

4. Ibid., Nos.268, (20-6-1770), 267, 269.

5. C.P.C. vol.III, No.270.

6. Ibid., Nos. 271, 287, 288.

7. Ibid., Nos.279-280.

8. Ibid.

Maratha army and again it would create dissension among the Emperor, The English and the wazir who were one, in alliance¹. The Queen-mother explained to the Emperor that he should make his choice from the two Amirs left in Hindustan, Najib and Shuja; and make at least one, his own. He was again given to understand that a king should be fond of camp-life and that it was strange he had no pride in empire and war; that he should never allow that opportunity² to slip and the Emperor wrote to Najib that he would set out after the rains.³ In July, Cartier mildly accused the Wazir of short-sightedness in not providing assistance to the Rohillas⁴; and recommended the grand policy of the reduction of the Marathas, the separation of Najib from the Marathas, encouragement and assistance to the Rohillas, effecting unity among the Jats.⁵ But while Shuja hesitated, the Emperor threw himself under the Maratha protection. Shuja again explained himself that even though he loved the Muslim religion and wished to help the Rohillas, his forces were not capable of effecting out anything of that sort. The Marathas had already continued themselves at Aligarh and the heavy rains during the first four days of July caused suspension of all military and diplomatic activities;⁶ but the envoys had already arrived from the Rohillas⁷. On the 8th July, the English account to the Emperor was calculated to stand at Rs.15,12,483/10/0 out of which Rs.27,000 were paid.⁸ The Emperor acknowledged the

1. Ibid. No.285.

2. Ibid. No.288.

3. Ibid. No.287 (25-6-1770)

4. Srivatsava, op.cit., I.H.R.C.P.; vol.XVIII, (1942), p.334.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. S.P.D. vol.29, No.261.

8. C.P.C. vol.III, No.294.

receipt of one lakh of rupees from the Governor and waited for remaining two lakhs of rupees for re-installing Mubarkud-Dowla, on 12 July.¹

On c.21 July, Baburao Hari crossed the river Bhagirathi with forty to fifty thousand army while Bangash and Najib worked together to frustrate the Maratha plans.² News of 24th July reported that the Zamindars of Ajit Mal and Khanpur Auraiya, depending on the districts of Etawa, invited Bala Rao and Ganga (Dhar), sons of Gopal Pandit, the late Faujdar of Kalpi, to cross the Jumna. They accepted the invitation and subdued the Etawa district without opposition from the Rohillas. Etawa is only 40 cos from Agra and Ramchandra and other Sardars were encamped on this side of the city near Farrukabad and Shikobabad which are 20 cos from Etawa. Kora Jahanabad was exposed to great danger and the Faujdar of Kora was not strong enough to withstand the Marathas.³ Hafiz Rahmat was approached by the English for alliance⁴ and the Emperor was told that the arrow once shot from the bow, can by no means be recalled⁵, Najif Khan was requested by the English not to disband his army and was given a promise on 2 August that his accounts would be paid within twenty days by Galliez.⁶

The Marathas had already taken possession of Akbarpur by 2 August and Ahmadkhan's officer, who was there, fled without offering resistance;⁷ Shuja explained to the Governor that unless accompanied

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.295.

2. Khare, op:cit, vol.IV, Nos.1001-1003.

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.307.

4. Ibid, No.308 (29-7-1770)

5. Ibid, No.314 (1-8-1770)

6. C.P.C. No.315.

7. Ibid, No.317.

by the Emperor, he would not set out to join the Rohillas. The Emperor gave drafts for ten lakhs of rupees on the dues from Bengal for the sum which the wazir forwarded to him and assured the wazir that the sum would be paid on demand.¹ The Emperor while setting out on his march for the capital on c.6 August; to save himself afterwards from the charge that his servants were ready to help him but that he himself was irresolute and inactive,² pointed out the old adage to the effect that time which is passed is like an arrow that has been shot from the bow for neither can be recalled and that, "the source of the spring may be choked with a single clod; let it flow and an elephant cannot cross it"³.

The advance guards of the Marathas at Etawa were slightly defeated by Shaikh Kabir⁴. A letter from Najib to Hafiz Rahmat was intercepted by the people under Tukoji and it was taken to Ramchandra consequently, a coolness had sprung up between Najib and Ramchandra. Najib was desirous for setting out for Shahajahanabad but Ramchandra and others, under the cloak of friendship, prevented his departure. Formerly it was not the intention of the Marathas to adjust their disputes with Naval but Ramchandra sent for his vakils and a settlement was reached, between them. Naval was required to pay 65 lakhs of rupees in all, exclusive of the revenues accruing from the provinces conquered by Najib and the Marathas. He was to pay ten lakhs of rupees in twenty days, the fifteen lakhs of rupees in two

1. Ibid, No. 319 (4-8-1770).

2. Ibid, No. 321. (6-8-1770).

3. Ibid, No. 321.

4. Ibid, No. 322.

months and rupees seven lakhs and fifty-thousand in the month of Phagan and the remaining half within three years. He was also required to pay an annual Nazaranas of eleven lakhs of rupees and to settle a jagir of twenty-lakhs of rupees on Ranjit Sing. The agreement was signed by the contracting parties and Ramchandra's diwan was to set out to receive the money.¹ Ramchandra wrote to the Emperor that he was on good terms with the wazir and promised to out-rival the wazir and the English in serving the Emperor and settling the affairs of Hindustan.² The Emperor, in his turn, sent these letters to Bajirao (?), Madhavrao and Tukoji Holkar.³ The English evaded the demand of the Emperor for more battalions⁴. The wazir had sent the military help to the Rohillas and promised not to accompany the Emperor unless in company of the English. And the English had with the restlessness of the Emperor, the threatening attitude of the Marathas, the impudence of the Rohillas, the hesitating policy of Najib and the intrigues of Ghazi-ud-din, ample material for anxiety.⁵ Hari Pandit, a vakil of the Peshwa had arrived at Patna on 26 August and was on his way to Calcutta with dispatches from Ramchandra also, for the Governor.⁶ The Emperor was marching "in defence of his honour" and had received a vakil from Ahmad Khan, Hafiz Rahmat and other Rohillas.⁷

On 18 August, Naro Narsi wrote to the Peshwa, "your troops have nothing to eat. Up till now we have carried on by borrowing

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.323 (10-8-1770. News from Shitab Rai).

2. Ibid, No.325.

3. Ibid, Nos.326, 327, 328.

4. Ibid, No.329 (11-8-1770).

5. Ibid, No.330 (11-8-1770).

6. Ibid, No.339 (26-8-1770).

7. Ibid, No.342 (28-8-1770).

6 to 7 lakhs of rupees. But no further loan is procurable. No tribute has been realised by us. All the Rajputs are watching to see what success attends our efforts to get money from the Jat Rajah".¹ Najib forwarded new proposals to march for the Jats around Delhi.² Najib had reconciled the other Jats to the Marathas and proceeded to his own country on 9 October.³ Janakibai, Parashuram Bhau's mother wrote from Gaya on 30 August that the Maratha force had checked the intended march of Shuja in the Doab.⁴ Hari Pandit, in the beginning of September arrived at Murshidabad and delivered to Muhammad Reza Khan a letter from Ramchandra, for friendship with the English.⁵ The Emperor pleaded for more battalions to enter the capital and to exterminate the Marathas and requested that the English should have the implicit faith in him.⁶ While the English had no vakils with the Marathas, Ramchandra sent presents to the Governor and the Peshwa explained that Ramchandra was despatched to settle the affairs of Hindustan and to execute the Governor's orders in connections with the disturbances that were going on there.⁷ About 27th September, as already referred, Najib held private discussions with the Jat envoys and on 8th October finally reconciled them to the Marathas by fixing up the tribute conditions. He had given Zabita's hand in Tukoji's and thereafter Najib wielded no influence in politics of Hindustan.⁸ "Freed at last from the malign

1. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.III, p.22.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.23.

4. Khare, op.cit., vol.IV, No.1015.

5. C.P.C., vol.III, Nos.354 (8-9-1770), 355.

6. Ibid., No.370 (18-9-1770).

7. Ibid., Nos.387 (27-9-1770), 376 (20-9-1770).

8. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.II, pp.414-415; vol.III, pp.22-23.

influence which had hypnotised all their chiefs, except the clear-sighted Mahadji Shinde for the last seven months, the Maratha enterprise in Hindustan rapidly achieved a series of brilliant successes with the most far-reaching consequences".¹ The Emperor, as solicited by the English sent a separate treaty for the Rohillas on 30 September and awaited the approval of Galliez and the arrival of the battalions.² The Rohillas took the oath on Koran to help the Emperor against the enemy of the religion and prosperity.³ In October Shuja kept on excusing himself for the procrastination even though the English approved his plans and manouvring had started already.⁴ Shuja was also afraid that Imad would proclaim Jawan Bakt as the Emperor and himself as wazir and hence urged the English to hasten for the action.⁵ The Emperor again on 1st October urged for the battalions, before the Marathas would proceed towards Kora and pointed out to the English that the rains were then over.⁶ The Emperor was given a promise that Munir-ud-din would set out within five or six days, thence to his succour.⁷

Najib had left Zabita with 5000 horse and foot as ally with the Marathas and had started for Koil (Aligarh) with his troops and guns. In a day and night, he reached Hapur.⁸ The wazir on 10 October was prepared to help the Rohillas only if the English army would join him,⁹ and he was given a promise by the Governor that

1. Ibid., vol.III, p.23.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.393.

3. Ibid., No.395.

4. Srivatsava, op.cit., I.H.Q.C.P. vol.XVIII, (1942), p.335.

5. Ibid., p.334.

6. C.P.C. vol.III, No.399 (1-10-1770).

7. Ibid., No.401 (2-10-1770).

8. Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C. vol.X, (1936), p.658 (3-10-1770).

9. C.P.C. vol.III, No.413.

Munir-ud-din would always help his cause.¹ But on 12 October Chaytsing was given hint to set himself against the wazir and to look for prosperity to the English.² However, Mahadji's plan to take the Emperor to Delhi was ready and it was supported by Visaji, too.³ The bridge over the Jumna at Rajghat was built and the army was expected to cross it within no time; but Tukoji postponed on account of Pitrapaksha. Zabita despatched his wakil to the Emperor to negotiate, on behalf of Ramchandra. But the Emperor, at that time, was entertaining the vakils from Hafiz Rahmat. The Emperor had promised Hafiz Rahmat to wait only for ten days more. He had already left Farukhabad for Nabigajar while Mujat Jang Khan was in his camp.⁴ Najib's health was worse and one week after his arrival at Najibabad, he died, on 31 October 1770⁵ and Zabita khan succeeded to his estates. To Zabita, however, the Emperor bore an intense enmity as he suspected the young Rohilla of having dabbled his sister Kherunnissa, as well as the other ladies of the Imperial household.⁶ Shortly after Najib, there was no one to keep the Marathas away from the capital. Najib alone had united the Rohillas in a common cause and had saved of the destruction from his country. Otherwise, an alliance of the Maratha and the Rohillas would have come to pass. His death was the signal for the Maratha advance.⁷

One party of the Marathas marched on Delhi and opened the negotiations with Zabita; another began to ravage the southern

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.402.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.402, 415.

3. Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.76 (15-10-1770).

4. Ibid.

5. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, p.415; Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C. vol.VII (1934), p.257; Sarkar, op.cit., Is.C. vol.X, (1936), pp.648 et seq.

6. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit., vol.III, p.100.

7. C.P.C. vol.III, p.XXVII.

districts of Ahmad khan's territories upto the frontier of the wazir's dominion; capturing Etawa, the capital of Hafiz Rahmat. Ahmad khan was trying to buy off the Marathas while Hafiz Rahmat was determined to fight. The wazir, hoping to get the territories of the Rohillas, did not help them though the English urged on that he ought to have done so, as it was unsafe but Shuja explained that it was unsafe itself to do anything of the sort unless he was helped by the English army. No wonder, the Marathas were quick to seize the opportunity.¹

The plan of the Marathas was in the first place to get the Emperor into their clutches; then to summon the chiefs of Hindustan in his name to submit to their authority; and to punish all those who refused to do so. In the Maratha camp there were two parties, one headed by Tukoji and Ramchandra and the other by Mahadji and Visaji. Both wanted to sell the office of Bakshi of the Empire and wanted the highest bidder. Ramchandra favoured Zabita and Visaji, supported by Mahadji, backed two candidates, Ghazi-ud-din or Ahmad khan. But when the Emperor inclined to the English, they waived their disputes and marched on to Delhi to set up another Emperor, as suggested by Ghazi-ud-din whom, Shinde's party then intended to make the wazir of the Empire.²

On 22 October Munir-ud-din had arrived at Murshidabad.³ The Marathas had managed very ingeniously to cross the Jumna, as referred earlier, when Najib was on the Ramghat on the bank of the Ganges, at

1. Ibid.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, p. XXVII.

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No. 437.



the time of his death.¹ All except Mahadji offered condolences to Zabita on his father's death.²

Mahadji was powerful near Delhi and Ramchandra arrested Zabita but Tukoji arranged for his escape on a dark night. Zabita sought Tukoji's protection which resulted in breaking the good relations of Mahadji and Tukoji. Ramchandra and Visaji informed Hingane about these affairs. The Emperor's Khoja and Shuja's servant, Trimbak das was to give Saranjam of Tika to Zabita and was to take Hingane to Zabita but now Hingane was ordered to proceed to Itawa to Ramchandra and Visaji, after a week of the capture of the fort.³

The Marathas were in the Doab and the Jat had not paid still⁴ and the fear of Imad-Maratha pact drove Shuja to enter into a treaty with Hafiz Rahmat who now promised to pay for Shuja's troops. This was sanctioned through the mediation of Harper.⁵ On c. 6, November the Marathas settled a new arrangement of payment with Naval Sing.⁶ The Governor declared he would listen sympathetically to the Peshwa and lamented that "Hindustan has pains in her heart and a thorn in her side".⁷ The Maratha wakil left Calcutta on 10 November⁸ and Muhammad Reza Khan was ordered to procure one elephant and two ponies as presents to Ramchandra, to be delivered through the Wakil, Hari Pundit.⁹

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1. BHRI, (1927-28), No. 140; Tarikh-i Faiz Baksh, Elliot, vol. VIII, p. 178.
 2. Sarkar, op.cit., I.H.Q. vol. XI (1935), p. 642 (Najib's life by Behari Mal).
 3. Ibid., BHRI, (1927-28), No. 140.
 4. Khare, op.cit., vol. IV, No. 1037.
 5. Srivatsava, op.cit., I.H.R.C.P., vol. XVIII, (1942), p. 334.
 6. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 445.
 7. Ibid., No. 448.
 8. Ibid., No. 453.
 9. Ibid., Nos. 449, 464, 466.

The wazir was informed by the Governor as to what matters were referred in the talk of Hari Pundit¹. Janoji Bho'sle demanded his Chowth from Bengal, in November.² The news of Najib's death was received by the Governor on 23 November³ and Razakhan's draft, to be addressed to Ramchandra was approved by the Governor, by 23 November too⁴. The wazir reported to the Governor that the Royal family was at Shahajahanabad and Ghazi-ud din was in readiness and that the Marathas and Ghazi-ud-din intended to set up Jawan Bakt as the Emperor. The wazir solicited further that something was done at once⁵. Rezakhan wrote to Ramchandra that the English were always true to their engagements and had the interest of the people of Hindustan at heart⁶. This led to the surrender of the central Doab between the provinces held by the Emperor to the eastward and the immediate territories administered in his name from Delhi, to the Marathas, though the latter tracts were spared in pursuance of the negotiations with the Emperor.⁷ The Marathas and Ghazi-ud-din still carried negotiations with Mir Kasim and the Emperor had decided to set out for Delhi, leaving the royal family at Allahabad. He had appointed Zabita as Bakshi and instructed Saifuid-din Muhammad Khan to negotiate with the Marathas and to do his utmost to press them for the evacuation of the fort of Delhi and to counteract the designs of Ghazi-ud din.⁸

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.466.

2. Ibid. No.467.

3. Ibid. No.469.

4. Ibid. No.472.

5. Ibid. No.473.

6. Ibid. No.475.

7. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.88.

8. C.P.C. vol.III, No.480.

The English on 14 December, advised the Emperor not to undertake the expedition on the then present occasion when the Marathas and Ghazi-ud din were on the confines of Etawa and Farukabad with a force to devastate the whole empire.¹ On 14 December again the wazir was advised by the Governor to be on guard for the sake of "our" safety.² On the morning of 15 December, Kabir Khan began removing the baggage from the Etawa fort. Mahadji posted Mirza Rahmat Beg and Bhore, his diwan, at the gate of the fort to see that the effects, tents etc. from the citadel were safely removed to the encampment of Kabir Khan. They accordingly had the baggage carried by their own oxen. At 12 O'clock, Ramchandra, Mahadji and Gangadhar Ballabh hoisted their separate colours on the fort and nearly 400 men of the Maratha forces took possession of it. Before the approach of the Marathas they had removed as much as they could and what was left behind, they put under the charge of Gangadhar Ballabh. At 3 O'clock, in the afternoon, Kabir Khan quitted the fort and repaired to his encampment and the fort fell into the hands of the Marathas.³

The Marathas were ravaging the districts round Etawa, Shaikhabad and Kanauj when it was reported on 15 December that Ahmad Khan Bangash offered 22 lakhs of rupees to the Marathas, to leave the territories, undisturbed. The Marathas made Naval hand over Guntur fort to Ranjit along with an annual sum of 20 lakhs of rupees. The Marathas escorted Ranjit and stopped between Mathura and

1. Ibid, No. 503.

2. Ibid, No. 504.

3. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 544; Sarkar, Fall of the Maghal Empire; vol. III, p. 24., Phalke, op.cit, vol. III, No. 464; Khare, op.cit, vol. IV, No. 1110.

and Akbarabad to demand six lakhs of rupees. Dundi khan suffered from palsy in the left arm. The affairs of Shahajahanabad were in the hands of Zabita in conjunction with the Marathas and the Marathas were practically governing the country.¹

Munir-ud din set out from Patna to join the Emperor.² He did not think it advisable for the Emperor; for if he (Emperor) should once fall into the hands of the Marathas, it would be but the far-fore-runner for more overwhelming calamities.³ About 20 December Mahadji sent a secret letter to the Emperor professing sincere devotion to his cause and offering to escort him to Delhi if his expenses were paid.⁴ The reply was the despatch of Saifuddin Muhammad from Allahabad on 20 December to Mahadji.⁵ The Peshwa also sent instructions to Visaji and Ramchandra on c.21 December.⁶ Janoji Bhosle on 24 December wrote to Moroba Phadnis, pointing his monetary difficulties and asked for help from the Peshwa for equipping an expedition into Bengal against the English for reinstating Mir Kasim Ali, who had applied for help to Janoji.⁷ The wazir was afraid, too, that the Marathas, at any moment, would settle affairs with the Rohillas and attack him⁸ and as per instructions earlier given to Rezakhan, he had presents of one elephant and five ponies, despatched to the vakil of Ramchandra on 24 December.⁹

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.505.

2. Ibid., No.506 (16-12-1770).

3. Ibid., No.508.

4. Sarkar, op.cit., vol.III, p.29; S.P.D. vol.29, No.89.

5. Ibid.

6. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.II, p.511.

7. S.P.D. vol.20, No.297.

8. C.P.C. vol.III, No.517.

9. Ibid., No.518.

The Marathas were established in the pargana Bhuttore and intended to attack Kora and earlier, if possible, Sirajpur.¹

It would have been well for the Empire, had Zabita inherited the former qualities of Najib. Had he followed in his father's steps and had the Emperor at the same time been a man of more decision, it was perhaps even then possible for a restoration to have taken place in which, backed by the power of the Rohillas and on friendly terms with the English, the Court of Delhi might have played off Tukoji against Mahadji and shaken off the irksome consequences of a Maratha protectorate.² And while the Marathas spread over the whole of upper and central Doab and occupied all Rohilkhand, excepting the small territory of Farukabad, to the South of the latter and north of the former, Zabita Khan, instead of endeavouring to prepare for the storm, occupied himself irritating the Emperor by withholding the tribute due at Allahabad and by violating the sanctity of the Imperial Zanana of Delhi by intrigues, with the Begams.³ The Marathas burnt the villages near Sikandarabad, whereupon the inhabitants had fled in panic and at night, the Gujars burnt Sarganj and Shahdara.⁴

Mahadji wrote a note to Ramchandra Naik Parange and Abaji Naik that for his purchase of jewellery, in his stay at Poona earlier, worth Rs.1,62,656/14/0, he had paid all except the balance of Rs.31,087.⁵ One Sakharam Chobe requested Nana to give him a new

1. Ibid, No.530 (13-12-1770).

2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.89.

3. Ibid, p.91.

4. Sarkar, "Delhi during the anarchy, 1749-1788", Delhi chronicle translated: I.H.R.C.P. vol.III, (1921), p.8.

5. Rajwade, op.cit, vol.X, p.40, No.73.

grant in the Etawa district which was now in Mahadji's hands.¹

The Emperor had consulted the authorities in Calcutta, on his proposed movements and they had strongly expressed their disapprobation. But Shuja, for reasons of his own earnestly, though secretly, encouraged the enterprise.² Alarm was raised in the territories of the English and the wazir, on account of the arrival of the Marathas at Kora³. In January 1771, Mahadji and Visaji demanded 25 lakhs of rupees as the succession fees from Zabita for his Mir Bakshiship. Tukoji backed Zabita and pledged himself to get him acknowledged as Mir Bakshi by the Emperor when Zabita refused to pay Visaji. Visaji and his party sent intimation to Tukoji to expel Zabita from his camp.⁴ A news letter from the Doab reported, "All the officers of the Maratha army are Visaji's friends and they consider Ramchandra Ganesh a fool. All this is due to the instigation of Mahadji Shinde. Visaji and Mahadji wish to make Ahmad khan Bangash Mir Bakshi, for he has promised them a sum of money."⁵ Saifuddin who was sent by the Emperor to the Marathas had returned and the Emperor planned to start for the capital. Munimud-din, nevertheless, hoped to procrastinate the march still for a year and to effect it out, had arrived at Benares.⁶ Since the fall of Etawa, ten thousand Marathas were directed to the frontiers of Kora and they had already made claims to certain parts of the

1. Parasnîs, Itihasik Charitre; chap VII, p.1.

2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.94.

3 4. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.III, pp.24-25.

4 5. Sarkar, op.cit, vol.III, p.26.

5. Sarkar, op.cit, vol.III, p.26. (Foot note); C.P.C. vol.III, No.605; Sardesai, Kavyekihās Sangrah, No.489.

6. C.P.C. vol.III, No.538 (1-1-1771).

wazir's territory.¹ The third brigade of the English Company was ordered to march from Patna to the banks of Caramnasa, in order to guard against any "treacherous engagements, should the Emperor be timid or the wazir more enterprising to prompt them (the Marathas) to any measure dangerous to the English Company" and that a vigorous conduct on the part of the Company was solicited to be a check upon their counsel and to oppose the first appearance of so formidable a danger"². Again, it was thought necessary, it would be required to order the third Brigade of the English to pass that frontier, on account of the progress of the Marathas and the suspicious conduct of the Emperor and the wazir³. "The wazir, on his part, had been full of his usual professions and had suffered the the neighbouring powers to be crushed without advancing a man to their assistance and entertained a correspondence with the enemy under the pretence altogether frivolous".⁴ The Emperor was full of apprehensions for the safety for the safety of his son and intended to march but the sudden invasion on Najib's provinces, laid aside the Emperor's plans.⁵

The Marathas by 6th January 1771 had collected their chowth from the pargana Bhuttore.⁶ The Governor wrote to the Emperor on 8 January that he had sent Gen. Barker to assist him to drive the Marathas from his provinces,⁷ and the wazir was also

1. S.P.D.D. vol.12, 9 (Fort William to Bombay).

2. S.P.D.D. vol.12; 10 and 11.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., vol.12; 9-10.

6. C.P.C. vol.III, No.544.

7. Ibid., vol.III, No.546.

informed about this.¹ Barker solicited secret news from Muniruddin about the real motives of the Emperor.² The Rohillas were planning to meet the Marathas in the battle and Munimuddin declared that the Emperor's march was postponed and that the Emperor, the wazir and the Governor were so intimate as to have one soul in three bodies.³ But on 21 January an agreement between the Marathas and the Rohillas was reported and the wazir complained that Gen. Barker was tarrying "while the Marathas devastated the country".⁴ Dindikhan was dead and his son had married the daughter of Hafiz Rahmat⁵. Ghazi-ud din came from the Marathas to settle the terms of peace with Hafiz Rahmat and Ahmad Khan. The Marathas agreed to withdraw their forces from Itawa, Shaikabad and Kananj and would receive a sum of rupees 20 lakhs, payable within three years. On the return of Ghazi-ud din to the Maratha camp, they insisted on having a further sum of 2 lakhs of rupees. Hafiz Rahmat had likewise given his consent to the additional sum. According to the first engagement Ahmad Khan was to pay 12 lakhs of rupees on account of Kanauj, Hafiz Rahmat was to pay Rs.5,50,000/- for Etawa and Dindikhan was to pay Rs.2,50,000/- on account of Shaikabad and both the parties had sworn to the agreement. Ramchandra and Mahadji were satisfied but Tukoji who was an enemy of Ghazi-ud din disagreed and impeded the adjustment of affairs and insisted on fighting. Ghazi-ud din then took his departure for Ajmer. Tukoji assisted Zabita who, in his turn,

1. Ibid. vol.III, No.547.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.558.

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.562.

4. C.P.C. vol.III, No.569.

5. C.P.C. vol.III, No.570.

represented that the Rohilla Sardars had a large force and that if they could be got over, great deeds could be performed in Hindustan.¹

In the meanwhile, ten thousand Marathas set out and ravaged the country, subordinate to the fort of Farukabad. The Rohillas, too, rushed out and an engagement did take place in which many of the Marathas were killed and the remainder, put to flight. Hafiz Rahmat had sent 200 pieces of cannon and a large quantity of rockets with several thousand Rohillas to reinforce the troops at Farukabad. He had sent Khan Muhammad Khan, Sultan Khan and Ghulam Jilam Khan with 10,000 horse and foot and himself intended to cross the Ganges to inspect the ramparts and his own army. He determined to meet the Marathas in the field if they were not satisfied with the offer. A man named Ghulab Ray had arrived to negotiate on behalf of the Marathas. Hafiz Rahmat being pleased with some persons who were in possession of the districts of Etawa, would not cross the Ganges to afford them assistance. For the last 12 years these persons had been in possession of the districts which were formerly in the hands of the Marathas. The Rohillas used to pay an annual sum of Rs. 30,000/- as Chowth for their own country.²

Ramchandra had then written to the Peshwa, complaining of Tukoji and of the differences that subsisted between them. Tukoji wished to settle the affairs of the Rohillas, independently; while Ramchandra was of opinion that they should have been settled through Mahadji. The Marathas settling their affairs with Hafiz

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.571 (23-1-1771).

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.571 (23-1-1771).

Rahmat hoped to get the fort of Shahajahanabad.¹ About 26 January it was decided in consultation with Visaji that the territory across the Ganges belonged to Bangash and he was to join the Marathas. But, actually no reply came forth from him. Mahadji got his territory in the Doab and got forcibly the document signed by him for that. Now when Visaji was told that if Bangash was to get his territory back, he would be offering a Nazar to him. Visaji replied that he was ready to accept the proposal in case, Bangash would forward his document; and Visaji would then twist it for his own purpose. Visaji again, gave an assurance that nothing would be told to Mahadji, till he reached Poona. Even the copies of the document and not the original, would be sufficient for the purpose of Visaji. Thus - Visaji, too was not on good terms with Mahadji². Tukoji's policy was overruled by Mahadji and a treaty with Bangash and Hafiz Rahmat was contracted. Bangash and Hafiz were to pay ten lakhs of rupees and twelve lakhs of rupees to the Marathas, respectively.³ On c.26 January 1771, Ramchandra, in extreme dejection, determined to march back with his household cavalry but a compromise was effected out and he stayed on⁴. Military preparations were carried on in Berar and Bihar by the English against the Marathas.⁵

In the beginning of February 1771, Shuja wrote to Gen. Barker that it appeared, from Harper's letter, that the Marathas, the Rohillas and the Afgans were disposed to come to an agreement and that if these three combined, serious troubles were ahead and

1. Ibid.

2. Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.78.

3. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.III, p.27 (By 26-1-1771).

4. Ibid, p.28.

5. C.P.C. vol.III, No.577 (27-1-1771).

solicited a firm alliance ~~with~~ with the English.¹ Gen. Barker, opining same, left Buxar on 4 February to reach Benares to discuss the state of affairs with the wazir.² The English nevertheless were apparently not ready to engage themselves in a war with the allies, though they would have liked to see the Marathas crushed; and only instigated Shuja, writing to him that "if he gives battle to the Marathas, it will certainly end in disaster for them who will share the same fate as they did at the battle of Panipat."³ Barker received a letter from the Peshwa, soliciting permission of passport for Dhondu Pandit to go to Benares for the pilgrimage.⁴ Barker postponed his proceeding to Benares and approved the plan of the wazir. The wazir was to go to Kanpur on the Maratha frontier and Barker informed him that the wazir was not to give battle to the combined armies of the Maratha and Ahmad Khan at Kora, till he arrived there.⁵

On arriving at Sherganj, a place about four miles from Delhi, the Marathas sent the Emperor's wakil, Saifuddin Muhammad khan into the master-less city. He went to a place of religious worship of the Moors, sent for Mir Abdullah, brother of Musari khan and directed him to proclaim the Emperor and demanded the surrender of the fort. He stationed a Mughal and a troop^rer at the entrance of every lane. The Begam Zinat Mahal refused to hand over the fort. Qasim Ali khan who resided in the fort as a representative of Zabita was determined to defend it.⁶ Thus, the Emperor was proclaimed in the capital on 7 February 1771.⁷ Balarao Govind, Mahadji's officer occupied Delhi

1. Heras, *op.cit*, *Is.C.*, vol. XI, (1937), p. 508.

2. *C.P.C.* vol. III, No. 581.

3. Heras, *op.cit*;

4. *C.P.C.* vol. III, No. 580.

5. *Ibid*, vol. III, Nos. 584-585 (2-2-1771).

6. *C.P.C.* vol. III, No. 632, vol. III, Intro. P-XXVIII; Sarkar, *op.cit*, vol. III, p. 30.

7. *Ibid*.

at noon on the 9th February. The fort-keeper was paid Rs.11,000/- by Balarao Govind, probably as the salary of Qasim's Sebandi troops.¹ The Marathas, still had to bombard the fort and capture it.² For the time, Mahadji and the two Brahmin commanders brought severe pressure upon Tukoji and compelled him to give up Zabita whom, he had, before the capture of the fort, sheltered under his protection.³

The Marathas set out for Talkatorah, leaving some troops behind to attend upon Shaahzada to whom they paid homage.⁴ Saifuddin on behalf of the Emperor, promised to pay the Marathas 40 lakhs of rupees with eight districts, including Merat and the Marathas took upon themselves to bring the Emperor in the capital, within two months. Kora and the other districts were to be handed over to the Marathas. The city of Delhi was to be handed over to the Marathas and when they would get ten lakhs of rupees within ten days, they would hand over the fort back to the Emperor. By that time, the Emperor himself would come and fifteen lakhs of rupees would be collected by confiscating the surrounding districts. The remaining fifteen lakhs of rupees could be paid within seven months, thence to come. The Emperor sent hundis for two lakhs of rupees from Prayag and promised to send hundis for three lakhs of rupees more. The Emperor had set out from Prayag and the city of Delhi was nominally under the custody of Saifuddin. Madhavrao Sirdar had his garrison in the city-fort and was ready to hand over the fort, on receipt of ten lakhs of rupees.⁵

1. Sarkar, op.cit.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, p.XXVIII.

3. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.II, p.502.

4. C.P.C. op.cit.

5. S.P.D., vol.29, No.89.

It was evident that the Marathas intended that their conquests in Hindustan should be permanent. As to the wazir, he gave up all hopes of reconciling the Marathas and recalled his wakil, Talmuk Das, from their camp. This he did, of course, to quiet the suspicion and to gain the confidence of the English¹. But the Emperor who was nervously anxious of their further movements allowed his wakil to continue with them, inspite of the repeated protests from the Company and Shuja.² The Company and the wazir even suspected that the Emperor himself instigated the Marathas to advance on the capital, intending then, to follow them later.³ Gen. Barker had been ordered by the Committee at Calcutta to march with the whole army from Dinapur to help the Emperor in case the Marathas encroached upon his 'demesne' but neither the assurances of the English nor the advice of the ministers could now change the Emperor's mind. And he wrote to Barker, "we are at liberty to exalt any one of the Marathas or Rohilla tribe, who submits to us and punish who do not acknowledge our authority"; and again, "If - which God forbid ! the business (march to Delhi) is delayed, we shall be obliged to take such steps as seem to be advisable". Barker and the wazir tried to establish an alliance with the Jats to frustrate the designs of the Marathas. But it was too late and again the feebleness with which the Committee at Calcutta had acted so long, as well as the jealousy that existed between the wazir and the Rohillas put an alliance between them out of question and left the Marathas free to do whatever

1. C.P.C. vol.III, p.XXVIII.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

they liked.¹ Gen

Gen. Barker complained to the Peshwa that the affairs of the pilgrimage of Naik Bhat, Sheth, Shivram Pandit and Hari Sakhaji to Prayag (Allahabad) and Kashi (Benares) were rather strained.²

Ramchandra had sent Faru Pandit with directions to Tukoji to dismiss Zabita from the army of the Marathas. If Zabita would leave, Visaji would remain with the forces; otherwise the latter threatened to return to the Deccan. It was reported that he would quit the army next day and that he was only awaiting a reply from Tukoji. Visaji desired that Zabita either would leave the camp or pay the Nazar of twenty-five lakhs of rupees for the Bakshiship. Visaji's party desired this office for Ahmad Khan on payment and proposed to set out for Kanar Manikpore, for the Emperor, after settling the Bakshiship affair. Ramchandra had an interview with Tukoji and appeared very disgusted, on its account.³

On 27th January 1771, early in the morning, Ramchandra gave the signal for marching. He mounted his elephant by about 7 o'clock, marched 5 cos and pitched his tents in the village of Moyassi. He had fixed the day for setting out for the Deccan but he changed his mind and thought it unwise to start without taking the advice of the Peshwa. Some said he was going to Shahajahanabad, others said that he was proceeding to the country of Naval and some really thought he would go to the Deccan. It was certain, if he set out for Etawa, that would be road to the Deccan; if for Manipur, that was the way to

1. C.P.C. vol.III, p.XXVIII.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.592 (7-2-1771).

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.605 (12-2-1771).

Shahajahanabad¹.

Mahadji, Ramchandra and Visaji thence had arrived at Eliabad which is within seven cos from Manipur and had quitted the route to Etawa. Mahadji sent a person to Hafiz Rahmat and also another to Ahmad Khan with the following message: "we have consented to the terms of your treaty. We are bent upon marching to the capital and have therefore recalled Ghazi-ud din at Ajmer to come as quickly as possible. We are going to the banks of the Jumna and will cross it at the Ghat of Mathura. Tomorrow is the day fixed for our march to Manipur".² On Wednesday, the 6th February, the Marathas arrived at Manipur on their way to Shahajahanabad.³ Tukoji had not still joined the main army but it was reported that he had dismissed Zabita. The Marathas now decided to march to the capital and it was said that the Ghat of Mathura which was 35 miles away from their position, was the place, fixed for the troops to cross the Jumna. Ramchandra had declared that if Mahadji summoned Ghazi-ud din to the Maratha camp, without consent, he would dismiss the khan in the same manner as Mahadji dismissed Zabita khan. Saifuddin Muhammed and Mishraban khan were still in the Maratha camp,⁴ and Gen. Barker, next, was sorry to hear from the Emperor that the Marathas had disturbed Shahajahanabad.⁵ The Emperor, on the representation from Muniruddin called back Saifuddin and Bahadur Ali khan from the Maratha camp.⁶

Ramchandra Shamrao wrote to Nana on 18 February, requesting that the Peshwa should write to Mahadji and Tukoji to succour Raghunath Bapu at Gwalior who was harassed by Gohad and other Powers.⁷

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.605 (12-2-1771).

2. Ibid, No.607.

3. Ibid, No.611 (16-2-1771).

4. Ibid, No.614.

5. Ibid, No.616.

6. Ibid, No.617.

7. S.P.D. vol.29, No.263.

The Maratha march was delayed on account of the internal dissension and they arrived at Shaikhabad, on this side of Akbarabad.¹ Gen. Barker wrote to Hafiz Rahmat, Zabita, Ahmad khan, Dundi khan, Faizullah khan for the alliance against the Marathas.² Tukoji sided with Ramchandra, and Visaji and Mahadji were inseparable. They were not on good terms with Zabita and the wazir. Mahadji proposed to place another king on the throne and to declare Ghazi-ud-din as the wazir and Ahmad as the Bakshi.³ The wazir explained to the English how another Emperor would be dangerous to his own interests and those of the English, too.⁴ The Marathas arrived at Sherganj which is at a distance of two cos on this side of Shahajahanabad but they had not crossed the Jumna.⁵

Gen. Barker sent to the wazir for the sake of the Governor, the copies of the Royal Shuquas which were privately issued by the Emperor to the Marathas.⁶ He also advised Muniruddin to inform Ramchandra, Tukoji, Mahadji and Visaji that the negotiations must be made to the Emperor, through the wazir only.⁷ The wazir proposed to pay five lakhs of rupees to the Marathas if they would withdraw from the capital. But if the rumour of the Peshwa Madhavrao's death would be correct, it was thought, however, that they would leave the capital themselves and the sum would be saved.⁸

After plundering the capital, the Marathas took into their custody the members of the royal family and the Emperor solicited

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1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.621.
 2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.622.
 3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.625.
 4. C.P.C. vol.III, Nos.626, 630.
 5. C.P.C. vol.III, No.632.
 6. C.P.C. vol.III, No.647.
 7. C.P.C. vol.III, No.651 (7-3-1771).
 8. C.P.C. vol.III, No.658 (10-3-1771).

the English to oppose them and to send some lakhs of rupees for the Emperor's mother.¹ Zabita had gone to Najibabad². By 20 February, the Marathas were appointing amils in the districts round the capital, which belonged to Zabita and they had formed three resolutions: (1) If Shah Alam would pay the sum agreeable to his engagements, they would then appoint his son, his successor; (2) They had written to Ghazi-ud din that if he would pay the Nazarana, he would be appointed the wazir and they would place on the throne, another king whom he might choose, (3) If Zabita would pay the Nazar, they would restore to him the districts round the capital and the fort.³ Gen. Barker was again surprised to find that Muniruddin himself had promised to pay nine lakhs of rupees to the Emperor, on his entering Kora,⁴ and again that the Sanad for Kora was prepared for Nijaf Khan.⁵

Ramchandra Sadashiv reported on 17 March that Mahadji had settled all feuds in the Maratha camp and that they had agreed to work in concert in future.⁶ New alliance of the Rohillas and Shuja was proposed for the consideration of the Governor, when the Rohillas would pay Rs.25 lakhs to the wazir for help. In case he would not help, they would give this to Ahmad Shah Durani.⁷ Ghulam Husain suggested to the Governor that "there are two ways of rooting out the Marathas. The one is for all the Sardars of Hindustan to unite together (of which, at present, there is no prospect) and the

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.663 (12-3-1771).

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.659 (11-3-1771).

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.665 (14-3-1771).

4. C.P.C. vol.III, No.666 (14-3-1771).

5. C.P.C. vol.III, No.668 (15-3-1771).

6. S.P.D. vol.III 29, No.266; Oturkar, Op.cit, No.149.

7. Heras, op.cit, Is.C. vol.XI, (1937), pp.508-509.

other is the arrival of Abdali." He had great confidence in Dundi khan and thought that Abdali would certainly come if the Governor and Dundi khan would write to him, to that effect. If Abdali would not come personally, he would send his own son, Timur Shah - and it was pointed out that one good point about Abdali was that he never would remain in Hindustan. He used to go back to his own country as soon as his affairs were settled in Hindustan. Abdali again had no confidence in the Emperor or the wazir.¹ Gen. Barker had already threatened the Emperor that the English would be drawn into the war with the Marathas.² The Emperor inclined towards the Marathas and the Prince in Delhi signed the treaty with the Marathas.³ The Emperor was himself mediating an alliance with the Marathas.⁴

The Emperor left Allahabad on Friday, 9th April at ten O'clock and was escorted by an army, headed by the wazir's son. The wazir had also helped him with the money and men, a step which the Company strongly disapproved and which caused the English to doubt his former sincerity. The wazir could not withhold his services from the Emperor, altogether. The utmost he could do to please the Committee at Calcutta was that he did not accompany Shah Alam to Delhi and even this he did, in violation of the agreement which he had made with the Emperor in 1769. Muniruddin also stayed behind. The only friend of the Company who followed was Najaf Khan, ex-Faujdar of Kora⁵. The Emperor went to the Sarai of Alamchand, about

1. Ibid, p. 509.

2. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 686 (31-3-1771).

3. C.P.C. vol. III, Nos. 694, 695 (12-3-1771).

4. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 698 (8-4-1771).

5. Ibid, vol. III, p. XXIX; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. II, p. 555; Seir Mutaquerin, vol. III, pp. 85-86.

18 miles from Allahabad when he was met by Gen. Barker and the wazir. Here he granted to the wazir, the Subedari of Allahabad and Kora and wrote to the Governor to hand over the fort of Allahabad to the wazir.¹ From Alamchand, he proceeded, in spite of the attempts of the wazir and Gen. Barker to stop him, to Farukhabad, intending to halt at Jajman, Bhuttore and other places and proposed to remain at Farukhabad until the Marathas evacuated the fort of Shahajahanabad. Gen. Barker accompanied him to the borders of Kora.² The Company temporised and finally refused to cede the Allahabad fort to the wazir for Muniruddin had secretly written to the English to hold fast that fort, while the wazir insisted on immediate evacuation. They agreed to await the news of affairs westward and sure enough, the Emperor who was angry with the wazir for not accompanying him, wrote to the Governor, ordering the English troops to remain at Allahabad and Kora to defend that part.³ The Emperor had an army of 16000 and Shuja had offered a Peshkush of four lakhs of rupees.⁴ The Emperor moved on and the British power closed on behind his wake, so that no trace of him or his government, ever re-appeared in the provinces that he had inconsiderably left.⁵ Even then, if the Governor's ships had sailed to Allahabad after the plan of Benares was decided upon all would have been well and that business which had now assumed so serious an aspect, would have been nipped in the bud.⁶

In order to bring pressure on Shah Alam, Mahadji threatened to raise another king to the throne and to make, Ghazi-ud-din, the Wazir

1. Ibid, p. XXIX.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Keene, Shah Alam, p. 36.

5. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p. 94.

6. C.P.C., vol. III, No. 702, (10-4-1771).

and the

threat had its immediate effect.¹ The Marathas had given up Shahajahanabad and they were preparing for the delivery of the fort.² Mahadji, Tukoji and Visaji entreated Ramchandra to join them and not to go back from Palwal on c.26 April 1771³. Mahadji and Visaji were all-in-all in the Maratha camp when the proclamation was read that the Peshwa had appointed Visaji as the leader.⁴ Six to seven thousand Naga mendicants with the wazir's parvana crossed the Jumna from the Ghats of Kalpi and passed on towards the Ganges through the confines of Kora.⁵ Dundi khan, the Rohilla Sardar died on 17th April 1771.⁶

"Only the actual restriction on the Emperor's person would have stopped him (the Emperor) - but, not approved by the Court of Directors; Sentiments of humanity attended with mischief and inconvenience, irritated the Emperor beyond the possibility of forgiveness; and the Marathas would have put another king, perhaps the eldest son of Shah Alam on the throne. There could be no way, then to guard against the new Prince, entirely under the influence of the Marathas whose resentment might be stimulated by any move on the part of the English. Instead of thus combating the intrigues of an angry prince, the Emperor was allowed (by the English) to go."⁷

On the last day of April, the wazir had an audience with the Emperor and on the second day of May, Muniruddin was appointed Naik of Allahabad and Kora and on 3, the Emperor ordered his camp to be

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. II, p. 514-517.

2. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 720 (23-4-1771).

3. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. III, p. 33.

4. Sarkar, op.cit, vol. III, p. 32.

5. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 728 (24-4-1771).

6. Ibid, vol. III, No. 734 (9-5-1771).

7. S.P.D.D.; vol. 12; 44, 45, 46 (17-5-1771).

removed to Sharitabad. Saadat Ali, the wazir's son, accompanied the Emperor, all the while.¹ The Bhosle forwarded his immediate demands for the chowth of Bengal, too.²

But again, Naro Narsinh, the Peshwa's agent at Delhi, reported recriminations among the Maratha Sardars and expressed his fear that, that would lead to complete failure of the expedition³. Visaji was angry and had gone to Ghaziabad from Delhi on c.22 May 1771. Now, Mahadji, Tukoji and Ramchandra allied together against Visaji. The Maratha Sardars wanted to give the supreme command of the army in the north to Ramchandra but Visaji kept his firm hold on Delhi and sent rival correspondence to the Peshwa.⁴ The Peshwa strongly reprimanded the Sardars and upheld the position of Visaji.⁵ The Peshwa, however, had sanctioned a loan of Rs.40,000/- to Mahadji.⁶ On Thursday, 23rd May, the Emperor arrived safely on the banks of the Ganges near Janjanabad.⁷

Ahmad Shah Durani himself had proposed several times an alliance against the Marathas to the Emperor but the latter had rejected all these proposals saying that "he would not enter into engagements without the consent of the English".⁸ Mahadji and Tukoji had earlier advanced victoriously on Gahamukteshwar, forcing the Rohilla chiefs to fall back on Farukhabad. The Rohillas thus defeated and disheartened could not act on a united plan of action.⁹

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.746 (18-5-1771).

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.749 (18-5-1771).

3. S.P.D. vol.29, No.269.

4. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.III, p.33; C.P.C. vol.III, No.810.

5. Sarkar, op.cit, vol.III, p.34.

6. S.P.D. vol.29, Nos.284, p.319.

7. C.P.C. vol.III, No.779 (6-6-1771).

8. Heras, op.cit, Is.C. vol.XI, (1937), p.509, (May 1771).

9. S.P.D. vol.29, No.271 (15-6-1771).

The fort of Delhi, formerly in the custody of Madhavrao Sivdev was given to Mahadji by the Peshwa by 18 June¹.

On account of the Emperor's resolution to put himself into the hands of the Marathas, the English presidencies were driven into the necessity of finding out "some general and uniform plan and system for the general safety".² On 20 May, Ramchandra, whom the Peshwa had suspended, received a letter from Visaji advising him that if he approved of the Peshwa's plan of setting out for the Deccan, to go with him; otherwise, he was expected to return to Ramchand Pandit who would give him charge of the baggage and implements of war and himself set out for the Deccan. Visaji, after despatching this letter, encamped on the other side of Ghaziuddinagar facing Selkhartore. Tukoji with 6000 and Mahadji with 5000 horse set out for Palwal to bring back Ramchandra. They succeeded in bringing him back but still Visaji, Ramchandra and Tukoji were not in good terms. The Marathas had not evacuated the fort of Shahajahanabad and its neighbouring territory.³

The Emperor reached Bhuttore on 16 June, and ordered on 19 June for eleven bungalows to be built there. The Emperor would not set out till the Marathas evacuated Shahajahanabad. Accordingly, the Emperor sent Yakut khan, the royal ennuch with seven Khilats and two lakhs of rupees to Shahajahanabad. He awaited then the report of Yakut khan, expecting the Marathas to evacuate as per his orders. The Maratha Sardars were still divided by the internal

1. S.P.D. vol 29, No. 285, p. 319.

2. S.P.D.D. vol. 12; 40-41 (Mad. to B'bay), (19-6-1771).

3. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 810 (30-6-1771).

feuds. Tukoji and Mahadji had joined their forces and wanted Ramchandra to take the command of army again but Visaji would not consent to this shifting and his deputy acting under his sole orders was in possession of the fort. In order to guard the fort and to prevent the other Sardars from occupying it, he had pitched his tents by the side of the river and himself kept a vigilant watch over the fort-keeper (Qiledar). Saifuddin, in vain, negotiated for the evacuation of the fort and having failed to come to any terms on account of the private quarrels of the Maratha Sardars, did not himself return to the Emperor. Mahadji had consented to evacuate the fort while Tukoji desired to form an alliance with the Rohillas. Visaji, on the other hand, opposed both these schemes and declared that he would act with complete independence. The Marathas were encamped on the other side of the Jumna river, in the town of Shahajahanabad. Consequently, each Sardar had selected a large house for his residence and was removing his baggage and artillery across the Jumna, which in its way, had greatly increased the price of the grain.¹

The Emperor left Surajpur on 4 July and arrived at Manganpur, seven cos. from Surajpur and proposed to continue his march till he reached Farukhabad. Ahmad khan, Khudaad khan, Mihraban khan set out to meet the Emperor. Yakut khan with 2,50,000 rupees had already reached Shahajahanabad to bribe the Marathas. The Marathas wanted the security of ten lakhs of rupees. But the khan explained that the five lakhs were already paid and $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs were ready and $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs would be deducted from the accounts of Bakhawatward khan; the Marathas

1. C.P.C. vol.III, Nos.812 (5-7-1771), 823 (15-7-1771).

agreed to this and deducted the said sum. Yakutkhan also gave them a promissory note of $1\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees paying upon their removing themselves from the fort and removing at a distance from the country.¹

Gen. Barker reported on 31st July to the Governor that Ahmad khan was dead and that the Emperor was in the neighbourhood of Farukhabad.² Near Kallianadi, the Emperor intended to seize the effects of Ahmad khan who died on 11 July 1771.³ The Peshwa did not approve the action of Mahadji and Tukoji who handed over the flag and seal to Ramchandra and insisted that the matters must be left in hands of Visaji.⁴ The Emperor was pleased to grant one lakh of rupees to Gen. Barker.⁵ The Maratha army, round Delhi, consisted of 30,000 horse of Mahadji; 25,000 of Ramchandra; 20,000 of Tukoji; 5000 of Sivaji Vithal; 40,000 of Colla Goroar and 10,000 of Ghazi-ud din khan, awaiting instructions from the Peshwa.⁶ The wazir was to exchange the fort of Allahabad for Chunargarh with the British.⁷

The Emperor was at Farukhabad by the beginning of September 1771.⁸ The Peshkush for the succession to Ahmadkhan's chiefship was offered to the Emperor which amounted to six lakhs of rupees and seventy five thousand rupees more were offered by Nawab Muzaffar Jang who was an infant in the family of the deceased.⁹

1. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 823 (15-7-1771).

2. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 843 (31-7-1771).

3. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 858 (11-8-1771).

4. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 272.

5. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 883 (26-8-1771).

6. S.P.D.D. vol. 12; 50-51 (Bombay consultation) (28-8-1771);

55 (Bombay to Fort William) (31-8-1771).

7. C.P.C. vol. III, No. 887 (29-8-1771).

8. C.P.C. vol. III, P. XXIX.

9. Franklin, Shah Alam, p. 36-(4 lakhs); Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire (5 lakhs), C.P.C. vol. III, No. 888 (6 lakhs), C.P.C. vol. III, No. 906, 918 (6 lakhs) and 75000 Rs.).

The Marathas delivered up the Fort in Delhi on 12 August though they still had the possession of the town and seized the neighbouring districts belonging to Zabita. As their chief need was money, they contemplated several plans simultaneously to achieve this end.¹ They took the money from the ennuch but demanded the second instalment of fifteen lakhs of rupees. They intended to stay in the capital till the Emperor's arrival there and contemplated to demand then the balance of 40 lakhs of rupees before Mahadji had to leave for the Deccan. They were however, still quarrelling when the Emperor was within 5 to 6 cos from Farukhabad. The son of Ahmad had offered his Nazar to the Emperor half in specie, half in effects.² The Emperor earlier had hesitated but learnt, now that the fort of Delhi was ceded and hence he was glad and intended to reach the capital by forced marches.³

On 10th September 1771, Ramchandra left Delhi for the Deccan⁴ and thenceforth, Mahadji by acting individually and secretly, wormed himself into the Emperor's confidence. Tukoji antagonised the Emperor by supporting Zabita with the demonstration of force while Visaji cared only to get the possession of the region, north of Delhi for himself.⁵ Robes of honour were presented to Ragho Malhar on his appointment as Mahadji's diwan on c. 22nd September⁶. The exchange of the forts between the wazir and the Governor, earlier, had

1. C.P.C. vol.III, p.XXIX, and vol.III, No.895.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.888 (2-9-1771).

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.895 (6-9-1771).

4. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.III, p.34.

5. Ibid, p.35.

6. S.P.D. vol.29, No.285.

brought the wazir and Gen. Barker, to the verge of open rupture¹ and now, the wazir demanded ten lakhs of rupees as the tribute of Bengal from the Governor.² Mahadji and Tukoji gave one village as Jagir to Hingane as he was labouring under financial plight. All the letters from the Emperor, Hafiz, the Jat and the wazir were directed to Visaji. Mahadji and Tukoji were one at heart but actually sided with Visaji, externally.³ The Emperor on 2 September 1771 had offered presents to Visaji.⁴ By 29 October Bhaskar Pant had offered terms from Jaypur but Ramchandra disagreed with him.⁵

The Emperor had at once resumed his march from Farukhabad. When he was at Baniaganj, the Marathas who left Shahajahanabad to meet him, arrived at Anup Sahar.⁶ When the Emperor was expecting the arrival of Mahadji, Saifuddin arrived in company of Ali Naqu Khan, in the Royal tent on 15th November. It was decided that the Prince would go out and receive Mahadji who was encamped at a distance of one cos. So the Emperor set out on 18th November together with all the nobles of the court and arrived at 4 O'clock in the afternoon at the camp of Mahadji, who had an audience with the Prince and presented him with a Nazar of eleven gold mohars and four trays containing clothes and a tray of jewels. The relations of Mahadji presented a Nazar of seven gold mohars and offered Nazars also to the dependents of the Prince according to rank and stations. The Prince then left and returned to the

1. C.P.C. vol.III, No.909.

2. C.P.C. vol.III, No.934 (25-9-1771).

3. Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.79 (19-10-1771).

4. Parasnis, Itihasik Charitre, chap.10, p.118.

5. Hingane Daptar, vol.II, No.79 (29-10-1771).

6. C.P.C. vol.III, No.979 (16-11-1771).

Emperor at half past of six; Two hours later, Mahadji with all his retinue arrived in the Presence and offered a Nazar of 50 gold mohars. His relations offered 21 gold mohars each. Mahadji was honoured with a Khilat of six pieces and given a sirpech, a Jagha, a string of pearls, an elephant, a horse and a sabre. The relations of Mahadji and other Maratha Sardars were awarded khilats of five pieces each. As this was the first day of interview, no conference on business took place. Saifuddin represented to the Emperor that in addition to the six lakhs of rupees which he took from the banker Gangaram, he required another six lakhs of rupees to defray the expenses. On 17th November Abdul Ahad Khan and Shamlat Munshi deputed by Zabita arrived and offered presents and Nazar to the Emperor.¹ The Emperor escorted by Mahadji, left Baniaganj on 25 November². The Nawab of Arcot requested the wazir that Muniruddin should be set free.³ On 26th November the royal tents were sent forward and pitched near the Sarai of Afgan, which is 20 cos from Baniaganj. On 28th November the march to Shahajahanabad was to be resumed which was, this time, suggested by Mahadji. The Emperor intended to travel by the stages of six cos. and then to halt for two days.⁴ At Nabiaganj, a town 30 miles west of Farukhabad and in the high road to Delhi, Anant Rao, a Maratha Vakil, had given the following propositions to the Emperor: (1) The balance of Chowth to be paid to the Marathas. (2) For war against the Jats, five lakhs of rupees to be given to them again.⁵

1. C.P.C. vol.III, Nos.987,999, p.XXIX.

2. C.P.C.; vol.III, No.997 and p.XXIX (on 26 Novm); Sarkar, op.cit., vol.III, p.32.

3. C.P.C. vol.III, No.993.

4. C.P.C. vol.III, No.998 (15-12-1771).

5. Franklin, Shah Alam, pp.37 and 28.

Mahadji escorted the Emperor to the camp of Visaji,¹ where Visaji and Tukoji were introduced to his Presence.² The Emperor rebuked Ramchandra on 15 December 1771, for not keeping the promises and it was expected that Ramchandra would convince perhaps Visaji, to his views.³ The Emperor under the auspices of Visaji was taken into the capital on 27 December 1771 and seated on the throne,⁴ by Visaji and Mahadji.⁵ Ragho Malhar - Mahadji's diwan saw that his expenses were paid from the Emperor's treasury.⁶

1. Duff, op.cit, vol.II, p.574.

2. Franklin, op.cit.

3. Hingane, Daptar, vol.II, No.80.

4. Duff, op.cit, vol.II, p.574; C.P.C. vol.III, p.XXIX; Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.95, (christmas day); Franklin op.cit. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag vol.IV, p.221; Khare, op.cit, vol.IV, pp. 1885-86; B.H.R.I. (1926-27), No.76 (for Visaji's family); Sarkar, op.cit, vol.III, p.32 (6- January 1772).

5. Parasnîs, Itihasik charitre, chap.10, p.118.

6. S.P.D. vol.29, No.225.

CHAPTER - IV.

The Rift in the reed.From 27th December 1771 To 25th February 1775.

The Emperor escorted by Visaji and a great Maratha army had entered his capital and on him, Mahadji pressed the conquest of Rohilkhand.¹ The Bawani Mahal (consisting 52 parganas, now included in the districts of Shaharanpur and Muzaffarnagar) contained three strongholds: Pathargarh on the left, Sukratal on the right of the Ganges and Ghansgarh, near Muzaffar nagar. The first two had been built by the late minister, Najib to protect the ford which led to his fief in the north-western corner of Rohilkhand for the Ganges is almost always fordable here, except in the high floods. The last was the work of Zabita himself. The Imperialists - The Marathas, the Emperor and Najaf - directed their attack here.² An army of 90,000 men thus invaded the fief of Zabita, as per advice of Mahadji. The Maratha cavalry was commanded by Mahadji himself and the small Mughal force was led by Najaf Khan. Zabita tried to hold the northern bank but failed. The Rohillas were defeated completely. The Marathas plundered the whole of Rohilkhand and captured the ladies of Zabita's household whom they held for ransom for 1½ lakhs of rupees.³ The Afghan resistance and aid were handicapped by the menacing attitude of Shuja and while the Maratha and the Mughal armies crossed the Ganges by a mixture of boldness and stratagem,

1. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit. vol.III, p.100.

2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, pp.96-97.

3. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit.; Keene, op.cit., p.97 (for history of Najaf.)

Zabita fled to the Jat country. The occasion is memorable because among the children of Zabita was the eldest son, a beautiful youth named Ghulam Qadir Khan, whom the Emperor was said, by tradition, to have transmuted into a harem page and who lived to enact vengeance for any ill-treatment that he may have received.¹ The family of Zabita were by the order of the Emperor set at liberty and sent with a strong escort to the fort of Ghosgar, it being an inviolable maxim throughout Hindustan and in general, most religiously observed, to respect the honour of the harem.² The title of Amirul- Umara was bestowed on Ghulam Qadir and the Emperor himself and his sons slowly began experiencing hardships even for food of proper type by 26th January 1772.³ The Marathas were sent against the Jats by the Emperor because the Jats joined Zabita against the Emperor and Najaf.⁴ Najaf had been declared the paymaster general of the forces.⁵ Raghunath Hingane was called back from the wazir's camp by Ramchandra and Visaji by about 30th January.⁶

The President and Council in Bengal were at a loss to account for the conduct of the Marathas in not making themselves masters of Delhi, they had taken the route of Rohilkhand then.⁷ But Mahadji wanted to inflict vengeance on Zabita, first and the policies of Shuja hastened up the course of events.⁸ Mahadji and

1. Franklin, Shah Alam, p.41; Keen, op.cit; pp.97-98; Sarkar, "Zabita Khan, the Persian MSS translated," I.H.Q. (1935), vol.XI, p.644.

2. Franklin, Shah Alam, p.42; Gul-i Rahmat, Elliot vol.VIII, pp.303, 305.

3. S.P.D. vol.34, No.540.

4. Franklin, op.cit, pp.42, 43.

5. Franklin, op.cit.

6. Hingane Dantar, vol.II, No.81.

7. Duff, op.cit, vol.II, p.574.

8. Ibid, p.575.

Tukoji had defeated Ahmad khan's forces, too.¹ The English in February remitted to the Emperor, six lakhs of rupees for the last time as the tribute of Bengal.² The Peshwa reprimanded Mahadji for mis-appropriation of Rs.25,000/- collected by Raghoram from Trimbat-
rao Mahadev's debt.³

Najaf, Mahadji, Tukoji, Visaji and the Emperor had all marched against Zabita⁴ and over the spoils taken from Pathargarh, the quarrels broke out between the Emperor and the Marathas. Mahadji appropriated lakhs of rupees but neither paid the Peshwa nor the Emperor.⁵ In March, Sukratal had been captured, too, by the Marathas.⁶ Raghoba intended to start querries but Nana had informed him, of his satisfaction⁷ and the Peshwa who was engaged in the carnatic campaign, from January 1770 to July 1772, had approved Nana's policy.⁸

The English held that the wazir was the only remaining power to oppose the Marathas, in the North and declared their intention to defend him if the Marathas invaded his country.⁹ On 16 March, the fort of Pathargarh was vacated for the Marathas¹⁰ and the expedition was directed towards Ramghat.¹¹ The Peshwa issued orders to Mahadji to settle the accounts of Hingane and to pay him Rs.200/- per horseman per year for fifty horsemen whom he would be required to maintain,¹² and Rs.500/- per day to Hingane himself.¹³ The constant

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1. Gul-i-Rahmat, Elliot, VIII, pp. 307-308.
 2. Askari, "A newly discovered letter of Shah Alam to George III, Mitah-i Khazayn", I.H.R.C.P. vol. XX, (1943), p.47.
 3. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. 13, p.47, No.62.
 4. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Emperor, vol. III, pp.50-51.
 5. Ibid; p.57.
 6. Ibid; pp.53,54.
 7. Sardesai, S.H.S. vol. II, No.327.
 8. Khare, op.cit., vol. IV, p.1661.
 9. Gleig, Warren Hastings, vol. I, pp.232-33 (Hast.to Josiah Dupre-14-3-1772).
 10. Sarkar, op.cit., vol. III, p.56.
 11. Ibid, p.79. (12) Hingane Daptar, vol. II, No.32. (13) Kibe, "Some original Marathi documents", I.H.R.C.P. vol. XVIII, 1942, p.324.

application of Visaji in urging demands, the eagerness with which his Brahmin followers snatched at every opportunity of acquiring wealth, the sordid parsimony of their habits when absent from the Deccan and that meanness and impudence, deeply disgusted the Emperor and all who were compelled to tolerate their insolence and rapacity. Their behaviour gave the Emperor extreme offence so that he was willing to run risk to rid himself of such allies.¹ The Marathas had passed many of the Rohilla posts as if they had no intention of fording much higher up the river, when after throwing them off their guard, they suddenly wheeled about, dashed down on one of the fords at full gallop and crossing over, made a great slaughter.² The avarice exhibited by them in the moment of victory caused great discontent among the Emperor's troops and laid the seeds of internal discord and animosity. ^{Notwith} ~~Notwithstanding~~ the stipulations entered into at Nabeganj, the Marathas appropriated the greatest part of the spoil taken on this occasion to their own use. They secured the whole of the treasure, amounting to a crore of rupees without offering to make the smallest distribution with their gallant colleagues. The Emperor complained but he was not paid heed to. The Mughal nobility nourished to a secret hatred against them, which they resolved to make manifest, on the first opportunity that was offered them.³

Hastings referred to a likely offer of the Marathas to the wazir to join with them to partition Rohilkhand between them and

1. Duff, op.cit, p.576.

2. Ibid, p.575.

3. Franklin, Shah Alam, pp.41-42.

and cherished such an agreement as that would save him the troubles of a war with them.¹ At the approach of the rains, the Emperor returned to the Metropolis and the Marathas who even during his presence in the camp had paid him but scanty respect, now threw off the last shreds of disguise and appropriated all the profits of the campaign. They allowed Zabita to take back the members of his family and Shuja advanced to them on Zabita's account, $1\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees, which was the sum fixed for the ransom². The Marathas were in Agra and its neighbourhood. They would have willingly proceeded to complete the reduction of all Rohilkhand but Mirza Najaf objected that it must involve a collision with Shuja, who would be supported by the English. Shuja himself followed the policy to annex that province and the Rohillas looked to Shuja to lead the Muhammedan League.³ Hafiz and Inayet Khan were not on good terms⁴ and the Marathas again attacked Rohilkhand⁵.

Mahadji set free certain of the prisoners and collected two lakhs of rupees and set out for Delhi.⁶ Mewad, Bundi and other disputes in Rajputana were heading towards a crisis and Jaypur sought help from Mahadji. Malhar Govind sent hundred maunds of iron for the Indore factory on c.31 March 1772.⁷

Like the rest of the Indian world, Hastings beheld, at that moment the growing power of the Marathas with alarm and was not less willing than the wazir himself to impose some checks upon it.⁸

1. Gleig, *op.cit.*, vol.I, p.235 (Hast.to Josiah Draper-26-3-1772).

2. Keene, *op.cit.*, p.98.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Sarker, *op.cit.*, *I.H.Q.* vol.XI, (1935), p.644.

5. *Ibid.*, p.654.

6. *Gul-i Rahmat*, Elliot, vol.VIII, p.308-309.

7. *Holkarshahi Itahasachi Sadhane*, vol.I, No.49.

8. Gleig, *op.cit.*, vol.I, p.251.

He felt that Marathas and not Hyder, were the enemy of the English. "All my hopes are in the spirit and perseverance of Hyder, which may give another turn to his affairs or suspend his ruin till measures can be taken to prevent it, that is, till the Presidency of Fort St. George shall be empowered to take such measures and for once to assume a dictatorial power in the operations of the Carnatic," ¹ he thought. The English general had in the preceeding month, already returned to join the first brigade which was ordered to assist the wazir with the permission to carry his operations in the Rohilla country, lying north of Oudh and included by the Ganges, if he found it necessary, to defend Kora and the province of Allahabad for the Emperor and to take the immediate possession of it but not to pass the boundary of that district. ² But the Marathas were preparing to retire and it was hoped that the campaign would prove to be a peaceful one. ³ But nevertheless, Gen. Barker was told that independent of the considerations which respect the political state of affairs in Hindustan, there were many powerful causes which rendered every kind of caution and circumspection necessary to prevent the appearance of the English taking an active part in the quarrels of the neighbours but more especially such as the Marathas were concerned in it. ⁴

Visaji secured the Sanads from the Emperor for Itawa, Gankukedeshwar, Kada, Kora and Narayan Ballal sent a letter of congratulation to him on c.28, April. ⁵ Zabita called for help Hafiz

1. Gleig, op.cit., vol.I, p.227.

2. Ibid, p.332.

3. Ibid, (To John Sullivan- 2-4-1772).

4. Ibid, p.240 (21-4-1772).

5. Parasnis, Itihasik Charitra, chap.10, p.120.

Bahmat, the children of Dundikhani and Faizullah Khan, son of Ali Muhammad Khan. The Rohillas were worsted by Najaf Khan, earlier and since then Najaf was appointed as the agent of the Marathas in Delhi.¹ Ferohabad was attacked and Zabita had escaped to Saharanpur-Beria and Najibgur. Ahmad Khan was received by the Emperor². The Marathas resold Rohilkhand to Zabita and made the Emperor grant them Allahabad and Kora which were under the English and the wazir, respectively; while the Emperor's possessions were reduced to the single town of Delhi.³

The English in May concluded the treaty of Shuja and the Rohillas against the Marathas,⁴ and Shuja desired to settle the peace between the Rohillas and the Marathas, taking as the price, 40 lakhs of rupees⁵. The invaders began their return journey from Rohilkhand⁶. Najaf's influence was undermined by Abdul-Ahmad Khan, Hussain-din Khan and Bahadur Khan with the effect that the Marathas were sent against Najaf by the Emperor as per advice tendered to him, specially by Hussain-din Khan, while Najaf was received by Tukoji, in his camp.⁷

Narsing Ram, the Peshwa's auditor with the Maratha army, in the north, complained that he was being put off in recovering the Peshwa's dues by Mahadji and incidentally referred on 3 May to the reconciliation between Mahadji and Visaji.⁸ The Peshwa enumerated

1. *Seir Mutaqherin*, vol. IV, pp. 41, 42.

2. *Ibid*, vol. III, p. 306, vol. IV, pp. 41, 42.

3. Kincaid, *Parasnis*, *op.cit*, vol. III, p. 100.

4. 4. Sir Evan Cotton, "The Memoirs of Gentil", *I.H.R.C.P.* vol. X, (1927), p. 25, (Note).

5. Sarkar, *op.cit*, I.H.Q. vol. XI, (1935), p. 644.

6. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol. III, p. 61.

7. *Seir Mutaqherin*, vol. IV, pp. 41, 42.

8. *S.P.D.* vol. 29, No. 277.

on 12 May, the amount due from Mahadji and asked Visaji to recover the amount from him, without any delay.¹ But again, over the negotiations sued by the Rohillas through Shuja, the dispute between Visaji and Mahadji came to a crisis,² and on 29 May, Narsing Rao reported to the Peshwa that Mahadji and Visaji held different views on the details of the agreement to be made with Shuja.³ The envoys of Shuja, Hafiz Rahmat and the other Rohilla chiefs and the Emperor arrived in the Maratha camp for peace negotiations and due to Mahadji's counsels, the spoils of Pathargad were divided between the Marathas and the Emperor on c.12, June.⁴ Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji alternately abandoned the Maratha camp and on c.20 June Mahadji tried to bring about the reconciliation.⁵ The wazir left Ramghat and went towards Anupsahar and the English were two cos. ahead. The Emperor was to be taken, with all the Princes to Delhi or Agra.⁶ The wazir on 28th June was informed by Gen. Barker that the Marathas re-crossed the Ganges and did not intend to disturb the wazir's territories.⁷ Mahadji after reconciling Ramchandra, took him back to the camp on 30 June. The Peshwa's health collapsed in the rains of 1772.⁸

Tukoji had marched against the Jats⁹ but Mahadji was not supporting him. Manaji Phakde, Bhagwantrao Kadam, Khandoji Boyate and Yeshwantrao Chavan who had joined Mahadji, came back. Visaji and Mahadji, however, joined afterwards for plunder. Tukoji had forcibly

1. Ibid, vol. 29, No. 275.

2. Sarkar, op.cit, vol. III, pp. 59-60.

3. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 276; Forrest, Selectons from Foreian Department, vol. I, pp. 9-12 (1-6-1772).

4. S.P.D., vol. 29, No. 270; Oturkar, op.cit, No. 150.

5. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol. I, No. 51.

6. Hingane Daptar, vol. II, No. 83.

7. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 50.

8. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol. IV, p. 225.

9. Khare, op.cit, vol. IV, pp. 1877-1950.

collected all the plunder from three camps and distributed it equally.¹ The Ex-Nawab Mir Kasim was another important friend of the Marathas who craved for some maintenance but it was beyond the Peshwa's power to satisfy him.² Sakhubai Shinde had a dispute over Rs.40,000/- with the Naik of Srigonda and the Peshwa looked to its settlement³. Mahadji submitted his accounts and tabulated down that he collected the revenues of Rs.55,05,083/- and odd;⁴ and again Rs.57,97,487/- and odd⁵. Haripant Phadke was informed both by Ramchandra and Visaji about the Hindu rule in Delhi.⁶ But over the affairs of the Rohillas again, Mahadji instigated Visaji against Ramchandra and wrote about it also to the Peshwa.⁷ Tukoji, too, explained his position to the Peshwa, charging Visaji⁸. Shuja and the English instigated the Emperor to order Najaf to drive the Marathas out of Delhi.⁹ In a fit of anger, the Emperor ordered Najaf to start up hostile moves against the Marathas and Visaji solicited instructions from the Peshwa.¹⁰

The Emperor had entered Delhi, again, on 9th July, 1772 while the Marathas had plundered the Jat cities- Amroha and others - with the help of Najaf and settled on Rs.60,000/- to the Peshwa's accounts. On 30th July, Khurja, a Jat post, was captured¹¹. But by 10th July, already, the anti-Hindu front was opened up in Hindustan. In Poona,

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1. Parasnis, Holkar Kaifiyat, p.4.
 2. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.5.
 3. Rajwade, op.cit, vol.XII, p.51, No.88, p.51, No.90; vol.XIII, p.145, No.142.
 4. Parasnis, Peshwa Records, 3.
 5. Ibid, 1.
 6. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipana, I, 52.
 7. Rajwade, op.cit, vol.XIV, pp.10-11, No.14.
 8. Rajwade, op.cit, vol.XIV, pp.2-3, No.3.
 9. Khare, op.cit, vol.IV, p. 1951.
 10. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit, vol.III, p.100.
 11. Sarkar, fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.III, p.62.

Ramchandra Ganesh was prevented from taking "Sanyasa" by the Peshwa and Sakharam Bapu.¹ On 11 July, in a treaty that finalised the alliance of Shuja, Zabita and Hafiz through the mediation of Barker, Hafiz took upon himself to pay 40 lakhs of rupees in four instalments to Shuja on the condition that the Marathas would be expelled from Rohilkhand. In the Persian version of the "Life of Rahmat", it is mentioned that the 40 lakhs of rupees were to be given to the Marathas and that Shuja was only the surety for the transaction.²

The Peshwa was displeased with Visaji for he could not manage the Hindustan affairs. Visaji quarrelled with Mahadji and the Peshwa even threatened to re-send Ramchandra to the North³. The Marathas desired that Shuja should surrender to them Kora, Allahabad and Benares as well as his claim on the Rohillas, in July⁴ but the wazir was told by the English that according to the treaty subsisting between the company and the wazir to which the latter had then appealed, the company's troops could only be sent to his aid when his territories were invaded by an enemy and not when he might want them for the execution of his ambitious schemes or in pursuance of causes which had their origin in the part he might have taken in the quarrels of different parties.⁵ Visaji had solicited instructions from the Peshwa, whereupon, the Peshwa now ordered the clerk Balaji Pant to be ready to bring Visaji back.⁶ Mahadji made the Emperor

1. Khare, *op.cit*, vol.IV, 1185, 1186, p.1896; Sarkar, *op.cit*, vol.III, p35; B.H.R.I. (1914), 141.

2. Keene, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, pp.98-99, 117-118.

3. Khare, *op.cit*, vol.IV, p.1896.

4. *C.P.C.* vol.IV, No.59; Gleig, *op.cit*, vol.I, p.315.

5. *C.P.C.* vol.IV, No.60 (26-7-1772).

6. Khare, *op.cit*, vol.IV, p.1187 (30-7-1772).

to give Bakshi ship to Narayan which alienated Tukoji who now joined Visaji, again.¹ Mahadji, too, being confronted, left Delhi by about 30th July and marched towards Jaipur to collect the tributes.²

Anupsahar and Karnal were given by the Emperor to Mahadji, because he had undertaken to bring Shuja to Court and to make him personally support the Emperor. However, these negotiations had failed. He exchanged the turbans with Mahadji as a sign of full brotherhood but it was done in absentia. Mahadji had started on 11 May 1772 but on account of an irreconcilable breach with Visaji, again, had finally given up the mission in disgust.³ Tukoji and Visaji had advised the Emperor to march on Shuja and the English but Najaf and Mahadji advised otherwise. One day, Visaji and Tukoji visited Husain-ud-din, the Emperor's prime minister and urged him to march to east. This visit ended in hot words and perhaps in the armed fight which the Emperor stopped and Najaf's guards protected the Emperor.⁴ Visaji and Tukoji quarrelled with the Emperor for the payment of Rs.30 lakhs as per the treaty of 22nd March 1771. Zabita agreed to pay 10½ lakhs of rupees but Mahadji had refused to make him Mir.Bakshi. Husain-ud din, the rival of Najaf, conspired with Visaji and Tukoji to set Zabita in place of Najaf. The Emperor declined and the Marathas prepared to attack Delhi.⁵

The Marathas instigated the Bharatpur Jats against the fief of Balangarh. Balangarh urged for the support of the Imperialists

1. Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol.IV, p.224.

2. Ibid, p.226; Phalke, op.cit, vol.II, p.3;

3. Sarkar, op.cit, vol.III, p.58.

4. Ibid, p.61.

5. Sarkar, op.cit, vol.III, pp.64-65.

signed, however, for the management of the Maratha State.¹

Visaji and Tukoji on c.21, November arrived within eight miles of the capital.² The Governor had ordered the English military to succour the wazir on 26 November.³ Narayan was declared the Peshwa on 14th December 1772,⁴ and he replied to Visaji's despatch by ordering him to drive Najaf Khan from Delhi. Lack of funds had reduced the latter's forces to 5000 cavalry and four battalions of infantry, two of which were disciplined and were commanded by Madec. Najaf Khan organised his defence⁵. The wazir had already paid Rs.1,26,926-9-6 for the military expenses and was still to pay the balance from Rs.4,24,874-8-7 to the English for the military expenses, too.⁶ Zabita was in the Maratha camp and the Marathas asked the Emperor to make Zabita, Amir Alamrah which the Emperor refused, relying himself on the Mughal troops and Najaf Khan.⁷

The division of Visaji mustering 15000 men marched to Arabsarai, about 4 cos from the capital. Tukoji and Zabita with 20,000 horse "marched along the banks of the Jumna to oppose the troops of the Emperor which were under the command of Najaf Khan. Madec with two battalions trained by the English and the Emperor's other regular troops attacked Visaji and the action lasted till 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The Marathas then made a general

1. Parasnis, Peshwa Records III, 12, Parasnis, Itihasik Spusta Lekha, 23.

2. Sarker, op.cit; vol.III, p.69.

3. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.94.

4. Phalke, op.cit, vol.I, p.8.

5. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit, vol.III, p.106, For Madec, refer to Sarker, op.cit. vol.III, p.42, 66.

6. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.105 (10-12-1772).

7. Franklin, Shah Alam, pp.43-44.

charge and a severe battle ensued. The Emperor's troops were obliged to give way but retreated in order. The Marathas seized eleven pieces of artillery, five elephants together with a large number of camels and horses. Casualties were many on both the sides. Sayid Muhammad Baluch, a Risaldar of merit, in the Emperor's army and several reputed Jamedars in the Maratha army fell. 300 to 400 men fell in the days action. The tents of Najaf and Madec were captured. Khan, ashamed of his Afgans, joined the retreating Madec, in the evening. Najaf was wounded and the Marathas plundered the great part of the city which offered resistance (in the Kabul gate) till 8 o'clock in the evening".¹ Again on the following morning, the fighting began near Nila Rampart but in the evening the Marathas asked for a truce which the Emperor granted.²

The battle of Purana Qilla was fought on 17th December 1772³ and when the Emperor yielded and all the coveted terms were ceded to Zabita⁴: The Marathas were received in Delhi and this time, their terms were not severe. Najaf khan was dismissed from the Royal service. On 27th December, Visaji and Tukoji brought Zabita before the Emperor who conferred a Khilat on him. Zabita was appointed the Imperial commander-in-chief and was nominally the deputy of the Peshwa. Allahabad and Kora were granted to the Marathas. But the English refused to permit the Maratha occupation⁵ there and again, just because the negotiations were carried by Husain-ud daula, Najaf

1. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.122 (5-1-1773); Keene, op.cit, p.101.

2. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.138; Gleig, op.cit, vol.I, p;278 (To Sir George Colebrooke).

3. Sarkar, op.cit, vol.III, pp.69-75; Keene, op.cit, p.101.

4. Sarkar, op.cit, Franklin, op.cit, p.45.

5. Kincaid, Parasnis, op.cit, vol.III, p.105; C.P.C. vol.IV, No.138, Gleig, op.cit.

was completely sacrificed. The Marathas were anxious to return to the Deccan and hence were not disposed to make matters difficult. They, however, picked up the quarrels with Najaf for the former payments during the Sukratal campaign and obtained thus an order from the Emperor which banished him from the Court.¹ However, Najaf was finally rescued by Tukoji. "Admiring the intrepidity of Najaf and ashamed of the part his country men were playing, that generous chief (Tukoji) offered his mediations which were accepted and Najaf was directed to repair to Court in order to receive his pardon".²

When on 18 December, it was reported that Narayan and Raghoba had gone to Satara to receive the honours; the army from the North had already returned though Tukoji, Visaji and Zabita were still engaged there. Mahadji, too, had left Mathura³. In December, Narayan was declared the Peshwa⁴ and Imad-ul Mulk, a friend of the Marathas was anxious to be re-instated in the office of the Imperial wazir, which he had once held. He personally repaired to Poona to persuade the new Peshwa to undertake a fresh plan for the management of the Northern affairs.⁵

A letter from St. George, even before 1773, had referred to a supposed treaty among Shuja, the late Peshwa and Hyder against the English,⁶ and hence, perhaps, the English felt to find no good cause to interfere in the Delhi affairs when Visaji triumphed over Najaf

1. Keene, op.cit, pp.100-101; Franklin, op.cit,; p.45.

2. Franklin, op.cit, p.46.

3. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.54, Parasnis, Itihasaik Charitre, chap.10, p.118.

4. Sat.Raj.Diar, vol.IX, No.98. (5) Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.15.

6. Selections, Home Series, vol.II, 160.

and the Emperor.¹ Najaf left the Emperor's services and worked under the Marathas on Rs.3000 a day, as their servant in the forthcoming invasion of the Rohilkhand.² The Emperor had abolished the fares on the Hindu pilgrims, after the battle of Purana Qilla³. Shuja, before the battle had declared that Shah Alam's affairs were at an end and urged repeatedly on the Governor to send Gen. Barker⁴ and had complained that the Marathas who had summoned Kasim Ali Khan and Samru, would ^{invade} his country with 10,000 men. Visaji had set the guards on Najaf and demanded from him the expenses incurred in the war. He pointed out that the Emperor had not fulfilled any of his promises beyond appointing Zabita to his post. Again, Visaji intended to set out for Farukhabad but Mahadji ordered Mir Razi to go there and also to visit the wazir. Najaf thought of leading the life of a faqir whereupon the Emperor had sent Abdul Ahad to persuade him to change his mind. Twenty thousand Sikhs were supposed to have been arriving in Butana.⁵ Sakharan Bapu was all powerful in Poona, about 13th Jan. 1773⁶ and the Marathas in the North were expected either to march into Rohilkhand or to return to the Deccan and Shuja ordered Muniruddin Khan who was stationed with 10,000 horse and foot and eight pieces of cannon at Kora, to march and encamp at Kanpur and to raise 25,000 troopers more, heedless of the expenses.⁷ The Emperor demanded the tribute from Bengal on the threat of writing to the King of England,

1. Gleig, op.cit, vol.I, p.278 (To Sir George Colebrooke, 15-1-1773).

2. Sarkar, op.cit, vol.III, p.77.

3. S.P.D.P.; vol.14-A, 1.

4. C.P.C.; vol.IV, Nos.119, 121.

5. C.P.C.; vol.IV, No.128 (11-1-1773).

6. Oturkar, op.cit, No.153.

7. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.144 (23-1-1773).

demanding an explanation.¹ The wazir had declared that sooner or later he would be dragged on to fight the Marathas and that he was ready for the event.² On 1 February 1773, it was decided in the Council of Bengal to undertake the defence of Kora against the Marathas who had extorted a grant of it from the Emperor.³ The Marathas, Najaf and Zabita attacked Kora and Allahabad, but Mahadji had left them, already with his 10,000 troopers.⁴ Shuja was reminded by the Governor of the payment under the threat that if the troops would remain unpaid, they would be recalled.⁵ The Court of Directors sent orders in February to send Mostyn to Poona to secure opportunity to get Bassein and Salsette.⁶

In spite of the repeated requests from the Marathas the Emperor refused to attack, earnestly, Shuja's territory, with them and explained that he had taken an oath on Koran, to that effect. But the Emperor wrote to Munir-ud din to hand over Kora and Allahabad to the Marathas as these places had been given to them, by him.⁷ Shuja, however, strengthened the Allahabad fort and planned the defence, soliciting instructions from the Governor for defence against the guerilla warfare.⁸ Shuja was determined to defend Kora, Kara and Allahabad as Najaf wrote to him about his intention to join him as well Madec who was now pardoned by the Governor.⁹ Champeon's troops

1. Ibid, vol. IV, No. 145 (23-1-1773).

2. Ibid, vol. IV, No. 148 (28-1-1773).

3. Gleig, op. cit, vol. I, p. 281 (2-2-1773).

4. Sarkar, op. cit, vol. III, p. 178; Keene, op. cit, p. 102.

5. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 161 (4-2-1773).

6. S.P.D.D. vol. 13, 9-10 (5-2-1773).

7. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 162 (6-2-1773).

8. Ibid, No. 169 (9-2-1773).

9. Ibid, No. 172 (12-2-1773); Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, p. 69.

arrived at Kanpur on c.15, February and everything was ready for crossing the Ganges. However, Shuja was not prepared to go to the extremities and the Marathas themselves had not marched being under great consternation at the approach of the English and perhaps, it was reported they would not attack that season at all.¹ However, instructions were imparted to Barker to protect Kora and Bihar against the Marathas.² The Marathas crossed the Jumna and were only at a distance of ten or twelve days journey from Shuja. Shuja was encamped on the banks of the Ganges, on the other side of Kanpur. Few marches on both sides would have brought them to an engagement. There was a rumour, too that the Rohillas joined the Marathas. Innayatulla Khan, son of Hafiz Rahmat, left Lucknow immediately after Shuja's departure from there and it was presumed his father had sent for him.³ A skirmish had taken place on 22 February between Shuja's son joined by some of the English troopers and the Marathas, to the northward of the Jumna in which the latter fled leaving two elephants, some horses and their baggage.⁴

On 1 March 1773, expenses were granted to Manaji Shinde by Poona Court.⁵ The Governor reported on 3 March that the Marathas had not yet then made any decisive advancements and that they were weak and seemed irresolute.⁶ The Marathas would not, it was judged, undertake anything for the season but the Governor intended to make another

1. Forrest, *op.cit.*; vol.I, p.25 (15-2-1773).

2. *Ibid.*, p.34 (18-2-1773).

3. *G.P.O.* vol.IV, No.178 (19-2-1773).

4. *S.F.D.D.* vol.14-A, 20 (24-2-1773).

5. *S.P.D.* vol.23, No.285 (1-3-1773).

6. Gleig, *op.cit.*, vol.I, p.288 (To Sir George Colebrooke, 3-3-1773).



excursion to meet Shuja as solicited by him. Shuja had paid all the expenses to the Governor.¹ Hastings had earlier in the year 1772, sent orders for the arrest of Muhammad Reza Khan² and Shitabrai, but Shitabrai was thence acquitted. He was charged to have carried a secret correspondence with the Emperor and the Marathas and ever since his arrival in Calcutta, he was doing the same.³ But Reza Khan declared himself non-guilty in March 1773.⁴

The Marathas kept the baggage in Etawa fort and were determined to hazard a battle with Shuja. Shuja also advanced with all his forces on this side of the Mendee Ghat.⁵ The Marathas made a peremptory demand for Kora and sent Banu Pandit and Dada Mulkar together with Zabita to Hafiz'll-Mulk to secure his alliance.⁶ Akbar Ali Khan and Purshotam Pandit approached Munir-ud din on behalf of the Marathas; but the military strength of theirs was half of what it was before. Mahadji with a body of 10,000 had left for Jaypur and Sivji with 5000 horse had returned to Gwalior. The army of Tukoji and Vissaji was dissipated and thought several times to return to the Deccan. They were not at all prepared for a severe battle, while they waited on Ramghat on the other side of Farukhabad to hear the result of the negotiations carried by Akbar Ali Khan and Purshotam Pandit.⁷ Shuja forwarded the suggestion to the Governor that he would be paying the English brigade that was with

1. Ibid, p. 239 (To Josiah Dupre, 9-3-1773).

2. Sair Mutaqherin, vol. III, pp. 39, 47.

3. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 203 (13-3-1773).

4. Ibid, No. 210.

5. S.P.D.D. vol. 14-A, 27 (16-3-1773).

6. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 224 (23-3-1773).

7. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 225 (23-3-1773).

him - not the mere batta but the entire pay - if the English Sardars would assist him in fighting the Marathas and allow the brigade to accompany him when he would go to Delhi or anywhere else. The Bengal tribute- accounts would also be settled and Shuja pointed out solemnly that it was not advisable to put off till tomorrow what one can do to-day.¹ He was determined to conquer the Rohilla country which adjoined to his territory.² The Marathas were expected to return to the Deccan³. In spite of the protests of Bapu and Wana, Narayan arrested Raghoba and confined him in the Shaniwar Peth in Poona, on c. 11th April, 1773.⁴ In Bengal, Rezakhan appealed to the Governor that he was prepared to pay and the Governor asked for the exact proposals.⁵ The Emperor desired that the Governor should send him six lakhs of rupees immediately,⁶ and Shuja made a contract to help the Rohillas for 40 lakhs of rupees and promised to pay the Governor 50 lakhs of rupees if the Company would help him to take Rohilkhand.⁷

Raghunath Hari communicated on 20 April to Poona that Visaji had broken up his camp and sent back heavy guns and other baggage while Shuja and the English mobilised their forces.⁸ Lawrell was specially stationed at Allahabad and Kora, for "extraordinary services require particular talents to execute them which with certain persons may be endowed in a degree beyond others.....and requiring instant

1. S.P.C. vol. IV, No. 230 (24-3-1773).

2. Gleig, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 307; (To Sir George Colebrooke, 3-4-1773), 294.

3. Hinsano Dantar, vol. II, No. 85 (9-4-1773).

4. Kincaid, Parasnis, op. cit., vol. III, p. 103.

5. S.P.C. vol. IV, No. 243 (12-4-1773).

6. S.P.C. vol. IV, No. 250 (13-4-1773).

7. S.P.C. vol. IV, No. 251 (14-4-1773).

8. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 273 (20-4-1773).

decision, if the proposed interview with the wazir should take place.¹ The Rohillas, however, were either in collision with the Marathas or unable to oppose them.² The Marathas returned to Etawa³. The Rohilla tributes to be paid to the Marathas were settled by Barker on 5th May. Najaf was dismissed with honours and payment by the Marathas and he after visiting Barker on 9th May, returned to Delhi. Zabita Khan also received his congee from Visaji on 9th May⁴. Narayan, in May, was proposing to lead, in person, the entire military forces of the Kingdom to the conquest of the Carnatic and had recalled Visaji and his army.⁵ The army returned to the Deccan,⁶ in May and it must be remembered, Madhavrao earlier had ordered to shower golden flowers on Visaji on his arrival in Poona.⁷ After the departure of the Marathas, Najaf was received well by Shuja as he was his relation⁸ and Shuja drove the Maratha posts from Etawa, their stronghold in the Doab.⁹

Ahmad Shah Abdali died in June 1773, on the mountains, east of Qandahar, after having appointed his second son, Taymur Shah, his successor.¹⁰ When the Marathas returned, Najaf attacked the Jats. The Jats had Samru's forces and hence they were victorious at Keval

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1. Forrest, Selections of Foreign Department, vol. I, 37 (21-4-1773).
 2. Keene, op. cit., p. 107.
 3. Keene, op. cit., p. 104; S. P. D. D.: vol. 14, 63 (Fort William to Bombay, 9-6-1773), 62; vol. 14-A, 57-58, 61, 62.
 4. Sarkar, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 84-85.
 5. Kincaid, Parasnis, op. cit., vol. III, p. 106.
 6. Sardesai Madhvavibhag, vol. IV, p. 226; Keen, op. cit., p. 104; Kincaid, Parasnis, op. cit., p. 106; Khare, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 1958-59.
 7. Parasnis, Itihasik Charitra, chap. 10, p. 120.
 8. Keene, op. cit.; p. 104.
 9. Kincaid, Parasnis, op. cit.; vol. III, p. 106; C. P. C. vol. IV, No. 314 (23-5-1773)
 10. Heras, op. cit., Is. C. vol. XI, (1937), p. 509.

and Dialisser. But Najaf took Agra¹. Shuja took Rohilkhand from the Rohillas.² In August, Hastings gave orders to Shuja not to engage the French.³ The Emperor wrote to the Governor on c.6, August that the Marathas had returned to their homes and he was free to attend to the affairs of the Empire⁴.

In Poona, Raghoba underwent the hunger-strike and finally Narayan had to yield⁵ but, however, Narayan himself was murdered on 30th August 1773,⁶ and Raghoba with little opposition, was received in Poona as his successor.⁷ "The accounts of this catastrophe are variously related. The Peshwa family and a large part of the nation accused Raghoba of the murder; some of the Maratha chiefs and numerous partisans asserted his innocence but when we consider his ambitious character and his peculiar situation at the time, it is difficult to exculpate him".⁸ Indeed, Raghoba became timid, indolent, and suspicious; his understanding seemed clouded by superstitions and his mind weakened, either by the severities he had lately suffered or the distraction of a wounded conscience.⁹ He acted as the Peshwa for about six months but there is no record to show that he was

1. Seir Mutagherin, vol. IV, pp. 50-51.

2. Ibid; Saadat Jawad, Elliot, vol. VIII, p. 349.

3. Sir Evan Cotton, "The Memories of Gentil"; I.H.R.C.P. vol. X, (1927), p. 22.

4. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 428 (6-8-1773).

5. Sardesai, op. cit., vol. III, p. 22.

6. Ibid, p. 23; Oturkar, op. cit., No. 154-(2-9-1773); Phalke, op. cit., vol. I, p. 8; Diar, Sat. Raj. vol. IX, No. 104; Sardesai: Kavyatihar Patren, No. 489; Rajwade, op. cit., vol. X, pp. 44-45, No. 83; Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, p. 69; Abdul Ali, op. cit., I.H.R.C.P. vol. XII, (1929), p. 111.

7. Gleig, op. cit., vol. II, p. 10; Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 27; Rajwade, op. cit., B.H.R.I. (1913), 414 (Gopika's song).

8. Sardesai, op. cit., c/f Forbes, Oriental Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 301, et. seq.

9. Sardesai, op. cit., p. 29.

invested with the clothes of Peshwaship by the Satara Raja.¹ Sumer Sing Gardi was paid Rs.3576 on the account of the year 1772-1773.² Visaji was at Kumbher when the news came to him. He stayed there a month. He had handed over the revenues collected in Delhi campaign to the would-be Peshwa, the son of Narayanrao.³ But the Gardis went so far as to threaten that they would raise Ali Bahadur, son of Shamser Bahadur, to the Peshwaship, if their demands were not granted.⁴ On the night of the murder, letters were despatched to the Maratha Sardars not to leave their stations.⁵ During the scramble for the Peshwaship which followed, Mahadji seized the opportunity to extend his power and played an important part in the civil onslaught.⁶ Raghoba now assumed the dignity of the Peshwa and in order to strengthen his position, entered into negotiations with Mahadji, Tukoji and the English.⁷ To Mahadji, Raghoba applied for aid when the Ministers of the State of Poona formed a party in favour of the widow of the late Peshwa. The wise and just administration of Raghoba would have totally defeated the views these men had formed of benefitting out of the situation. While Gangabai, Narayan's widow was taken to Purandar Fort, the confederates immediately set about collecting troops to support the declared rebellion against Raghoba. Raghoba had sought the help of Mahadji and Tukoji but finding that they would give him no substantial assistance to regain his power, he began negotiating with the English.⁸

1. Sat.Raj.Diar, vol.I, No.100.

2. Ibid, No.103.

3. B.H.R.I. (1926-27) No.76.

4. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.29.

5. Khare, op.cit, vol.IV, 1260. .

6. Abdul Ali, op.cit, I.H.R.C.P. vol.XII, (1929), p.111.

7. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, p.xii.

8. Ibid.

Hastings justified handing over Kora and Allahabad to the wazir for the Emperor was unable to defend them and even the Emperor's throwing himself in the Maratha arms was declared to be "an act which was in the highest degree involuntary and therefore not his own."¹ After the defeat of Visaji and Tukoji's front and the repulsion, the remainder of the Maratha army under Shinde had arrived but finding the ill-success of their associates and observing the countenance of the British troops, they held consultations upon their operations.² Shah Alam himself was responsible for the alliance of the Rohillas, the wazir and the English against the Marathas³. But Shah Alam suddenly changing his views about the English, wrote to Taymur offering twenty million rupees as the price of an army sufficient to expel the English from Hindustan and the English withdrew the yearly pension given for the cession of Bengal and Bihar.⁴

Nana Phadnis, Haripant Phadke, Sakhararam Bapu, Trimbakrao Pethe, Moroba Phadnis, Babaji Naik, Maloji Ghorpade, Bhavanrao Pratinidhi and Patwardhans were the original members of the Barbhai party who were all made to swear oaths to execute the coup against Raghoba.⁵ All the administration was to be done in the name of Gangabai.⁶ Bhonsle, too, proposed to join this Ministerial party, suggesting that he should be given some lakhs of rupees as he was very needy then.⁷ It was decided that Rs. five lakhs should be sent to him.⁸ Janrao Dhulap was sent to meet the French,⁹ with some political purpose. Gangoba Chandrachud

1. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, pp. xii, xiii.

2. Franklin, Shah Alam p. 48.

3. Ibid, p. 47.

4. Heras, op. cit, Is. C. vol. XI, (1937), p. 509.

5. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 40.

6. Rajwade, op. cit, vol. X, p. 47, No. 87.

7. Rajwade, op. cit, vol. X, p. 48, No. 89.

8. Ibid, pp. 56-57, No. 98.

9. Sat. Raj. Diar; vol. VI, Nos. 540, 541, 544.

asked for Mahadji's intercession with Tukoji for protecting his family and for clearing his debts.¹ About this time, Mahadji had sent "Bel Bhandar" oath to Raghoba, declaring his loyalty to his cause.²

A battle was reported between Raghoba on one side and Moroba, Trimbakrao and Gangabai on the other. Raghoba ordered Mahadji to march into Hindustan and to collect the Chowth from Shuja. Raghoba laid waste the Nizam's country but many Sardars left his cause and joined the party of Gangabai.³ In short, the great Maratha Empire rested upon Raghoba's single life, should he by any accident be taken off, the whole must go to destruction and as many petty governments be formed as there were forts, until some superior force by degrees would reduce them. However, things drew fast to a crisis.⁴ Raghoba was as much as a prisoner as ever; surrounded by the guards and the people belonging to the different ministers. Raghoba was jealous of the whole and they of each other and he seemed to place his whole safety on the guards that cut off Narayan and who still guarded his person and his palace.⁵

The Emperor sent the letter to the Governor, asking for the tribute of Bengal but Hastings had reported to the secret Committee in England that it was not improbable that the Marathas would have sufficient employment nearer home to prevent their attempting the renewal of the distant enterprises.⁶ Hastings ratified on 10th

1. S.P.D. vol.39, No;168.

2. Khare, op.cit, vol.IV, p.2804.

3. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1026.

4. S.P.D.D., vol.14, 64-65 (7-9-1773).

5. Ibid, vol.14, 74 (10-9-1773).

6. Forrester, Selections from Foreign Department, Vol.I, 57; S.P.D.D. vol.14-A; 74 (10-9-1773).

September, the treaty with Shuja that Kora and Allahabad were to be ceded to him for fifty lakhs of rupees, of which twenty lakhs were to be paid in ready money and fifteen lakhs at the expiry of two years, from the date above mentioned. Shuja of course would pay Rs.2,10,000/- per month for one brigade and would confirm Cheytsing's Zamindari of Gazipur.¹

An agreement was reached between Hafiz Rahmat and the wazir through the mediation of the Governor, by about 13 September 1773,² and the Governor informed the Emperor about the affair³. Raghoba tried to supercede Mahadji in his claims of the chiefship but nobody paid heed to him.⁴ Visaji in the first fortnight of September, had come to Koregaon from his campaign in the North.⁵ Shivaji Pant wrote to Wamanrao Patwardhan about his consolidating "The Barbhais- the ministerial party - as he had already perceived the fact that Gargabai was carrying for 1½ months ahead, then.⁶ The English devastated the North Konkan, by about 25 September⁷. Balaji Naik and Anentrao Jewji had applied for the English protection. Naik had about two lakhs of rupees in the Soorgur fort near Surat which he would be glad to lodge in the hands of the Company provided the English would admit thereof and would give the direction for its being paid to the "Gentlemen" at Surat.⁸ As per the Sanads, Mahadji was included (25000) in

1. S.P.D.D. vol.14-A,72-74 (10-9-1773) (Hastings to Sel.Com. England).

2. Forrest, op.cit., vol.I, 58-59.

3. Ibid., p.57.

4. Khare, op.cit., vol.IV, No.1258.

5. Ibid., No.1259.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., No.1269.

8. S.P.D.D. vol.14, 73-74 (29-9-1773).

Raghoba's patti (share)¹ and Mahadji by about 20 September was promised Rs.60,000/- by Raghoba.² Raghoba in October acknowledged the messages sent by Moroba Phadnis and invited him, at once to occupy his official post.³

Zabita and Hafiz Rahmat opened negotiations with the Marathas, again, in October⁴. In October again, the fort of Etawa fell and the last of the Maratha forces, there, were driven out from the Doab.⁵ The Company had originally proposed to ward off the possibility of an attack through Allahabad by neutralizing that territory by granting it to Shah Alam. But the Emperor had ceded it to the Marathas, bringing the danger one step nearer. Foiled with the breach in the Ring Fence so labouriously constructed, Hastings hit upon the plan of giving the title of the districts to the wazir, hoping thereby that the conflicting claims of the wazir and the Marathas would render any alliance between them impossible and he wrote so to the Court of the Directors.⁶ It was observed: "It was not the want of the Sanads of Shah Alam which defeated the long-concerted projects of the Duc de Choiseul, nor will the possession of them quicken the designs of the Marathas against us. The sword which gave us the dominion of Bengal must be the instrument of its preservation and if (which God forbid) it shall ever cease to be ours, the next proprietor will derive his right and possession from the same

1. Paragnis, Peshwa Records, Chapt. III, No. 15, 16, 17, 18.

2. S.P.D. vol. 29, No. 287.

3. Shindeshahi Raikarne, S.H.S.; vol. II, No. 330.

4. Forrest, Selections from State papers of Governor General of India- Warren Hastings; vol. I, 33-35 (4-10-1773).

5. Keene, op.cit., p. 110.

6. Paniker, "The Ring Fence System and the Marathas", J.I.H. vol. VIII, (1929), p. 337; Forrest, Selections from Foreign Office, vol. I, pp. 49-54.

natural character".¹ Directions were given to the Chief of Surat from Bombay for receiving from the agents of Balaji Naik any sums of money that may be tendered there on his account.² On 23 October the wazir told the Governor of Bengal the news of Narayan's death and his firm intention, thence to possess the country in the Doab.³ Sabaji Bhonsle demanded the title of Sena Sahab Sube and declared to Trimbakrao in November that if he would be receiving that title, he would be always prepared to sacrifice his life in any event.⁴ Raghoba, earlier, on 1 November, had written to Trimbakrao to induce Sabaji to join the Marathas against the Nizam⁵ and Karvir Raja pleaded Hyder on c.5, November to place Raghoba on the Pashwa's march, by force.⁶ In December, Sakharam Bapu acknowledged the warm compliments paid to him by Raghoba and assured him of his own loyalty and devotion, advising Raghoba at the same time to adopt a conciliatory policy towards all the parties.⁷ Again, Sakharam approved the measures adopted by Moroba for concerted action.⁸ But the Ministers were disgusted with Raghoba and Mostyn advised the English on 4 December to secure Bassein and Salsette.⁹ Poona was deserted and Parvatibai and Gangebai would leave on 6 December and the bullock carts and camels were kept ready to carry off the plates and goods at a moment's warning.¹⁰ The Bombay Company resolved on 11th December 1773 to take the

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1. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 46-51 (12-10-73)
 2. S.P.D.D. vol. 14A, 70-71 (12-10-1773).
 3. Forrest, op.cit., vol. I, 75.
 4. Chitaye, "Early phase of the struggle between the Barhai and Raghunath," I.H.S.G.P. vol. XXIV, (1948), p. 19.
 5. Ibid., p. 13.
 6. Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patra, No. 228.
 7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 335.
 8. Ibid., No. 334.
 9. S.P.D.D. vol. 14, 82-85.
 10. S.P.D.D. vol. 14, 86.

possession of Salsette and Bassain in case of Raghoba's death or deposition when whole country and the affairs of the Marathas would be involved in the greatest confusion.¹

In November 1773, the Marathas had re-invaded Rohilkhand² and Shuja waged war there with the help of the English³. Shuja requested the Governor of Bengal "for twelve pieces of battering cannons" to be assisted by a Company of artillery for his operations in the Doab against the Marathas and Hastings approved to send half the number from Patna and Shuja had promised to put the English and the Emperor on good terms as regards the tribute of Bengal⁴. To the request from the wazir that Kora and Kara should not be ceded to the Marathas, the Emperor politely replied that they had been already handed over to the Marathas⁵. Raghoba asked Moroba on 25, December not to entertain doubts about the former's intentions and to accept the settlement as final⁶. The old ministers were still certainly disgusted with Raghoba and Moroba who was the only one, now of any consequence, remaining in the camp, too had left on 27 December and by some means or the other, Raghoba had been induced lately to dispatch from his army on different services many of the troops who were most devoted to his service.⁷ Babuji Naik was despatched with 15000 horse towards the Carnatic and Raghoba was to return to Poona to celebrate his own marriage. Sabaji Bhonsle had established peace with Trimbakrao and the Marathas assembled their fleet for

1. Imd, 87.

2. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, Intro. XV.

3. S.P.D., vol. 29, No. 280.

4. Forrest, op. cit., vol. I, 555 (17-12-1773).

5. C.P.G. vol. IV, Nos. 1280, 1281 and 1282.

6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.⁶ vol. II, No. 333.

7. S.P.D.D. vol. 14A, 90 (Mostyn to Bombay).

the English were preparing for an offensive in Salsette.¹ On 30 December 1773, Whiteman, one of the German Cadets, was appointed by the English to prepare charts of the different passes, rivers, forts and fortified towns, in different parts of Hindustan, on Rs.120 per month.²

In January 1774, Daryabai with Raghoji left Raghoba's camp and was wending her way towards Nagpore with the army of 8000 troops. It was Trimbakrao who made Sabaji and Duryabai work together³. Raghoba communicated to Moroba the military information about the operations in the Carnatic and asked him to raise quickly funds for the expenses of war.⁴ He even called Moroba on 18 January to proceed to his camp immediately⁵. By about 24, Trimbakrao had settled the terms with Sabaji and had joined his forces, leading all, at about 30 cos eastward of Aurgangabad which station he did not intend to quit, though expressly told to do so by Raghoba.⁶ It was arranged on c.25, that the Peshwa's robes would be taken from the hands of Chatrapati for Sawai Madhavrao, even before his birth⁷ and the Ministerial party just waited for someone to come and attend on behalf of Mahadji.⁸

On c.30 January, 1774, Moroba had already issued official orders to different forts in the name of Gangabai with the Shiqqa (Seal) of the late Peshwa and had made the Kotwal a prisoner and placed official guards (Chowkies) on all the houses of those who

1. S.P.D.D. vol.14A, 98-99, (27-12-1773).

2. S.P.D.D. vol.14A, 91.

3. Chitale, op.cit., I.E.R.C.P., vol.XXIV, (1942), p.19, (Lakshman Ballal) to Baburao Vaidya).

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S. vol.II, No.336 (3-1-1774).

5. Ibid., No.837 (18-1-1774).

6. S.P.D.D. vol.14A, 102 (24-1-1774).

7. Sardesai, Itihasik Pattravahar, No.136 (Joshi Sangraha) 27-1-1774.

8. Ibid., No.137 (28-1-1774).

sympathised with the cause of Raghoba. From the behaviour of Moroba, it appeared as if the order despatched for Sadoba's (the Pretender of Sadashivrao Bhau) release was only a finesse to induce his (Sadashivrao) wife, the readier to leave Poona and that the Ministers really did not mean to take him out at all.¹ Raghoba had not by about 30, January settled his terms with Hyder and the Nizam; and Balaji Naik and Grist Row (?) took his leave.² A rumour was passed to circulate, that actually an order was despatched from Poona to Daulatabad for the release of Sadoba and that his uncle Trimbakrao and Sabaji, joined by the forces raised by the different ministers, in all about 80,000 men were waiting near Koor Cumb, about 50 cos. off, to conduct him to Poona.³ Nana, Anantrao Sevji and Haripant, on the morning of 17 January at day-break, planned to carry off Gangabai, who was seven months gone with the child and Parvatibai, Sadashiv's wife, to the Purandar fort. All the old ministers and the Brahmin officers were to a man with Sabaji and that Tukoji, Mahadji and the Nizam were in the league against Raghoba.⁴ Mahadji Sadashiv Godse took Gangabai to the fort of Purandar as per the instructions from the Barbhais⁵ and Gangabai informed Baburao Krishna on 30 January that she had accepted the reins of the Government and had started administering the Maratha State from Purandar.⁶

On 3 February, Mahadji and Tukoji were reported to have accepted the leadership of Sakharam⁷ and on 7th, Yadav Moreshwar and Dhondo Mahadev wrote to Nana about their success to win the Nizam to the

1. S.P.D.D. vol. 14A, 104 (30-1-1774).

2. Ibid. vol. 14A, 103.

3. S.P.D.D. vol. 14A, 103 (30-1-1774).

4. Ibid.

5. B.H.R.I. (1928-29), 5 (17-1-1774).

6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 340.

7. Sardesai, Itihāsik Patrayāhar, No. 138.

Barbhai cause, through Sherganji.¹ But Raghoba on 6.10, February had collected 15000 troops and wrote to the Nizam and Hyder for the assistance. Trimbakrao and Sabaji by some frivolous excuse evaded joining the ministers and retired towards Pandharpur. Nana had set out for Trimbak's camp to persuade him to return. Moroba also declared off his connections with the ministers and his plan was to lodge his family in a place of security and afterwards to join Raghoba and perhaps, his father-in-law, Trimbakrao, himself must have induced him, in this direction. Mahadji and Tukoji still remained in Hindustan and seemed to wait and see how affairs would go, before they joined either side.² Gangabai advised Baburao Krishna of the despatch of Rs.25000 for the expense on account of Satara,³ while Raghoba sent compliments on 13 February to Baburao Krishna himself on his having kept the Chatrapati secure in the fort of Satara and warned him against the treacherous machinations of a party of some prominent Poonites.⁴ Raghoba having received an account of expected conduct of the ministers, three hours before their party in the army, marched off with eight to ten thousand men and had taken protection of Gutti, a fort belonging to Murarrao Ghorpade. The ministers removed everything to Shivner. Moroba was at Junnar- 30 cos to the north of Poona. Haripant was now the only Sardar to go against Raghoba⁵. The President of Bombay had received proposals for the delivery up to the company

1. Chitale, *op.cit.*, I.H.S.C.P. vol.XXIV, (1948), p.20.

2. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 23-24.

3. *Shindeshahi Rajakarne*, S.H.S. vol.II, No.344 (12-2-1774).

4. *Ibid*, No.345 (13-2-1774).

5. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 32-33 (Mostyn to Bombay. 13-2-1774).

of the whole island of Salsette for a sum of money¹ and Raghoba on 14 February expressed his surprise to Moroba why the President had sent to him no communication so far then.²

The wazir was completely occupied with his expedition in the Doab for the recovery, on behalf of the Emperor, of the territory seized by the Marathas.³ The naval force of the Marathas, at this time, consisted of five ships and thirteen Hetch Crabs, with about hundred Gallivates which were stationed as follows :- 3 Grabs and 20 Gallivates at Bassein and Salsette; 1 Grab and 5 Gallivates at Savarnadurg; 14 Grabs and 50 or 60 Gallivates at Gheriah; 5 - Gallivates at Ghoul and 5 at Dabhol, each of the 3 Mast Grabs had on board 150 Sepoys besides Lascars, the Hatch Grabs 100 and the Gallivates 75 sepoy each.⁴ The force of the Marathas, in the adjacent countries by land, then, was very inconsiderable. Even Poona, their capital, was as the Resident advised, totally improvided with forces.⁵ Narayanrao Appa told Mostyn on 17 February in the Durbar that the Nizam, Mahadji, Tukoji and Vast number of other officers had acknowledged Gangabai and meant to draw an acknowledgement of the new Government from the English, but Mostyn evaded.⁶

Raghoba had established a treaty with the Nizam⁷ and Devaji Pant Chorghode was also sent to Ibrahim Khan Daushta to persuade the Nizam to join Trimbakrao⁸. But Trimbak wrote to him that he

1. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 25-28 (Bombay Consultation).

2. Shindeshahi Haikar, S.H.S. vol.II, No.347 (14-2-1774).

3. Forrest, Selections from foreign department, vol.I, No.92 (14-2-1774).

4. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 25-28 (Bombay consultation) (15-2-1774).

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., vol.15, 34-37 (Mostyn to Bombay).

7. Oturkar, op.cit., No.158.

8. Chitale, op.cit., I.H.R.C.P. vol.XXIV, (1948), p.20.

intended leaving his camp and Raghoba offered terms to Sabaji.¹ Sabaji showed Raghoba's letter to Trimbakrao and wrote to Raghoba that he would not accept his offers.² Trimbakrao, too, joined the Ministers' party and still, Mahadji and Tukoji had not moved this way³. The Chatrapati issued a proclamation on 17 February that Raghoba was the usurper⁴. Raghoba was on the banks of the Sugli, near Moha with upwards of 25000 men with Wamanrao Patwardhan with 3000 men at a little distance away.⁵

In the Varaval Camp, Trimbak, Sabaji and Daryabai were together when the orders of Senasahab Suba for Sabaji were received⁶. Haripant Phadke wrote to Baburao Krishna extolling his faithfulness and circumspection in not yielding to the persuasion of Raghoba.⁷ Trimbak wrote to Sakharam that he was for the ministers' party and proceeded with Sabaji to join Waman against Raghoba and promised to win over also Murar Ghorpade, Polygars, Rydrugs.⁸ Raghoba devastated Raste and Patwardhan jagirs.⁹ Mahadji on 22 February was still in Northern India but was reported to have joined the ministers' party.¹⁰ Pandurang Govind Patwardhan advised Nana on 27 February to meet the delicate situation arising out of the movements of Raghoba.¹¹ The Chatrapati's orders declared Raghoba, a murderer and further called upon thirty-three Maratha gaddars to support Sawai Madhavrao.¹²

1. Ibid, p. 21.

2. Ibid.

3. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 37-38 (Mostyn to Bombay, 17-2-1774).

4. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 41; Sardesai, Kavyetihās Patren, No. 230.

5. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 34-37 (Mostyn to Bombay 17-2-1774).

6. Chitale, op.cit., I.H.N.C.P. vol. XXIV, (1948), p. 20.

7. Bhindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S.; vol. II, No. 349 (19-2-1774).

8. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 37-38 (Mostyn to Bombay, 21-2-1774).

9. Chitale, op.cit., p. 32.

10. S.P.D. vol. 36, No. 32.

11. Bhindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 350.

12. Sardesai, Kavyetihās Patren, No. 230.

Tukoji requested the addressee perhaps Mahadji, in his letter of own hand-writing, on 3 March, to come quickly and join him, when Tukoji was in Malwa.¹ Trimbak met the Nizam at Gunjoti and the Nizam agreed to overthrow Raghoba.² Raghoba was gradually deserted by all the prominent Sardars and Waman Govind Patwardhan even persuaded Murar Ghorpade to join the ministers.³ Raghoba intercepted several letters sent from Poona to the various Maratha Sardars in his camp. This made all afraid of Raghoba's wrath.⁴ Raghoba arrived on 12 March near Jamkhindi⁵ and gave new terms to Sabaji⁶. Hastings expressed that, "the Marathas were in a state of the greatest distraction and that the Maratha confederacy was headed by Sabaji, whose party seized the widow of the late Peshwa, intending to set up the child of which she was big, if he proves a boy, as no doubt he would be, to be their head".⁷ As to the wazir, he was busy in adding the Doab to his dominions. He had been successful, having no enemy to oppose him.⁸ Haripant Phadke informed Baburao Appa at Satara on 21 March that he had joined Trimbakrao's army near the Krishna.⁹ Raghoba wrote to Mahadji on 21, March, refuting all charges on him and referred to the treachery of Nana and Sakharao.¹⁰ Gangabai declared to the President of Bombay that she was supported

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1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.II, No.77.
 2. Chitale, op.cit. p.20.
 3. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.II, No.361.
 4. Ibid, Nos.352, 353.
 5. Ibid, No.354.
 6. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayabar, No.140 (18-3-1774).
 7. Gleig, op.cit., vol.I, 396 (20-3-1774).
 8. Ibid.
 9. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.II, No.355.
 10. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, I, 54.

by all - by Nana, Sakharan, all officers of the army, Sabaji, Trimbak, Holkar and Shinde.¹

Raghoba inflicted a defeat on Trimbak in the battle of Kassegaon on 26, March and Trimbak fell in action.² Gangabai, on 28, March, informed Baburao Apte of her intention of removing herself for protection from Purandar to Satara in view of Raghoba's march from Miraj towards the North.³ On 2, April, Moroba came to his garden outside the town and Nana came from Purandar to request him to lead the army.⁴ Gangabai wrote to Baburao Krishna not to be disheartened on account of Trimbak's death and to hold courage and not to give in to any wild rumours about the ministers' party being fearfully weakened.⁵ Udhav Vireswar Chitale was on 7th, asked by Gangabai to admit Moroba's family in the Shivneri fort for security.⁶ Raghoba told Sakharan on 8th, of his envoy Varamchi Padhye having been deputed to meet him and to explain Raghoba's intentions, so as to bring about a reconciliation.⁷

Raghoba proposed to the Bombay Company terms for help wherein he promised to make over any lands along the sea coast such as Gujraath, Sarrangham island near Bombay and again some tract for their perpetual enjoyment for ten thousand men and fifty lakhs of rupees.⁸ Raghoba also sent Chinto Vithal on c.12, April to Sakharan for effecting the terms of peace between the two parties and warned him of

1. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 56-57 (Mostyn to Bombay).

2. Chitale, op.cit., p.22, S.P.D.D. vol.15, 56-57.

3. Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.II, No.356.

4. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 59-60 (Mostyn to Bombay, 4-4-1774).

5. Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.II, No.357 (6-4-1774).

6. Ibid., No.358;

7. Ibid., No.359.

8. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 61-65, (Mostyn to Bombay 10-4-1774).

the consequences, if he would reject the proffered hand.¹ The Nawab of Arcot also referred to Raghoba's cause by the same time.² Trimbak's army of 15000 men, now, under the command of Haripant Phadke³ was joined by Sabaji with 30000 and the Nizam with 10000. But the last two had views of their own. Moroba had returned to Junner to be present at the ceremony of burning Trimbak's wife (Sati) and when it would be over, he meant to go with other ministers to Satara⁴. The Company on 13, April, had resolved that it was not in a position to furnish Raghoba with money but that the army could be sent if he would show how it was to join him with safety and its maintenance was guaranteed.⁵ Attempts were made by Raghoba to win over Mahadji to his side through Mahadji Subhedar, of his Court.⁶ Raghoba, again on 17th, warned Sakharan against the extreme measures that the ministers were pursuing and the terrible consequences that would result by such persistence.⁷ Raghoba was reported to be at Kali Chabutra, 100 cos. from Poona by about 16, April;⁸ and he requested Moroba to meet Chintu Vithal to bring about a reconciliation, so advantageous to all.⁹ Baburao Krishna on 17th was advised by Gangabai to address a letter from the Chatrapati to Bhavanrao Pratinidhi to remain firm.¹⁰ Savai Madhavrao was born on 18, April, 1774.¹¹

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1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 360.
 2. G.P.C. vol. IV, No. 959.
 3. Khare, Life of Nana, p. 28.
 4. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 66-70 (Mostyn to Bombay, 13-4-1774).
 5. Ibid, 65 (Bombay Consultation) (13-4-1774).
 6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. I, No. 1 (14-4-1774).
 7. Ibid, vol. II, No. 361 (17-4-1774).
 8. G.P.C. vol. IV, Nos. 972, 973, 978.
 9. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 362.
 10. Ibid, No. 363.
 11. Sardesai, op.cit, vol. III, p. 46; Khare, op.cit, vol. IV, p. 2026; Phalke, op.cit, vol. I, p. 8; Oturkar, op.cit, No. 159; S.P.D. vol. 32, 30; Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 364; Rajwade, op.cit, vol. X, pp. 89-91, Nos. 137, 138, 139 and 140.

Raghoba had arrested the son of Basalat Jang, nephew of the Nizam and hence the Nizam was not on good terms with Raghoba.¹ Raghoba was pursued upto the Godawari by the Nizam, the Bhonsle and Haripant. The ministers had seemed inclined to defer taking out the Chatrapati, till after Gangabai was brought to bed and had planned not to do so, at all if it would be a boy, as finally it did turn out to be.² Haripant, on account of the half-hearted support of Sabaji and the Nizam, could not quickly follow Raghoba, who was at a distance of 20 to 30 cos. Mahadji, however, was not responsible for Haripant's inability in this affair.³ Raghoba, thence, looking forward for help from Mahadji and Tukoji proceeded to Burhanpur. He had also thought of going to Shuja with whom he had a brother-in-law who enjoyed a position of high status, in case he failed in getting any help from Mahadji and Tukoji.⁴ Exchange of letters took place between Sakharan and Mahadji, over this affair of Raghoba, by about 27, April⁵. Raghoba reached Indore with about 3000 men. Mahadji and Tukoji met him near Ujjain and at his instance, undertook to negotiate terms with the ministers, at Purandar.⁶ Govindrao and Fatesing Gaikwad, then contending for the possession of Gujarat, had agreed to submit their dispute to the arbitration of Mahadji and Tukoji.⁷ When Haripant Phadke wrote to Mahadji not to allow Raghoba to march into Hindustan, he replied that Hindya Ghat and Bandawa Ghat were the two ways for

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. I, 1, (14-4-1774).

2. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 78.

3. Khare, Life of Nana, pp. 28, 29; S.P.D.D. vol. 15; 85, 87 and 90 (Mostyn to Bombay).

4. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 81, (Mostyn to Bombay 24-4-1774).

5. Parasnis, Itihasik Tinane, I, 55, (1, 2).

6. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 46.

7. Duff, op. cit., vol. II, p. 17 (13-4-1774).

Raghoba to escape and that he would manage the Badawa Ghat but Raghoba, however, without any obstruction, reached Indore via Badawa Ghat.¹

The fact was that "Mahadji and Tukoji by no means entirely friendly between themselves, could now easily assume the position of arbiters, threatening to join any side as suited their personal interest."² They could not evidently lay violent hands on one whom they had long served as their master and who had now sought their protection.³ In addition, both Shinde and Holkar had their own personal troubles, having just returned from their duties in the region of Delhi, with their troops clamouring for pay".⁴

"Mahadji usually supported Nana while Tukoji had his predilections for the opposite side".⁵ But Raghoba's affairs were going from bad to worse; he had hoped that Mahadji and Tukoji would send him troops to Burhanpur and so he crossed the Nerbada. But the Sardars welcomed him only for their own aim, as they wished for his support, in their advance into Gujarat. The cash given to Raghoba by Hyder was already spent and Raghoba plundered the villages of the two Sardars, which at once, rendered his presence in their province, distasteful to his hosts and readily they listened to the proposals from Nana to make Raghoba their prisoner.⁶ Behirji Tapkir, Mahadji's son-in-law, joined Raghoba and Nana demanded an explanation as to

1. Khare, Adhikar Yog, pp. 17-18.

2. Sardesai, op. cit., vol. III, p. 46.

3. Sardesai, op. cit., vol. III, p. 47.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Kincaid, Paramis, op. cit., vol. III, p. 110.

whether Mahadji himself sent him thither. Nana had explicitly ordered that the Sardars must arrest Raghoba as soon as he would be across the Werbada and pointed out that if at all, it was impossible, the Sardars, at least, should avoid meeting him. Mahadji, of course, referred to his own services to the Peshwa, his Udepur and Etawa campaigns and complained that Visaji, Tukoji and himself were not paid well for their exertions. Mahadji was inclined towards the Peshwa but suggested that the arrears for six years ought to be paid to him and finally explained that he had gone to Indore only in order to win over Tukoji to the cause of the Peshwa. He had already written four letters to Tapkir who deserted and joined Raghoba. Mahadji paid all his army and showed all the letters from Raghoba which he had received, to the ministers' party. However, Aba Raghunath, chitnis of Mahadji, was with Raghoba and advised Mahadji to accept the terms, but Mahadji declared his loyalty for the young Peshwa, even though he explained again that he was prepared to put faith in Nana's words for future payment due to him.¹ Mahadji assured Nana of his support in the latter's campaign against Raghoba and of his readiness for taking all the precautions to prevent Raghoba's march further.² Mahadji was told to stop Bhoola who joined Raghoba and who carried his plundering activities, meeting no opposition in his pursuit. Mahadji, however, assured Nana that by forwarding opposition, the country would be devastated and suggested that he would save the country and also his son-in-law, only that Nana ought

1. Sardesai, Itihāsik Patravayahar, No. 142.

2. Sardesai, Historical Papers of Mahadji Scindia, (HPMB) No. 1 (27-4-1774); Oturkar, op. cit., No. 161.

not to doubt his sincerity, on that account.¹ Mahadji also wrote to Gangabai, expressing his readiness to carry out the instructions sent out to him and informed her of his having moved into the tents to prevent Raghoba's further progress.² Tapkir was instructed by Mahadji to go to Purandar and Rayaji Patil was also dispatched, with 1000 army after Tapkir. Bahirji Tapkir replied him that he had left Tisgaon and had ascended the Ghat. Raghoba was three cos. away. Ganoji Kadam and Naropant came to him when Tapkir postponed joining, excusing himself that it was inauspicious day. He could not escape, however, in the night. In the morning Amrutao, Sedashiv Ramchandra, Ramchandra Ganesh, Manaji Shinde, Phakde came with the army to take Tapkir to Raghoba. He tried to evade by his decision to go on pilgrimage but nobody paid any heed to him. Now Tapkir submitted Raghoba's terms to Mahadji but Mahadji was firm in his loyalty to the Peshwa only that he was handicapped by his own financial difficulties. Mahadji had informed Nana that he would cede all the provinces to get Bahirji and his wife back and requested that Nana should not misunderstand him for such a transaction.³ Ramraja acknowledged Nana's letter on 28, April, communicating the fixture of the name giving ceremony of Gangabai's son.⁴ Mahadji wrote to Nana not to harass the wife of Sakharan Hari Gupte, a partisan of Raghoba.⁵ A loan for one lakh of rupees was given to Bhonsle from Poona⁶. On 1, May, 1774, Ramraja received the news of the name of Madhavrao, having been given to the

1. Ibid, No. 2.

2. Ibid, No. 3.

3. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvahan, No. 142.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 366.

5. Paramis, Itihasik Tipane, vol. I; 15.

6. Rajwade, op.cit, vol. X, pp. 93-94, No. 146.

son of Gangabai.¹

When Raghoba had reached Indore, Mahadji wrote in May, to Haripant not to cross the Nerbada as it would devastate his country and that he was sure of reconciling Raghoba to the ministers, in a short time.² Moroba went to Purandar on 1, May, where it was determined that he or Nana should, in few days go to Satara to receive the Sirpen, in the young Peshwa's name.³ Visaji and Chinto Vithal had gone to Purandar on 2, May, from Raghoba on presence of accommodating the differences. Nimbalkar and Pattankar also made the same plea.⁴ Tukoji wrote on 3 May to Sakharan and Nana, assuring them of his support to the ministers' party.⁵ But Nana, presuming that Shinde and Holkar had joined Raghoba was prepared to oppose and Raghoba continued the activities of burning the villages and getting everything out of them.⁶ Raghoba followed the policy of confiscating the territories of persons in the ministers' party, and entrusted the district of Haripur on 7, May to his own partisan, Visaji Vivasrao,⁷ and the management of the jagir districts belonging to Rastee and Patwardhans to Venkappa Desh Kulkarni.⁸ Haripant was given the explanation by Mahadji Ballal Guruji on 9 May that Mahadji was sincerely endeavouring to bring about Raghoba⁹ and Mahadji had actually given his terms for accommodation to Raghoba.¹⁰ While

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1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.II, No.367.
 2. Khare, Adhikar, Yog, p.18.
 3. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 85 (Mostyn to Bombay, 2-5-1774).
 4. Ibid., 86, (Mostyn to Bombay, 2-5-1774.)
 5. S.P.D. vol.V, No.46.
 6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. Vol.I, No.2.
 7. Ibid., vol.II, No.372.
 8. Ibid., vol.II, No.371.
 9. Khare, op.cit., vol.V, 1372.
 10. Ibid., 1380.

Sakharam, earlier to May 12, carried on the intrigues with Mahadji to join Raghoba's side. Raghoba was acting on Mahadji's advice and Sakharam had told Mahadji not to hinder Raghoba¹. Mahadji informed Gangabai of his negotiations with Raghoba.²

Sawai Madhavrao was given the robes of the Peshwa on 14 May 1774.³ Madhoji Bhonsle left Raghoba with a view to induce Ismail Khan of Ellichpur to give him some help and had since then joined him with a reinforcement of men. Sakharam and Nana had been to Satara and Maroba returned to Poona being not on good terms with Sakharam. Gopikabai had raised 3000 horse near Marsiah and was enlisting more in May; Butehoba left Raghoba and his troops⁴. Mahadji had earlier tried to bring about a settlement of Raghoba by making him disband his followers but he explained his position frankly that as Raghoba had come to his home, he could not be attacked for the prestige of the State and again, on account of Raghoba's military retinue⁵ and Mahadji Guraji had written to Wamanrao Patwardhan to march nearer to expedite negotiations between Raghoba and Mahadji.⁶ But, no doubt, all looked to Mahadji and Tukoji to conciliate the affairs of Raghoba,⁷ but the fact was that Mahadji and Tukoji had decided to remain active and to watch the trend of affairs.⁸ Mahadji sent Ramrao to Sakharam and Haripant was

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.I, No.3 (12-5-1774); Khare, op.cit., vol.V, 1381-82-83.

2. S.P.D. vol.V, No.47.

3. S.P.D. vol.V, No.49, Onturkar, op.cit., No.160.

4. S.P.D.D. vol.16, 89, (Mostyn to Bombay 14-5-1774).

5. Sardesai, H.P.N.S., No.4.

6. Khare, op.cit., vol.V, 1370.

7. Ibid., 1368.

8. C.P.C., vol.IV, No.1026 (12-5-1774).

waiting for Mahadji's advice.¹ Moroba informed Nana of his own gratification at the success of the measures adopted by Nana and told him that he was ailing from ulcer in the nose.² Tukoji, on 19 May, again assured Gangabai of his support and pointed out that the negotiations were still in progress.³

The wazir by this time, with the help of the English had completed his victory over the Rohillas and had imprisoned Zabita Khan.⁴ Mahadji informed Haripant, on 24 May, that he had good hopes of reconciling Raghoba, who on certain terms, agreed to repair to the Deccan. He advised Haripant to keep out of the latter's way, so as to avoid the least cause for friction and not to scare him away.⁵ Nana and Sakharam were requested by Krishnarao Ballal to accept the terms as protracting the negotiations would, in itself, be most costly, in the end.⁶ The Nizam demanded the forts and the jagirs promised to him and the ministers evaded. The Chatrapati bestowed the Peshwaship on Sawai Madhavrao but refused to adopt as his own heir, the boy whom Nana and Sakharam carried with them, for that purpose.⁷ In June, the attitude of Mahadji and Tukoji was far away from boldly espousing the cause of either of the two - in Barbhais or Raghoba, though Mahadji was persuading Raghoba to return to Poona.⁸ Haripant was facing the rains and the army was to be disbanded and if once disbanded, it would be very difficult to collect the same, next year.

1. Khare, *op.cit.*, vol.V, 1375.

2. *Shindeshahi Rajkarna, S.H.S.* vol.II, No.377.

3. *S.P.D.* vol.V, No.50.

4. *S.P.D.D.*, vol.15, 98-100 (Mostyn to Bombay, 19-5-1774).

5. Sardesai, *H.P.M.S.*, No.5; *S.P.D.* vol.36, No.48.

6. *S.P.D.* vol.36, No.49 (27-5-1774).

7. *S.P.D.D.*, vol.15, 91 (Mostyn to Bombay. 24-5-1774).

8. *S.P.D.* vol.36, No.53.

9. *S.P.D.* vol.36, No.51.

He had to incur high expenses and if he were to allow the Bhonsle and the Nizam to go, they would not join him, till the next year, so it was urgent to settle Raghoba's affairs. Mahadji wrote to him to give five lakhs of rupees for Raghoba's expenses and Raghoba would come back for the talks with the ministers through Mahadji. But when the sum was paid, Raghoba marched ahead, Mahadji speedily rounded him and Raghoba finally accepted to go to the Deccan. Haripant cantoned, in Berar; sent off the Nizam and the Bhonsle.¹ On 2, June, Mahadji had demanded the letters of orders for three villages, formerly of the Nizam, from Sakharam.² There was a rumour that Raghoba, Mahadji and Tukoji, at the head of a considerable body of men had thought of coming to the Deccan before the rains would swell the Nerbada, so much as to make the passes of that river difficult. It was also reported that Raghoba's brother-in-law, Gopal Burwe and one Umraogir Gosawin, with a reinforcement of men were coming to join him, from Hindustan.³ Ranchod Krishna reported to Nana from Bombay, the news that Raghoba, joined by Mahadji and Tukoji had received assurances from Shuja and the Rohillas and that they were planning an attack on Poona, after the rains.⁴ But on 8 June, it was also reported that as soon as a successor to the office of the Peshwa was born, Mahadji and Tukoji had refused to adhere to Raghoba's cause and had declared themselves duty-bound to the new Peshwa.⁵

1. Khare, Adhikar Yog, p.19.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.I, No.4.

3. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 91 (Mostyn to Bombay.5-6-1774).

4. S.P.D. vol.35, No.8; C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1108.

5. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1097.

Raghoji Angre congratulated the Peshwa, on his receipt of the robes of honour.¹ Mahadji and Tukoji still pursued the double policy.² Mahadji had suggested to Raghoba that he would reinstate Narayan's son on the Marnad and appoint Raghoba, his guardian. Mahadji and Tukoji advised Raghoba to act in such a manner as would leave the Deccan under the authority of Narayan's son and added that if he had the ambition of making conquests, he should march to Hindustan and reduce that country. In case of success, Sakharan would certainly submit. This, however, displeased Raghoba. He just then intended to go to Hindustan to request the assistance of the Emperor and the wazir and then to return and plunder the Deccan.³

Raghoba could not prevail upon Mahadji and Tukoji to join him finally and curious rumours were in circulation, often, even about the false story of Sawai Madhavrao's death.⁴ On c.20, June, the Emperor received Muhammad Rida Khan and Itihdad Khan, ambassadors from Taymur, for what purpose nobody knew.⁵ The Peshwa's own vatan (jagir) was ceded to Haripant on c.26 June.⁶ Mahadji and Tukoji had interfered in the affairs of Govindrao and Pattesing Gaikwad and the matters were likely to be soon amicably settled between them through their mediations, when it was believed, both would embrace Raghoba's cause. It could not be ascertained then that Raghoba would come to the Deccan before the rains as he had not

1. S.P.D. vol.36, No.55.

2. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, I, 49.

3. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1108 (17-6-1774).

4. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1108.

5. Heras, op.cit; Is.C. vol.XI, (1937), p.509.

6. Itihasik Sankirna Sahitya, vol.II, No.239.



crossed the Nerbada by about 20 June.¹ On the night of 27th, Sakharan and Nana fled with the Peshwa from Saswad to Purandar, on account of the conspiracy of Moroba, Babaji Naik and Batchoba.² Tukoji again assured Gangabai of his support to the cause of the Peshwa and that he was persuading Raghoba to return to Poona³ and Mahadji had asked Haripant to halt where he was on 30 June, lest Raghoba might be scared away.⁴ Haripant, nevertheless believed that, in Raghoba's march, Mahadji and Tukoji had treacherous designs in view⁵ but Raghoba, having wasted May and June, at Indore, had tried to escape to Bhopal but had been brought back forcibly by Shinde and Holkar.⁶

The reports of the Emperor's alliance with Mirkasim, Ghazi-ud din, the Sikhs and the Marathas were false. If he had invited the Marathas, he would not have driven them out of Meerut and other places and appointed the royal officers, there⁷, even though Majdund-dowlah was entering into correspondence with the Sikhs and the Marathas.⁸ Raghoba desired Mahadji and Tukoji, each to raise an army of 5 to 6 thousand horse in order to proceed to Poona and swear that they would be faithful to him. This they promised to do when a letter was received from Sakharan inviting them immediately to Poona.⁹ On 6th, Raghoba and the Sardars had crossed the Nerbada on their way to Poona with 40 to 50 thousand force.

1. S.P.D.D.; vol. 15, 93 (Mostyn to Bombay); Khare, op.cit., vol. V. Nos. 1402, 1403.
2. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 102 (Mostyn to Bombay) (30-6-1774); S.P.D. vol. 36, No. 59.
3. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S.; vol. II, No. 78.
4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S.; vol. II, No. 80.
5. Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 19.
6. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas; vol. III, p. 48.
7. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 1152 (13-7-1774).
8. Ibid., No. 1154.
9. Ibid., No. 1134.

Sakharam and others pretended that the Sardars were bringing Raghoba to adjust the matters amicably. The ministers, finding Moroba too strong, were out to settle the terms with him and they had already made ready the Sanads for the Nizam who was at Aurangabad. Haripant had not arrived by about 16th July. Raghoba had released Basalat's son, whom he had imprisoned at the time of Trimbak's death.¹ Haripant had arrived as far as Maheshwar and was asked to stop there by Ahalyabai in order to confer with Mahadji. He also informed Ahalyabai that the Nizam had prevailed upon Mudhoji Bhonsle not to join Raghoba. Muhammad Yusuf had been dismissed from the service of the Bhonsle and he had gone over to Anandibai at Dhar with his force.² Mahadji ordered 'books' (?) for Raghoba on 20th July³; while Mahadji was not actually in Raghoba's camp, he was crossing the Nerbada, also, on this side.⁴ The wazir had made it a condition binding on the Emperor to march against the Marathas to Kotah and to stop the correspondence with them, thenceforth. Mahadji suggested to Sakharam the advisability of releasing from the custody the families of the partisans of Raghoba and of making other friendly gestures to create an atmosphere favourable for his settlement and return. Mahadji, on the contrary, had heard that the jagirs would be confiscated, on account of their adherence to Raghoba. Mahadji explained why at all, he himself was negotiating with Raghoba. He did not want him to go to Hindustan as the Northerners would exploit the weakness of the Marathas, on account

1. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 103-104 (Mostyn to Bombay. 16-7-1774); Khare, op.cit., vol.V, Nos. 1391, 1395 (27-7-1774).

2. S.P.D.; vol.36, No.60 (17-7-1774).

3. S.P.D.; vol.5, No.55 (20-7-1774).

4. S.P.D. vol.36, No.10 (26-7-1774); Khare, op.cit., vol.V, Nos. 1391, 1395.

of their domestic dissensions. Mahadji knew that the wazir would invade Bundelkhand and Najaf Khan would devastate the Rajput States, as both of them were already strong, if this half-baked statesman, Raghoba, would join them. The Bhonsle, Gaikwad, Ismail Khan would be too ready to help. So he wanted to check Raghoba and escorted him to Burhanpur. Mahadji now pleaded that Raghoba's adherents must be released and that he must be supported financially.¹

Raghoba was six miles from Dhulcote on 1 August and demanded money.² He plundered villages, tried to take Ashirgad by force and collected money from the state officers. Mahadji used to pay him for his expenses, on the account of the ministers. His vakils had opened up the talks: Ten lakhs of rupees worth jagir, three common forts and Mahadji to manage his affairs and if the ministers would agree, they would pay 50,000 rupees or one lakh of rupees to Mahadji and would give him Shindkheda as jagir. But Mahadji himself was not satisfied.³ Mahadji's advisers would again decide a treaty with the Bhonsle but Muhammad Yusuf, described as "Raghoba's sword" was to go to Nagpore.⁴ Tukoji's diwan, Naro Ganesh wrote probably to Moroba, informing him of his own and his master's movements.⁵ On c. 8, August, the Emperor had sent the Khilats to Mir Kasim and Imad-ul Mulk and summoned them to the Presence. Samroo was favoured too. These persons were all the enemies of the English.⁶ Beniram was on 10,

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S. No. 6.

2. Sardesai, Kavyetihās Patra; No. 233.

3. Khare, Adhikar-Yog; p. 20; Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. V, Nos. 1396, 1400;

4. Sardesai, Itihasik Patrayvaha, No. 143 (2-8-1774).

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 380.

6. G.P.C. vol. IV, No. 1205.

August, returning to the Bhonsle with the presents from the English and was to see Raja Cheytsing on his way,¹ and the presents were also forwarded from the Company to Maharani Daryabai, widow of late Janoji Bhonsle.² Wamanrao and Anantrao Raste were to raise with all the possible speed, 25000 men for the ministers³. The company declared to the wazir that the English were not interested in the affairs of the Emperor.⁴ As Raghoba was so far away, the Nizam was quiet at Aurangabad, the two Bhonsles were in Berar and the ministers had as yet then by about 28 August no force to speak of, on foot.⁵ Raghoba advanced to Tulner on the banks of the Tapti, on his way to Chondoor, and had 40000 good men. The ministers seemed to waver and were less resolute on the approach of Raghoba. They ordered some troops to assemble at Seiddee Tenk under Visaji and some days, earlier to 28th August came to a decision that Sakharam would lead them and would also accompany two vakils who had arrived lately from Mahadji and Tukoji to endeavour for accommodating matters.⁶ But, "yet Nana and Sakharam though embarked in one cause, appeared throughout the whole, to be mutually jealous of each other, it was just possible, it might not be carried into execution as the former on second thoughts would be most likely afraid to trust the latter with his fate as Moroba also wavered in his inclinations".⁷ Tukoji on 30, August informed Sakharam of Raghoba's movements.⁸ Mahadji had escorted Raghoba upto

1. Ibid., No. 1211.

2. Ibid., No. 1220 (15-8-1774).

3. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 109 (Mostyn to Bombay. 15-8-1774).

4. C.P.C. vol. IV, No. 1231 (19-8-1774).

5. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 111-112 (Mostyn to Bombay. 28-8-1774).

6. Ibid., vol. 15, 111-112.

7. Ibid.

8. S.P.D.; vol. V, No. 56; Sardesai, Madhyvibhag, IV, p. 352 (For inclinations of the Sardars.)

Dhalkot and intended to cross the Tapti river near Chandwad. But Haripant was encamped near Bodad Pimpri. Nana had urged on Mahadji to proceed with forced marches but Haripant had blocked the way.¹ Robert Gambier, the acting Chief at Surat proposed the terms which Raghoba's agent forwarded to the Governor of Bombay on c.6, September seeking the military assistance from the Company.² The English asked for one lakh of rupees per month for the maintenance of the army which would be accounted for, out of the sum deposited by Raghoba and the English forces in conjunction with Raghoba's would easily carry him back to Poona and effectually restore him to his Government of the Maratha Empire.³

Mahadji was allowed to take 20,000 troopers for his Saranjam. For two years, he had not maintained such an army but took the money attributed. Now he expected the ministers would not allow him the surplus and called the ministers for a personal meeting.⁴ Mahadji on 9 September expressed misgivings to Nana, if it would be agreeable to Raghoba to fix up his residence at Kopergaon instead of at Chevdas near Gangapur. Anandibai put up at Gangapur and if Raghoba, too, stayed at Anandiwalli, they would be nearer to each other. Mahadji assured Nana that he would try to persuade Raghoba to accept the change.⁵ The Peshwa informed Mahadji that he was invested with the title of "Sawai" and

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S.; No.7 (3-9-1774).

2. S.P.D.D., vol.15, 113-114 (Bombay consultation. 6-9-1774).

3. S.P.D.D., vol.15, 124-125 (Hornby to Surat. 7-9-1774).

4. Khare, Adhikar Yog. pp.20-21.

5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.8.

Mahadji offered his hearty congratulations on c.10, September.¹ Wamanrao Patwardhan wrote to Nana that he was making preparations for starting as soon as possible and was collecting the troops for the state service.² Mahadji wrote on 27 September to Sakharan, in reply to his soliciting speedy movements of Raghoba, that he was exerting his best to hasten Raghoba's return.³ Sakharan's going to Raghoba for the settlement of peace was overruled but still, on 9, October the ministers were talking of peace and simultaneously endeavoured to raise the troops at three different places, though not more than 4 to 5 thousand (when 25000 were expected) owing to their want of public cash and not choosing to advance their own. The whole train of artillery under Bhimrao would join Haripant. The vakils sent to Mahadji and Tukoji had come back with two other vakils from them.⁴ The Gardis, even though they were paid, were round about Raghoba and in reply to the Poona ministers' remonstrances about Raghoba's delay, Mahadji pleaded that he was pressing the point earnestly and would offer no more concessions to Raghoba;⁵ and reported to Sakharan on the same date that he could not be responsible for the dilatory tactics adopted by Raghoba and that he himself was leaving no stone unturned in hastening his march back.⁶

Raghoba was encamped about 12 cos. on this side of Burhanpur, which city lies about 130 cos. from Surat. He had 30,000 horse chiefly belonging to Mahadji and Holkar. Nou Rattan had opened up talks for

1. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1263.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S.; vol.II, No.381.

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.9 (27-9-1774).

4. S.P.D.D.; vol.15, 126-127 (Mostyn to Bombay. 2-10-1774).

5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S.; No.11 (7-10-1774).

6. Ibid, No.10 (10-10-1774).

Raghoba to Surat Chief, on c.11 October 1774.¹ Mahadji informed Sakharan that he had despatched Naro Ganesh and Balarao Govind to Poona to explain the situation, personally,² and by about 28th Octr. the proposals for Raghoba were given to the Peshwa at Purandar, by the vakils of Shinde and Holkar. The proposals were: The Siwa was to be continued in the young Peshwa's name and Raghoba would conduct the Government. The ministers would work in the different departments, under Raghoba. If this would not be approved of, then it was suggested that the whole empire would be divided, on the lines approved of in the days of Madhavrao; so as to cede twenty lakhs of rupees worth jagir and twenty forts to Raghoba. The ministers did not, however, agree with the proposals and offered, instead, fifteen lakhs of rupees a year, without any fort. Raghoba's vanguard had two or three days march further on this side. The ministers thought this embassy was never meant to put an end to the dispute by those that sent it; but only to amuse and prevent their raising any men or framing any alliances in order to face Raghoba³. A large force arrived from Portugal to Goa and Don Joze Pedro de Camera was made the Governor and Captain-General of the Portuguese possessions in India and immediately terms were offered for the English-Portuguese alliance against the Marathas.⁴ Sakharan urged on Moroba to come at once to proceed to Satara.⁵ Mahadji had accompanied Raghoba who left Kasarbari.⁶ The Bhonsle brothers were powerful. Madhoji along

1. S.P.D.D. vol-15, 123-133 (Surat to Bombay).

2. Sardesai, H.F.M.S. No.12 (15-10-1774).

3. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 133-134 (Mostyn to Bombay. 28-10-1774).

4. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 177-183 (R.Henshaw of Goa to Bombay. 31-10-1774).

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne: S.H.S., vol.II, No.387.

6. S.P.D., vol.36, Nos.68, 63.

with Ismail Khan and Muhammad Yusuf wished to join Raghoba who had already gone to Kasarbari and left that place.¹

Raghoba's letters to Muhammad Ajni of Bombay were intercepted in the first fortnight of November,² but on 10, November, Raghoba's agent had set out from Surat to acquaint his master of the terms on which the English assistance could be obtained. But Raghoba had preferred not to offer the negotiations, for a long time.³ Mahadji, too, finally gave Raghoba the terms of ten lakhs of rupees worth jagir and two forts, on 16 November⁴. But Raghoba had deputed on 19, November two confidential men to fetch the news from the English.⁵ The draft of the treaty of the Company with Raghoba ran on the following lines: 700 Europeans and 1800 Black Sepoys with 19 guns and 1,50,000 Rs. per month to be paid on that account, the amount of 15 lakhs of rupees to be deposited previously by Raghoba. In case, the amount was not required, it would be returned by the end of November. Again, 100 Europeans and 200 black soldiers with 15 guns could be afforded for Raghoba's help if he would pay six lakhs of rupees instantly; Salsette, Bassein and four other small islands were to be ceded to the Company. The Chowth of Surat and the revenue thereof also was, in addition, to be ceded. Raghoba however, desired to cede, instead of these parts, Broach, Ahmed, Bessy Berry, Orpad and Hansot.⁶

1. S.P.D. vol. 36, Nos. 62, 63.

2. Sardesai, Itihasik Sangraha, No. 144.

3. S.P.D.D., vol. 15, 138-139 (Bombay to Court. 10-11-1774).

4. Khare, op.cit. vol. V, No. 1406.

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S. vol. II, No. 385.

6. S.P.D.D., vol. 15, 164-167 (19-11-1774).

The ministers knew that if they showed their inferiority complex, anything would be demanded from them.¹ Wamanrao Patwardhan writing to Nana on 25, November cordially accepted the latter's commands and expressed his readiness to be present with his full quota of the troops, at the appointed place.² Govindrao Gaikwad also declared that if he would be paid adequately for his army, he would join the ministers. Mahadji and Tukoji were giving their advice to Raghoba who, nevertheless carried on his anti-state activities.³ Sabaji had been to Nagpore and Madhoji Bhonsle was at Ellichpur where he intended to take up his residence. Daryabai and Raghoji, son of Madhoji, were at Nagpore. Tukoji, Govind Gaikwad and Mahadji were in Burhanpur area. The proposals of Raghoba were forwarded by his agents to Sakharam at Poona⁴. Sakharam and Nana had left Purandar and were on 27, November at the head of 30000 troopers, together with those under Waman Rao and Raste and the army under Haripant. They were endeavouring to raise more army and were proceeding towards Raghoba. They had with them Tukoji's vakils but had despatched Mahadji's vakils from their camp. The Nizam was to join at Tonka. Madhoji would help Raghoba and Raghoba levied contributions in Khandesh. Moroba, in spite of the ministers' solicitations, remained quiet in Poona.⁵ Sabaji Bhonsle from Nagpore, was expected to join the ministers.⁶ The ministers had finally written to Mahadji that they had paid Raghoba 15 lakhs of rupees, jagirs and forts etc. and

1. Khare, Adhikar-Yog; p.22.

2. Shinde-Sahai Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.II, No.386.

3. S.P.D. vol.36, No.69.

4. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1436. (28-11-1774).

5. S.P.D.D., vol.15, 190-191 (Mostyn to Bombay).

6. Khare, Adhikar-Yog; p.22.

that if in spite of all these, Mahadji was not able to reconcile Raghoba, Mahadji himself ought to leave his cause.¹ The ministers had secretly engaged Shinde and Holkar in their interests and they advanced towards the Tapti. Raghoba was apprised of the secession of Mahadji and Tukoji, in sufficient time to escape from being surrounded and he retired towards Gujarat.² Sabaji thanked the Governor-General, after having informed him of the new ministerial resistance.³ The Portuguese had, as per the report of Robert Menahem from Goa, on the last date of October, intentions upon Salsette and Bassein and it was pointed out that there would be bad consequences of the Portuguese gaining possession of that island and a resolution was formed by the English to attack Salsette and Bassein and it was observed, in addition, "that a more favourable opportunity than the present one will probably never again offer, as by the divisions in Maratha Government; there is now no head in that empire and it will be out of the power of either party to send any effectual force to obstruct our proceedings". "The part of the force at Tellicherry and Anjengo was to come for this purpose of the attack and Mostyn was to come back before the matter became publicly known; and the Surat Chief was to be informed for preventing the talks with Raghoba, breaking down."⁴

While Mahadji was accompanying Raghoba, Haripant had tried to follow tactics to surround Raghoba, in November.⁵ The ministers, the

1. Khare, *Adhikar-Yog*; p. 22.

2. Kincaid, *Parashis*, pp. 311, vol. III, p. 111; Duff, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 27.

3. *G.P.C.* vol. IV, No. 1437. (28-11-1774).

4. *S.P.D.D.*; vol. 15, 171-177. (28-11-1774).

5. *S.P.D.*, vol. 36, No. 67. (28-11-1774); Khare, *Adhikar-Yog*, p. 22.

Bhonsle and the Nizam returned and Mahadji and Tukoji would have certainly prevented Raghoba's flight but did not obviously, like to take the odium of laying hands on a member of the Peshwa's house. On the contrary, they purposely prevented Haripant from closing upon Raghoba, on the ground that he was in the fear of his life. This pretext, however, seemed to give a chance for Raghoba to escape and launched the ministers on a long, costly war for which Wana held the two chiefs alone responsible in all his future dealings with them.¹

Sadashiv Raghunath was under the necessity of explaining the arrangement for the defence of Borghat to Haripant, on 5th December². Mostyn arrived in Bombay on 9th December and approved the measures taken by the Council. The proposal for the delivery of the island of Salsette made by an inmate, was broken off and a resolution was formed to take possession of it by force of arms. It was held the ministers were in no position to obstruct the operations³. The English fleet was fitted out.⁴ Raghoba had suddenly decamped on the night of 10th and made for Gujarat.⁵ The rumour was reported to Poona that the English had joined Raghoba, contrary to the negotiations which they had opened with the ministers, and it was suggested that the English meant treachery, as was seen in their dealings with Shuja.⁶ Manaji Phakde was in Raghoba's camp on 12 December⁷. On 12, December, again, that part of the English forces intended to proceed by

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 49.

2. S.P.D. vol. V, No. 63.

3. S.P.D.D. vol. 15, 208-13; S.P.D. vol. 35, No. 28.

4. S.P.D.; vol. 35, No. 17.

5. Sardesai, op.cit., vol. III, p. 48.

6. S.P.D. vol. 36, No. 72.

7. Ibid., No. 74.

land to Thana, marched off the parade to Sion and the remainder, that evening, embarked on boards the vessels and boats, provided for that purpose. The Brigadier-General proceeded with the party that marched off by land and Watson embarked in one of the vessels proceeding to Thana.¹ "The Portuguese fleet, consisting of three ships and Snow, the largest ship carrying sixty guns and the whole being full of men, in company of a fleet of boats, anchored at the mouth of the Bombay harbour" on 31 December². Visaji Krishna who was to proceed to South against Haider was asked on 14 December by the ministers to march to -Salsette.³ The Siddi of Rajpuri was also fitting out an expedition, but his destination was not known.⁴

It was not known whether Raghoba had any just cause to suspect Shinde and Holkar and whether it was only an artifice of the ministers, very usual in this country, but it was said Raghoba intercepted letters to Holkar and Shinde wherein they appeared to be bargaining for his destruction. Alarmed at this, he found means to quit their army, giving out that he was flying to Delhi but turned off and joined his partisans.⁵ When Raghoba had escaped, Mahadji and Tukoji pleaded Haripant for speedy pursuit. Tukoji was loyal to the Peshwa but Haripant got the impression that Mahadji had no such inclinations.⁶ On 16th December, the arrival of the English forces at Thana was reported to the Peshwa.⁷ The Peshwa had informed Naro Anandrao on 19 December,

1. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 240-241 (Consultation.12-12-1774).

2. Ibid, vol.15, 243-244 (Consultation).

3. S.P.D. vol.35, No.131,

4. Ibid, vol.35, No.28.

5. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, pp.254-259 (William Taylor to G.G.).

6. Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol.V, No.1416, 1418 (16-12-1774).

7. S.P.D. vol.V, No.69.

that Mostyn left Poona and was proceeding to Surat as the Chief of that place and maintained that he was the trusted friend of the Peshwa and as such, would not hesitate to help the Peshwa's officers in collecting dues and therefore he should be treated cordially.¹ In the meanwhile, Raghoba was reported to have gone to Dhar. Malaji Ghorpade, Baburao Patwardhan, Yeshwantrao Mane came to Shinde and Holkar from Raghoba for negotiations and stayed with them permanently.² The Poona forces attacked Nouruttendas in his castle and along with his brother he was taken prisoner and carried to Mowah, their headquarters. The whole country between Surat and Raghoba was beset and closely guarded by the Poona army. Holkar's mother who had always patronized Raghoba was dead and had left him the guardianship of her children, along with great treasures. Raghoba on that account, had gone in such a hurry to the place where she died³. Sakharam took to task Naro Anand for not reporting his activities and it was reported on 28 December that Mahadji was hotly pursuing Raghoba⁴. Thana was taken by storm, in the afternoon at 3 o'clock⁵ on 28 December by the English⁶. On 31 December, Raghoba had drawn near Surat with his army which was very considerable in strength, in order that the English forces might easily join him as he expected the treaty would be speedily executed, but suspecting some treachery about this time from a part of his troops, he quickly separated from them, with those he could rely on and

1. Ibid, vol.35, No.51.

2. Khare, op.cit, vol.V, Nos.1421, 1426, 1428 (26-12-1774); Forrest, op.cit, vol.I, pp.254-259.

3. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 254-255. (27-12-1774).

4. S.P.D. vol.36, No.93.

5. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 254-255.

6. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 272-273. (Bombay to Fort William).

for the present was actually retreating. He had however assured the Chief of Surat that he should speedily return when he desired the treaty might be concluded.¹ The receipt of the news of the fall of Salsette sent by Naro Appaji was acknowledged by the Peshwa on 31st December 1774.² The general balance of cash in the treasuries of Bengal on 30 November 1774 was Rs.8,84,0845-5-16.³

Fatesing Gaikwad wrote to Naropant Keskar to hasten with help to oppose the forces of Raghoba, on 1 January 1775.⁴ Raghoba had left Anandibai at Dhar as she was pregnant and himself had gone to Ujjain - he was escaping and also negotiating through Mahadji and Tukoji. He thence went to Gujarat and reached Baroda,⁵ with 10000 horse and 400 musquet men, giving his pursuer a slip.⁶ Mahadji and Tukoji were watching the result of the negotiations started by the English envoy, before proceeding to the South.⁷ The Peshwa had instructed Naro Anand not to relax the blockade of Surat and as, again, Raghoba was proceeding to join Govindrao Gaikwad; Haripant accompanied by Mahadji and Tukoji, was pursuing Raghoba, and Naro Anand was asked to join the main Maratha force.⁸ Govindrao himself proposed terms to the Company.⁹ Hari Umaji reported to Naro Anand, his meeting with Raghoba, in the camp of Govindrao. Haripant, Mahadji and Tukoji were also drawing near Raghoba on 8 January¹⁰. Rumours were in circulation

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1. S.P.D.D. vol.15, 272-273 (Bombay to Fort William).
 2. S.P.D. vol.35, No.120 (31-12-1774).
 3. C.P.C. vol.II, p.280.
 4. S.P.D. vol.36, No.103; S.P.D.D. vol.16A, 29-30 (Surat to Bombay, 1-2-75)
 5. Khare, op.cit., vol.V, No.1430; Khare, Adhikar Yeg, pp.22-23; C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1615.
 6. S.P.D.D. vol.16A, 1-3 (Surat to Bombay, 3-1-1775).
 7. S.P.D. vol.36, No.290.
 8. S.P.D. vol.36, Nos.108, 112.
 9. S.P.D.D. vol.16A, 6-7 (William Shaw to Bombay, 6-1-1775).
 10. S.P.D. vol.36, No.113.

that Mahadji and Ahalyabai supported Anandibai in collecting the Bhils and the Gardis by payment of money. Mahadji, however, complained that Anandibai had set Bhagirthibai Shinde against him.¹ Raghoba, at Baroda was received cordially by Govindrao and Raghoba's agent opened up negotiations at Surat.² The forces of Shinde, and Holkar and Haripant now actually met together, on c.14, January;³ though Haripant did not know exactly the real disposition of the Sardars.⁴ Haripant intended to proceed to Baroda from Dahodhya via Payagad with the two Sardars.⁵ Mahadji had requested Naro Anand on 21 January to restore to Padaji Shelke the horses captured by the men of the addressee.⁶ Raghoba marched towards Ahmedabad. When he was across the Mahi river, Haripant and others reached this side of the bank. Raghoba forcibly sent back their advance guards. On the next day, Haripant decided to march against Raghoba, but the Sardars objected on the plea that the vakils from Raghoba had opened up the talks. The hostile camps were there for seventeen days.⁷ When Raghoba was sure of the English help, he demanded from the ministers, 20 lakhs of rupees worth jagir; 10 lakhs of rupees for Manaji Phakde, Sadashiv Ramchandra and Sakharan Hari for 2000 troops each; and the whole of Gujarat for Govindrao. Mahadji told Haripant that he would fix it up on 32 lakhs of rupees for Raghoba towards expenses and 10 lakhs of rupees worth jagir. Haripant explained that he was not concerned with what Mahadji got or paid but insisted that Mahadji must anyhow manage Raghoba and himself

1. Khare, Adhikar Yog, p.36, (10-1-1775).

2. S.P.D.D. vol.16A, 7-8 (13-1-1775) (Surat to Bombay); S.P.D. vol.V, No.74.

3. S.P.D. vol.36, No.173.

4. Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol.V, No.1433 (18-1-1775).

5. S.P.D. vol.36, No.128 (21-1-1775).

6. Ibid. vol.36, Nos.130, 132.

7. Khare, op.cit., vol.V, Nos.1435, 1438, 1441, 1442, 1439; Khare, Adhikar Yog, pp.22-23.

marched to Baroda. Mahadji and Tukoji, thereupon, marched there, following him and pleaded that they should all march against Raghoba. Haripant was only to follow them and so he did.¹ Raghoba was just killing time as he had already applied for the English help. Haripant also knew this but he could do nothing against the Sardars.² Raghoba retreated beyond the Mahi on c.22, January³ and Haripant was closing on him.⁴

Three chiefs from Raghoba (two named Appaji Pant and Baji Pant and some one else) deposited jewellery estimated by Malet at - Rs.6,25,750 at Surat by about 10 February 1775.⁵ Anandibai wrote letters still to Sakharam.⁶ The battle between Sabaji and Mudhoji was fought,⁷ in the other sphere. Shuja died on 26 January 1775⁸. Naro Appaji had reported on 16 February to Poona, a battle that was fought between Fatesing and Govind rao and requested the ministers to support the cause of Fatesing as he was favourably inclined to the Peshwa.⁹

At Patna, Gentil received an invitation from the Emperor for French aid. "The Emperor was turning his eyes towards an alliance in the belief that a French alliance would rid him of the tutelage of his rebel subjects and the English". But, of course, Gentil had the

1. Khare, Adhikar Yog, pp.23-24.

2. Ibid, pp.22-23.

3. S.P.D.D. vol.16A, 52-53. (Chief of Broach to Bombay).

4. S.P.D. vol.36, No.143. (3-2-1775).

5. S.P.D.D. vol.16A, 64-67 (Malet, Resident at Cambay to Surat Chief).

6. Parasnisi, Itihasik Tipane, vol.I, 60.

7. Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol.V, Nos.1440, 1446.

8. Srivatsava, "A critical examination of the various versions of Shuja-ud-Dowlah's death", Is.C. vol.XIX, (1945), p.242, B.H.R.I. (1928-29), Gulgule letters, N.32; Seir Mutachherin, vol.III, 938, vol.IV, 60-61; Parasnisi, Itihasik Tipane, I, 12, (There is controversy about date and place).

9. B.H.R.I., Gulgule letters, (1928-29), N.33; S.P.D. vol.36, No.147.

good sense to decline the offer. Nevertheless, this offer was narrated to Louis XVI in June, 1778.¹

Mahadji and Tukoji were not doing anything vigorously in Gujarat and Haripant and Fatesing had to bear all.² A heavy engagement between Haripant and Raghoba on the Mahi, again, was reported. Manaji Phadke, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Sakharan Hari were severally wounded³. Raghoba was deserted by his troops, the 500 Arabs of Govindrao and he took to flight.⁴ It was reported that the English had offered to help Raghoba to the Peshwaship in return for Salsette and Bassein. The Peshwa instructed Naropant Nana to lose no time in stopping the English from proceeding to Broach to join hands with Raghoba.⁵ Visaji Krishna inquired whether the Sardars and Haripant had crossed the Mahi and whether the negotiations with Raghoba had been carried out with any success.⁶ Raghoba still demanded 32 lakhs of rupees and 10 lakhs of rupees worth jagir through Mahadji and Haripant, now, disagreed with them.⁷ The Peshwa complimented Naro Anand upon his success in persuading Fatesing to join Haripant.⁸

On 17th February, the army under Phadke, Mahadji and Tukoji crossed the Mahi at Sanwally Pargana, about 35 cos. from Cambay and attacked Raghoba who had 35000 horse and foot, still. The ministerial army of 42000 horse commenced hostilities in the noon and ended by 8 o'clock in the evening. 1200 Arabs deserted Raghoba due to arrears

1. Cotton, *The Memoires of Gentil, I.H.R.C.P.*, vol. X, (1927), pp. 27-28.

2. Khare, *Adhikar Yog*, pp. 23-24.

3. *S.P.D.* vol. 36, No. 150.

4. *S.P.D.D.* vol. 16A, 67-68 (Malet to Surat. 21-2-1775).

5. *S.P.D.* vol. 35, No. 201.

6. *S.P.D.* vol. 35, No. 202.

7. Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, vol. V, No. 1443.

8. *S.P.D.* vol. 36, No. 150.

of pay. Raghoba lost 3 to 4 hundred men and fled to Cambay, reached it at 3 o'clock and arrived at Bhavnagar same night with 700 horsemen, 7 elephants and few camels. He was so hasty in reaching Surat that horses were turned loose and he, his adopted son and 900 followers reached Surat. Raghoba's Chief officers, Appaji Mahadev, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Sakharan Hari, Govindrao Gaikwad wrote to him, "We are much surprised to find that after having fought so well with the army of Haripant that you are missing, nor do we know where to send you, this going as chance may direct; however, we have now collected all our forces amounting to about 16000, mostly horse, also our ammunition at the fort of Kapadganj which is about 50 cos. from Cambay and there shall remain until we receive your orders".¹

Raghoba had replied to these advices, "The reason of my being obliged to retreat was owing to Haripant having made the attack with 25000 men on the centre, where I was with little more than 4000 men, being deserted by the Arabs who drew off and refused to fight. Thus situated and finding the whole force of Haripant's troops was against my person, I went to Cambay, from thence to Bhavnagar and there took shipping to Surat where I arrived safe after many troubles which have been made up for, in a great degree by the kind reception I met from my good friends, the English. The Governor-in-Council in Bombay has sent me a good force and all kinds of guns and ammunition, so that I only wait to hear from you what place you think most proper to join

1. S.P.D.D. vol. 16A, 98-99 (Keating to Bombay. 4-3-1775); Sardesai, Itihāsik Patravayahar, (Joshi Sangraha), No. 145, S.P.D. vol. 35, No. 204, Forrester, Maratha Series, vol. I, p. 217.

my forces to the English and when that is once accomplished, my affairs will soon be in proper condition. I wait to have your speedy answer to this great business and very much wish it may come soon".¹

Raghoba had come down to Malet at Cambay on 18 February² and sought his protection, as a representative of the English. Malet was responsible for having, "preserved Raghoba's person, friends and several grants of territories to the Company".³ Kero Narayan sent news on 27 February that Raghoba had arrived in Surat and that he had taken residence at Salabatpura.⁴ The chief reason for Raghoba's acquiescence in the action of the Bombay Government was his own defeat by Haripant and the Sardars were as anxious to destroy Raghoba's army as they formerly had been to help it.⁵ In the minute observed by Clavering, Monson and Francis of the Calcutta Council, of 25th February, the policies of the Bombay Government towards the Marathas were criticised and the consent of the Supreme Council at Calcutta was withdrawn.⁶

1. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, pp. 217, 218.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 16A, 67-68 (Malet to Surat. 21-2-1775).

3. Raghubir Singh, "Manuscript letter-book of Sir Charles Malet, 1780-1784", I.H.R.C.P., vol. XIV, (1937), p. 19; B.H.R.I. (1928-29), Oulgule letters, No. 34.

4. S.P.D., vol. 36, Nos. 151, 152; Khare, Adhikar Yog, pp. 23-24.

5. Kincaid, Parasnis, op. cit; vol. III, p. 112.

6. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, pp. 297-298.

CHAPTER V.

INTERNAL CONFLICTSFrom 25th February 1775 to 29th March 1778.

Haripant reported that, Raghoba when defeated was proceeding towards Bombay¹ but Raghoba arrived in Surat on 25th February 1775.² The English troops, too, arrived in Surat on 27th February and met Raghoba.³ Lieut.Col. Keating was introduced to Raghoba on 3rd March and opined that Raghoba was a man of sound judgement and clear conceptions.⁴ Haripant, anticipating what was coming, had employed the interval in organising his forces and resources and in settling the difference between himself and Mahadji.⁵ The "Revenge" and the "Bombay Grab" were attacked by Rodraji.⁶ The treaty between Raghoba and the English of Bombay for active help was contracted.⁷ The English had besieged the fort of Bassein and Saktharam had sent a strong cavalry to drive away the English.⁸ Appaji Hari and Ramaji Anant were sent against the English,⁹ and Mahta Wrijlal offered his assistance to the Marathas.¹⁰ The Governor-General on 8 March remonstrated against the Bombay Government.¹¹

1. S.P.D. Vol.36, No.158 (2-3-1775)

2. S.P.D.D. Vol.16A, 72-75 (Surat to Bombay 3-3-1775); Banerjee "Contemporary account of Anglo-Maratha War (First)," I.H.S.C.P., Vol.XI, (1945), p.51; (A statement of Ministers to Col. Ophon, later on); Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, Vol.V, Nos.1447, 1448, 1450, S.P.D. Vol.35, No.203.

3. S.P.D.D. Vol.16A, 92-93 (Keating to Bombay. 3.3.1775)

4. Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol.I, p.217 (Keating to President at Surat. 4-3-1775)

5. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol.III, p.51

6. S.P.D.D., Vol.16A, 95-96 (Bombay Consultation, 7.3.1775)

7. Mirasid, Parasnisi, op.cit., Vol.III, p.111, Forrest, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.211-213, 217.

8. S.C.P.C; Vol.IV, No.1638 (8-3-1775)

9. Sat. Sai Diar., Vol.VI, Nos.416, 417, 418.

10. Ibid, No.421

11. Sardesai, op.cit., Vol.III, p.53

On 7th night, Raghoba himself signed and fully executed the treaty and delivered it to Robert Gambier, Chief of Surat, with his own hands and he was given on the Company's part, an exact copy thereof. But the treaty on his part was written by his express directions in his language as he could not be prevailed to have done it in persian, for he alleged that it was never his custom.¹ The deposit of Raghoba's jewels as security was accepted to finalise the treaty.² Daniel Draper wrote to the Council of Bombay giving his arguments for dissent from the general policy of support to Raghoba.³ It had been decided, as early as, 12 February that if the English forces for Raghoba should consist of 80 European-artillery, 550 European Infantry, Sepoys 80, lascars 160. With their officers and non-commissioned officers, it would more than complete the number of 1500 men. The English would also send a proper and complete train of artillery and stores. Such part of this force as would go from Bombay, would set out so as to arrive at Surat bar in time for new moon-springs. All the force would be commanded by Lieut.Col. Keating.⁴ Sometime before 15 March, Raghoba set out to March with Col. Keating to Cambay.⁵ The English attacked the ministerial patrols, three miles near Surat by 1 to 3 in the night of 11 March and the English took 3 camels and about 150 horses and some men. But

1. S.P.D.D. Vol. 16 A, 108-109 (Surat to Bombay, 9-3-1775)

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. 16A, 34-35

3. Forrest, *Selections from Foreign Department*, Vol. I, pp. 388-390.

4. S.P.D.D. Vol. 16 A, 42-43 (Bombay to Surat)

5. S.P.D.D., Vol. 16 A, 128 (Surat to Bombay)

soon the guides started searing the army.¹ Shinde and Holkar, on C. 15 March, had settled the Gailwad-family dispute,² somehow.

Saldharam, on an assurance that Raghoba and his party were totally demolished after the late battle, wrote to Haripant to send Mahadji to Poona to settle his accounts with the State. Mahadji, hearing this, was deeply disgusted and having received orders from the Emperor, resolved to quit the ministers' army and was actually preparing for that purpose before he left the army.³ Tukoji did not appear warm in the ministers' cause. Patesingh's army was encamped at five or six cos distance. Haripant gave out that he intended to march his army to Malind to meet Raghoba and give a battle if the English chose that way.⁴ Keating wrote to Bombay on the necessity of an immediate supply of cash amount of five lakhs of rupees as a loan to Raghoba, on 20 March and again on 21 March, pointed out that it became necessary than before for Raghoba's force was about 40000 horse and foot and he had no cash in possession for their support.⁵

Mahadji, it was reported on 22 March, was on the previous Sunday, at Dakur with his camp. Sri Ranshodkarji, the head, came there from Dwarka and Mahadji after Darshan, left the place.⁶ He had sent his army ahead and himself proposed to

1. Ibid, Vol. 16 A, XXX-134-135 (Keating to Bombay)

2. B.H.R.I., Gulmule Letters, (1928-29), No. 35 (Terms and details.)

3. Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, 219; S.P.D.D. Vol. 16A, 188-187 (Keating to Bombay); Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol. I, p. 36

4. Forrest, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 219

5. Ibid, p. 220

6. Phalke, op.cit., Vol. II, App. III, No. 2

to follow, after his visit to the temples.¹ On the morning of 19th the ministers' army was 5 cos from this side of Kapsdwanj and 45 cos from Cambay. On the 17th the force of Baghoba was on its passage to Cambay, with Keating. A body of 50,00 horse commanded by whom not known, marched about the 17th with great number of cattle, women, carts towards the Deccan.² Mahadji had gone off, with 1200 men, before 21 March and it was certain that he would be prevailed upon to return. Haider, Gopalrao were united and were moving towards Poona.³ Tukoji was totally estranged from the party which he then apparently espoused and very little harmony subsisted amongst the other principal chiefs. Govindrao and Khanderao's forces remained aloof and amounted to 25,000 men.⁴ The heads of the ministerial auxiliaries were most of them heartily tired of supporting the pretensions of they knew not whom. The usage of Mahadji had not only drawn him from the party but must have also opened the eyes of others who could not expect better treatment in the end. The English hoped that these matters, added to their having so warmly espoused Baghoba's cause, his interest must in a short time, effectually loosen the ministerial combination.⁵

When Mahadji was visiting Dakur, Haripant wrote Naro Anand that the negotiations were still then carried on with the Gaikwads, through Mahadji. He advised Naro to raise money

1. Ibid, No.3

2. S.F.D.D., Vol.16 A, 156-157 (Keating to Bombay)

3. Ibid, Vol.16, A, 157-158 (Keating to Bombay 21-3-1775) Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, Vol.I, 24-25.

4. Ibid, Vol.16A, 141 (Millet to Surat, 23-3-22 1775)

5. Ibid, Vol.16A, 156-157 (Keating to Bombay, 21-3-1775)

from the Gaikwad's provinces for the maintenance of his army and to tighten the blockade of Surat and Broach with the help of Changoji Kadam.¹ William Hornby reported to Hastings that as the different persons that formed the ministerial party were reported to be very much divided amongst themselves and that Mahadji had actually deserted that cause and others, it was expected, would very shortly fall from these, too. The English had therefore reason to hope that Raghoba might in short time be able to reduce them all to their due obedience to him.² The ministers clamoured for the Dahak-Patti which Mahadji and Tukoji resented.³ Moroba started talking about confiscating the Jagirs of Mahadji and Patwardhan.⁴ The three ministers had written to Haripant and Parasram that they carried on well but Nana had his treaty with Moroba and therein had slightly changed certain terms. Thereafter all the amounts to be paid from the Maratha State when sanctioned by the three jointly and no body would be able to pay any thing singly.⁵ Parasram was anxious about Nana and the Peshwa.⁶ Mahadji was collecting revenue in the country round about Lonawade.⁷ Moroba wanted to bring Raghoba to Poona and even S. Saldharan would not cherish this idea and Mahadji was to be set against such a project.⁸ Mahadji was not prepared to face the English as he

1. S.P.D. Vol.36, No.177

2. Forrest, *Maratha Series*, Vol.I, 232.

3. Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, Vol.I, p.88

4. Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, p.85

5. Khare, *op.cit.*, p.75

6. *Ibid.*, p.81.

7. S.P.D., Vol.36, Nos.182, 185, 196.

8. Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, p.81

would gain nothing out of it.¹ Raghoba with the English, was in camp, at Darrab, ten miles from Cambay. Sadasaiv Sandhanira, Appaji Madhav, Sakharam Hari, Manaji Bhakle led Raghoba's army. On 21 April, by five in the afternoon, Govindrao's army of 10,000 joined the English. Raghoba's army - in all 40,000 horse and foot - was away from the ministerial army by six miles. Tukoji would not act against Raghoba and Fatesingh, too, concluded a treaty.² Haripant complained about the treachery of Govindrao, in going over to the side of Raghoba.³ He suggested to seduce the English and thus weaken Raghoba's side.⁴ Hornby promised to pay 36 lakhs of rupees to the Bombay Company.⁵ George Lovibond who had been to the confederates camp for offering treaty to Fatesingh reported that the whole army of Fatesingh had joined the Confederates.⁶ Keating on 23 left Dorab, halted at Versara, crossed the river Sabarwati and marched from Angela to Hassanlee. Raghoba wanted to seek an engagement with the ministerial army and then to proceed to Ahmedabad.⁷ Hornby even wrote to Hastings that not simply Bahadji had deserted the confederate ministers but he was assured that Bahadji had actually entered into engagements for assisting Raghoba and only waited for the first favourable opportunity to do so. Tukoji would never act against Raghoba and Fatesingh was entering into engagements with Raghoba.⁸

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25

2. *S.P.D.*, Vol. 16A, 178-180 (Keating to Bombay 19-4-1775)

3. *S.P.D.*, Vol. 36, No. 196

4. *Ibid.*

5. Khare, *Adhikar-vas*, p. 82

6. *S.P.D.*, Vol. 16 A, 221-223 (Letter to Keating, 27.4.1775)

7. *Ibid.*, Vol. 16 A, 192-194 (Keating to Bombay, 28.4.1775)

8. Forrest, *Paratha Series*, Vol. I, p. 233. (30.4.1775)

On 30 April, Keating left Hossanloo and was misdirected by the guides and came to Charwar. He was on the west bank of the river Waterie and obliged the enemy to retreat. At Marish, the ministers' army attacked a right to Raghoba's position. After two hours, it retreated. No body from the English but 50 to 60 from the ministers' army were killed. The English were handicapped by the bag and baggage and the Bazaar equipment. They intended changing the route and proceeding to Poona.¹ The President of Bombay urged on Keating to use his utmost endeavours to induce Raghoba to move towards Poona which he thought would be the most effectual means of bringing the war to a speedy issue.² The Marathas moved lightly. The English could not move without baggage and all their stores. If they did, they must become a prey to their enemy. Keating on 3rd evening intended to endeavour to prevail on Raghoba to change his route and take the road towards Poona. That would have obliged the ministers' army to follow them; consequently they must march with Bazaar, baggage etc., with them and would be equally embarrassed as the English.³ On 5th, Keating left Nowtarah, Coomtah banks of the river Shirne, being interrupted by the ministers' army. One officer of rank in the Maratha army was killed and Raghoba had 30 killed on his side. The Marathas directed shots to that quarter where Raghoba was on

1. SP.D.D. Vol. 16 A, 209-210. (Keating to Bombay, 3-5-1758)

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. 16 A, 188-190. (Bombay to Keating.)

3. Forrest, *Maratha Series*, Vol. I, p. 223

on his elephant. On 7th, Keating left Hyderabad for Marid and another engagement ensued forth. The ministerial loss was very considerable. Then Keating encamped at Deban and on 8th morning, encamped at Marid. Bhanderao joined the ministers' party. The ministers' army was defeated four times and was driven 33 English miles. Keating, however, thought himself unable to cross the Mahi before the rains, unless the cash was received. When a tax was levied on Marid, Rs.61,000 could only be collected. Raghoba promised to distribute 30 lakhs of rupees to the English officers when he would be on the throne at Poona. Two more days were spent and only Rs.5000 were recovered from Marid. The balance stood at Rs.23,000, out of which Rs.10,000 would be required for Raghoba's army to save separation and Rs.40,000 had been already paid.¹ Raghoba's jewels were re-valued at Rs.3,11,000 in all.² Keating left Marid on 14th, encamped at Puttapoor on 15th, at Beravie on 16th Anant Wogree and reached Napor on the 17th.³ At Napor, in the battle of Malinpada, Maridast defeated the English and Raghoba.⁴ Next, the battle of Arvas was fought.⁵

Saldharam's son was dead and Bayu suspected of witchcraft.⁶ Hostyn was sent on 24 May as special deputy to Raghoba's army and Durbar, to counsel him well to proceed to Poona. The

1. S.P.D.D. Vol. 16A, 216-221 (Keating to Bombay); Forrest, *Marathas* Series, Vol. I, p. 224.
 2. *Ibid.* Vol. 16A, 214-216 (17-5-1775. Surat to Bombay)
 3. *Ibid.* Vol. 16A, 223-231 (Keating to Bombay)
 4. Khare, *Adhikar-vog*, pp. 26-27, Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sanshodhan* Vol. V, Nos. 1462, 1464.
 5. S.P.D.D. Vol. 16A, 223-231; B.H.R.I. (1928-29) No. 89
 6. B.H.R.I. (1928-29) No. 89 (22-5-1775)

The Company had lost confidence in Keating.¹ "Whenever it might be resolved and agreed between Raghoba and Mostyn to march, to encamp or to make any other movement with the army, Mostyn was to signify the same to the commanding officer of Company's forces in writing and he was ordered to obey". Keating marched to Ahmedabad", which was the opposite route to Poona"². Mahadji marched to Ujjain, as per the report of Haripant on 24 May³. Hastings wrote to Bombay that duty imposed him the painful necessity of declaring that the English Council at Calcutta totally condemned the measure which the Bombay Government had adopted, that they held the treaty which Bombay Government had entered into with Raghoba invalid and the war which Bombay Government had entered into against the Maratha State, impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised and unjust. Both were expressly contrary to the late Acts of the Parliament. Bombay had imposed on its behalf the charge of conquering the whole Maratha Empire for a man who appeared incapable of affording it any effective assistance in it; instead of sising at a decisive contest, portended an indefinite scene of troubles without an adequate force, without money, or certain resources to extricate company from him, nor has the Company plea either of injury sustained from the party which it had its enemy or of any prior obligation to defend the man whose case it had espoused.⁴ Nawab Asaf-ud-daula wrote to the Governor-General, that Raghoba had sought friendship and support from the Governor-General.⁵

1. S.P.D.D. vol.16A, 203 (Instructions to Mostyn, 24-5-1775).

2. S.P.D.D. vol.16 A, 206-206.

3. S.P.D. vol.36, Nos.218,227.

4. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, p.238 (31-5-1775).

5. C.P.C. vol.IV, No.1316.

But the Governor-General condemned the Bombay measures and opened negotiations with the ministers.¹ Keatinge cantoned at Bhadoch and Haripant, keeping some army for Gujarat, cantoned in Ramesh.²

The Marathas had declared the economic blockade of Bombay, in June 1775³ and the Supreme Council advised the Bombay Government instant cessation of arms and a confirmation of Company's possessions of the island of Salsette and Bassein; but the Company not to aim at more extensive acquisitions nor conclude any definite treaty without the approbation of the Calcutta Council.⁴ The Governor-General requested Sakharan to stop the hostilities for the deputation of a proper man for the consideration of treaty.⁵ Haripant had retired from Gujarat, sometime before 20 June.⁶ The Peshwa declared Raghoji Khosle, the Sena Sahab Subha⁷ and Nana wrote to Raghoji that because he was insisting on a special letter from the Peshwa, declaring his new title, Nana would send it forthwith.⁸ In the rains, Shinde and Holkar were silent observers when the English occupied Gujarat. When the ministers enquired about it, they simply connived at it.⁹ In June, Mahadji was keeping good relations with the ministers but Nana himself seemed to have some misgivings. So Mahadji informed Nana of his having deputed Baro Shankar to Poona as his envoy.¹⁰

1. S.P.D.D., Vol. 16A, 298-299 (Fort William to Bombay, 31-5-1775)

2. S.P.D.D., Vol. 16A, 279-281; Khare, Adhikar-yog, p. 28

3. Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, Vol. V, No. 1470

4. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, Vol. I, 393-394.

5. Ibid, p. 394

6. S.P.D.D., Vol. 16A, 244-245 (Sarat to Bombay)

7. Sardesai, Itihasik Patra-vyavar, No. 147

8. Ibid, No. 148 (28-5-1775)

9. Khare, Adhikar-yog, p. 28, S.P.D. vol. 36, No. 243.

10. Sardesai, H.P.V.S. No. 13 (28-5-1775)

Dowlatrao who was some months ago in Govindrao's service, quitted Baroda when it was attacked, to join Raghuba, but went towards Poona and stopped at Tangread (100 Cos from Surat, 20 from Poona, 20 from Songur) with 4000 horse, and he was joined by 15,000 horse separated from Maripant after the surprising of his camp at Bawa Peer and also by all the troops in the neighbourhood, except 1000 horse at Fort Verah (30 Cos from Surat, also some from Songur) which were also expected to join him shortly.¹

The explanation forwarded by the Bombay Government was not accepted by the Governor-General and the despatch of Col. Upton to Poona was announced.² Patesingh after parting with Maripant continued to amuse Raghuba with promises of submitting himself and by that means found an opportunity of throwing himself in Baroda with a few of his best horse.³ In the first fortnight of July, Patesingh negotiated with Raghuba for a treaty.⁴ The ministers at Poona charged Mahadji for all the past sabotages and failures but Shivaji Babaji supported Mahadji's case well enough and Sindkheda was even transferred to Mahadji, in the first fortnight of July.⁵ The affairs between Patwardhan and the Raja of Kolhapur were taking a bad turn and

1. S.P.D.D. Vol. 16A, 275-277 (6-7-1775) (Surat to Bombay)

2. S.P.D.D. Vol. 16 B, 351-352 (Bengal to Bombay, 10-7-1775),
C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 1896, Khare, Adhikar-vat, pp. 28-29, C.P.C.
Vol. IV, Nos. 1881, 1895 (12-7-1775), Khare, Atishayik Lekha
Samgraha, Vol. V, No. 1489.

3. S.P.D.D. Vol. 16A, 275-276 (Surat to Bombay, 13-7-1775)

4. Khare, op.cit., Vol. V, No. 1485

5. Khare, op.cit., Vol. V, No. 1487

and Yashwantrao Shinde wrote to Komrao proposing to execute the terms of agreement contracted at Purnanar in consultation with Bana, Bapu and other persons concerned.¹ On 18th July, it was reported that Patesingh joined Baghoba.² Bana and Bapu were displeased with Mahadji who now requested Pandurang Patwardhan to reconcile him to them. Bana had paid 15 lakhs of rupees to Baghoba and some to Mahadji also but he had found that all the payment was of no avail.³ Baghoba intended on 31 July to proceed to Dhar to meet his newly born son. Mahadji was at Ujjain and Baghoba's Vakil had approached him again.⁴ The Governor-General requested Baghoba to listen to Col. Upton's intended proposals⁵ and it was suggested that Baghoba should write a letter to Hyder asking him not to molest Dilerkhan Dilar Jang's interests.⁶ The Bombay company was, too, explicitly ordered not to compel the Marathas to declare war.⁷ Bana collected a special tax -E Halka Musam- from all, by about 8th August, along with one year's income from all inams, tainats and Votans, and from the merchants was collected. Ten per cent income tax i.e., Dahak Patti was collected from the citizens. All Sardars along with Mahadji collected money on all these items and handed it over to the State. But Tukoji hesitated. It was finally settled at 9 lakhs of rupees for him. Hearing that Mahadji was to get ten lakhs

1. Shinde Shahi Balkarne, S.H.S., Vol. II, No. 368

2. S.P.D., Vol. 16A, 282-283 (Meeting to Bombay)

3. Khare, op.cit., Vol. V, No. 1494 (12-7-1775) Khare, Adhikar, p. 35

4. S.P.D., Vol. 36, 251.

5. S.P.D., Vol. IV, No. 1898

6. S.P.D., Vol. IV, No. 1912 (Aug. 1775)

7. Sardesai, Kayasthas Patra, No. 236

of rupees worth jagir and Ashirgad, he also demanded ten lakhs of rupees Jagir and some good fort. The ministers told him to work like Mahadji and explained that nothing had been paid to Mahadji, yet then. Fatesingh, when he paid 18 lakhs of rupees as Nazar, was favoured against Govindrao for the chiefship of the Gaikwad estates. Naro Shankar's sons were also directed to pay 10 lakhs of rupees as Nazar to the State and to divide their ancestral jagir amongst them.¹

Raghoba's family was at Dhar and Ruuf Khan and the son of late Sumer Singh were within forty cos of that place with 4,000 horse, on their way to join Raghoba. Mahadji wrote to the ministers that he would go to the Deccan after the rains; and so did Mudhoji and the Nizam, provided some territory would be ceded to them. Naripent was in the Sandwa country (which belonged to Holkar) 100 cos from Raghoba.² Raghoba by about 16 August, still carried on intrigues with Wanaaji and Mahadji trying to wean Mahadji off,³ from the ministers' party. On 17 August, Holkar had already been to the Deccan and was reconciled to the ministers. He presented himself before the Peshwa and his accounts were settled.⁴ Nana gave the hint that Pandurangrao should not put in a word for Mahadji, as Mahadji had, in the name of his army, collected the funds from Poona, but never had proportionate army.⁵ The cessation of hostilities was officially declared on 18 August, as per the result of the correspondence between all concerned.⁶ Perhaps Mahadji and

1. Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, p.64

2. S.P.D., Vol. 16A, 294-296 (12-8-1775)

3. S.P.D., Vol. 36, No. 257

4. Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, pp. 33-36

5. Khare, *Itihasik Lokna Sangraha*, Vol. V, No. 1502

6. S.P.D., Vol. 16B, 304-306 (consultation to Hastings), pp. 310-311 (Peshwa Mahavarao to President, 9-8-1775); *op.cit.*, pp. 310-311 (W. Hastings to Sakharam) *op.cit.*, pp. 310-313 (Bombay to Hastings 10-8-1775)

Tukoji had decided to join the winning party.¹ The Nawab of Arcot forwarded his claim that the treaty of Upton should include the exemption of Chowth from the Carnatic and he requested the Governor-General that Col. Upton should see him on his way to Poona.² Dhowse, under the orders from the Nawab Ali Khan also wrote about Raghoba-English relations to the Nawab of Surat.³ Mahadji had forwarded several of his demands to the Poona ministry and finally a settlement between him and the ministers took place on the following lines on 10 September, 1775.

(1) Jagirs of five lakhs of rupees per year will be given to Mahadji.

(2) Mahadji was not in a position to pay a bill of 8½ lakhs of rupees to Lakshman Naik Chabukwar. The ministers agreed to pay four lakhs of rupees thereof.

(3) Mahadji had no place where he could accommodate his family safely. The ministers agreed to give him one fort for that purpose.

(4) The Ministers proposed to settle the due accounts of his.

(5) Mahadji was to be given separate sanctions for the villages and the grass lands. Mahadji agreed to oppose Raghoba and his Sardar, Rajaram Govind. Mahadji was expected to cross the Narbada and see the Peshwa personally, in the specified time-limit.⁴

1. Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol. V, No. 1506 (22-8-1775)

2. C.P.C., Vol. IV, Nos. 1915, 1918 (26-8-1775)

3. C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 1925

4. Sardesai, *H.P.H.S.*, No. 14

The clothes of honour were received from Mahadji and Tukoji for the infant Peshwa, his mother and Lady Parvatibai.¹

Half the revenues of the Mahals of Kenwar, Kotapad, Satwas, Rajor and Harangan were assigned in Saranjam to Mahadji. The remaining half was given to Tukoji Holkar, in the same style.²

Sakharam thanked the Governor-General on his disapproval of the plan of the Bombay Government and the withdrawing of the forces and that he had his representative already despatched for a treaty with the Maratha State.³ Sakharam was informed, prior to 20 September that Col. Upton would be that representative.⁴ Sir Edward Hughes hinted, in his secret and confidential letter to the Governor-General about the impending conspiracy of the Marathas, the Nizam and Hyder against the English, as he was told about it by the Nawab of An Arcot and suggested to treat the Marathas, at once, with the sword. He pointed out that the Nizam was the guiding spirit of the said conspiracy and that he had never any affection for the English.⁵

The pretender of Sadashivrao was removed to Patnagiri on 30 September 1775. Sakharam sent the passport to Upton in October⁷ and informed the Bombay Company that the Marathas had stopped the hostilities.⁸ The Peshwa presented ornaments to

1. Sat. Raj. Diar., Vol. IV, No. 251

2. Ibid., No. 282

3. C.P.C., Vol. IV, Nos. 1944, 1945 (18-9-1775) (For Hana)

4. Ibid., No. 1948

5. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, p. 446 (30-9-1775)

6. Khare, op. cit., Vol. V, Nos. 1520, 1521.

7. C.P.C., Vol. IV No. 1982

8. Ibid., No. 1959, (1-10-1775)

Raghoji's first wife, on the occasion of their marriage, (as the price to induce him to join the ministers' party).¹ The Governor-General informed the Nizam that Upton would be passing through his territory.² On 8th October, Mahadji's army was at Chincholi and Tukoji was at Talegaon. The Peshwa wrote to Bhivrao Yashwant that the orders were issued to Mahadji, Tukoji and Raste to join him. Bhivrao Yashwant was despatched against the Pretender.³

Sakharam informed the Governor-General that the Bombay Government had not stopped the hostilities.⁴ The Nawab of Arcot wanted himself to be the mediator of the English treaty with the Marathas and desired to exclude the Nizam and Hyder from the said treaty.⁵ On 22nd October, Tukoji had written to Jalam Singhji to pay up Rs.78,000 due to Mahadji.⁶ The Nawab of Arcot pointed out to include the question of the Carnatic Chowth in the treaty.⁷ Sakharam was not fully aware of the status of Upton and hence, he was declared as accredited plenipotentiary and was vested with the full powers to conclude a treaty between the Company and the Peshwa.⁸ Sakharam and Mann as per the request from the Governor-General asked all to stop the hostilities.⁹ Raghoba, however, showed his surprise to the Governor-General at his order of stopping all the hostilities.¹⁰ Muhammad Yusuf was arrested.¹¹ There was also reason to believe

1. Sardesai, *Itihasik Patravayabar*, No. 149 (3-10-1775)

2. C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 1984 (8-10-1775)

3. S.P.D., Vol. 36, No. 319

4. C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 1974 (13-10-1775)

5. C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 1978 (14-10-1775)

6. *Ibid.*, op. cit., Vol. II, No. 81

7. C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 2008

8. C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 2011

9. *Ibid.*, No. 2022, 2023 (26-10-1775)

10. *Ibid.*, No. 2024 (27-10-1775)

11. Sardesai, *Itihasik Patravayabar*, No. 150 (31-10-1775)

that the Nawab of Arcot was tampering with the ministers' party and the Nizam to the prejudice of the English and he had lately written to the latter, observing to him how the English took Bengal, Arcot etc., and should, they be, therefore, suffered to place Saghoba in Poona, the riches of that town must fall in the hands, all the powers and countries from Calcutta to Cape Camorin must be subject to the English, therefore, then was the time to frustrate them and that he might depend, they would, be both on the Nizam and himself in a short time.¹

Adams, an English surgeon in Hyder's service reported that Hyder had observed that the English were good for nothing, deceitful people who did not mind breaking any firm agreement and that their assistance was of no value.² Shah Alam had at Abdul Ahad Khan's instigation written to Taysar in October, inviting him to his assistance and proposed a double marriage between their children.³ The Emperor had called Anaf-ud-Daula to come and punish Zabita Khan.⁴ It was hinted by Sala Us to Mir Nishta Ali that the Marathas were entering into an alliance with the English and that the Nasir's territory would be devastated.⁵ The English had stopped paying the Bengal tribute and protests were raised against the Governor-General's invitation to Ghazi-ud-din to Calcutta.⁶ Sakharan, again complained to the Governor-General that the Bombay Government had not withdrawn the troops.⁷ The Nawab of Arcot was informed by the Governor-General that Chambers was accompanying Upton to Poona

1. G.P.O., Vol. 16B, 452-453 (31-10-1775)

2. *ibid.*

3. Bishu N.K., *op.cit.*, I.H.Q. Vol. X, (1934) p. 635

4. G.P.O., Vol. IV No. 2032 (Nov. 1775)

5. G.P.O., Vol. IV, No. 2030 (Nov. 1775)

6. G.P.O., Vol. IV, No. 2034 (6-11-1775)

7. G.P.O., Vol. IV, No. 2041 (8-11-1775)

to settle the Carnatic Chowth problem.¹ Clevering, Monson, Francis, the members of the Supreme Council of Calcutta found it necessary to address separately to the Court of Directors, defending the pacific policy towards the Marathas.² The Nizam had demanded thirty lakhs of rupees worth jagir from the ministers and his terms were accepted by them.³ Chait Singh of Benares was informed of the recall of Col. Muir and the appointment of Col. Goddard to succeed him in command of the detachment at Chunar, by the Governor-General.⁴ The Bombay Government protested against the Supreme Government to the Court.⁵ Anandibai had been to Surat (after the birth of Bajirao II at Dhar on 10-1-1775) to see Raghoba but when cessation of fire was declared due to Upton's setting out for Poona, she returned to Dhar, collected army and organised disturbances at Bhilsa and other places. Rhanderao Pawar, at this time was sympathising with the cause of Raghoba in these quarters.⁶

Abaji Mahadev had been to see Mahadji on 25 November.⁷ The Nawab of Oudh cherished projects on Delhi and Najaf Khan concluded peace with the Rajputs receiving three lakhs of rupees, keeping eight lakhs of rupees more in balance from them. A confederacy of the Jat and Najaf Khan and the Goswami who had invited the Marathas was most dreaded.⁸ A vakil from Bijesingh, Raja of Marwar, had promised help to Raghoba. The Raja was encamped

1. C.P.C., Vol. IV No. 2046 (18-11-1775)

2. C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 461 (21-11-1775)

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. V, No. 1541 (27-11-1775)

4. C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 2024 ((28-11-1775)

5. S.P.D., Vol. 16B, 557-558 (28-11-1775)

6. *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 2, 19.

7. S.P.D., Vol. V, No. 82

8. Forrest, *Selections from Foreign Department*, Vol. I, p. 438.

Within 45 cos from Ahmedabad with 1000 men.¹ Sakharan informed Keating that Raghoba received Vakil from Bachoba who declared that his master would join Raghoba in Khandesh with 5000 troops. Appaji Mahadev residing with Mahadji at Ujjain wrote to Raghoba that Mahadji publicly had sworn to his support and desired Appaji to inform Raghoba that if the English helped him, he would join with a large body or if not, requested Raghoba to retire with army to Ujjain where the necessary measures would be determined.² The Governor-General denied to the Emperor that he had corresponded with Ghazi-ud-din on 8 December.³ Secret vakils from Moroba, Appa Rao Patankar, Maloji Ghorpade, Vissaji Pant Biniwale, Chinto Vithal, Vithal Shivdev, Raghupatras were despatched to Raghoba and Keating.⁴ Mahadji Ballal wrote to Nana that a settlement of compensation and of saranjam to Bhikhan Khan who was won over from the side of Raghoba by Mahadji, should be effected without any loss of time.⁵ Col. Upton was at Bhopal and was not getting the passport from the Peshwa, whereupon the Governor-General expressed his surprise.⁶ But finally, Upton could cross the Nerbada and all arrangements were made by Naro Krishna for his safe journey and he was given funds till his cheques would be cashed at Aurangabad. He passed through the Ghats of Kasarbari on 11 December 1775.⁷

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.16B, 557-559 (28-11-1775)

(2) Ibid, 567-568 (29-11-1775)

(3) C.P.C., Vol.IV, No.2069

(4) S.P.D.D., Vol.16B, 591-592 (Keating to Bombay. 8-12-1775)

(5) S.P.D.D., Vol.36, No.280 (8-12-1775)

(6) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.17

(7) S.P.D.D., Vol.36, No.281 (11-12-1775), Khare, op.cit., Vol.V, No.1550.

Appaji Mahadeo who had been to Mahadji to negotiate terms of Raghoba returned, bringing with him about 2000 horse, 700 of whom were a chosen body under the command of Biraji Kadam, lately in the service of Mahadji.¹ Col. Upton's arrival at Purandar was reported by him to the Bombay Government on 30 December 1775.²

The Maratha Chiefs had formed the fixed determination in their minds of taking vengeance on the ill-fated Raghoba but Mahadji by his manly and generous feelings, diverted them from their head-long and cruel purposes, so that the matter was managed mercifully and kindly.³ Gangoji Awad, Hana's huzrya with Mahadji, wrote on 3 January 1776 to Haripant informing him of the intention of Mahadji and Tukoji to go to the Deccan.⁴ Tukoji wrote to Hana that he was starting for the Deccan, as desired and had sent a word also to Mahadji and that both would try to set out immediately. Tukoji pointed out that the Maratha State had grown always on the goodwill of the master and service on the part of the Holkars - service in the form of protection of Gods and the Brahmins.⁵ The terms of the treaty were being discussed at Purandar.⁶ Naro Shivdev from Mahadji's court had written that the Sardars had sent army for Jhansi and that they had set out for the Deccan.⁷ But the Governor-General was surprised, about

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- (1) S.P.D.B., Vol.16B, 597-598 (consultation 22-12-1775)
 - (2) S.P.D.B., Vol.17, 7-8 (Upton to Bombay 30-12-1775)
 - (3) *Tarikh-i Ibrahim Khan*, Elliot, Vol.VIII, p.296
 - (4) S.P.D.B., Vol.V, No.83.
 - (5) *Holkarsahi Itihassachi Sadhana*, Vol.I, No.74 (6-1-1776)
 - (6) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, Nos.1764, 1769, 1792, 1803 (10-1-1776); Khare, *Adhikar Yog*, pp. 31-32.
 - (7) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, No.1761.

13 January to find that Sakharan had ordered the intercepting of the English vessels on the Malabar Coast.¹ The Maratha forces had marched into Gujarat by about 14 January 1776.² Gopalrao Ganesh from the wazir requested the Governor-General to write about the matters connected with Raghoba.³ Khanderao Trimbak Odhekar wrote on 31st to Shamrao Bapu asking him to inform Nana and Sakharan that Anandibai did not agree to move from Dhar to the Deccan and that she was being persuaded to accept the proposal but that it was very difficult to fathom her real intentions.⁴ Mahadji desiring to have matrimonial alliance with the high-born Maratha families, insisted on demanding a daughter of one Tanpura Patil Bahurikar. The Patil took the girl to some other place, with the effect that chowkies were now set, in February, on the house of Tanpure.⁵ Shinde and Holkar only wrote about setting out for the Deccan but actually waited for the Purandar treaty being ratified. The ministers were even on the point of sending out expedition against them.⁶

The Governor-General informed Mudhoji on 15 February that the hostilities in the Deccan were suspended⁷ and replied same to Raghoba's letter of 27 December 1775, on 15 February 1776.⁸ Sakharan expressed his hopes to the

(1) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.18

(2) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, Nos.1766, 1767.

(3) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.24 (22-1-1776)

(4) *Shindeeshahi Rajkarne*; Vol.II, No.389 (31-1-1776)

(5) S.P.D., Vol.43, No.49 (7-2-1776)

(6) Khare, *op.cit.*; Vol.V, No.1793 (Second fortnight - Feb.1776)

(7) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.54

(8) *Ibid.*, No.64.

Governor-General that peace would be established.¹ But the English showed anxiety enough to retain the possession of Bassein and Salsette while the negotiations were proceeding.² The Peshwa despatched army against Anandibai at Dhar; and Mahadji and Tukoji had defeated the Rohillas.³ The Jats were on good terms with the Marathas when the Rohillas attacked them and they solicited help from Mahadji and Tukoji. The Sardars had despatched the army, too. The Marathas and the Jats finally defeating the Rohillas, captured ten elephants, seven or eight cannons and the Rohilla army was completely routed.⁴ On 27 February Tukoji was expected to join the main Maratha army at Khodavi Kobali.⁵

The treaty of Purandar was executed on 1st March 1776.⁶ The Company abandoned the cause of Raghoba and stipulated through Col. Upton that the English would not help him.⁷ Warren Hastings then wrote to a friend that he was disappointed and that he disapproved the treaty.⁸ The signing of the treaty was announced by Upton to the Bombay Government on 2 March and the Bombay Government wrote to Upton on 11th that Raghoba was not accepting the terms.

(1) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.72

(2) S.P.D.D., Vol.17, 126-130 (Bombay to Upton. 25 Feb. 1776)

(3) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, No.1814

(4) *Ibid*, No.1814

(5) Sardesai, *Itihasik Patravysahar*, No.153

(6) Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, Vol.I, p.57; Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, Nos.1822, 1842; S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 642-649; Vol.17, 136-140 (Upton to Bombay); Parmnis, *Itihasik Tipani*, VI.43; Forrest, *Maratha Series*, Vol.I, p.277; Forrest, *Selections from The State Papers of Governor-General of India, W.Hastings*, Vol.I, 143; C.P.C., Vol.V, No.665.

(7) Pandurang Pissurlawar, "Some unknown dealings between Raghoba and the Portuguese", *I.H.R.C.P.*, Vol.XI, (1928), p.124.

(8) Forrest, *Selections from the State Papers of Governor-General - W.Hastings*, Vol.I, 143.

Raghoba even appealed to the King of England on 16 March.¹ Raghoba started his usual game in all directions, writing, protesting, appealing not only to the British authorities of Bombay, Calcutta, London but even seducing powerful Maratha Chiefs such as Mahadji and Tukoji from their allegiance to Poona.² Raghoba asked the Chief of the Portuguese navy Joze Sanches de Brito, when he was sailing to Surat in March 1776, to receive him in the ship and take him to the capital of Goa. The Portuguese admiral, however, very sagaciously refused to comply with his request in spite of the offers of lakhs of rupees that were made to him, suggesting to him, that if he left his army which still followed him, it would join the enemy's rank. Raghoba then wrote to the Governor of Daman to give him hospitality in that place and also wrote to the Portuguese Viceroy in April 1776 asking the help of troops, ammunition, war material and refuge in Daman, promising in exchange to grant to the Portuguese Government the territories of the north and some parganas near Daman. Ramohandra Narayan and Appaji Ramchandra for Raghoba forwarded the terms to the Portuguese through the Director of the Portuguese in Surat, Jeronimo Ribesiro Neves.³

Anandibai devastated Bhelsa and the adjacent parganas.

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- (1) S.F.D.D., Vol.17, 136-140, 170-172, 177-178, 176-177.
 (2) Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol.III, p.58.
 (3) Pandurang Pissurlencar, op.cit., I.H.R.C.P., Vol.XI, (1928), p.124.

collecting her own army and hence, the son of Trimbak Sadashiv and Visaji Govind were despatched with 4000 army.¹ Mahadji and Gopal Sambhaji were ordered to send two pieces of cannon each to Khanderao Trimbak who was opening up campaign against Anandibai. Anandibai asked Sakharan on 4 March, either to arrange for her journey to meet her husband or for her, then current, expenses at Dhar or at any other place, she was wanted to go and stay. It was unfortunate, she declared that she should be obliged to beg in that way.² Sakharan was of the opinion that the past was to be forgotten and that the ministers should then reconcile with Raghoba, the English and Mahadji. But actually Mana and Sakharan alone contracted the treaty with the English while Shinde, Holkar and Bhonsle were not so much insisting on it.³ On 7 March, the Governor-General suggested measures for the Bombay Government to prosecute war, in case of failure of Upton's negotiations; and he further, wrote to the Nizam, Hyder, Mudhoji, Mahadji and Tukoji to engage their assistance or at least their neutrality in the, then present, war; the two first of these chiefs would receive applications to the same effect from St. George and the Supreme Court at Calcutta ordered their Resident at the Court of Oudh to open negotiations with

(1) Khare, op.cit., Vol.V, No.1814.

(2) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.390.

(3) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.67.

the two last and if they should concur heartily with the English, he was authorised on their solicitations for assistance from the English to grant them the aid of three battalions of sepoys to co-operate in any military operation which they might recommend and be disposed to engage in for the service of Raghoba.¹

The Peshwa protested to Upton about 7th March, against Raghoba's securing asylum in Bombay² and pressed that, "if Raghoba would not live at Kopergaon, the English should separate their army from him and no Englishman would assist him for the future".³ Col. Upton informed Raghoba on 10 March that the offer of peace had been rejected by the ministers at Poona who had declared their intention of renewing war and that the Bombay Government, too, was informed to prepare for war against Poona.⁴ In the second fortnight of March, the Pretender at Ratnagiri was released by Paranjpe.⁵ Hastings wrote on 21 March, "I never approved of the treaty with Raghoba nor the precipitate measure of the war undertaken without a force or treasure to support it, without a plan of conduct and with little necessity and less profit to require it, but as it is almost impossible to withdraw from a war before the conclusion of it with honour or safety; had it rested with me, I would have directed to prosecute their original design by escorting Raghoba to Poona

(1) Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol.I, p.275.

(2) S.P.D.D., Vol.17, 258-259.

(3) Ibid.

(4) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.79.

(5) Khare, op.cit., No.1830.

and to get clear of the war as soon as they could with honour and safety".¹ It was again pointed out that Sakharas was doubly treacherous.² Hastings insisted on considering the capture of Salsette as an act of necessity and of good policy, nor inconsistent with the most rigid principles of political justice.³

The Peshwa settled the affairs of Hingane and expected Mahadji to pay him amounts sanctioned by the State, in his next Hindustan campaign.⁴ Mahadji on 26 March was told by Sakharas not to harass the jagirs of other Sardars namely Vithal Sheshadri, Ramchandra Bhagwant, Janardan Appaji, Brinivas Sheshadri and Ravaloji Nimbalkar.⁵ Mahadji wrote to Nana on 28 March that he was despatching Sadashiv Dinkar to explain his attitude. This cleared, of course, any misunderstanding that subsisted between Nana and Mahadji.⁶ By about 25th, Sadoba, the Pretender of Sadashivrao, was acknowledged at Ratnagiri and had Durlabh's fleet under him. Even Haripant's brother was on his side. George Dick from the Bankot factory applied for help to the Bombay Government to carry out the repairs.⁷ Beniram Pandit of Nagpore enquired as to when he should start for Calcutta.⁸

(1) Gleig, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, p.33.

(2) S.P.D.D., Vol.17, 206-207. (Bombay to Court.)

(3) Gleig, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, p.33. (21-3-1776).

(4) Hingane Daptar, Vol.II, No.86. (23-3-1776).

(5) Shindechahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.5.

(6) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.15.

(7) S.P.D.D., Vol.17, 239, (Dick to Bombay), 253-255.

(8) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.98 (31-3-1776).

Nana established a secret understanding with Mahadji with the effect that the high-command of the army was to be vested in Mahadji and Nana would retain the Phadnishi of the Maratha State. They would always treat each other as brothers.¹ Sakharam still pointed out to the English the terms on which peace might be established.² Bhavanrao Pratinidhi was suspected of treachery and this was soon to compel the ministers to open the Karwar Campaign.³ Several Maratha chiefs joined Sadoba by about 5 April and Sadoba had now a considerable army under him. Sadoba desired the office of Regent either for himself or jointly with Raghoba, in the minority of the Peshwa.⁴ Mahadji, on 6th, informed Nana of his march being delayed by the unrest in Mewar, caused by his son-in-law, Bahirji Tapkir.⁵ It was arranged that Mahadji would cross ^{the} Rewa and Bahirji would start on the campaign and hence military equipment was sent to him. He, however, treacherously, mismanaged so that Dhansing Pagya had to return. This misbehaviour had detained Mahadji for two days. Again, nothing was heard of Raghoba and so Mahadji had written about a conjuncture with Haripant against Raghoba and waited for the reply. Mahadji expressed his eagerness to reach Poona as early as possible.⁶ Raghoba set intrigues with Moroba⁶ and Mahadji.⁷

(1) Khare, *Life of Nana*, pp.49-50.

(2) *G.P.C.*, Vol.V, No.100. (1-4-1776).

(3) *Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane*, VI, 42. (5-4-1776).

(4) *S.P.B.D.* Vol.17, 235. (Bombay to Court. 5-4-1776); Khare *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, Vol.V, No.1837.

(5) Sardesai, *H.P.M.S.*, No.16.

(6) *Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane*, V, 12.

(7) *Ibid*, 14.

The Governor-General gave orders to the President of Fort St. George and to the C-in-C of the English forces in the Province of Oudh to co-operate in the execution of Raghoba's design and particularly to form connections with the Kizam, Hyder, Mahadji, Tukoji and Mudhoji for the support of his cause and informed Raghoba of these movements.¹ On 12 April the Resident at Bankot reported to Bombay Government that Buchoba Purandare and Moroba were in favour of Sadoba and that Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Pant were ordered by the ministers to go against him.² Hirji Nagsore, serving under Mahadji was confidential with Raghoba privately and it was not known whether he was there of his own accord or Raghoba had persuaded Mahadji to send him, thither. The English had not respected the Purandar treaty and they supported Raghoba with forces.³ Dhansha was routed by Tukoji on his way to Purandar by about 27 April.⁴

The Nawab of Oudh received investiture as the Nazir of the Empire. His minister was murdered but by the approach of the rains the Marathas were expected to be inactive and so the wazir was cherishing vigorous plans.⁵ John Bristow wrote on 10 April that the Marathas expressed an inclination for peace but however, it was judged necessary to guard against the worst and therefore Mahboob was ordered to reach

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.17, 265. (G.G. to Raghoba. 12-4-1776).

(2) S.P.D.D., Vol.17, 275. (13-4-1776).

(3) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 329-330. (26-4-1776).

(4) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, No.1840.

(5) Forrest, *Selections from Foreign Department*, Vol.1, 512. (29-4-1776).

Kalpi and there, to remain until further orders.¹ By about 30 April, the Marathas were facing Keating in Gujarat.² Raghoba's Vakil had left Calcutta on 1st May.³ John Bristow was mediating peace between the Wazir and the Marathas.⁴ The Peshwa had told Upton that Raghoba's army must quit Surat and Broach within 15 days.⁵ On 14th, the Parandar treaty which was officially signed, was sent to the Governor-General.⁶ Sadoba was preparing to march to Kolhapur and to threaten the power of Nana. Ramechandra Naik and Ramechandra Ganesh had collected ten to twelve thousand army against him.⁷ By about 16th May, Mahadji was still at Ujjain.⁸ Nana complained on 17th May that the Bombay Government was assisting Raghoba.⁹ On 18th, Manaji Shinde wrote to Nana and Haripant that he was prepared to submit his forces to the services of the Peshwa.¹⁰ Mahadji, on c.27th May, started from Ujjain¹¹ and was marching towards the Deccan by about 5th June 1776.¹²

The approbation and support of the Supreme Council at Calcutta were, after a stormy debate, gained only by the casting vote of Hastings who owing to the death of General

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- (1) Forrest, *Selections from Foreign Department*, Vol.I, p.516.
 - (2) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, No.1841.
 - (3) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.147.
 - (4) Forrest, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, 521.
 - (5) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.148. (4-5-1776).
 - (6) *Ibid.*, No.156.
 - (7) B.F.D.D., Vol.17A, 366-367.
 - (8) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, No.1843.
 - (9) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.162.
 - (10) *Shindeshahi Rajkarne*, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.6.
 - (11) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.V, Nos.1846, 1847, 1849.
 - (12) *Ibid.*

Clavering had recovered his ascendancy in the Council. Francis and Wheeler condemned the resolution as illegal, unjust and impolitic. they argued that it was unjust because it was contrary to the Treaty of Purandar and impolitic because it involved the English in the dangers and burdens of war; Hastings and Barwell argued that the emergency justified the illegality; that it was not contrary to the Treaty because the principal person with whom the Treaty had been made, had proposed it; and that it was not impolitic because it would give the English permanent influence in the Maratha empire. After considerable discussion and minutes of considerable ability and force had been dictated and read at the Council Board both by Francis and Hastings, the resolutions were passed¹. On the Maratha side, Mahadji wrote to Nana on 4th June of his having understood all the details from Sadashiv Raghunath deputed by the latter.²

Raghoba complained that Col. Upton had never gone to him. He had sent his two representatives, Madhursao Gopal and Sheorao but Col. Upton just acted as his enemies desired.³ Ahalyabai wrote on 10th to Tukoji, "you could have, all decently and conveniently delayed payments, due on account of Diwan-Dane, after Shinde had paid it. You should always follow the policy of the late Subhedar Malharji in upholding the interests of the master and preserving one's own prestige".⁴

1. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, Intro, ii. XLix.

2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.17.

3. C.P.C. vol.V, No.198.

4. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhana, vol.I, No.79.

Haripant ordered his Vakil at Surat to retire, and Sadoba's Vakils arrived in Bombay on 17th June. The Bombay Government asked for explanation from Col. Keating for the amount of 26 lakhs of rupees which he received from Patesing.¹ Mahadji and Tukoji now gave their own terms to the ministers and there were signs of revolt everywhere in the konkan.²

Mahadji had demanded the Asheri Fort and a Jagir which Moroba promised. Moroba told so, to Sakharam, too. Shinde was joined by Haripant at Moreswar.³ Sakharam, too met Shinde and Haripant.⁴ Mahadji wrote to Parashuram Patwardhan why he could not see him at Jejuri and finally Shinde, Haripant and Patwardhan met together but dispersed, after two hours talk, due to heavy rains. Next day, marching ahead for 3 cos, Shinde came to Lonand. Patwardhan insisted on clarifying intrigues demanding explanation whether Moroba supported Raghoba and doubted that Moroba, Sakharam and Raghoba acted as one party. But it was accepted by all that Sakharam would lead the State. Shinde, however, wrote a message to Patwardhan that the visit with Sakharam had been postponed; and that he should immediately join Shinde. So he proceeded to the bank of the Nira but Moroba in his own way, suspected alliance against him as Sakharam, too, was to proceed. Moroba insisted that when Shinde had come

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 423-425, 429.

(2) Khare, op.cit., Vol.V, No.1852.

(3) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VII, No.2356.

(4) Ibid, No.2357.

so far, he would himself proceed ahead accepting the terms of his, as told by Balarao and Baburao Keshav. Sakharas was disheartened at this over-ruling by Moroba and setting out from Bhavadi, went to Saswad. When Patwardhan approached Shinde's camp with an intention to join him, Moroba, Bajaba, Raghupatras, Bhivrao, Pandoba Joshi, Visaji Krishna, Appa Balwant, Ramchandra Ganesh, Ganesh Katre, Holkar with two to three thousand army proceeded to Parincha. Shinde, hearing this left his route to Jejuri and proceeded to Padegaon and wrote to Patwardhan that he would be avoiding them all and would proceed to Purandar and insisted that he should join him immediately. The other party noticing that Shinde had not waited for them and avoided them, set out for Kothala from Parincha. Sakharas intended to see Mahadji by five in the evening, so Haripant made it a point to see him early, by five in the morning. When Haripant finished his talk with Mahadji, he left for Parashuram's tent where he was followed by Sakharas, immediately afterwards. Mahadji and Haripant were of opinion that without the clash of arms, the matters should be settled but Parashuram opined that nobody was firm in his opinions. Chinto Vithal had gone to Bombay to bring back Raghoba.¹

Mahadji's wife and mother-in-law were staying with the family of Raste. Raste was now told to bring them to Mahadji's camp. Raste had brought them to Athani. They were finally brought to Mahadji's camp.²

(1) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VII, No.2358.

(2) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VII, No.2359; Bat.Raj.Diar., Vol.IV, No.263.

Mahadji and Patwardhan presented themselves before the Peshwa on 9th June. Nana had come down the Purandar Fort to receive them. The Peshwa also was in the tent, specially set for him. In the evening after the ceremony, by the sunset, the Peshwa went back to the Fort. Mahadji and Patwardhan, too, returned to their camp. The army underwent privation and the fodder was scarce everywhere.¹

Raghoba protested against Upton's treaty and declared the young Peshwa as not at all the son of Sarayan, by about 19 June.² The Governor-General asked the Bombay Government to adhere to the Treaty of Purandar but actually recalled Upton, on 1st July.³ Mahadji and Tukoji evaded now the payment of Hukka Rusum.⁴ Sakharam showed his surprise to the Governor-General that four of his letters were not replied and that he was never agreeable to the terms about Salsette and complained about the conduct of the Bombay Government.⁵ Maharaja Purshottam Pandit, the Vakil of the Peshwa transacted treaty with the Wazir through Bristow but while Bristow wanted to retain the Doab for the Wazir, the Maratha Vakil insisted on the Peshwa's claims, too.⁶ Anjanwel and Suvarndurg surrendered to Sadoba, in the konkan, on 30 June.⁷ The Governor-General ordered the Bombay Government to expel Raghoba but the Bombay Government resolved that as

(1) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VII, No.2361; Vol.V, No.1853.

(2) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 476. (Bombay Consultation. Raghoba's letter).

(3) *Ibid.*, 509-514. (G.G. to Bombay).

(4) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1868.

(5) G.P.O., Vol.V, No.217. (4-7-1776).

(6) Forrest, *Selections from Foreign Department*, Vol.1, 547-548.

(7) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 445. (Dick to Bombay).

circumstances were so much altered since the date of the letters from Bengal, to defer, for the present, taking any steps in consequence thereof.¹ Sadoba applied for help to the Bombay Government and he had already captured the whole konkan by about 9th July.² There was nobody, now, as Haripant's Vakil at Surat.³ Raghoba complained to the Governor-General that he was not getting replies from him and that the Purandar Treaty had stripped him off all liberty and consigned his name for oblivion for ever.⁴ Hastings declared to the Court of Directors on 14 July that the war was an aggressive and offensive one.⁵ Tukoji informed Ahalyabai of his sad plight in the Deccan and Ahalya reminded him of the policy of the late Subhedar, Malhar, again.⁶ All the methods suggested by Tukoji for the collection of the money were skillfully refuted by Ahalya on one or the other reasonable ground.⁷ Bristow was instructed from Calcutta to hand over certain districts to the Rana of Gohad, on 22 July 1776.⁸

Mahadji was crossing the Nerbada by about 27 July 1776⁹ and thereafter visited Ahalyabai but hearing the news of the meeting of Tukoji and the Peshwa, he crossed the Tapi

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 443, 452.

(2) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1871.

(3) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 449-450. (Surat to Bombay. 10-7-1776).

(4) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.220. (11-7-1776).

(5) Gleig, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, 45.

(6) *Molkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane*, Vol.I, No.82.(18-7-1776).

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) Forrest, *Selections from Foreign Department*, Vol.I, 548.

(9) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1881.

and came to the bank of the Godawari by speedy marches.¹ He was expected at Pedgaon on the eclipse day.² Mahadji on 31st July requested Sakharam for the release of Khanderao Trimbak.³ The Governor-General desired Beniram Pandit to proceed to Calcutta as expeditiously as possible.⁴ Purebottam Pandit, the Peshwa's Vakil to the Wazir, wrote to the Governor-General that his deputation was to increase friendship between the Peshwa and the Wazir.⁵ By about 10th August the Wazir was extremely suspicious of the intentions of the Rohillas as they had been detected in entertaining a correspondence with Najaf Khan, expressing the most earnest desire to enter into any enterprises against his government.⁶

Mahadji and Tukoji were practically bankrupt and still the ministers had insisted on Dehak Patti from them.⁷ Everywhere there was disorder due to the public report that the ministers and the Sardars were not one in the political cause.⁸ The enmity between Mahadji and Tukoji which was itself the part of the earlier jealousy between the house of Shinde and that of Holkar, undermined the Maratha cause since the times of Nana Sahib Peshwa.⁹ The calamity of Panipat was its result. Nana instead of healing it, cherished such a rift. Tukoji and Ahalyabai, again, were

(1) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1884.

(2) *Ibid.*, No.1883.

(3) *S.P.D.*, Vol.V, No.84.

(4) *C.P.C.*, Vol.V, No.234. (31-7-1776).

(5) *C.P.C.*, Vol.V, No.236. (1-8-1776).

(6) Forrest, *Selections from Foreign Department*, Vol.I, 553.

(7) Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, Vol.I, p.98.

(8) *Ibid.*, p.93.

(9) *Ibid.*, p.94.

not on good terms. While Nana joined Tukoji's cause, Mahadji sided with Ahalyabai.¹ Nana, however, on this occasion took Mahadji in confidence as against Tukoji and split their united strength which would have been overwhelming for him.² Sakharam and Mahadji were never on clear terms. Nana, when Mahadji came to the Deccan in the rains of 1776, to see the Peshwa, set his demands, making a pose that it was Sakharam who objected to Mahadji's demands. Nana however managed the Shinde disputes about the feudal dues as in return he has to get the Pretender defeated by Mahadji's hands.³

The Wazir requested the Governor-General to send four more officers to Col. Goddard in Oudh.⁴ Abdul Gunay who was sent from Bombay to enquire about Sadoba reported that he was real one and had 30000 men under him. He was to be joined by the Raja of Malvan and had designs on Bassein.⁵ Raghoba required the Havaladar of the fort Parnera to send a chief to meet him on his journey towards Balad, on 14th August.⁶ Raghoba earlier had quitted Surat and had gone to Broach.⁷ When Holkar stayed at Vatgaon, Mahadji with 2000 selected horse met him on the Godawari, on 17th August.⁸ They settled terms and as a result Mahadji

(1) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.94.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.237. (12-8-1776).

(5) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 473-474. (Bombay Consultations. 13-8-1776).

(6) Shindechahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.392.

(7) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 484-488. (Intelligence. 16-8-1776).

(8) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.88.

presented himself before the Peshwa.¹ As a result, again, Mahadji accepted to undertake the campaign against the Pretender and massacred 200 of his Arabs near Sinhaged.² Sadoba had sent letters to the President of Bombay and now he sent Gopal Dhondoo there to seek a direct meeting with Raghoba.³ The Bombay Government sought advice from the Governor-General, in case Sadoba would become the master of Poona.⁴ The Peshwa agreed to a change of abode for Raghoba and agreed to pay five lakhs of rupees per year to him, provided "he would reside at Benares and would not cause again any sedition or disturbance in the country nor would have improper correspondence with any person and would not change his residence without the Peshwa's knowledge."⁵ Sakharan expressed his satisfaction to Nana for the friendly relations the latter had established with Macpherson who seems to have met Nana, about this time, when he was not in the British employ. Raghoba with Hyder, was to be defeated as per the plea of Sakharan, on C. 27th August.⁶ The Marathas had again, settled a treaty with the Portuguese by about 24th August.⁷ Jivaji Gopal was arrested by the Raja of Karvir and he was compelled to pay one lakh of rupees, on C. 26th August.⁸

(1) Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S.; Vol.II, No.79.

(2) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.88; Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, Nos.1898,1901,1905; Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S.; Vol.II, No.90.

(3) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 492. (Written on 9-8-1776; received on 19-8-1776).

(4) Ibid., Vol.17A, 494-495. (Bombay to G.G. 20-8-1776).

(5) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 505.

(6) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.82.

(7) Parasnis, Marathanche Vakil, Chap.II, No.1.

(8) Khare, op.cit.; Vol.VI, No.1886.

Sakharam addressed to his agent Mahadji Guruji, approving on 30th August the measures he had taken for the settlement of the demands of Mahadji Shinde who was already coaxed to lead an expedition against the Pretender.¹ Friendship was declared by solemn oath by September between the Peshwa and the Wazir and the friends and foes of one would be the friends and foes of the other. Neither party would encroach upon territory and that the countries conquered by the united efforts would be divided equally and again, emergency would demand joint efforts of defense, too.² Anandibai wrote a clever and strongly-worded letter on c. 3rd September both to Nana and Sakharam, asking them why they were persecuting her and her infant son when they were in the most helpless condition. She advised them on the contrary to look after her, according to her dignity.³ The Court of Directors ordered Bombay to respect the treaty with Raghoba while the Governor-General's orders were contradictory. Sadoba had offered by about 4th September two villages near the Fort Victoria to the Bombay Government but the offer was rejected.⁴ The Peshwa pointed out that the Vakils of Raghoba and of the exciter of commotion namely Sadoba resided at Bombay and the Council had raised one thousand men. Upton would not be allowed

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- (1) Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.61; Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.1589.
 (2) C.F.S., Vol.V, No.288.
 (3) Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.393.
 (4) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 514-516. (Consultation. 4-9-1776).

to leave for all visible measures and because the Bombay Government was not true in friendship with the Peshwa. The Peshwa insisted that another trustworthy person should be sent to Poona.¹ The Bombay Government submitted to the Purandar Treaty under protest. Raghoba had moved southward. The Bombay Government recalled Upton but it was objected to. Sadoba proceeded northward to meet Raghoba.²

Mahadji and Tukoji with 3000 army joined Bhivrao Panse, against Sadoba, on C. 21st September.³ But still the accounts of Mahadji and Tukoji were not settled by the Peshwa.⁴ Mahadji was at the Purandar fort, on 25th September and took his meals there and remained there for three hours. Sakharam was exposed⁵ and there was a threat to the very administration in Poona. Upton appealed to Moroba on 26th September who was an avowed partisan of Raghoba and one of the ministers present during the late negotiations of Purandar Treaty, although he refused to take a share in them and to sign his name to the Treaty. Upton again wrote that if Sadoba succeeded, the treaty must be confirmed by him.⁶ Curious enough, a new alliance

(1) S.P.D.B., Vol.17A, 541-542, (7-9-1776).

(2) *Ibid.*, Vol.17A, 535-540. (Bombay to G.G. 14-9-1776).

(3) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1895; Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, pp. 46-47.

(4) Khare, *Itihaseik Lekha Sangraha*, Vol.VI, No.1893.

(5) *Ibid.*, No.1894.

(6) Gleig, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, pp.113-114.

of the Sikhs, the Marathas, and Zabita against the Wazir, was reported on C. 20th September.¹ Mahadji was joined by Naro Bapuji and Mahadji now prepared himself to start on 8th October against Sadoba.² The Wazir in Hindustan proposed reorganisation of his forces and Col. Goddard was given the command of his troops, in October.³ One Madhu Rao (Mahadji ?) claimed the tenth part of the cash and the eighth part of the territory obtained by the English on the conclusion of treaties with Rao Pandit Pradhan, for acting as a negotiator. He said that his claim was based on ancient customs and requested Colonel Goddard to forward his application to the Supreme Council at Calcutta for consideration.⁴

Mahadji marched against Sadoba via Sinhagad towards the Devghat, while Bhivrao Panse marched from Kureda via Borghat; and Parashuram Ramchandra and Raghunath Nilkantha marched towards Ambeghat.⁵ Pandurang Patwardhan wrote to Anubai Ghorpade of Ichalkaranji to leave the cause of Sadoba, which she ought not to have supported and requested her to start on pilgrimage.⁶ Ramchandra Ganesh was to blockade the Kolhapur front.⁷ Holkar and Haripant were to join Mahadji, immediately afterwards.⁸ On 27th October

(1) C.P.C., Vol.V, Nos.280, 287.

(2) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.7.

(3) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.291.

(4) Ibid, No.277. (16-9-1776).

(5) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.1897. (9-10-1776).

(6) Ibid, No.1899.

(7) Ibid, No.1901.

(8) Ibid, No.1903.

Mahadji was one cos ahead of Bhivrao Pansse. He attacked Sadoba's camp and devastated it and pursued his army to Revani. Mahadji lost 40 to 50 men and sixty horses. Mahadji stayed there for one night but when he resumed activities, Sadoba had escaped with 200 men, crossing the Ghat. Balarao from Mahadji's army was then pursuing him. Mahadji and Bhivrao, now intended to pass through the Borghat; Naro Ganesh and Narsingrao Dhygude descended the Kurud Ghat with 4000 troops. Rajipant Anna with 2000 troops marched towards Pratapgad. Moropant Phadke, the nephew of Haripant and the son of Bachyaji Barwe escaped from Sadoba's confinement and joined Mahadji and Bhivrao.¹

Raghoba was given new terms by the Peshwa on c. 10th October when he was near Daman collecting forces but as yet then, no Portuguese force had come to his assistance.² Nawab Majid-daulah reported to the Governor-General that the Emperor was threatened by the Sikhs and that the English if they helped the Royal cause would become the masters of Hindustan.³ The Governor-General wrote to Sakharam and Nana requesting strict adherence to the treaty.⁴

Sadoba arrived at Rajmachi on 14th October. The Peshwa went to Purandar; and Nana and Sakharam came to Poona to enlist troops and they intended to march to Miraj.⁵

(1) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1907; Sardesai, *E.P.H.S.*, No.18.

(2) *S.P.D.D.*, Vol.17A, 560. (Surat to Bombay).

(3) *C.P.C.*, Vol.V, No.299. (13-10-1776).

(4) *C.P.C.*, Vol.V, No.301. (14-10-1776).

(5) *S.P.D.D.*, Vol.17A, 565. (17-10-1776).

On 25th, the President of Bombay and Carnac proceeded to Salsette.¹ There was a rumour that Sadoba was in possession of Purandar and was to make his entry into Poona on 22nd October.² Raghoba, on 21st October wrote to Nana expressing his readiness to come to an amicable and honourable settlement with the ministers and asked for some respectable persons being deputed to him from Poona for effecting mediation.³ Sakharas wrote to the Governor-General on 22nd October about the question of Salsette.⁴ The revolt of Sadoba was now "a revolution in Maratha Empire";⁵ and Sadoba was to see shortly Raghoba who was refused help by the Portuguese.⁶ Bahadji was supporting Bhivrao on 26th October⁷ and Raghoba sought the advice of the Bombay Government in matters of Sadoba who intended to see him and requested to fix up the place for rendezvous, through the President of Bombay.⁸ The Governor-General wrote to Mudhoji on 26th October for everlasting friendship.⁹ Raghoba was on C. 26th October near Bassein and Sadoba appealed for help to the Bombay Government, again; sending Mukundrao Sripat for that

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 565. (17-10-1776).

(2) *Ibid*; 563-565. (19-10-1776).

(3) *Shindeshahi Rajkarni*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.394.

(4) C.F.C., Vol.V, No.307.

(5) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 562-563. (Bombay to G.G. 22-10-1776).

(6) *Ibid*.

(7) S.P.D., Vol.36, No.342.

(8) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 572-573. (24-10-1776).

(9) C.F.C., Vol.V, No.325.

purpose.¹ Mahadji informed Nana that he had defeated the Pretender and was pursuing him in the direction of the Borghat.²

In the north, Maharaja of Jaipur and Sawai Prithising of Jainagar solicited Governor-General's help to introduce them to the Emperor's Court.³ On this side, on 29th night, Jugdis Gheer and Ganesh Pant, two of Sadoba's officers took possession of Kalwa opposite Thana, with 20,000 men, 700 horses and an elephant and on 30th waited on the English Chief to request protection to themselves and the other people, surrendering their arms.⁴ On 28th, Sadoba, finding the sepoys of Rajmachi had some intention to seize him and being deceived by the commander of the ministerial artillery, Shivrao Panse, who had promised to join him and apprehending some danger from his own people, fled with all the speed possible to Belapur at which place, he embarked in a boat with Dowlat Gheer, Sivaji Pant, Blackman and some others, by the time of the night. He was expecting shelter from Raghaji Angre, too.⁵ Thana chief was not prepared to provide for the irregular bandity of Sadoba and to encourage the ministerial party to open hostilities near Thana. Blackman joined the

(1) B.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 571-572.

(2) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.18.

(3) C.P.C., Vol.V, Nos.339, 342. (29-10-1776).

(4) B.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 566. (Thana to Bombay).

(5) Ibid, 565-567.

English at Thana and reported that Sadoba was within 3 cos, therefrom.¹ Sadoba, with 4/5 thousand men was at anchor off the Crose Island, opposite Fort George and proposed coming on shore. He had sent his messenger to Draper. Manordas Rupji and Balvani - the two interpreters - were sent to Sadoba to tell him Draper's compliance. But Sadoba, finding that the Governor was absent at Salsette, replied that he was determined to go to Manávi (Colaba) for 2/3 days, hoping to return. He proceeded there, by about two in the afternoon.² Mahadji was pursuing the Pretender's force near Panvel³ and had conveyed the details of Sadoba's defeat to Nana on 30th October.⁴ Nana was again informed of a battle that was fought between Ganesh Behare and Raghoba.⁵ Mahadji had requested Nana for a speedy supply of provisions.⁶

The Company wanted to avoid interfering, as little as possible, either with Raghoba or with Sadoba; however, instructions were despatched to Thana to receive Sadoba's people at Salsette if they were attacked, to save their lives.⁷ Early, in the morning of 1st November Sadoba was escaping to Bombay. Raghoji Angre with hundred men

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 565-567.

(2) Ibid., Vol.17A, 568. (30-10-1776).

(3) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.83. (30-10-1776).

(4) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.19.

(5) Ibid., No.19. (30-10-1776).

(6) Ibid., No.20.

(7) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 570. (1-11-1776).

surrounded him on 4th November, Thursday evening and sent Bhavsing Chopdar and Ram Ratan Pardeshi to Mahadji to inform him of Sadoba's arrest. Mahadji sent Balarnao Govind and Ranekhan to Angre to bring back the Pretender.¹ Raghoji had confined Sadoba in the fort of Colaba. He had earlier prevailed upon Sadoba to land there to refresh himself with professions of utmost friendship and then stripped him of the jewels, to a large amount. Raghoji wrote to the President of Bombay that he intended to deliver Sadoba up to the ministers in case he should prove not to be real Sadoba. The Company held the view that Sadoba was under its protection.² Sadoba had taken a promise from Raghoji that he should not be punished without a trial.³ Mahadji alone stood loyal to the Peshwa's cause, at this time and helped to save the situation, otherwise, the Maratha Government was at the point of extinction at that critical moment in November.⁴ Mahadji tried to seize Raghoba also when he was near Bombay. In mortal fear, Raghoba made his way towards Bombay.⁵ Mahadji now said that no territory was devastated.⁶ Haro Shivdev reported to Nana on 3rd November his conversation

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- (1) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos. 21, 22; Shindeeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol. I, No. 9; Vol. II, No. 84; Khare, op.cit.; Vol. VI, No. 1910; Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane II, No. 29; S.P.D., Vol. 36, Nos. 311, 312, 313, 314.
 (2) S.P.D.D., Vol. 17A, 577-581. (Consultation. 4-11-1776).
 (3) Khare, Adhikar-yog, p. 47.
 (4) Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 66.
 (5) Ibid., pp. 60, 63.
 (6) Shindeeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol. I, No. 8. (3-11-1776).

with Mahadji, who having secured the Pretender, intended to return to Poona. Mahadji pointed out that if he proceeded towards Bassein in pursuit of Raghoba, the latter would run away and create fresh troubles and that it was advisable to reconcile Raghoba by peaceful means.¹ Nana had explicitly written to Mahadji to get hold of Raghoba, too but Mahadji wrote to Nana on 8th again, that Raghoba was at Tarapur with 150 to 200 men.²

Mahadji had written to Nana on 5th November to write at once to the Governor of Bombay not to offer the British protection to Sadoba and also to Raghoji not to pay heed to the English.³ Mahadji communicated to Nana on 8th, that Raghoba had arrived at Dahana and that he (Mahadji) had detached a force to recapture him (Raghoba).⁴ When Angre was taking Sadoba to Poona, he received a letter from the Governor of Bombay that Sadoba was proceeding to Bombay and that he was their (the English) deposit in Angre's hands and that Sadoba must be sent back to Bombay. It was pointed out that Angre's behaviour was against the treaty, which meant protection or assistance not to be given to each other's rebels and seditions of both sides to be given up. The Salsette authorities had already given protection to 1000 men with bag and baggage belonging to Sadoba.⁵ On 10th November Hastings was thinking of

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- (1) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.85.(3-11-1776).
 (2) Sardesai, Uttarvishag, Vol.I, pp.76-77.
 (3) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos.23,24; Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.86.
 (4) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.24.
 (5) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 587-590. (Peshwa to Bombay, through Upton).

tendering his resignation.¹ Raghoba asked Madhavrao Sadashiv to effect a reconciliation for him with the Court of Poona, reminding that he had given up his former high demands.² Mahadji met Angre on his way;³ and Angre handed over Sadoba to Mahadji's custody.⁴ Both of them then set out for Poona.⁵

Raghoba embarked on the "Success", a British ship, sailing from Tarapur (where he was besieged by his enemies) by 10 O'clock in the morning of 11th November and the captain of the ship by name Lyon Fancourt reported his arrival to the Bombay Government.⁶ Raghoba was accompanied by his son Amrutrao.⁷ Raghoba had received no answer to his seven letters that he wrote to the Governor-General.⁸ He, however, wrote to Calcutta that he had learnt from his vakil, Ganeshrao Bhat that Parshottam Naik had gone with a big present of jewellery to Asaf-ad-daula in order to secure with his help the recognition of the "Child" (the young Peshwa) from the Emperor and that a vakil was also directed to the Royal Court for this purpose.⁹ The Bombay Government explained to the Peshwa that the English were induced by humanity alone

(1) Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, E. Hastings, Vol. I, 150; Gleig, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 89.

(2) Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.E.S., Vol. II, No. 396 (10-11-1775).

(3) Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, Vol. IV, p. 175.

(4) Sardesai, H.P.H.S., No. 25; Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, Vol. VI, Nos. 1913, 1914.

(5) Sardesai, H.P.H.S., No. 25.

(6) S.P.D.D., Vol. 17A, 592; Vol. 18, 75-76. (Bombay to G.C.); Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 63.

(7) Sardesai, op.cit., p. 63.

(8) G.P.C., Vol. V, No. 385. (14-11-1776).

(9) G.P.C., Vol. V, No. 386.

to receive Sadoba's people into Salsette merely to save their lives, as they should have done to the ministerial forces in the like situation. Raghoba was brought to Bombay on 14th November.¹

Mahadji wrote from his camp at Khalapur to Sakharan and Nana on 17th November that he himself and Sadoba were marching shortly towards Poona.² Trimbakrao Pethe's wife, Venubai, daughter of Anubai of Ichalkaranji wrote to her mother that she had appealed to Mahadji to save her in the Pretender's case.³ Mahadji along with Raghoji and Sadoba came to Talegaon when some of the followers of Sadoba escaped because Raghoji connived at it, on C. 21st November.⁴ Mahadji and Raghoji took so many days to reach Poona, that there was a rumour that they would never return to Poona.⁵ At Bombay, Gordon urged the Company to give up Raghoba, and Upton and the Peshwa protested against this protection given to Raghoba.⁶ Mahadji postponed his arrival in Poona and informed Nana on 24th November that he would reach on the following Friday instead of, on Tuesday or Wednesday as pre-arranged.⁷ The letters of Nana to Bombay concerning Raghoji were sent and received through Mahadji.⁸ Mahadji informed Sakharan on 26th that

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 590-592. (Bombay to the Peshwa).

(2) Sardesai, H.P.H.S., Nos.25-26; Oturkar, op.cit.; No.164.

(3) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.1917.

(4) Ibid., No.1918.

(5) Ibid., No.1919. (23-11-1776).

(6) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 602-605. (23-11-1776).

(7) Sardesai, H.P.H.S., No.27; Shinde Shahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.87; Vol.I, No.11.

(8) Shinde Shahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.10. (25-11-1776).

he was bringing with him Lakshman Kolhatkar, Parwatibai's brother.¹

Raghoba wrote from Bombay on 26th November to Mahadji that he was prepared to give back the fort of Bhar to Khanderao Pawar.² Mahadji had agreed to meet Nana and talk over all the details about Raghoba, as suggested by the latter.³ Mahadji had sent away his army to take over the konkan forts. Tale, Ghosale, Aachitgad Subha and Mahad were already under order. Bajipant Anna Joshi was sent to Suvarndurg. There Appa Bhat (Sadashiv Bhat, Paranjpe's accomplice) and wife of Ramchandra Paranjpe were arrested. Still Vijaydurg was not captured. Mahadji declared his profound loyalty to the Peshwa and his readiness to serve him faithfully.⁴ Naro Shivdev requested Nana at the instance of Mahadji on 28th November to send three shackles for the Pretender and his companions.⁵ On 30th November Mahadji reached Sangam where Nana received him.⁶

The Bombay Government showed aversion to Upton's negotiations and to the advice from Calcutta. Raghoba had arrived and the Bombay Government was unwilling to execute the Purandar Treaty.⁷ For the Bombay Company

(1) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.28.

(2) Phalke, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.12; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.78.

(3) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.29. (27-11-1776).

(4) Ibid, No.30.

(5) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.88.

(6) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.1924.

(7) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 606-614.

observed, "We cannot suppose any person who has been in the least conversant with the natives of Asia can be so totally un-acquainted with their genius and disposition as not to allow that treachery and perfidy are therein peculiar characteristics and most particularly so of the Marathas who are the most treacherous and perfidious of all Asiatics. No one possessed of this knowledge can suppose for a moment that Raghoba's life would not be in danger, were he to trust himself in the power of the Ministers; his professed enemies who must dread even the possibility of his future elevation and surrounded as he would be by persons entirely at their devotion."¹

The ministerial army had attacked the fort of Dhar where Anandibai had taken quarters with her child of 1½ years.² Anandibai refused to escape from Dhar. Raghoba wrote to Mahadji that the Emperor and the Wazir should be told to march into the Deccan and the fort of Dhar must be recaptured from the ministers; Raghoba's family would stay there and that the fort would be given to Khandernao Pawar.³ Raghoba had supported Sadoba and asked for army from Bijasing.⁴ The Pretender had hypnotized all⁵ except Mahadji and that was why the ministers bent in solemn obedience to Mahadji's diplomacy. The Portuguese authorities

(1) B.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 614-615. (Bombay to Upton. 30-11-1776)

(2) Rajwade, op.cit., Vol.12, p.115, No.172.

(3) Ibid, p.127, No.189.

(4) Ibid, pp.109-111, No.166.

(5) Ibid, pp.121-122, No.180.

contracted treaty with Raghoba, offering four lakhs of rupees for his support.¹ Baburao Ballal Kane from the ministers suggested to Raghoba to contract treaty through Shinde and Holkar.² Raghoba, too, felt that unless Shinde, Holkar and the English were there, the ministers would mean harm to him.³ Fateeing, again, has joined the ministers.⁴ There was a rumour that Shinde and Holkar had joined Raghoba's side.⁵ Moroba was encouraged by Raghoba's party because he had written letters to Raghoba and the English.⁶ The Bombay Company demanded the original treaty with Raghoba for the exchange of jewellery.⁷ Sakharam and Nana had only agreed to the Purandar Treaty but Shinde, Holkar, Bhonsle and Moroba were displeased and the Governor-General would not fix up his own policy, for a fortnight⁸ or so but thereafter, would sanction war against the Marathas.⁹

Ramshastri opened the trial of Sadoba on 1st December 1776.¹⁰ Mahadji, having been asked by Nana to send some old men to examine the Pretender and declare whether he was real Sadashivrao or not, replied that there was none about him competent to do that mission. Sultanji Lambhate was pretty old but he had gone to the fair of Pandharpur.¹¹

(1) Rajwade, *op.cit.*, Vol.12, p.127, No.188; pp.127-138, No.191.

(2) *Ibid.*, pp.121-122, No.180.

(3) *Ibid.*, p.125, No.185; *Tarikh-i Ibrahim Khan*, Elliot, Vol.VIII, p.294.

(4) *Ibid.*, p.114, No.171.

(5) *Ibid.*, pp.100, 101, No.156.

(6) *Ibid.*, pp.113-114, No.170.

(7) *Ibid.*, pp.113-114, No.170.

(8) *Ibid.*, pp.101-102, No.157 (suppliment).

(9) *Ibid.*, pp.102-103, No.158.

(10) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1927; *Shindeeshahi Rajkarnag*, S.H.S., Vol.II, Nos.92,93.

(11) Sardesai, *H.F.M.S.*, No.31.

The Governor of Bombay informed the Peshwa that Sadoba was real and that Angre must be punished.¹ But Sadoba himself accepted his non-authenticity.² After finishing the Pretender's affairs, Nana would proceed to Purandar to settle the accounts of Shinde and Holkar.³ Raghoba had written on 10th December to Bhivrao Yeshwant Panse that the cows, the buffaloes and the deer sent by him had arrived at Pen.⁴ Raghoba from Bombay, now, negotiated for peace through Shinde and Holkar.⁵ New terms were given to Raghoba. Raghoba would go to Benares and the same jagir would be ceded to him there as was provided if he were to stay in the Maratha territory.⁶ Sakharan urged Nana on 17th December to finish up the affairs of the Pretender by carrying into execution the punishment for the culprit without delay.⁷ The Peshwa wrote to Bombay Government in strong words to hand over the rebels protected in the Thana Fort. John Halsey, the Chief of Salsette, replied to Bhivrao that Kalwa was within the garis range and threatened war. Raghoji also implored Sakharan that the English had sent two deputies demanding Sadoba, declaring that the consequences of not delivering him up would be war.⁸ Shivaji Appaji Paranjpe gave the

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 68-69 (Governor to the Peshwa).

(2) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, Nos.1930, 1931.

(3) *Ibid.*, Vol.VI, No.1932.

(4) *Shindeshahi Rajkarni*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.397.

(5) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1938. (13-12-1776).

(6) S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 628-629. (Upton to Bombay)

(7) *Shindeshahi Rajkarni*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.80

(8) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, pp.44-46.

confession in writing and told the names of persons responsible for the Pretender's plot and himself begged for mercy.¹ When at Rajmachi the Pretender had defended himself with 25,000 troops, Mahadji had 5,000 troops only. Sakharan and Nana, thereupon, after the trial, handed over Sadoba to Shinde who took him to Kumbhar Veshi (gate), north of Poona and put him to death by thrusting iron bars into his head and putting him under the camel's foot. Sadoba's sardar, Dowlat Giri was trampled by elephant. There were, here and there, street fights in the konkan on account of the agitation of the Pretender's followers who were helped by the Janjira army.² Sadoba thus met his death on 18th December 1776.³ Mahadji offered to meet Nana at the Purandar Fort. Gurusaji and Balaram Govind were previously told to stay in the fort. All affairs were to be managed within a couple of days as Mahadji was not to be delayed. The meeting of the Peshwa with Angre was also arranged on the Sunday that came next, with established customs.⁴ Shinde and Holkar followed Nana to Purandar. Mahadji's marriage with the daughter of Deshmukh of Sanganner was to be arranged soon.⁵ Mahadji proceeded first to Sanganner

(1) Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol.II, Nos.17,18,19.

(2) B.H.R.I., (1927-1928), No.162.

(3) Khare, Adhikar-yog, p.47; S.P.D.D., Vol.17A, 635-636; Sardesai, Kavyatishan Sangraha, No.489; Sat.Raj.Diar., Vol.VI, Nos.624,627,630; Parasnis, Itihasik Tipana, II, 25; Gleig, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.140-141; Tarikh-i Ibrahim Khan, Elliot, Vol.VIII, p.294.

(4) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.32. (21-12-1776).

(5) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.1953.

for his marriage. Angre was rewarded with a fort and 50,000 rupees worth Jagir, on c. 30th December 1776.¹

Dhondupant, now as Vakil from Raghoba, resided at Benares in the Court of Cheytsing.² Dhar was captured by the ministerial force and Anandibai requested that she should be either kept in Poona or with Ahalyabai. The ministers refused to accept both these suggestions and kept her at Mandaleshwar, on the bank of the Nerbada.³ On 26th December Mudhoji wrote to the Governor-General that his Vakil met the Nizam who agreed to make a treaty with the Peshwa and that it would then be possible for all of them to attack Hyderabad. He explained that he had received a letter from Poona to the effect that all matters had been settled there with the help of the English and that Shinde, Holkar and the other Maratha chiefs were satisfied with the arrangement.⁴ The Governor-General wrote to the Bombay Government that if it be true that Raghoba had received their protection, the Bombay Government would be immediately required to compel him to depart therefrom. A policy of strict neutrality was to be observed;⁵ and the Governor-General wrote to Raghoba that the English treaty with him was nullified and that the English up-held the Purandar Treaty.⁶

(1) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.1958.

(2) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.439.

(3) Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, p.37; *Sat.Maj.Diar.*, Vol.IV, No.11.

(4) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.428. (26-12-1776).

(5) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 43-44. (30-12-1776).

(6) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.437. (31-12-1776).

By about 12th December 1776, Yesaji Shinde of Kolhapur with 2000 troops and 2000 infantry attacked the ministerial army near Khujgaon. In this skirmish, the Karvir forces were slightly defeated and were compelled to retreat for 3 cos.¹ The Poona Durbar had on 3rd January 1777 requested for a resident from the Bombay Government and Mostyn was appointed for the same by the Company.² Salsette had been seized by the Bombay Government and the Governor-General wrote to Sakharan on 6th January regretting to find in his correspondence that he had not yet then forgotten the events of the late war though peace had been concluded and observed that the remembrance of them could not exist without producing a desire for revenge which was certainly to the duties of friendship and to the principles of good policy.³ The Peshwa informed Upton on the 8th, that Mostyn was not acceptable as the Resident at his Court.⁴ Hastings observed in his letter of 12th January to Alexander Elliot that so sudden a revival and reunion of the powers of this great empire and so sudden an application of them immediately on the close of a long civil war, indicated a degree of vigour in its constitution

(1) Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.12.

(2) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 2-4 (Consultation. Bombay to Upton.4-7).

(3) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.447.

(4) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 11.

which could not fail to alarm the friends of the Company if the subsequent appearances should warrant this conclusion.¹ The Bombay Government on 13th adhered to its appointment of Mostyn² and the Poona Durbar finally consented to accept him in that capacity.³ Macpherson was sure that the crisis was coming forward in Hastings' career and pointed out that there were some others besides his direct opponents who were deeply interested in his removal.⁴ The Governor-General complained on 22nd that the Treaty was broken by the Bombay Government.⁵ Mahadji acknowledged on 23rd the receipt of a letter demanding the presence of Balaram to settle various accounts at Poona. Mahadji declared he would finish up affairs at Bid and then join them at the earliest convenience. Naro Shanker was already dispatched and now Mahadji sent Naro Shivdev to explain fully the full purport of his demands.⁶ Ahalyabai had written to Mahadji that the Udaipur affairs would be settled according to the former arrangements till both Mahadji and Tukoji would leave the Deccan.⁷ Naro Shivdev communicated to Nana the irritation of Mahadji on account of the conduct of the ministers.⁸ Naro Shivdev also explained on 1st February to Haripant Phadke

(1) Gleig, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, p.131.

(2) S.P.D.P., Vol.18, 12.

(3) *Ibid.* op.17-18. (28-1-1777).

(4) Dodwell, *Warren Hastings' letters to Sir John Macpherson*, p.53. (17-1-1777).

(5) G.P.C., Vol.V, Nos.471,472.

(6) Sardesai, *H.P.M.S.*, No.33.

(7) *Molkarshahi Itinashahi Sadhana*, Vol.I, No.94.(29-1-1777).

(8) S.P.D., Vol.V, No.86.

that Mahadji was extremely irritated on account of the alleged favours shown to Tukoji.¹ On 11th February Col. Upton set out from Poona, for the first time after the Purandar Treaty.² Raghoba always tried to win over Shinde and Holkar and the ministers found it very difficult to keep them attached to their cause.³ Naro Shivdev suggested to Nana, marking out the difference between the services of Mahadji and Tukoji, that Tukoji might be employed in the task of subjugating the chief of Kittur who had rebelled against the Marathas and had joined Hyder.⁴ Deshmukh had paid Rs.25,000 for the marriage of his daughter with Mahadji.⁵ Hyder, on 6th March, wrote to Yeshwantrao Shinde, the karbhari of Kolhapur, that he should start harassing the army of the ministers and that he himself intended to join Yeshwantrao.⁶ The Governor-General advised the Bombay Government to lay down with the Marathas certain rules for their guidance by which the peace of India might not be broken.⁷ However, the English at Bombay were carrying preparations of war and hints were passed by the local agents to Poona on 9th March to keep the Marathas on guard.⁸ Lala Sevakrao was appointed as vakil by the Peshwa to stay at Calcutta,

(1) S.P.D., Vol.V, No.85.

(2) Parasnis, Maratha Vakils, p.56.

(3) Sardesai, Uttarvishag, Vol.1, p.118.

(4) Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.1.

(5) Ibid, Vol.1, No.13.

(6) Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patra, No.237.

(7) S.P.D., Vol.18, 67-68. (Fort William to Bombay)

(8) Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patra, No.239.

by about 12th March.¹ In March 1777, St.Lubin arrived in Poona.²

Nana well knew that Lubin was not an accredited ambassador of France but was determined to use him as an instrument to intimidate the English.³ Mostyn arrived in Poona on 29th March. Raghoji Bhonsle adopted the son of Janoji Bhonsle and earlier by about 22nd March, the Kolhapur forces commanded by Yasaaji Shinde defeated Ramchandra Ganesh. There was news again that Ramraja died on the 24th.⁴ On 30th March, Mahadji had assured Nana of his entire readiness to effect the release of Jivaji Gopal who was captured by the Kolhapur forces.⁵ The Raja of Kolhapur supported Raghoba's cause and harassed Patwardhan and Nana. Mahadji demanded Achirgad and ten lakhs of rupees worth territory.⁶ Balaram Govind (of Shinde) and Mahadaji Guraji (of Nana) approached Mahadji for the Karvir campaign, on 1st April.⁷ Hyder kept on supplying money to the Raja of Karvir.⁸ On 20th April, Haripant was 60 cos from Poona beyond Purandar plundering and raising contributions on Nimbelkar territory to satisfy his army. The Nizam was near Kalichehabooks, 30 cos from Hyderabad. Dhanra was a few

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- (1) Parasnis, Maratha Vakils, p.56.
 (2) C.P.C., Vol.V, p.xii; S.P.D., Vol.36, No.328.
 (3) Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol.III, p.68.
 (4) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 66. (Mostyn to Bombay).
 (5) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.34.
 (6) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.102.
 (7) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2077, 2081.
 (8) Ibid, No.2079.

cos away from him and Parashuream had already skirmishes with Hyder's advanced army, within 30 cos from Miraj and had 2000 killed and taken prisoners. He lost the greatest part of his baggage and camp and was obliged to retreat within a few cos of Miraj.¹

Mahadji was compromised with the term of ten lakhs of rupees worth Jagir in Malwa.² Naro Shivdev, however, reported that Mahadji was using dilatory methods in prosecuting the expedition against Karvir. But the fact was, Mahadji's son-in-law was sick.³ Mahadji had left Jaagaon,⁴ and had reached some place near Jejuri and there intended visiting the temple of Jotiba. But he had to wait till the Purnima, the full moon.⁵ Mahadji acknowledged on 23rd, that Nana had arranged for the cannons for his intended march and Mahadji explained explicitly that the delay was due to Kalyanrao's illness and for no other reason.⁶ He, again, on 25th assured Nana of his anxiety to act justly and fairly in the case of the Sumant. Mahadji, however, acknowledged instructions from Nana about Walharrao Sumant and explained that Sumant's property had not been touched. It had been calculated

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 78-80 (Mostyn to Bombay).

(2) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.1, p.102.

(3) Shindeeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.3.(20-4-1777).

(4) Sardesai, op.cit., p.102; Shindeeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.4.

(5) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2094. (22-4-1777).

(6) Sardesai, S.P.M.S., No.35, Sardesai, Itihasik Patravyskar, No.294.

and not removed. Only a vigorous search of his followers was effected.¹ On 26th, Kalyanrao was a little better and Mahadji was to start immediately when he would recover. Mahadji was glad that the cannons were made available and he requested Shivrao to accompany him as the artillery officer against Kolhapur.² On 27th April, Mahadji was near the bank of the Nira,³ but on 29th, he complained that no body put faith in him; that his demands were not paid heed to, nothing was pointed out about the Mutsaql of Hindustan, that he had received conges from the Peshwa and hence, after the Karvir campaign, would march to his country.⁴ In May, Mahadji was at Srigonda. Nana asked Bajipant who had been despatched against Kolhapur to pull on for some time more in spite of the difficulties and further explained that Mahadji had promised to join him.⁵ The arrival of the French at Chawl was resented much by the English at Bombay, as that would be "very immediately in the English neighbourhood."⁶

Nana had called at Chawl the French envoy,⁷ while Mahadji had advised Nana to drive out St. Lubin.⁸ Haripant Phadke had left Poona for the Carnatic in the summer of 1777.⁹

(1) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.36.

(2) Ibid., No.37.

(3) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.102.

(4) Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.5.

(5) S.P.D., Vol.36, No.329.

(6) S.P.H.S., Vol.18, 81-82 (2-5-1777; 5-5-1777).

(7) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.113.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Ibid., p.102.

Mahadji attempted to secure the Gadi (throne) of Chatrapati after Ramraja and Hastings encouraged the intrigues.¹ The Dahak Patti was paid by Mahadji and Patwardhan but Tukoji evaded it for three years. It was settled at nine lakhs of rupees but he wanted the same terms which were given to Mahadji, he being his equal. He was on the contrary responsible for the disputes of Baroda and the quarrels among the sons of Naro Shankar and refused to go to the Carnatic to help Patwardhan. Visaji was sent by the ministers to bring him to terms but it was of no avail.²

Naro Shivdev lost his brother and hence was going home by about 4th May, 1777. Mahadji was performing the ceremony of the marriage of Sakhubai's (Jaysappa's wife) grand-daughter and intended next to proceed on his march.³ The English Vakil at Poona offered new terms to the Peshwa on behalf of Raghoba and the French also opened up intrigues with the Peshwa, by about 6th May.⁴ In the second fortnight of May, news came that Ramchandra Ganesh defeated Karvir⁵ and on 20th, Mahadji reached the Salpa pass.⁶ Holkar's Sardars visited Mahadji often and secret conferences were held many times. Mahadji's daughter Balabai was to be given in marriage to the son of Sidoji Narsingrao Sitole Deshmukh

(1) *Ibid.*, p.106.

(2) *Ibid.*, p.102.

(3) *Shindechahi Rajkarni*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.6.

(4) *Khare*, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.2107.

(5) *Ibid.*, Nos.2116, 2119; *Parasnis*, *Peshwa Records*, Chap.I, 68.

(6) *Khare*, *op.cit.*, Nos.2116, 2119.

of Poona.¹ Krishnaji Baghunath and Baysaji Pant, hence, were sent to Nana.²

The Bombay Government applied on 10th May to Sir Edward Hughes or his successor in command to bring round His Majesty's squadron as early as possible.³ The French envoy suffered hardships on account of the sudden downpour of rain; he, however, was prevailed to stay on, where he was, and the residence of Muhammad Jat or Sumersing was suggested to be given to him, for his stay in Poona.⁴ Sakharan on 31st May complained to the Governor-General that the Bombay Company had not ceded to the Marathas, the Mahals of Chikdi and explained that he had not detained Upton for a minute.⁵ On 5th May, Raghoji Bhonsle was given leave from Poona; and Haripant and Hyder were about 30 cos. distance from each other.⁶ On 8th, Chevalier St. Lubin had his audience of the Peshwa, on which occasion the principal ministers were present. The English Vakil could not help observing the difference of his reception and the one given to the French, on these occasions. Sakharan and Nana went outside the tent-walls to receive him as he alighted from the elephant, the Durbar had supplied him with and

(1) Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.7.

(2) Ibid, Vol.I, No.14.

(3) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 85-86. (Bombay to G.G.).

(4) S.P.D., Vol.V, No.87.

(5) C.F.C., Vol.V, No.548.

(6) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 92-93.

introduced him into the Darbar but they had only sent Madhavrao Jadhavrao and Bahiro pant to receive and introduce the English Vakil. Indeed in every respect, they paid the greatest attention to the Frenchman. His real view was to obtain a port on the coast in the Maratha dominions and a factory at Poona.¹ Dhondopant, Nana's agent reported on 23rd May to Nana that Mahadji, and Tukoji were manouvring to support Raghoba.² Mahadji was reported to be at Paithan, on 27th.³ By about 30th May, Mahadji had captured Wadgaon, Herale, Kadoli and Alate⁴ and had set out for Kolhapur by double march on 31st. He had left Salpa on 26th, earlier and Dero Shankar heard the news that Ramchandra Ganesh and Bajipant were recalled. But this would offend Mahadji who would feel that as soon as he set out, the State-army was recalled.⁵ At any rate, it was clear that St. Lubin was in active touch with the Pondicherry authorities and wanted them to believe that, as a result of his negotiations with the Marathas, they were ready to assist the French against the English. Hastings got early information of these designs and was not deceived by the vague assurances of friendship which the Peshwa conveyed to him through the

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 90. (19-5-1777).

(2) Shindeeshehi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.3.

(3) Ibid, Vol.I, No.15.

(4) Khare, Adhikar-yog, p.62.

(5) Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.38.

Bhonsle.¹ The French policy was directed to write the Marathas and Hyder against the English² and "it is a fact that the French were building hopes though not much on St. Lubin's negotiations and the policy sketched in the French memorandum "E'tat politique de l' Inde au commencement de la presente annee 1777," was not unconnected with Lubin's negotiations with Nana."³ "The sad fates of Dupleix and Lally did not diminish the ardour with which the French pursued their ambition in India and their high-bred courteous bearing made an unreliable impression on the natives of India, with whom they identified themselves in a way that seems only possible, among Europeans to Frenchmen."⁴ Hastings was reported to have tendered his resignation in June 1777.⁵ Nana, on 5th June, instructed all to respect Mahadji in his march. Ramchandra Ganesb was ordered to join Mahadji and Patwardhan solicited that Mahadji must be requested not to molest Miraj territory. Nana even hinted to Patwardhans that Mahadji ought to be respected and that when he would reach that part of the country, some family member of Patwardhans must receive him and invite him for feast. It would really not matter much if they would be required to spend some couple of thousand rupees on such occasion.⁶

(1) Milkantha Sastri, "French policy in India in 1777", I.E.R.C.P., Vol.XIII, (1930), pp.116, 117.

(2) *Ibid*, pp.117-120.

(3) *Ibid*, p.116.

(4) *Ibid* c/f Sir George Birdwood's Report on the old records of the India Office. (1891), p.249 note.

(5) Banerji, D.N., "Hastings and his supposed Resignation", I.E.R.C.P., Vol.XIX, (1942), p.27.

(6) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.2158.

It was reported on 6th June, that Mahadji reached Rahimatpura.¹ A thousand horse had devastated the region from Pirankavatha to Digaraj and returned. Mahadji avoided Miraj and marched through Karhad.² Raghoba had made secret arrangements to capture Sinhagad and Purandar and to arrest Sakharan.³ The Kolis at Purandar revolted but perhaps against Raghoba himself.⁴ A report was circulated to the effect that Nana himself was arrested at Purandar.⁵ An attempt on Nana's life, too, was made sometime earlier.⁶ Mahadji was not well when he had his camp at Burkumb. Ramchandra Ganesh and Baji Govind had joined Mahadji near Karhad on the banks of the Krishna. Pratinidhi insisted that Mahadji ought to approach and receive him. Mahadji opined that he did not know that the King of Delhi(?) was somewhere in his neighbourhood, in a jovial mood and declared that he even proposed to place a King of his own on the mangled at Delhi. But, after two hours of hesitation, Mahadji, all alone, on horseback went to his tent. Ramchandra Ganesh wanted to go back to Purandar but Mahadji postponed it for a day and by the same night consulted Balarao and Ranekhan over the matter. Mahadji suspected

(1) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.2129 and p.2692; Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, Vol.I, p.102.

(2) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.2129.

(3) Parasnis, *Peshwa Records*, Chap.1, 67.

(4) *B.H.R.I.*, (1824-1925), 24; *Shindeshahi Rajkarne*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.20.

(5) *Shindeshahi Rajkarne*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.22.

(6) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.2129.

that perhaps he would be trapped and be a victim to Karvirkar's strategy. He decided to take Ramchandra Ganesh who had 8/9 thousand army with him and to march ahead. If Karvirkar would not contract treaty, he would return. Yesaji Shinde sent representations to open negotiations with Mahadji and Mahadji sent them back with Dattu Khijmatgar, next morning. Mahadji's Vakil, Sivji Narayan, who had been to Holkar, was to be sent by him now to Yesaji Shinde. News about Haripant's defeat at the hands of Hyder was reported in Mahadji's camp and everybody ridiculed the Brahmins even in the presence of Mahadji and some opined that to wield the sword was not the work of a Brahmin at all. Bajipant who demanded 10,000 rupees was given only Rs.5,000 who thereupon marched on Yesaji Shinde. Mahadji was wavering in his plans as regards where he should celebrate the marriage ceremony of his daughter and was going to select some place, either Jambgaon, or Ujjain or the very camp, on the bank of the Warna. If the treaty with Karvir was not settled, Mahadji would be undergoing tremendous hardships. Mahadji declared that Yesaji meant treachery and that he had not come to see Mahadji as he had promised. Mahadji would be required to postpone the marriage ceremony and he had no money to pay his army. For want of fodder, Mahadji devastated Batile Sirale. Ramchandra Ganesh urged on the relief to Sirale but Mahadji declared that it was too late as his army had already advanced. It was

reported that the disorder was ripe in Poona city when the tails of cows were cut, the ears of horses were, too, not spared and the images of Ganapati and Hanuman were broken. Mahadji was in his camp near the waras; with the river waras, $\frac{3}{4}$ cos. ahead; the Panhala fort, 4 cos; Shri Jotirling, $3\frac{1}{2}$ cos; and Batis Sirale, $2\frac{1}{2}$ cos. away.¹ Mahadji demanded 25 lakhs of rupees and the accounts of Chikodi and Manoli from Karvir. Holkar after visiting Tuljapur had returned to Kurkumb.²

The Bombay Company was at a loss what credit to give to the information received by Mostyn respecting St. Lubin but at any rate thought that Mostyn be right to encourage the ministers in the belief that St. Lubin was not in reality vested with the commission he had presented to assume.³ By about 25th June, Tukoji showed insubordinate attitude and when being asked to put down the rebellion of Kurkumb, he took possession of the place for himself and Nana deputed his agent Sadashiv Raghunath for a settlement to be effected in consultation with Mahadji Ballal and Shinde.⁴ Mahadji on 26th was approached by Patwardhan on behalf of Ghorpade to settle the affairs of Lat and Ramgola villages.⁵ Mahadji, on

(1) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, Nos.9,10.

(2) Ibid, No.10.

(3) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 117. (18-6-1777).

(4) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.11; Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, Nos.2156, 2158.

(5) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VII, Nos.2385, 2386.

26th, again, assured Nana of his efforts to negotiate for the release of Jivaji Gopal from Kolhapur. The clerk of Karvirkar was told about Jivaji and his release was explicitly rendered the basis for all further talks. Mahadji was told as a reply that Gopal Bhat Shrotri from Poona had been called for this. He would see Nana and when Gopal Bhat would return, Jivaji would be released. Hence, Mahadji awaited Gopal Shastri's arrival and determined to refer to arms in case of the failure of these talks.¹ Nana had disputes with Sakharam over the rights of the Power of Veto (vadiliki) and the Power of Executive (Akhatyari). The power of veto was expressed in the words "Dhyawe", while the power of Executive was expressed in the State papers by the word "Dewave". Nana started using this new remark for every State sanction - namely "Dewave", thereby taking into his hands the power of the Executive.²

In July, scandals were spread about Nana and even the ladies of the household of the Peshwa were not spared.³ Mahadji had sent some good animals, specially one deer for the boy Peshwa, who was particularly interested in them.⁴ Mahadji had informed Nana that Karvirkar had

(1) Sardesai, M.P.H.S., No.39.

(2) Khare, Adhikar-yog, pp.52-53.

(3) Khare, Life of Nana, pp.112-113; Macdonald, Life of Nana, p.33.

(4) Khare, op.cit., p.115.

opened up talks, on 9th July.¹ Gangabai, the Peshwa's mother, died on 12th July and Parvatibai was entreated by Moroba to take charge of the boy Peshwa.² On 13th, Dadarao Nagarow, Vakil of Nawab of Arcot informed Mostyn that Lubien was not authorised to come to Poona either from Europe or Pondicherry. He had taken upon him the title of ambassador in the hope of doing something for himself. Mostyn, too, found that there was some truth in the report as he did not seem to be so much caressed by the Poona Darbar as he was before. Dadarao made them acquainted with this news and indeed as informed by several people, Lubien then appeared to be very uneasy in this situation.³ Severe engagement took place between Haripant and Tipu when Haripant was wounded and he had to retreat to Cassunda, ten cos. northward to the Tungabhadra and Dhousa, receiving ten lakhs of rupees from Hyder was neutral.⁴ From 22nd July to 15th August, news was received from time to time by the Governor-General about the arrivals of the French ships in Chandranagar with the troops from abroad.⁵

Bahadji was approached by Chimappa Panse and Sadashiv Dinkar from Kolhapur for negotiating the treaty. The amounts were to be settled and Appaji Shamji was

(1) Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, vol.VI, No.2138.

(2) Parasnis, *Itihasik Tipane*, I, 18; Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI No.2140; *S.P.D.D.*, Vol.18, 122-124; *Shindeshahi Rajkarne*, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.6.

(3) *S.P.D.D.*, Vol.18, 115-117.

(4) *Ibid.*, 117.

(5) *C.F.C.*, Vol.V, Nos.594, 598, 601, 602, 603, 614, 627, 631.

to be released. Several places were to be ceded to the Peshwa, along with a payment of five lakhs of rupees. But it was found that the Raja was treacherous and Mahadji only solicited great caution in the settlement of the terms.¹ Mahadji requested on 15th July Haripant to believe in his loyal and sincere co-operation and implored him not to put faith in false reports, to the contrary. Mahadji declared that he had been always looking to the interests of the Peshwa and the welfare of Nana. He treated Nana as his brother and he would never be untrue to his relations.² Ramchandra Ganesh was recalled from Karvir to blockade Talegaon against the intriguing English.³ Mahadji was devastating land near Rahimatpura and when requested not to do so, explained that he would stop the ravages in question.⁴ Nana on 19th wrote a very courteous letter to Ahalyabai, expressive of his regard and confidence. Shivaji Gopal was the confidant on both the sides. The Devi was exhorted to remain keen on the interests of the State. A similar letter was addressed by Sakharan, too, to Ahalyabai.⁵

After the death of Gangabai, Parvatibai entreated

(1) Sardesai, H.P.H.S., No.40. (14-7-1777).

(2) Ibid. No.41.

(3) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, p.2979.

(4) Ibid. No.2144. (18-7-1777).

(5) Holkarshahi Itihaseachi Sadhane, Vol.I, No.95.

Moroba to take charge of the child Peshwa. But Nana also went to Purandar on 16th. Ramchandra returned with 150 horse and 3000 cavalry men left with Haripant were also obliging him to return to Poona to get their pay.¹ Lubien explained his plan in memoir to be delivered to the Ministry of France, pointing out that there were sufficient hopes of success. Mon. Duman would be immediately despatched with force which he would land before the English establishment on this and the Coromandal coast and reduce them jointly with the Marathas who were to strike the first stroke.² Mahadji wrote a letter of condolence to the Peshwa and declared that he would release Shivaji Appaji, as per the wish of the dead.³

Naro Shivdev was ready to start⁴ and a grant of saranjam was confirmed on Mir Khan Toke after the demise of his father, Hamid Khan. The grant amounted to Rs.48,307.⁵ Mahadji informed Nana on 20th July that he must be then prepared for effective hostilities against Karvir.⁶ Naro Shivdev, however, communicated to Nana on 30th Mahadji's suspicions that the ministers at Poona were working for his downfall.⁷

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 122-124. (20-7-1777).

(2) Ibid, Vol.18, 123-125.

(3) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.6.

(4) Ibid, Vol.II, No.12.

(5) Ibid, No.13.

(6) Sardesai, H.P.H.S., No.42.

(7) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.14.

While Mahadji was devastating Rahimatpura, on his march to Karvir, Holkar did not leave Kurkumb.¹ While the French intrigues were in high spirit in the Peshwa's Court, Mahadji devastated Wana's and Pratinidhi's pastures on his march to Karvir.² The Peshwa explained that as sovereign State, he had every right to entertain the presence of the envoys from any desiring nation.³ Hyder's Vakil, too, had come to Poona on c. 14th August.⁴ Haripant deplored the deaths of several useful persons in the Maratha State and advised Nana on 19th August to effect a settlement between the Gaikwad brothers.⁵ Mahadji also suggested on 25th August the best course for effecting a profitable settlement between the said disputants.⁶ Nana wrote to Mahadji explaining how Haripant had not fulfilled his promise given to Govindrao at the time of winning him from Raghoba's side.⁷ By about 7th September Mahadji was paying visits to the sacred temples as he was soon going to celebrate Balabai's marriage.⁸ The Raja of Tanjor corresponded with Hyder and the Marathas to open up a front against the English.⁹ There was

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- (1) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, pp.2976-2977.
 - (2) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI Nos.2151, 2155, 2154; *Shindeeshahi Rajkarne*, S.H.S., Vol.II, Nos.15,16.
 - (3) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.2156. (11-8-1777).
 - (4) *Shindeeshahi Rajkarne*, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.17.
 - (5) *Ibid*, No.21.
 - (6) Sardesai, *H.P.M.S.*, No.43.
 - (7) *Shindeeshahi Rajkarne*; S.H.S., Vol.I, No.18.
 - (8) Phalke, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, Appen.III, Nos.22,23.
 - (9) *C.P.C.*, Vol.V, No.694. (9-9-1777).

intelligence received on 22nd August that Mahadji would be deputed to the North and that the negotiations with Raghoba had failed due to the intrigues of Parvatibai who was against Nana. Mostyn was preparing to leave Poona.¹

After the death of Gangabai, the Peshwa himself was not well and suffered from dysentery. Mahadji spent nights over settlement of future plans with Ranekhan, in his camp, visualising all the possibilities in the immediate uncertain future of the Maratha State.² On 20th September Mahadji was instructed for speedy victory over Karvir.³ An offer of peace was made on 30th by Yesaji Shinde to Mahadji on behalf of Kolhapur.⁴ At Talegson, Ramchandra Ganesh was ordered on 30th September to form a camp with 4000 horse to be ready to seize the Ghats in case Raghoba should land at Bellapore and make an attempt to come over them, of which the ministers were very apprehensive. But Ramchandra could not raise the army at all. Tukoji had arrived at Jejuri, 6 cos. from Purandar on 29th, ultimo and had evaded joining the forces of Haripant, alleging that he had been absent from his own country upwards of two years, which was on that

(1) C.P.O., Vol.V, No.694.

(2) Shindeeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.23.

(3) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2168.

(4) Shindeeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.24.

account running to ruin. Like order was despatched to Mahadji's Diwan who accompanied Holkar to Jejuri but he made use of the same plea for his master.¹ Haripant wrote to Mahadji, explaining the situation in the South and sought his advice on 2nd October.²

The Bombay Company observed that the English had been watching the continued intrigues of the Ministers, Narayan deposed, Raghoba elevated to the Peshwaship and a confederacy formed to expel him from it, whose success had reduced the Maratha Empire to be so divided and distracted a State that then it might be said to be annihilated; not a jagirdar or any officer paying other obedience than what a temporary convenience or policy dictated, on the contrary endeavouring to foment the divisions in the Poona Government in order to secure their own independence on it.³ The Sardars tried to secure themselves in the independent possessions of their respective Jagirs and evade payment of the heavy arrears due by them to the Poona Durbar and they meant to effect their views by keeping the Brahmin Government weakened and divided and their conduct perfectly corresponded their policy. It was rumoured again that Mahadji had not sent the real

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 139-140.

(2) Shindebahi Rajkarna, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.19.

(3) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 168-169. (10-10-1777).

Sadoba to Poona but a member of a goldsmith caste and had kept real Sadoba in the Panhala fort.¹

Mahadji had reached Koregaon. Naro Ganesh and Visoba Lambhate joined him. He had collected light army of about 2000 horse and was expected to arrive at Yerawada. Mahadji had intended, too, to pay visit to the Peshwa and Nana.²

The Governor-General got the information in the letters of Sakharam and Nana on 21st October that they had received St. Lubin, and that Tukoji and Mahadji would be sent to Hindustan.³ The Governor-General, on 24th October required an explanation and demanded a reparation from the Peshwa for the attack on the English ships.⁴ Dayanath Pandit informed Beniram Pandit on 26th October that the Peshwa and Nana were at Purandar; Haripant with the troops was on the bank of the Tungabhadra and that Sakharam was with him; the Nizam was on the banks of the Krishna; Shinde and Holkar were at Pandharpur(?) near Sholapur with a view to march to Hindustan. The Englishman arrived in Poona to settle the affairs of Raghoba but the ministers offered four lakhs of rupees to Raghoba. The English were anxious for peace but

(1) Ibid, 145-175 (10-10-1777).

(2) Shinde Shahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., Vol. II, No. 25 (10-10-1777).

(3) C.P.C., Vol. V, Nos. 695, 697, 696.

(4) Ibid, No. 701.

were not serious. The Frenchman had two to three hundred men in Poona and intended establishing a factory. The ministers proposed to give him some other place. The matters were in confusion, in Poona.¹ Tukoji wrote on 27th October to Ahalyabai to honour his note as he stood facing very hard circumstances.² Shamrao was appointed by Raghoba on 30th October as his Vakil to go to Calcutta.³

"Hiring the aid of the Macheri chief and Ambaji Ingle (a Maratha captain posted in the Gwalior district), the Jat Rajah tried to recover Dig, then held by Najaf Khan's agent, but without success. His threat to Agra city also failed through the skilful defence measures of Muhammad Beg Hamadani, Mirza Najaf's local deputy. But the rebels made a successful night-raid on Farah (15 miles north-west of Agra), slew the Mughal Collector, looted the city, and turned the country up to the walls of Agra into a lampless desolation (in July-August 1777). No relief could be sent at that time to the hard pressed imperial agents in this region."⁴ The Emperor had marched from Delhi and took by about 2nd November four forts and twenty thanas (posts) in the province of Indore and Ujjain, so Ahalyabai wrote to Mahadji and Tukoji to march to

(1) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.704.

(2) Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sachane, Vol.I, No.97.

(3) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.715.

(4) Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol.III, p.164.

protect these provinces. There was disaffection in Haripant's army. Manaji Phakde, Simbalkar and Patankar revolted and plundered the camp of officers. Bajipant Barwe, in the name of Hyder, carried it out and Hyder was only 30 cos. away. Nana came to Poona town on 27th December and requested Moroba to take a share in the charge of affairs but Moroba refused to do so.¹

Mahadji himself was not well by about 3rd November and was worried about Tukoji's disloyalty. He made clear by this time his future plans of controlling the affairs of the Emperor of Delhi. When Razaji Patil informed that the debts of Deshmukh had been calculated at Rs.30,000 (the capital being 1½ lakh of rupees), including the interest, as was told by Sadashiv from Naro Shivdev, Mahadji advised to pay only 30,000 rupees and not to care for the interest thereof, at all. Tukoji had refused to reinforce Haripant and Mahadji declared that he would himself join Haripant and defeat Hyder.² But Mahadji, on 6th November, made clear his desire for Bandis, Khandwa and the fort of Asher for himself.³ Yesaji Ranji, a messenger, sent news on 6th November to Nana of a fight having taken place near Pandharpur between Manaji Shinde and Pratinidhi in which the former was routed.⁴

(1) S.P.D.M., Vol.18, 184-186.

(2) Shindebhai Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.26 (3-11-1777).

(3) Ibid, No.27.

(4) Ibid, No.28.

Mahadji celebrated the anniversary of Mansar Shah of Bid, his preceptor. Mahadji was advised in his dreams by him that he ought not to march to the Panhala and so Mahadji suggested that Ranekhan and Ganoji Kadam should lead the forces.¹ When Mahadji was performing his daily worship, he talked with Ranekhan and Sadashiv Dinkar, regretting that the ministers were fulfilling no demands of his and were not prepared to tell him explicitly that he would not be able to march to Hindustan for at least two years, till the affairs of the Peshwa were firmly settled and so he could not even arrange his affairs in the north. Najaf Khan, the Kohillae and others ought to have been checked, he, thought. Even then he was prepared to stay in the Deccan but for what purpose he knew not and Nana even never cared to tell him, why he was detained. Mahadji's talk was overheard by Dattu Khijmatgar and Nana's spy and was reported to him.²

One Captain of the French ship declared that he was present when Nana and St. Lubin mutually swore to the due performance of the treaty, though he was ignorant of the contents of the treaty, except that Nana's enemies were to be considered as the enemies of France.³ The

(1) Ibid, No.29. (6-11-1777).

(2) Ibid, No.30. (8-11-1777).

(3) S.F.D.D., Vol.I.18, 188. (Lewis to Bombay. 13-11-1777).

Bombay Government received letters from London that Raghoba was not to be protected, on 20th November.¹ Mahadji was at Rahimatpura on 23rd November.² On 24th, Mahadji was not prepared to march ahead unless his terms were fulfilled. Balasco was soliciting for the terms of Mahadji namely the Asheri Fort, five lakhs of rupees Jagir in the Deccan and Bhelsa of five lakhs of rupees more. The ministers were prepared to cede Bhelsa only and would give the other parts when Shinde would proceed to the north. Shinde however disagreed to the new proposals.³ The Peshwa wrote a letter to the King of England on 25th November but the Governor-General observed that the address and the appearance of the letter were objectionable but as it touched an important subject, he had decided to despatch it to its destination by a ship which was about to sail.⁴

Tukoji visited the Peshwa at Purandar and was accompanied by Mahadji's diwan. Mahadji himself pretended to be sick at Rahimatpura, a few cos. from the Kolhapur district. Tukoji, when ordered to join Haripant, refused to comply and when he was ordered for the second time, he set off, in contempt, on his march to Chandore, a strong fort belonging to him, 40 cos. northward to Poona.

(1) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2187.

(2) Ibid., No.2189.

(3) Khare, Adhikar-yog, p.52; Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, Vol.VI, No.2190.

(4) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.734; Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, I, 39.

He wrote to Mahadji to follow him declaring that if he did not arrive, he would continue his journey to Indore.¹ Mahadji, on 29th November wrote to Haripant in a frank and open-hearted manner, expressing his views and plans and affording to assist the ministers heartily in their policy of putting down all influences and persons hostile to the Peshwa's Government.² The Governor-General, on 1st December complained to Sakharan about the latter's negotiations with the Frenchman, regarding them as breach of the treaty.³ Raghaji and Diwan Divakar Pandit were at Purandar in December.⁴ Anantrao Jednice forwarded terms on behalf of Moroba, Sakharan, Chintoba and Tukoji, pointing out three possibilities: 1) Raghoba was to be brought to Nasik, the Marathas would join him there. 2) The Marathas would send people to Bombay and themselves would bring him. 3) The English would declare for him when they would immediately send their forces and bring him to Poona. Sakharan was reported to have absolutely refused to have any further connection with Nana, and Nana inclined towards securing French body while Lubien continued to be there, by about 5th December.⁵ The

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 218. (29-11-1777).

(2) Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.31.

(3) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.738.

(4) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.768.

(5) S.P.D.D., Vol.18, 237-40.

Company assured by Hyder's favourable disposition, was prepared to spare a body of troops to join the forces of Sakharan to escort Raghoba to Poona.¹ While on 10th December Sakharan, Moroba, Buchoba Purandare and Takoji regularly applied for the Company's assistance to bring Raghoba to Poona.² Mahadji informed Nana about the settlement of Patesing's accounts when Patesing paid, he informed, two lakhs of rupees; Holkar, too, paid two lakhs of rupees and Abaji Naik Waniwale paid one lakh of rupees. Holkar, still, had to pay one lakh of rupees more.³ The English were encouraging the party at Poona in Raghoba's favour and it was ascertained that M. Pascoal du Santy, charged with despatches for the French Ministry found means to get a passage from Surat, by about 20th November, in a dingy bound to Muscat from whence he might easily proceed to Europe by the way of Glein and Aleppo. He was accompanied by the Secretary to the French Consul at Surat.⁴

When Nana finally accepted Mahadji's terms, Sakharan refused even to promise the same and because Nana sided with Mahadji, the relations between Sakharan and Nana were more estranged.⁵ Holkar by his interference had prevented the ministers from getting 28 lakhs of rupees -

(1) Ibid, 233. (Bombay Consultation).

(2) Ibid, 231-232. (Lewis to Bombay).

(3) Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.20.

(4) Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, Vol.I, p.567.

(5) Khare, Adhikar-yog, p.52.

18 lakhs of rupees from Gaikwad and 10 lakhs of rupees from the sons of Naro Shankar - and himself refused to march to reinforce Haripant.¹ In the first fort-night of December, the ministers fulfilled Mahadji's demands.² On 31st December the Poona merchants were prepared to pay lakh of rupees to the ministers if the economic blockade of Bombay would be released.³ Mahadji had marched now in right earnest, in the second fort-night of December⁴

Nana wrote to Haripant that Moroba and Holkar had revolted and that Mahadji was called from Kolhapur. The Bhonsale from Nagpur had brought his 500 troops near Mahur. Bajipant Anna and Appa Balwant were directed not to march ahead. So Parashuram and Haripant closed their campaign against Hyder.⁵ Nana earnestly entreated Moroba to take a share in the Government but no compromise could be effected. Moroba set out for Purandar on 24th December from Poona, suspecting of a party being formed against him. But Moroba's plea for going to Purandar was only a cloak to his design of joining his friends and hence Nana made use of every artifice in his power to detain him in Poona.⁶ Tukoji had retired

(1) *Ibid.*, p.64.

(2) Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, Vol.VI, Nos.2195, 2200; Phalke, *op.cit.*, Vol.III, Nos. 119, 120.

(3) Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, p.50.

(4) Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, Vol.VI, Nos.2206, 2208.

(5) *Ibid.*, p.3073; Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, p.61.

(6) *S.B.D.D.*, Vol.18, 253-255. (Lewis to Bombay.25-12-1777)

to Watgeon.¹ Nana sent Visaji to bring Tukoji to his side. But he replied that he was the oldest officer of the Maratha State. Tukoji really did not wish to give him any offence and therefore advised him to keep away, but Nana still insisted on Visaji to go and see Tukoji. Visaji would set out in a few days but it was already reported that Tukoji and Visaji understood each other perfectly. Nana now was against having any Europeans in Poona and told the English Resident that a mere clerk was quite sufficient to transact affairs in Poona. Nana and Lubien met for three hours on 28th December.² Nana sent away the staff and jewellery to the Ratnagiri Fort, along with the family of Phadke. Nana himself was protected by a guard of two or three hundred men, day and night. The attempt to seize Moroba failed as Moroba reinforced his men at the foot of Dew Ghat and wrote to Nana that he was much obliged to him for that trick. Nana wrote a pleading letter, entreating him for accommodation. Sakharan complied with Moroba's move of bringing in Baghoba.³

Nana and Sakharan agreed to accommodate Moroba among themselves in the ministry and declared that the three would manage the State affairs. Still more to

(1) Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, Vol.VI, p.3073.

(2) *S.P.D.D.*, Vol.19, 3-6. (29-12-1777).

(3) *Ibid*, Vol.19, 3-4. (Lewis to Bombay. 29-12-1777).



prevent Moroba from joining the enemy, the ministers told him that they were then bankrupt but Moroba should utilize his credit and pay the arrears of the army. However, Moroba refused to comply with.¹ In the second fort-night of December 1777, the ministers agreed to give Shivner Fort to Moroba and a saranjam of 1500 troops was to be assigned to him. There would be three ministers of the State and all powers of declaration of war were vested in their hands jointly. Nana also was to be given a saranjam of 1500 troops while Sakharam enjoyed it already.²

In the beginning of January 1778, Mahadji suggested that Holkar must serve the State equally and might be asked to succour Haripant in the Carnatic as Mahadji had his own difficulties and hence could not himself go there.³ Mahadji, however, offered to go there himself when the Kolhapur campaign would be concluded.⁴ Mahadji Pant gave a letter to Mahadji from Anubai who requested him not to devastate her districts.⁵ Holkar refused to march till Mahadji returned from his campaign⁶ and Visaji actually set out to reconcile him.⁷ Mahadji collected forcefully Rs.5000 from Keso Satchadev of Ashte and complained that the Miraj people had joined the Karvir party. Mahadji

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- (1) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, p.2980.
 (2) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2204.
 (3) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.53.
 (4) Ibid, No.54.
 (5) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2214.
 (6) Ibid, No.2215.
 (7) Ibid, No.2216.

demanded that the Patwardhan army must join him, otherwise he would require new army for the Karvir campaign and he would collect funds to pay it by devastating the Miraj country. For his repeated solicitations for good cannons from Patwardhans, he was not paid heed to, at all.¹ Mahadji was within five cos. from Panhala in the first fort-night of January 1778.² Bajirao II wrote on 1st January 1778 a very diplomatic letter to Lakshman Appaji admitting frankly the mistakes of Raghoba and praised the ministers.³ The Patwardhans requested Nana to restrain Mahadji from aggressions on their territory.⁴

The plan of Moroba and Sakharan was supposed to be sensed by Mostyn and the chowkies were set on the English in Poona. Moroba, it was reported on 2nd January, returned to Poona. The English Resident was watched.⁵ Naro Shivdev on 3rd, requested Nana to send him a formal written assurance that the sanads of Bhandar about which Mahadji was quite likely to enquire would be sent in due course.⁶ Mahadji confiscated Jagirs and properties of Limbhaji Musale, Bharmaji Malavade, Rawloji Bhonsle, Jyoti Pawar on 4th January because they served the Karvir State.⁷ Nana on 5th, sanctioned new divisions between the sons

(1) Ibid., No.2217.

(2) Ibid., No.2215.

(3) Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvyahar, No.155.

(4) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.33; Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, Nos.2214-2218.

(5) S.P.D.E., Vol.19, 13-17. (Lewis to Bombay).

(6) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.32.

(7) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2218.

of Naro Shankar, Raje Bahadur of Jhansi and ten lakhs of rupees were handed over to him for the sanction.¹ News was received about the preparations of the English at Bombay.² Ranekhan advocated on 8th January that Nana ought not to encourage Tukoji unnecessarily and that Nana must follow a policy of severe punishments in order that he might make his word fully respected in the Maratha Government, after the model of the Peshwa Madhavrao. Even if Ahalyabai's grandson was raised to the office, he would have given money for keeping good army for the State which would have marched as per the dictates of the ministers.³

Hyder had secured a complete victory over the Marathas.⁴ Mahadji assumed hard attitude and demanded on 10th January that the Patwardhans must supply him ammunition.⁵ Nana wrote to Haripant to be very cautious as Moroba was returning from Bahul to Poona.⁶ Haripant tried to explain Tukoji's attitude to Nana.⁷ Mahadji exposed Haripant's reliance on Tukoji wherein he pointed out to the grant of a Jagir given to Tukoji by Haripant but declared that he would himself march to punish Hyder. He further pointed out that he would require 30,000 troops and that the country would be foreign to him, in that case. He would require

(1) Parasnis, Itihasik Tipani, V, 11.

(2) Ibid, 25.

(3) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.35.

(4) S.P.D.D., Vol.19, 63-64. (Hyder to President, Bombay. 9-1-1778).

(5) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2229.

(6) S.P.D., Vol.V, No.88. (11-1-1778).

(7) Ibid, No.89.

money for the provision and even if the State could not provide it, it could atleast give undertaking as loan. Haripant had solicited his help and Mahadji had demanded an explanation from the Nizam why Dhowda had not joined Haripant against Hyder.¹ Finally, on 12th, he showed his indignation against the ministers themselves whom he charged of being partial to the interests of Tukoji and desiring to run down Mahadji. He consequently expressed a desire to retire to the north, in disgust.² He approached Shigao, Koregao and Yesaji Shinde opened up new talks.³ On 13th January a drawn-out fight between Mahadji and the Kolhapur party was reported, in front of the town itself, wherein a few men and animals were lost by Mahadji.⁴ Again, news was received by Mahadji that Shivji Vithal, in the north, had routed the Rana of Gohad in a battle at Narwar.⁵

Moroba was ready, even before 13th January to carry on his enterprise but waited to know directly whether the English could join him. Moroba despatched Dadoo to Mostyn for that purpose.⁶ The President at Bombay was in conference, it was reported on 14th January with Moroba's agent and there was a plot to seize Nana and

(1) Shindehahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.36.

(2) Ibid, No.37.

(3) Khare, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2233.

(4) Shindehahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, Nos.38,39.

(5) Ibid

(6) S.P.D.D., Vol.19, 23. (Moroba to Mostyn.)

bring Raghoba in Poona. But the application was solicited to bring Raghoba on this side of the Ghats and ten to fifteen thousand Marathas to join him. The Company again insisted that these proposals must come from Sakharam. Mostyn had set out for Poona.¹ Moroba was then informed that unless Sakharam came forward, no English help would be given.² The Governor-General, however, informed the Bombay Government that the troops for them could not be spared.³

Nana on 15th January approved the settlement of the accounts of dues from Holkar made by Baripant. He also communicated to him Mahadji's wrath at the lenient attitude taken up by Holkar towards the supporter of the Pretender earlier, whom he had seized.⁴ Sakharam and Tukoji resented the understanding that existed between Mahadji and Nana.⁵ Further fighting was reported near Kolhapur and Manekhan assumed diplomatic role and letters were addressed to him. These letters were not even shown to Mahadji.⁶ News came that Mahadji's daughter in the family of Raghaji Angre was dead. Mahadji was on the south bank of the Panchaganga. He had attacked Kolhapur with severity and overtures were carried on but Mahadji now demanded twenty lakhs of rupees,

(1) Ibid, 17-18. (Consultation).

(2) Ibid, 24. (Bombay to Mostyn).

(3) Ibid, 77-78. (G.G. to Bombay).

(4) S.P.D., Vol. 36, No. 339.

(5) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol. I, p. 121.

(6) Shinde Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol. II, No. 40.

while Kolhapur party agreed to pay two lakhs of rupees only.¹ On 16th January Holkar continued at Watgaon and refused to see Nana or anyone whom he might send. Mahadji had raised, earlier, contributions on Janoji Patankar's Jagir near Rahimatpura and in the fight that ensued forth, Janoji was killed. This action, it was said, had caused great discontent among all the Maratha officers in Mahadji's camp.² Rudhoji Bhonsale was at Luckunvadi Ghat, 30 cos. to the eastward up from Aurangabad.³ Mahadji had carried away the cannons, on 17th. It seemed Mahadji anyhow avoided fighting near Kolhapur. Dharrao Shinde's younger brother was in the employ of Kolhapur. Raghopant had come on his behalf for terms. The Karvir State was prepared to pay 2½ lakhs of rupees while Mahadji insisted on 15 lakhs of rupees.⁴ Patwardhane had sent only one cannon for Mahadji⁵ and Nana reprimanded Patwardhane with severity for this lack of interest.⁶

On 20th January there was a rumour that Raghoba was proceeding to Talegaon and the Maratha army was at once dispatched there.⁷ The cannon "Mahakali" was on its way to Mahadji's camp. Nana had sent it and Mahadji promised to finish up the affairs as soon as the cannon would reach

(1) *Ibid.*, No.41.

(2) Forrest, *Maratha Series*, Vol.I, 305; *S.P.D.D.*, Vol.19, 25-28.

(3) *S.P.D.D.*, Vol.19, 25-28.

(4) *Shindeshahi Rajkarne*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.43.

(5) *Ahare*, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.2235.

(6) *Ibid.*, No.2236.

(7) *Ibid.*, No.2237.

him.¹ Nana proceeded to Purandar on 18th, noon, in order to consult Sakharan, through whose means he hoped to persuade Holkar, Shinde to go to assist Haripant. Haripant had received further defeat.² Mahadji opened up the attack from the Rankala Tank when Bhawanji Patil of Ranekhan's side was killed. The strong gate of Kolhapur appeared impregnable and Mahadji returned to his camp with the artillery, by two in the night.³ Hyder had given pledge of support to Karvir and Mahadji still had not received the cannon. He was, however, taking slow but sure steps, encircling Kolhapur.⁴

The English opened up secret negotiations with Sakharan, Moroba and Tukoji. But Sakharan still refused to commit himself. The Bombay Company was convinced of some agreement between the Poona Court and the French, hostile to its interests.⁵ Mahadji followed preparations to blockade and starve Kolhapur to submission. Talks were already opened by Ramajipant, the clerk and Bimbaji Jadhav, but Mahadji now demanded 30 lakhs of rupees while Kolhapur was prepared to pay 3½ lakhs of rupees, on 25th January. Some Potnis promised to capture and hand over Satvoji.⁶

On 26th January, apprehending the out-break of a war between England and France and with a view to averting the

(1) Ibid., No.2238.

(2) S.P.D.D., Vol.19, 40. (Mostyn to Bombay.20-1-1778).

(3) Chindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.44.(23-1-1778).

(4) Ibid., No.45.

(5) S.P.D.D., Vol.19.44.

(6) Chindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.46.

"threatened dangers" of a Franco-Maratha alliance, Hastings planned a diplomatic counter-move.¹ If Bombay should be attacked or in certain danger of being attacked by the French and the Marathas, an offensive war must be undertaken in defence of Bombay.² St. Lubin was referred as the French Minister.³ Hastings again put up the case of Mudhoji Bhonsle against the Peshwa and supported his pretensions to the sovereign power and assured the Bhonsle of the recovery of his dominions, captured by the Nizam.⁴

Raschandra Wilkantha Deshmukh Chikurdekar was asked by Mahadji on 29th January to allow Appajirao Deshmukh to watch and prevent provisions going to Kolhapur from Panhala.⁵ Mahadji himself skillfully set the cannon in the attack against Kolhapur. The Kolhapur garrison was in grave conditions and now the talks were altogether rejected by Mahadji. He was not prepared to accept anything less than 30 lakhs of rupees and was not prepared to leave the attack, atleast for two years to come. He sent back the proposals.⁶ Naro Shivdev on 29th January at the requisition of Mahadji, requested Nana to despatch without delay the large cannon "Mahakali", for the siege-operations. Mahadji was exerting heartily to capture the capital and also the fort of Panhala.⁷

(1) Gleig, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.194-207; Datta E.K., "The French and Warren Hastings, (1778-1779)"; I.H.S.O.P., Vol.XXII. (1945), p.40.

(2) Gleig, op.loc., Dutt, op.loc.; Forrest, Maratha Series.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.47.

(6) Ibid, No.48.

(7) Ibid, No.49.

It was reported on 31st January that Satvaji Khonsle had escaped from the siege of Kolhapur and that Yesaji Shinde and the Maharani were inside still, then.¹ But next day, it was ascertained that it was Yesaji and not Satvaji who escaped to Panhala. The Kolhapur party offered two lakhs of rupees to win over Shankarrao Ghorpade of Khanwad.² Mahadji received on 31st, some cannons from Miraj but still waited for the "Mahakali" to reopen the attack. Talks were afresh opened through Sudashiv Malhar Bakshi. But Mahadji insisted on nothing less than 30 lakhs of rupees.

Mahadji, it was reported on 2nd February had taken into confidence Bhagwant Krishna Potnis, through whose mediation the garrison of Panhala was to be harassed.³ The Governor-General advised the Bombay Government to assist in composing the internal divisions in the Maratha State to prevent the growth of an influence dangerous to the Company's possessions and the Council at Calcutta passed a resolution to support the Bombay Company's plan to support Raghoba.⁴ The Governor-General replied to the objections raised by Francis, and Serwell agreed with the effect that Francis finally adjusted himself conveniently.⁵ Mostyn had not even a doubt of the private agreement which had passed between Nana and W.St.Lubien.⁶ The Board

(1) Ibid., No.50.

(2) Ibid., No.51.

(3) Ibid., No.55.

(4) S.P.D.D., Vol.19, 85-86; 86-88. (2-2-1773).

(5) Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, Vol.1, 579-589.

(6) Ibid., 593.

resolved that Raghoba was to be taken to Poona; that he was to be supported; the plan of the Bombay Government of 10th and 12th December 1777 to be approved and sanctioned; the Company to be paid as compensation by personal security for Raghoba; sum for the military charges; Husein to the English; exchange of territory and that no foreign settlement to be allowed by the Marathas on the coast; ten lakhs of rupees to be sanctioned to support the Bombay plan and military assistance to be despatched to Bombay.¹

Balabai, Mahadji's daughter, it was reported, on 4th February, had joined Mahadji in his camp, earlier, at Tuljapur.² Mahadji, now, awaited the arrival of the great cannon, and found it very difficult to open up his final attack and hence started casting new cannons.² Mahadji accepted for safe custody into his camp, some animals and valuables sent by Shankaracharya of Kolhapur. Hari Sawaji and other families were arrested by Mahadji.³ The inhabitants of the city of Kolhapur were exposed to hardships of water and other necessities.⁴ Mahadji had exposed completely the tripartite alliance between Hyder, Karvir party and the English of Bombay. Hyder had sent five lakhs of rupees to Karvirkar and the English. Mahadji wrote to Hana to send the great cannon immediately and not knowing

(1) *Ibid.*, 577, 572-575.

(2) *Shindekshahi Rajkarna*, S.B.S., Vol.II, No.56.

(3) *Ibid.*, No.57.

(4) *Ibid.*, No.58.

whether the conspiracy was to support Raghoba, insisted that the Raja of Karvir was to be reduced to permanent submission and to wipe out the menace to the young Peshwa, to that extent.¹ Mahadji held a Durbar, it was reported on 8th, for the acceptance of the dresses of honour and the presents sent from Poona, probably received as marks of Mutalikship conferred on Mahadji by the Emperor.² Soon after 8th, February, Naro Shivdev reported the arrival of the Big Gun as far as Jejuri.³ Hastings had justified his policy on 9th and explained that the English were compelled to do so for the Poona Durbar had connections with the French.⁴

Hastings wrote to a friend in London that the Mughal Emperor had Mirza Naja Khan as his minister and that as long as he was there, the English were not afraid of the Marathas.⁵ Hastings equally tried to win over Mahadji by secret approaches, as he did well with the Bhonsle but Mahadji, without discouraging, just killed time.⁶ Mahadji, however, gave parvanas which were required by the English because he was not in a position to reap quarrels with the English.⁷

Tukoji had taken field with 12,000 horse and 5 to 6

(1) *Ibid.*, No. 59. (6-2-1778).

(2) *Ibid.*, No. 60.

(3) *Ibid.*, No. 61.

(4) *Sardesai, Uttarvibhag*, Vol. I, p. 158.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 175.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 159.

(7) *Ibid.*

thousand Pindharis. On 2nd February Moroba left his garden for Visaji Lele's and on 5th, marched towards Purandar. On 2nd, Nana came to entreat Moroba to share the burdens of State and Visaji apprehended an attack on Bassein by the English.¹ The Peshwa, in the Durbar, had given the Jerry-Patka, a flag of distinction, and the Mutalak Sica to Mahadji in order to induce him to join Haripant. Appaji Balwant with 3,000 horse was also to assist him but there were tremendous monetary difficulties. Tukoji was at Satgaon and Moroba had posed that he was marching towards Purandar for some religious purpose. He had already arrived as far as Jejuri.² Moroba and Tukoji were one at cause.³ The garrison of Kolhapur was reduced to extreme plight but Mahadji on 12th February, still, had not received the "Mahakali" - the Big Gun.⁴ Naro Shivdev asked Haripant to be cautious on account of the development of intrigues started by Moroba against Nana.⁵ Sakheram, again, explained the critical position at Poona to Haripant, caused by Holkar's dilatory tactics and Nana's absence from Poona.⁶ But Nana, receiving information, set out on 9th, in the evening, it was reported on 14th February for Purandar

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- (1) S.P.D.B., Vol.19, 65-68. (Mostyn to Bombay. 9-2-1778).
 (2) S.P.D.B., Vol.19, 71-72. (Mostyn to Bombay. 10-2-1778).
 (3) *Ibid.*, op.cit., Vol.VI, No.2247. (11-2-1778).
 (4) Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.62.
 (5) S.P.D.B., Vol.V, No.90.
 (6) *Ibid.*, No.91.

to accompany Sakharan to Jejuri to settle the matters with Moroba.¹

Satwaji Rhonsle came out to attack Mahadji but was repulsed and pushed back into the town of Kolhapur. Mahadji, on 14th, was waiting for the "Mahakali".² Nana complained to Haripant that Sakharan had lost confidence in him and all factions were at daggers drawn in Poona and that amity between him and Sakharan was spoiled.³ Nana again wanted to know from Haripant secretly what had passed in the interview between Sakharan and Shivaji-pant Mirajkar and complained that Sakharan blamed him (Nana) for his absence, declaring it as the cause of all miseries.⁴ Nana, however, assured that when Kolhapur would be subjugated, everything would be quite and suggested that Raghoba was playing mischief on account of the money given by Hyder and Hyder, too, had a big purse with the help of which he could advance big amounts and create troubles.⁵ Mahadji's siege, it was reported on 19th, pressed hard against Kolhapur.⁶ Naro Shivdev again informed Nana that Mahadji was prepared to march to the Succour of Haripant and Naro insisted that Nana should instruct Mahadji not to expose himself in the attack on Kolhapur.⁷ Mahadji again received solicitation

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.19, 69. (Mostyn to Bombay. 14-2-1778).

(2) Shindehahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.63.

(3) S.P.D., Vol.V, No.92. (15-2-1778).

(4) Ibid, No.93.

(5) Ibid, No.94.

(6) Shindehahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.64.

(7) Ibid, No.65.

from Haripant and replied that he would immediately march as soon as the Kolhapur affairs were over. The "Mahakali" had come up to Salpa.¹ The Governor-General informed Mudhoji of the two sections of the English army marching to Bombay through Malwa and Berar, in order to save the English from the intrigues of St. Lubien.² Letters of the same purport were addressed to Devakar Pandit, Sakharan and Nana.³

Wheler had observed in his minute that the military operations must be left to the Bombay Government and that the French were not objectionable at Poona or on the Coast as it would mean a war between two nations. Again, Mostyn had given his opinion that no definite agreement had yet been made between the Marathas and the French and opined that, in the extremity even, it would require no great ingenuity or address to counter-act their intentions.⁴ But the Governor-General replied that all the public advices from Bombay to Poona, corroborated by intelligence through other channels proved beyond a doubt that the French had already formed a close and intimate connection with the ruling administration of the Maratha State, had obtained possession of a port, not a port of trade, but a door for introduction of arms and troops into the Maratha country, almost within sight of Bombay. The Governor-General had

(1) Ibid, No.66. (21-2-1778).

(2) C.P.C., Vol.V, No.815.

(3) Ibid, Nos.819, 820, 821. (22-2-1778).

(4) Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, Vol.I, 591-592.

already informed the Board of an express which he had every reason to believe had been lately sent by M. Chevalier to Malabar Coast, addressed both to M. Bellecombe and the Chevalier St. Lubien and the Governor-General would not be surprised if the next month intelligence should inform the English that M. Bellecombe, the French Chief of all establishments in India, had made his personal appearance at Poona.¹ The Governor-General again observed that if a detachment of much less than 1000 Europeans with arms for disciplining a body of native troops in European manner, should have once obtained a footing in the Maratha country as the allies of that government, all the native powers of Hindustan united, would lie at their mercy and even the province of Bengal would be exposed to their depredations.²

It was hinted that Mahadji was purposely postponing the settlement of Kolhapur as then in that case he would be required to proceed to the Carnatic.³ The Bombay Government was informed on 26th February by the Governor-General that the English force was assembled at Kalpi to march to its support.⁴ Hastings had surmised for the information of the Bombay Government that the English had organised Morobe's affairs as a counter-move against the ministers, so that the enmity which was quietened by the Treaty of Purandar was to be renewed, by about March, 1778.⁵

(1) Forrest, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, 592.

(2) *Ibid.*, 593-598.

(3) *Shindeshahi Raikarne*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.67.

(4) *S.P.D.C.*, Vol.19, 134-136. (G.G. to Bombay).

(5) Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, Vol.I, p.147.

Mahadji offered guarantees to Nana on 28th February that he would never forsake his cause and would always run to his succour, and asserted that Nana should never be doubtful about it.¹ Mahadji complied with the urgent request of Nana to finish up the Karvir affairs as the "Mahakali" was sent to him and to come back to Purandar as his succour was urgently required there.²

On account of the approach of the English army, Nana's suggestion to Shinde and Holker to march against Hyder was not paid heed to. The Sardars did not join the campaign and were reported to be dissatisfied. They did not pay their army and were thinking of getting rid of them.³

On 28th February an attack of Satvaji Shonsle was reported, when Malharrao Pawar of Dhar received wounds.⁴ But the "Mahakali" was now expected to settle the affairs within four days. Mahadji had given Fadnishi to Appajiram Ramaji Dabholkar who was recommended by Nana,⁵ and handed over the whole work to his own Karkhari.⁶

Bellecombe, the Governor of Pondicherry and Governor-General of the French settlements in India, visited the Malabar Coast.⁷ Holker, at Satgaon, sent his son, with

(1) Shindekashi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.I, No.21.

(2) Ibid, No.22.

(3) Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, Vol.I, p.148.

(4) Shindekashi Rajkarne, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.68; Sardesai,

(5) S.P.M.S., No.44.

(6) Phalke, op.cit., Vol.III, No.139.

(7) Sardesai, S.P.M.S., No.44.

(7) S.P.M.S., Vol.19, 82-83. (Bombay to Montyn. 4-3-1778).

a body of men to join Moroba, at Jejuri.¹ Mahadji was irritated by lack of any firm policy on the part of Wana who solicited his coming to Purandar with only select horse and disdained that Manaji Phakde had joined Hyder against Haripant.² Wana himself was advised by Dhondo Bhivrao to be on guard against Moroba who was reported to have gone to Pandharpur.³ It was reported on 5th March that the "Mahakali" was at Karhad and Tipu was reported to have joined with Kolhapur.⁴ The petty skirmishes and harassing each-other were the features of the Kolhapur campaign.⁵

Lala Savakram talked with Hastings on 7th March about the terms of the Purandar Treaty being violated by the ministers.⁶ Raghoba was supported by the Court of Directors and he wrote so to Bajirao Govind Barwa and Hyder.⁷ Lubien's letter to the Portuguese Governor was intercepted by the English and it revealed the fact that Lubien solicited the Portuguese authorities to offer facilities to the French ships, arriving in their ports.⁸

Sakharam had instigated Moroba against Wana.⁹

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- (1) Ibid., Vol. 19, 89-90. (Westyn to Bombay, 5-3-1778).
 (2) Chindeshahi Sakarne, S.R.S., Vol. II, No. 69.
 (3) Ibid., No. 70.
 (4) Ibid., No. 71.
 (5) Ibid., No. 72.
 (6) Parasnis, Maratha Vakil, Chap. III, 2.
 (7) Parasnis, Itihasik Tinane, V, 22.
 (8) S.P.D.E., Vol. 19, 274-283.
 (9) Khare, Adhikar-Yog, pp. 66-67; Parasnis, Itihasik Tinane, VI, 36.

When Nana had gone to Menawali, Sakharan from Saswad and Moroba from Jejuri came to a secret spot and raised the plan of Moroba's revolt. Tukoji accepted Sakharan's terms for his army. Tukoji demanded five lakhs of rupees in advance; and a jagir and a fort, after the success. Nana had equally promised a fort and all expenses of army to Mahadji. Moroba then offered 30 lakhs of rupees through Mostyn to the Bombay Government for bringing in Raghoba.¹ Moroba's gardis and the Pathans started pouring in Poona, in great number, from Aurangabad. Sakharan wrote to Moroba that the secret was out and that Moroba from Pandharpur should make haste.²

Mahadji from Karvir wrote to Tukoji that Tukoji had conspired against Nana with Moroba and Mahadji explicitly warned Tukoji. Hence, Moroba was now out to crush Mahadji.³ The Bombay Company was very happy to find the Governor-General and others supporting their plan to conduct Raghoba to Poona and could only lament that the distrust of the party at Poona had rendered the design abortive.⁴ On the night of 8th March and the following day, 8000 troops were mustered in Poona. Moroba left Jejuri on 10th to arrive at Baramati on 12th and he expected Tukoji to join him after the Holi celebrations.⁵ Hastings, in Calcutta,

(1) Khare, *op.cit.*, p.70.

(2) *Ibid*, p.71.

(3) *Ibid*, p.97; Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, Vol.VI, No.2274.

(4) *S.F.S.D.*, Vol.19, 94. (Consultation).

(5) *Ibid*, 104-106. (Mostyn to Bombay. 12-3-1778).

postponed the calling of the meeting of the Council for a week in order to leave things to time.¹ Mahadji attacked Kolhapur² but when Haripant wrote to him to send a detachment to Kittur where Hyder was playing mischief, he replied that Haripant ought to ask Tukoji to undertake that expedition as he was his dearest supporter. Mahadji coveted himself the Bhelsa jagir.³ Haripant had retreated to seven cos. from Miraj, towards the South. Govindrao Nichure and Gopal Naik Tambhokar were negotiating terms between Nana and Moroba and Moroba insisted on Raghoba's reinstatement.⁴ Yesaji Shinde surrendered on the 7th day, when Mahadji harassed him severally with the artillery action which was reinforced by the "Mahakali", on the fourth day, since the commencement of this new attack. Appajirao, the clerk from Kolhapur, accompanied Jivaji Ballal Shenvi (Givba Dada Bakhhi) and settled for seven lakhs of rupees but Mahadji sent a word that he would demand 20 lakhs of rupees with Chikodi, Manoli Talukas; and Sat Rangoli village from Ghorpade. The said village would be given to the Peshwa. The Karvir party now implored to fix up the settlement at 15 lakhs of rupees.⁵ But Mahadji compelled Yesaji to pay 20 lakhs of rupees, when Mahadji

(1) Forrest, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, 599.

(2) Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VI, No.2264. (15-3-1778).

(3) *Shindekahi Naikarne*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.73. (16-3-1778).

(4) S.P.D.D., Vol.19, 111-112. (Mostyn to Bombay).

(5) Jardesai, *H.P.M.S.*, No.45; Khare, *op.cit.*, Vol.VII, p.3813.

himself would get six lakhs of rupees as a price for raising the siege. Yesaji would pay the rest in four months. He was also to cede Chikodi and Masoli to the Peshwa. Nana had, however, written to Mahadji, before the treaty, to keep 5000 troops there and to come back immediately to Purandar.¹ Raghoba and others were equally writing to Mahadji in March to win him over to their side.²

On 12th, Mostyn had reported on good authorities, that no public agreement had been entered into, between the Poona Durbar and St. Lubien³, yet the Bombay Governor wrote to the Governor-General on 23rd March, "We cannot view this intrigue - the French and the Marathas, - without feeling the most alarming apprehensions of the consequences. In effect this is the sole motive of all the late measures we have taken for the support of your Presidency. We regard the Marathas as the only native and the French as the only foreign power in the East Indies capable of affecting the influence which the English nation has acquired in it. The former were prevented from giving us an immediate or effectual trouble, by their internal distractions and the inequality of their number to the effect of our discipline;

(1) Khare, *Adhikar-yog*, p.62; *Shindechahi Raikarne*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.74; Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, Vol.VI, No.2272.

(2) *Shindechahi Raikarne*, S.H.S., Vol.II, No.75.

(3) *E.P.D.D.*, Vol.19, 104-106. (Mostyn to Bombay, 12-3-1778).

the latter by their want of landed property or any alliance might supply it. An alliance formed between them would at once relieve all their mutual wants and afford them all requisites to dispute with us in equal terms the dominion of the East Indies, which we are at present in a degree possessing without a rival."¹

Moroba was assured of the English help on 22nd March. Gopal Narayan was the agent between Moroba and Nana and he had been unable to produce any proof of Sakharas's compliance with Moroba's plan. Moroba intended to seize and imprison Nana. Dadoopant was to proceed to the Bombay Company and to Raghoba, after taking Bell Bhandar - i.e. the oath, from Moroba. Chinto Vithal and Ballajipant Damle secretly left Poona on the night of 22nd for Holkar's camp. There was panic in Poona on 24th and Nana invited Dhowse and Haripant to his aid. Nana himself left Poona on 24th, in the afternoon, for Purandar. The rest of the Durbar was to follow on 25th.²

Moroba joined Holkar, Chinto Vithal, Bajaba Purandare, Gopal Naik, Balaji Damle, Sadashiv Ramchandra, at Watgaon and marched on Poona with 16000 troops. Nana left his newly married wife at Purandar and himself lived outside that fort. Nana, too, had collected 5000 troops, out of which only 1000 of his and 500 of Pratapdhi were reliable, in case of emergency.³

(1) Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 316.

(2) B.P.D.D., Vol. 19, 108-110. (Mostyn to Bombay).

(3) Khare, Adhikar-vog, p. 71.

Nana agreed to Sakharan's advice and Sakharan gave new terms to Moroba. They all agreed on one point namely not to bring in Raghoba. Further (1) Sakharan would perform the duties of the Executive head of the State; (2) While Moroba would enjoy Akhyatari, - the power of veto - in consultation with Nana, Nana would have no Executive power; (3) No dispute between the Brahmans from the konkan sect and those from the Desh to be fomented and (4) finally, Raghoba would not be allowed to come to Poona, that time, at least. If he would be brought in, at some other time, there would be no objection whatsoever.¹

On 26th March, Moroba was all powerful in Poona. Parvatibai, from death-bed, gave him the robes of honour. At noon, Moroba, accompanied by Chinto Vithal and Haro Shankar's son with 10,000 horse, commanded the citizens to open shops in all streets, in Raghoba's name and not to run away. He had come to the town at 1, at noon time and had gone directly to pay his respects to Parvatibai who immediately had invested him with the Sirpav of Divan, Mutalik Sica, Catyar, Nabut and Jerry Patka. All ministers were replaced by him. He received compliments from Visaji, Sadashiv Ramchandra and Janoba, the Governor of the town and accompanied by them, he returned to his tent on the other side of the river.

(1) *Ibid.*, p. 74; C.F.C., Vol.V, p.xii; S.F.D.E., Vol.19, 105-106. (Mostyn to Bombay. 12-3-1778 for Moroba's early movements.).

Mostyn sent compliments of congratulations but Moroba with Dughoba and Chinto Vithal had gone to see Tukoji who was encamped about 3 cos. off. Sakheram had left Purandar and was expected to join Moroba. The whole force counted 30,000 troops under Moroba. Moroba returned from Tukoji and Mostyn was regretting the success of Moroba as it was effected without the English aid. The revolution, again, had set the French Captain at liberty.¹

Mahadji wrote on the same day that he intended to march for Purandar within three or four days.² Raghoba's ardent partisans - Chinto Vithal, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Nanaji Phakde and even Tukoji - were all too eager to seize power out of spite for Nana and had joined Moroba and Mostyn. "Nana was conscious of his own weakness in not being a soldier and had wisely secured Mahadji's willing co-operation in any dangerous eventuality".³ "Mahadji, too, was shrewd enough to perceive that the presence of St. Lubien caused unnecessary irritation to the English whose power, he knew, was too firmly established in India, to be easily shaken off; while the French power was too weak to maintain its footing. Mahadji, therefore, counselled Nana to dismiss the French agent and thus remove the root cause of the trouble. Nana admitted the

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- (1) S.P.B.D., Vol.19,115-119, (Mostyn to Bombay, 26-3-1778); Vol.19,114 (Consultation); Khare, Adhikar-yog, p.72; Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, Vol.VII, Nos.2279, 2285, 2287, 2288.
 (2) Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.D., Vol.I, Nos.23,24.
 (3) Jardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol.III, p.71.

force of this advice and allowed Moroba to send away St. Lubin.¹

2. Moroba, Buchoba, Tukoji and Naro Shankar's son, attended by all the principal officers paid their respects to Parvati before they proceeded on their march against Purandar. Nana was at Purandar with 5000 troops and was raising more. Moroba removed guards on Lubien, set by Nana earlier and placed his own and put even more restrictions on the French.²

On 29th, Mahadji wrote to Nana that he was settling the terms of the treaty with Karvir and would start immediately after finishing his work³ and advised that Nana must not lose heart and must live with adequate preparations in the fort and again expressed that "he would join him with forced marches."⁴ The agent from Moroba arrived in Bombay on 29th night and urged that no time should be lost in conveying Raghoba to Poona. But the agent did not forward any definite proposals, in particular. However, the preparations were set on foot immediately and 300 European infantry, rank and file; two companies of artillery; 2000 sepoy, rank and file; 500 artillery lascars were to march at a moment's warning.

(1) Ibid., p. 73.

(2) S.P.O.D., Vol. 19, 122-124. (Mostyn to Bombay, 28-3-1778).

(3) Shindeghahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., Vol. I, No. 5.

(4) Ibid., No. 26.

Col. Egerton was in command and Col. Cockburn was second to him.¹ On 31st March, the Minute from Francis explained that the late engagements of the Bombay Government were in violation of the Purandar Treaty and were not approved of by the strict orders of the Court of Directors. But Barwell refuted the objections thus raised by Francis and Wheler.²

(1) S.P.D.D., Vol.19, 121. (Consultation. 30-3-1778).
(2) Forrest, op.cit., Vol.I, 600.

CHAPTER: VI.

The First Anglo-Maratha War - The Borghat Campaign.

From: 29th March 1778 to 15th June 1779.

....

Mahadji imparted instructions, on 30th March 1778, to Nana how to guard the Peshwa and promised to set out soon to join him.¹ Mahadji insisted on 31st March, that Nana must live on the fort with the Peshwa and should expect himself at any moment.²

In the meantime, Hyder reduced Kapaul and Bahadur Benda and by the end of April, formed the siege of Dharwar. Haripant proceeded to Miraj, apparently with a design of forming a junction with Mahadji at Kolhapur and advancing in concert to attack Hyder. Nothing could be more distant from their real intentions but the report was credited by every person excepting Haripant, Mahadji and Nana. Hyder fully believed it and endeavoured to bring about an armistice.³

Raghoba had written on 2nd April to Dipajirao Yerudkar, corroborating the secret intrigue for the arrest of and confinement of the young Peshwa and Nana⁴ and his wife⁵. Raghoba also wrote to Shankraji Moreshwar, in the same connection, asking him to march⁶. The Kolhapur treaty was finally settled when the Karvir Raja was to pay Rs.25 lakhs as fine and would give the posts of Manoli and Chikoli to the Peshwa. The Kolhapur Raja, again, was to grant hostages

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.I, Nos.27,28.

2. Ibid, No.28.

3. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.94; Duff, op.cit, vol.II, p.67

4. Ibid, S.H.S., vol.II, No.399.

5. Ibid, No.398.

6. Ibid, No.400. (5-4-1778).



till the terms were executed.¹

Sakharam joined Moroba, and the English troops were held in readiness at Bombay on 5th April, 1778, to accompany Raghoba to Poona but no new proposals came from Moroba after the revolution in Poona.² The Governor General informed the Bombay Government about the march of the English army under Col. Leslie.³ The Governor General felt that the Poona Durbar had insulted the English agent.⁴ No proposals had come, till 6th April, from Moroba while Raghoba was anxious to march.⁵ Raghoba even fixed up the approaching Monday as the auspicious day to march and the English troops were forthcoming from Madras.⁶ On 8th April, Raghoba informed the Bombay Committee (of the two members of the Council) that his forces were in possession of Kalwa, opposite Thana, which had been delivered to him with five pieces of cannon.⁷ Moroba had paid five lakhs of rupees to Tukoji to join his cause.⁸ Mahadji had renewed hostilities against Karvir, even after the treaty on account of Moroba's revolution. Nana had attained temporary settlement with Moroba.⁹

Holkar was with his army near the Kara. Nana had written, earlier, to Mahadji to come to his succour immediately, but if Mahadji would come back, Moroba and Tukoji would invite Raghoba even before

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1. Ibid, No. 76; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 461; Khare, op. cit., vol. VI, Nos. 2281, 2284; Modak, Kolhapurcha Itihas, p. 70.
 2. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 136-139. (Bombay to G.G.)
 3. Ibid, vol. 19, 222-223. (G.G. to Bombay. 6-4-1778).
 4. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 602.
 5. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 139-141. (Consultation).
 6. Ibid, 146-148. (Consultation).
 7. Ibid, 151, (Consultation. Report of the Committee).
 8. Khare, op. cit., vol. VI, No. 2292.
 9. Ibid, No. 2290. (11-4-1778).

the rains started in full vigour, in spite of the new treaty of theirs. Nana wanted to kill somehow two months and then it would be impossible for the English to cross the Ghats with their bag and baggage. The expedition would be postponed for four months, naturally enough, which would give sufficient time for Haripant, Patwardhan and Mahadji to repair to Poona and punish Moroba and his satellites.¹ Haripant and Patwardhan, hearing the news of Poona, had started of their own accord for Poona and were given good hints not to do so by Nana and Mahadji and from Miraj. Moroba had even organised sabotage in Haripant's army through one prominent chief, Narsingrao Dhygude, with the effect that thousands of horsemen had left the army for their homes and those who remained had harassed the generals for the arrears of their pay. The three ministers had informed Haripant across the Tungabhadra, not to give up the campaign and that they now being reconciled would certainly despatch reinforcements and money. But Haripant, not believing a line, had sent Dhousa to his country, had arrived at Galgale on the banks of the Krishna in Bijapur District. Haripant had just 10 to 12 thousand troops but when he was finally told not to march to Poona, he marched to Pandharpur, by the end of April. Haripant and Patwardhan had, earlier, wanted to join Mahadji at Kolhapur but again there were hints that, that would drive Moroba and his party to extremities. The army of Haripant would have joined any one minister out of the three who would pay for their starving stomachs and Haripant, Patwardhan desired very much that Nana should pay and

1. Ibid, pp. 3186-3188.

and win the army. Nana, of course, had paid accordingly but Nana rightly thought that the worn-out of army of 13000 troops would be of no avail against the mighty combinations. Mahadji had promised to face odds on behalf of Nana but Karvir, encouraged by Moroba, still kept on standing high for a fort-night but when Mahadji finally, with the Gun-Mahakali showed no limit to his ravages and devastation, the Raja had to submit before him.¹

Moroba, Bajaba, Chinto Vithal and Nana paid official visit to the Peshwa and the Peshwa also returned the visit. Moroba despatched Baburao Keshav to Mahadji while Gopal Shastri had already been to him and even returned. Gopal Naik had been despatched to Bombay to bring in Raghoba;² and Raghoba himself had written to Mahadji on c. 18th April³. Nana did not move till Mahadji arrived. He did not even write anything to anybody but sent messages by the runners. Holkar did not want Nana in office, for he was afraid that Nana with the help of Mahadji, would overthrow him.⁴ Mostyn demanded the letter of invitation from Sakharan but Sakharan, knowing the opposition of Nana and Mahadji, refused to do so and Raghoba had to cancel his programme of entering into Poona, on 29th April. Mostyn had to go back to Bombay.⁵

Moroba recalled Manaji Phakde from Hyder and offered him the chieftainship of the Shinde family; but Mahadji wrote to Hyder and Hyder arrested Manaji, there, instead of giving him shelter.⁶

1. Khare, op.cit., pp.3188-3189; vol.VI, No.2302; vol.VI, No.2321; Khare, Adhikar Yog, pp.97-98; C.P.C. vol.V, No.920.

2. Khare, op.cit.; vol.VI, No.2300, 2292-2315; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.120; C.P.C. vol.V, No.995; Rajwade, op.cit., vol.X, pp.134-135, No.194.

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.127.

4. Ibid, p.129.

5. Ibid, p.130.

6. Khare, Adhikar Yog, p.98.

Mahadji enquired as to how the affairs were in Poona with Parashuram and Haripant. They wrote him back that they were on the side of Mahadji and would break Moroba's power. Mahadji said nothing in reply to this but after some days he wrote to them that they should not hurriedly run back. Mahadji had given Nana a definite promise of help but Parashuram doubted about Mahadji's sincerity. Gangadhar Patwardhan wrote about Mahadji that as Nana and Sakharam had promised a jagir to Mahadji, he would be true, but pointed out that Mahadji was also true to Moroba. But Mahadji, in his own way, was not at all weighing these considerations but was determined to fight for the cause of the young Peshwa.¹ When Moroba was bent on inviting the English and Raghoba, and had written the note to Sakharam that if Patwardhan, Nana and Mahadji were not crushed, they themselves would no more live. This note Nana produced and showed to Patwardhan and Mahadji.²

In April, the Moroba's party had arranged the distribution of offices: Bachoba, whose family had the sanad from the Chatrapati, to be Diwan to the young Peshwa; Sakharam to be his Naib and Moroba to be Diwan to Raghoba. The Executive authority was to be in Moroba's hands, though he was always to consult Sakharam. They desired Nana to accept the office of Fadnis or Collector-General of Revenues but he refused.³

The Governor-General tried to secure permission of the Peshwa to march a detachment of troops through the Maratha territory.

1. Ibid., p. 99.

2. Ibid., p. 86; Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. VII, No. 2353.

3. S.P.D.D., vol. 19, 189-192. (Mostyn to G.G. 19-4-1778); C.P.C., vol. V, No. 890.

Moroba, it was reported on 26th April, visited Sakharam and so Chinto Vithal who was to be sent to Raghoba first, now no more was to be sent and instead Dadoopant would proceed¹. The Bombay Company wrote to the Court of Directors, regretting that Moroba's revolution was carried out without the English aid and that Raghoba's position in the new set-up was uncertain. The forces at Kalpi were not to march further, on account of the expenses. However, reinforcements were expected by the Bombay Company from Madras as Raghoba desired the English aid for the Maratha districts.²

While Mahadji informed Nana on 28th April of his having communicated all his views with regard to the conduct of affairs to Baburao Keshav Thakur (of Limb near Satara), confident of Nana;³ Raghoba was supposed to have secret understanding with Mahadji⁴. The Poona Durbar offered new terms to Raghoba but these were same as those of 1768, between Raghoba and Madhavrao, namely 10 to 12 forts with 17 lakhs of rupees worth jagir. Raghoba, however, flatly refused.⁵ The Bhonsle assured the Governor General on 30th April assistance and passage to the English forces passing through his territory.⁶

The Bombay Company was surprised at Raghoba's private engagements with the Poona Court on 1st May and Mostyn was permitted to come back.⁷ On 2nd, the Bombay Company observed that the English still did not assign any specific part to Raghoba. Lubien was still

1. Ibid., vol. 19, 185-188 (Mostyn to Bombay).

2. Ibid., vol. 19, 177-185 (Bombay to Court).

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S. No. 46.

4. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, I, 38.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 19, 194-195. (Mostyn to Bombay).

6. C.P.C., vol. V, Nos. 898, 899.

7. S.P.D.D., vol. 19, 192-193. (Consultation).

in Poona and the Pattamars from Madras were stopped at Poona and the packets were opened. Sir Edward Vernon went to Chawl and Bellicombe remained at Mahy. Brillante proceeded to Mangalore where several artillery officers, two hundred men, a large quantity of military stores were landed for the services of Hyder Ali.¹ The English ordered the Bengal detachment to advance and Mostyn was informed accordingly.²

Raghupatras, son of Naro Shankar, encamped with Holkar and declared that unless Raghoba was brought into the Government, he would march with 4000 horse to Konkan. On 2nd, Sakharan paid visit to Tukoji and returned to Moroba and set out by 4 in the evening to Nimbgaon, six cos. on this side of Satara, for his marriage. Moroba was advised not to bring Raghoba. Buchoba and Holkar but were determined otherwise. Moroba guarded all the Ghats and Lubien was given Conge's by him. Moroba by about 6th had not issued dastaks for the Bengal army.³ The Poona Durbar showed unfriendly attitude towards the English and Moroba gave evasive answers, Sakharan was busy with his marriage. Haripant had arrived at Mudgul, about 100 cos. from Poona, with only the State army. Moroba intended bringing Anandibai and Bajirao. Bajirao would live with the Peshwa in the fort and Raghoba would be invited after the Dasara. Tukoji, however, disapproved of this plan and the troops were despatched to guard the Ghats.⁴ By about 9th May, French- Hyder relations were friendly and the London Gazette of 16 December 1777, now it was known here, had

1. Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 620-621.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 19, 206-209. (Consultation, Bombay to G.G. 9-5-1778-pp. 208-209.)

3. *Ibid.*, vol. 19, 213-221. (Lewis' proceedings).

4. *Ibid.*, vol. 19, 213-221.

declared the surrender of General Burgoyne in America. The Council of Bussora informed, again by the latter end of January that two Frenchmen were arrived at Grain from Surat and proceeded to Aleppo to see the French Minister in connection with the activities of their nation at Chawl.¹ The Bhonsle, however, assured the Governor-General that the welcome to the French at Poona was with the view to attack Hyder and not for any other purpose.² Mostyn wrote on 11th May 1778 to Kalpi that he was unable still then to secure permission for the passage from the Maratha Darbar.³ Lubien had not yet been to Purandar.⁴ But the Marathas had begun to show sympathies towards the French and on 13th May, Nana delivered a paper to St. Lubien and sought the assistance of the French, "to punish a nation who had raised an insolent head and whose meanness of injustice was full".⁵ The Bombay Company wrote on 14th to Kalpi, ordering the General to march ahead.⁶ Parashuram Bhanu joined Haripant by about 15th May⁷ and the Poona Government objected to the march of the Bengal detachment. Moroba wavered in his invitation to Ragoba, though Lubien received formal dismissal.⁸ Mostyn advised the English to apply to Tukoji and Mahadji for the passage to the Bengal Detachment.⁹

Everything depended on Mahadji and hence Sakharam negotiated with him on 3rd May.¹⁰ Mahadji had already taken the decision to

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1. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 630-631.
 2. C.P.C., vol. V, No. 913.
 3. Forrest, op. cit., 629, 621-622.
 4. Ibid., 621-622.
 5. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 356-357; C.P.C. vol. V, No. 982; Diskalkar, D.B. "George Gray's Embassy to Hyder Ali", J.I.H. vol. XI, (1932), p. 312; Abdul Ali, op. cit., I.H.R.C.P. vol. XII, (1929), p. 111.
 6. Forrest, op. cit., pp. 629-630.
 7. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2341.
 8. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 239-241 (Mostyn to Bombay).
 9. Ibid., vol. 19, 230 (Consultation Letter to Mostyn. 16-5-1778. pp. 235-237.)
 10. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2341.

punish Moroba".¹ "He closed his operations against Kolhapur and started for Poona, cautiously feeling his way and gathering individual sentiments without giving the least sign of how he was going to act. Apparently he assumed an entire unconcern about the Poona administration and thus lulled Moroba's suspicions as his powerful arm was alone the decisive factor. Moroba was still thinking of dispatching Chinto Vitthal to Bombay to bring in Raghoba without further delay".
 "Moroba, Sakharan and Tukoji, all in turn, tried their utmost to meet Mahadji and earn his good grace. But Mahadji having been well posted with every detail of the situation, studiously avoided meeting anybody, not even disclosing the route he was taking in his journey to Poona".²
 Mahadji left Shirol near Karvir on 15th May and reached Lonad on 31st and by that time, as was previously arranged, Haripant and Patwardhan also came nearer.³ The Karvir Raja had promised to pay two lakhs of rupees for Shirol to Mahadji who accepted the term but the Raja did not keep up the treaty and so Patwardhan decided to run over Shirol.⁴ The Raja, under the guise of negotiations called Bawadekar Amatya and his Karbhari, Vishalgadkar Pratinidhi, Appaji Shamji, Baburao Godnis, Raghoba Patharya, Sandaltikar Gosawi in all eleven persons together and arrested them. By the treaty again, the Raja was to pay eleven lakhs of rupees to Mahadji. Amatya and Pratinidhi were appointed to collect the sum. After three days of starvation, on the 4th day, Pratinidhi and Amatya were released when a note

1. Ibid, No. 2335.

2. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 74.

3. Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 99; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 127.

4. Khare, Itihasik Lekhe Sangraha, vol. VII, p. 3473.

of acceptance of five lakhs of rupees on the accounts of Mahadji was forcibly secured from them.¹ Bachaji Vishwanath was sent into the province of Chikodi with instructions to recover any Thanas (posts) or villages taken by Hyder and to attack the properties of persons who might be found to have gone over to him or Yesaji Shinde of Kolhapur.²

Mahadji on his way, visited the temples of Tuljapur, Pandharpur³ and earlier, had visited the Shrine (Samadhi) of Shri. Guru, from Sangam and Ratnagiri.⁴ Sakharam, in order to disguise his share in Moroba's affairs, started to join the Carnatic campaign but he never actually left.⁵ Mahadji had called Haripant⁶ but Mostyn at Poona still believed that Mahadji himself was in the conspiracy to bring in Raghoba. Hearing the news that Mahadji was at Lonad, Sakharam started to meet him, but Moroba put a stop to it and Sakharam and Moroba went to Saswad. Moroba was watching Sakharam, in case he would run to Mahadji but Moroba soon changed his mind and requested Sakharam to see Mahadji and arrange a meeting for them. Sakharam also agreed to do so.⁷

Pandurang Krishna, probably writing to Sakharam, informed how he and his party were harassed by Mahadji's troops on his way. He, however, managed to reach Saswad and took shelter in Sakharam's house. Mahadji suspected Sakharam of disloyalty to the State and was possibly hunting out his accomplices at this time.⁸ The French

1. Khare, *Op.cit.*, No. 2348 and pp. 3227, 3463-64.

2. *Sat. Raj. Diar.*; vol. IV, No. 381.

3. Phalke, *op.cit.*, vol. II, Appen. III, No. 13.

4. Phalke, *op.cit.*, Nos. 19, 18, 21, 14, 17, 15, 16.

5. Khare, *Adhikar Yog*, pp. 70-71.

6. Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, vol. VII, No. 2323.

7. Khare, *Adhikar Yog*, p. 79; Gleig, *op.cit.*, vol. II, 215-216; Khare, *Itihasik Lekha Sangraha*, vol. VII, No. 2347.

8. *Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S.*, vol. II, No. 2.

vakil was given conge'e, in Poona, in the second fortnight of May, when Mahadji had reached Salpa.¹ But Mostyn still believed that Mahadji was on the side of the English for Mahadji had sent from his Kolhapur march the parwana through him to allow Leally's army through his territory.² Notwithstanding the request then made to Moroba by the English, in Public Durbar, to accompany their agent to Bombay with proposals respecting Raghoba, the English found that the Marathas were only trifling, nor had they taken any steps towards settling the business or fulfilling the unexecuted articles of the treaty. The English began to suspect that Moroba was unwilling to part with any share of his power to Raghoba and might probably seek to secure the whole to himself.³

When Mahadji was at Shirol, Dhygude and Appaji Pant Gondhale and Lakshman Barwe came with three lakhs of rupees to Haripant's army to win over secretly the army to Moroba's side.⁴ But now Mahadji was expected at any moment in Poona.⁵ Ahalyabai wrote to the Kamavisdar of Indore to pay respectable and hospitable attention to the needs and demands of Shrimant Anandibai but a hint was also imparted that the military attendants should not be very many in number, even though Anandibai demanded to that effect. The escorting party was given to understand also that the chariots (Ran-gadas) might break out if the military was not on the spot.⁶ On 20th May, it was reported that Ballaji and Gangadhar opposed Col. Leslie in

1. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2350.

2. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.127.

3. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, p.319.

4. Khare, op.cit.; vol.VII, Nos.2352, 2353, 2345, 2355.

5. Khare, op.cit.; No.2343.

6. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.99 (23-5-1778).

his march.¹ Francis observed that the Marathas opposition was unexpected and again, Francis, Wheler, Barwell approved that the military authorities would be immediately consulted on the conditions of the army.²

Moroba had made arrangements with Lubien to bring in 500 Europeans in 40 days and Lubien was promised the command of artillery of the Marathas. On 23rd, the Pattamar carrying letters from the English to Holkar and Shinde was seized at Kalwa and sent to Moroba. Mostyn informed Holkar about this affair and applied for a letter of Holkar for Moroba.³ One Shukji from Purandar informed Mostyn that Lubien had agreed with Nana to bring in 2000 Europeans within 15 months and that Lubien even then was in a position to bring men whom Moroba would supply with ammunition before the battalion from Calcutta would arrive. Haripant was to be consulted before sending for Raghoba. The Poona Durbar wrote a letter to Europe against the Governor-General in India and also informed the Nizam about the affairs.⁴ Because the Bengal troops advanced and Hyder was equally aggressive, Tukoji, Moroba and Sakharam consulted together and requested Mostyn to accompany Chinto Vithal this time to Bombay.⁵ Moroba thus despatched Chinto Vithal and Gopal Naik Tambhekar to Bombay in June, 1773.⁶

On 27th May, Mahadji was awaiting the arrival of Parashuram Patwardhan.⁷ Moroba's secret alliance with Sakharam against Mahadji and Nana was detected by Nana and sent to Mahadji.⁸ On 28th May,

1. Forrester, Selections from Foreign Papers, vol. I, 612; C.P.C. vol. V, No. 939.

2. Ibid, vol. I, 612; C.P.C. vol. V, No. 924.

3. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 261-62. (Mostyn to Bombay. 25-5-1778).

4. Ibid, 262-264, (Mostyn to Bombay. 27-5-1778).

5. Ibid, vol. 19, 264-265. (Mostyn to Bombay. 27-5-1778).

6. Ibid, 264-265, 288-289.

7. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2351.

8. Ibid, 2353 (28-5-1778), 2355.

Mostyn reported that Mahadji was 12 cos. from Purandar and opined that because the Poona Durbar was much divided, Holkar urged the ministers to bring Raghuba, in which, Mahadji would most likely concur.¹ Moroba objected to Lesly's march from Bengal and Mahadji had arrived at Rahimatpura and granted passports for Lesly's army.² Even by about 29th May, Nana had a treaty with the English against the French.³

By the beginning of June, Mahadji reached the environs of Poona and was joined by Haripant and Parashuram Patwardhan. Mahadji was received by the prominent gentry.⁴ News was imparted to the Governor-General that Haripant was a force and that Mahadji and Dhonsa could not be ignored by the English.⁵ Along with Sakharam, Moroba advanced to Jejuri where Mahadji was expected to arrive.⁶ Bajaba Purandare, Raghupat Narayan, Bhivrao Panshe, Pandurang Baramatikar, Appa Balwant, Ramchandra Ganesh, Ganesh Kashi Katre, from both sides, started with 3000 horse to meet Shinde at Parinchya. Tukoji and Visaji were not there in this assemblage. They, however, intended to see Mahadji on his way to Jejuri but Mahadji refused to see Moroba and went to Morgao.⁷ Sakharam, however, declared complete surrender to Mahadji and on 5th June at Morgao where Sakharam had come all alone, Mahadji pardoned him.⁸ On 12th June, when Mahadji was already joined by Haripant and Patwardhan, as aforesaid, Sakharam came to the camp. A new confederacy was formed with Haripant,

1. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 321.

2. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 289-296. (Mostyn to G.G. 29-5-1778).

3. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, I, 50.

4. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 74.

5. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2355; Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 100; Sardesai, C.P.C. vol. V, No. 984. Uttarvibhag vol. I, 127.

6. Sardesai, Op. cit., vol. III, p. 74.

7. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 132; Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 100; Sardesai, New History of Marathas, vol. III, p. 74.

8. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 305-307. (Mostyn to Bombay); Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 100.

Sakharam and Patwardhan but Sakharam insisted that Mahadji should see Moroba. Mahadji did not want to do so but respected Bapu's words, as on 13th June he went to Nazara to Bapu himself with 10,000 troops where Moroba had come with 3000 of his own, too. Mahadji did not go ahead in honour but while standing met Moroba, casually, in the tent and returned to Morgao. Mahadji had talked absolutely nothing with him. Moroba himself was disappointed by this humiliating treatment. People understood that Moroba's fate was sealed.¹

Sakharam then suggested that a war must be avoided and Mahadji agreed with him. Mahadji called Haripant and reconciled him, too, to Sakharam.² Haripant and Patwardhan did not like conciliation by Sakharam and intended to attack Moroba who had just 18000 troops while they had 40000 troops under them. On Friday, Parashuram went to Mahadji's camp by night and returned in the morning, next day, fixing to start for Purandar on Sunday as Mahadji advised that if Moroba was attacked, Tukoji would escape to Raghoba and it would be a long war then. So the best course would be to see Nana first at Purandar. Mahadji knew that Haripant's army was riotous but Patwardhan still got the impression that Mahadji had been persuaded by Sakharam.³ Mahadji meanwhile won over Tukoji to his side, too.⁴

Holkar and others had joined the ministerial party and it was supposed that Holkar would reconcile Moroba to the Ministers. It was stipulated that Mahadji and Tukoji would march to Badami with

1. Khare, *Adhikar Yog*, p.101, Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, vol.I, 132.

2. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas*, vol.III, p.74.

3. Khare, *op.cit.*, .

4. *Ibid*, p.102.

4. Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, vol.I, p.132.

Ramchandra Ganesh as Tipu had besieged that place.¹ On 3rd June, it was reported that an attempt was made to kidnap the young Peshwa from the fort by one of his relations, who was likewise one of his attendants. He had got the Peshwa, halfway down the hill, when he was stopped. The Peshwa was sent up the fort and the man was sent a prisoner to Lohgad.²

Moreba offered terms to Mahadji and started with Sakharam to visit Mahadji but Mahadji left Nira and approached Moreshwar. Haripant, too, followed. Mahadji was unmoved even after the interview with Sakharam. Mahadji, intending to see the Peshwa first, encamped at Kumbhar Valam on 6th June³. On 8th, Mahadji, Haripant and Patwardhan came nearer to Purandar and Parashuram had half an hour's talk with Nana. Then Mahadji and Sakharam interviewed and it was followed by Mahadji and Nana's conference which lasted for one hour. Then Mahadji, Sakharam and Nana together consulted. Patwardhan, however, regretted that Bapu was saving the Deshastha Brahmins at the cost of the Konkani Brahmins and that Bapu was against Haripant and Patwardhan.⁴

The fort of Asher was given to Mahadji for keeping his family there and the pargana of Asher was assigned to him in military Saranjam.⁵ Clothes worth Rs.205 were received by the Peshwa from Bhopal state and similar presents were also received from Mahadji, Tukoji and Pant Sachiv and others.⁶ Mahadji had requested that the

1. Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. VII, Nos. 2356, 2358; Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 96.

2. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 304-305 (Mostyn to Bombay. 3-6-1778).

3. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2356, 2358; Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. Vol. II, No. 96.

4. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 321-322 (Mostyn to Bombay), (Mostyn to G.G. 10-6-1778) 322-324; (Mostyn to Bombay 12-6-1778) 324-326; (Bombay to Court. 17-6-1778), 328-333; Khare, Adhikar Yog, pp. 102-103.

5. Sat. Raj. Diar. vol. IV, No. 264.

6. Ibid., vol. IV, No. 103.

fort of Jaga situated in the bed of the Nerbada in Hande Taluka might be given to him to enable him to put down the Bhils who were infesting the territory along the Nerbada. His request was granted and Naro Ballal was directed to hand over the fort to him.¹

The Governor-General complained to the Peshwa on 9th June about the opposition offered by the Marathas to Col. Lesly's detachment.² However, the Bombay Company informed the Governor-General, "that the opinion they had formed on the present situation of affairs and their desire to save the Company from the heavy expenses and their troops from the dangers and difficulties of a march from Bengal provinces to that side of India had led them to put a stop to the march of the army." Lesly's march again was declared by Francis as expensive, dangerous and difficult.³ It was pointed out that Hyder was at war with the Marathas and the French had helped him; so it was impossible then that any intrigues between the French and the Marathas could have taken effect, if ever they existed but the Governor-General constantly believed in the Maratha-French alliance while Francis refused to do so. The Governor-General wrote to Mostyn that the new ministers by a dilatory and evasive conduct, had already furnished grounds to distrust the sincerity of the intentions which they had professed to him.⁴ News reached, indeed, on 12th June, the coast of India that, there was war between France and England and that the French fleet was on the way to India.⁵

1. Sat. Raj. Diar., vol. IV, No. 265.

2. C. P. C., vol. V, No. 946, Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 618.

3. Forrest, op. cit., vol. I, 622.

4. Ibid., vol. I, 622-625.

5. S. P. D. D. vol. 19A, 2-4 (News from Cairo); vol. 19, 310-319, (Consultations).

After 12th June, Mahadji had won over Tukeji to his side. Mahadji also brought Bapu and Nana together for a secret meeting in his presence and arrived at a definite plan in which they were all to co-operate sincerely in supporting the young Peshwa. He at once committed the whole plan to writing and compelled Nana and Bapu to sign it under solemn oaths. Similar oaths of fidelity and co-operation were exchanged at Mahadji's instance between Sakharan, Haripant and Parashuram Patwardhan, thus binding for the moment all the prominent members of the defunct Barbhai Council with two military leaders - Mahadji and Tukeji - backing the project with their armed strength.¹

Mahadji also managed to rigidly exclude evil spirits like Chinto Vithal, Naro Ganesh (Holkar's secretary) and others who had sympathies with Raghoba. This grand stroke of policy was secretly delivered by Mahadji to control a situation which was full of dangerous potentialities of a bloody civil war. He disclosed a masterly grasp and remarkably long views on the future of the Maratha State, thus thwarting British ambitions effectively by keeping away Raghoba.² On 13th, Raste and Shinde forces marched to defend the Ghats. The ministers and Mahadji wrote to all to leave Moroba's side and join them.³ Bapu and Nana again arrived in Mahadji's camp. Bapu still insisted that Nana should not enjoy Executive powers and Mahadji had to reconcile them again on 16th June. They all then visited Patwardhan in the evening. Mahadji did not want Moroba to be accommodated at all and

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, 74-75.

2. Ibid.

3. Khare, op.cit.: vol. VII, No. 2363.

and hence Moroba became desperate. Tukoji had complained to Mahadji that Sakharam had deceived him and suggested that Moroba should be sent to Benares or must be accommodated by them. Mahadji told Tukoji explicitly that Moroba's question would be tackled separately and that Tukoji singly should join him immediately. Mahadji personally went to Tukoji's camp twice or three times and hence on 19th June, Holkar descended on Saswad with his army. Mahadji immediately moved his army near him, too. Visaji and Anand Gopal also came in his neighbourhood.¹

Naro Ganesh had advised Tukoji to conspire and so Mahadji informed Tukoji to hand him over to him. When this was refused, Parashuram even attacked but Mahadji put a stop to the final war when Tukoji handed over eight persons including Naro Ganesh, Gopal Naik Tambhekar. Moroba collected his army and invited those who were prepared to die, for meal- a feast of death- but only 1200 attended. Moroba meant harm to Bapu on his way to Saswad. Bapu approached Nana through Panse, then reconciled to him by Mahadji, on sacred oaths. Mahadji and Tukoji met and together visited Nana. Thence Holkar came to Mahadji's camp, too. Now all intended to march to Carnatic. Nana and Moroba, however, were prepared for a contest. Moroba still pressed for Raghoba's return with the English military aid. Moroba even tried to negotiate through Mahadji so that all would march against Hyder.²

1. Khare, Op.cit, vol.VII, Nos.2365,2397; Khare, Adhikar Yog, pp.104-108, 109. Parasnis, Itihasik Tinang, I, 29.

2. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 137; Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol.VII, Nos.2397,2368,2371,2372; S.P.D.D. vol.19, 352-354 (17-6-1778) Mostyn to Bombay; 354-356 (Mostyn to Bombay.21-6-1778).

Raoji had reported to the Nawab of Arcot on 15th June that Mostyn was from the very beginning at the root of Moroba's revolution on and was awaiting Raghoba's army, advancing from Bombay.¹ Mahadji's munshi informed Raja Govind Ram of the wazir's court that Mahadji was on 15th June, in receipt of his letter and informed still further that Mahadji had gladly accepted the proposal to form an alliance with the English. The writer himself offered to undertake the negotiations of peace between the English on the one hand and Mahadji, Tukoji and the Peshwa on the other. The wazir was again informed that if presents were to be sent, the ministers must not be forgotten. Malkar Naik and Haridas intended to return to Mahadji through the wazir.² The Governor General had written a complimentary reply to Mahadji on 15th June³. Mahadji, too, had written on 15th June, approving the suggestions of friendship on the part of the Governor-General but explicitly maintained that the Maratha Sardars were not at all for the English. He, however, promised that he would try his best in spite of all the difficulties.⁴

Leslie moved from Kalpi on 19th May 1778 (and not on 4th May)⁵ and came to the Betwa river by about 15th June, and awaited further orders from the Bombay Company, there, in order to prosecute his march. He complained that, "the backwardness which the Maratha ^{chiefs} had shown to the performance of the engagements they had entered into

1. G.P.C. vol.V, Nos.953,954 (Pitambar Das from Poona to G.G.)

2. G.P.C. vol.V, Nos.956,959,971.

3. Ibid. 959.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 156.

5. Dutta k.k.; "The French Menace and Warren Hastings, 1778-1779", L.H.B.C.P. vol.XXII, (1945), p.40.

with him made him dubious of their real intentions.¹

As per his conciliation through Mahadji, Tukoji left Moroba and approached Kumbhar-valam when Mahadji joined him. There were three camps. (1) Mahadji and Tukoji with 30/35 thousand troops near Saswad. (2) Nana, Haripant, Parashuram, Appa Balwant, Ghorpade, Patankar, Darkar, Himbalkar-together, 20000 troops, near Purandar, outside the fort. (3) Moroba and others with 4000 troops, 2 cos. away from others, near the river Kara. Moroba was consistently negotiating with Nana that they would together punish Bapu. Nana and Mahadji, however, had refused to do so. Moroba tried to give fresh terms through Mahadji but Bapu and Nana refused to accommodate Moroba, at all. Then thirdly through Mahadji and Tukoji, Moroba pleaded to keep Shivneri fort, Jaripatka and Shikkakattyar. But he was told to take 200 horsemen to Bahul near Bhima and 400 state horse would watch him. He then pretended to be desperate.² Moroba after "the Feast of death", was secretly trying to escape to Bombay or Hyder or Shivner. Mahadji had sent 5000 men to escort Nana who fled to him, carrying his men, amounting to 2000 men and bazar. Nana after his arrival wrote to Moroba requiring him to deliver Shikka, Kattyar and Jaripatka which the latter refused. Many inferior officers of Moroba received notes from Nana to join him. So on 22nd June, as per order from Nana, Haripant and Patwardhan attacked Moroba by dawn. Moroba sent last hour appeals to Mahadji to save him. So they stopped the battle for a day. Next day, Moroba was to proceed to Bahul; but Haripant and Patwardhan disagreed and hence

1. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 628-629.

2. Khare, op. cit. vol. VII, Nos. 2374, 2375, 2376: S. P. D. D. vol. 19, 343-344 (Mostyn to Bombay). Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 106.

Mahadji sent Balarao Govind and Naro Ganesh with 1200 troops to round up Moroba but still Moroba took four more days. Moroba on 28th June in the night fled to Lohgaon and delivered Shikka and Kattyar to Tukoji who demanded them. Tukoji then handed them over to Mahadji who sent them to Nana. Moroba went to Bahul but he was not inactive there: So Nana, sending the army there for bringing to order the Kolis' revolt, captured Moroba on 12th July and kept him on Gultekdi. Moroba pleaded that he should be sent to Miraj fort as a prisoner but Parashuram Bhaui remonstrated.¹ Naro Ganesh had paid a lakh of rupees to Mahadji and had thus saved himself from arrest.² There was news also that Nana had promised nine or lakhs of rupees each to Mahadji and Tukoji - ten out of which were already paid and the remainder was to be paid, within short time thence. So that Tukoji before Moroba's final defeat had come from his rear to the front.³

Mahadji and Tukoji were to go to Saswad on 21st June⁴. But Mostyn contended that they were blinding Nana's party into a belief of security and permitted them to go on: while, so Mostyn reported, Manaji Phakde and Bajipant Barwe were expected hourly and Mahadji's scheme, in moving from Bapa and Nana was to afford those officers time to attack them.⁵ The Governor-General replying Francis consented that, on the contrary, if it be really true that the British arms and influence had suffered in Western world, it was the more incumbent in the East to escort themselves for the retrieval of the national loss and again that the conclusion which he should draw from such

1. Ibid., pp. 107-108-109; Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. VII, Nos. 2377, 2374, 2375, 2379, 2380, 2397; Sardesai, Uttarvibhaga, vol. I, 137, 134, 136; Gleig, op. cit., vol. II, 216; G.P.C. vol. V, p. xii and No. 954; S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 362-363 (Mostyn to Bombay); vol. 19A, 38-39, 2023c.

2. Parashnis, Kolkar Kaifiyat, p. 7.

3. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 342-344; vol. 19A, 38-39; Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2378; G.P.C. vol. V, No. 939.

4. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2378.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 19, 355. (Mostyn to Bombay. 21-8-1778).

promises was the very reverse. Not that they should act on the defensive but wait till the designs of their enemies were ripe, and they had chosen their own time to carry them into execution, but that they should provide for the safety of Bengal by obviating the impending dangers and by rendering their attempts abortive before the time destined for their birth.¹ The Bombay Company had carried on over night change in their orders to Leslie at Kalpi.²

Raghoba had written to Krishnaji Randive asking him to join Tukoji and Mahadji with his forces by about 24th June;³ and it was reported on 24th, again, that Raghoba was leaving Bombay for Poona.⁴ Nana had despatched a secret letter on 24th to the Nizam to come and abide at Aurangabad and Nana had declared in this letter that he had already a pact with the French through Lubien.⁵ It was, again, on account of Nana's instructions that Gangadhar with 15000 horse tried to obstruct Leslie in his march. Nana had solicited French troops to join the Marathas.⁶

The Peshwa tried to explain Lubien's presence in Poona to the Governor-General on 27th June and informed him that Lubien had already been given leave on 14 May.⁷

Sakharam had taken a promise from Mahadji that the Deshastha Brahmins involved in Moroba's affairs namely Bajaba Purandare, Dadopant

1. Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 632 (22-6-1778).

2. *Ibid.*, 631.

3. S.P.D.; vol. V, No. 96.

4. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2408.

5. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 357. (Nana to Nizam); C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1033.

6. *Ibid.*, vol. 19, 356-357. (Nana's letter to Lubien); C.P.C. vol. V, Nos. 982, 1033; S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, 44-48, 53, 55-57, 62-64, 70-72, 81-84, 87, 102-103, 175-177, 226; Glieg, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 193-201; Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 657.

7. S.P.D.D.; vol. 19, 367-369. (Lubien left on 1 July); C.P.C. vol. V, 972, 991.

Vagholikar and others, would not be punished but Mahadji and Nana indiscriminately punished all the participants and Sakharan could not stop this, even though he enjoyed the status of the principal karkhari (minister).¹ Sakharan had to bear all; Two letters of Patwardhan again show that Mahadji was not steady in his support to Nana and had refused to disband his army till he got Ashirgad in his possession and because Mahadji did not disband his army, Tukoji also kept his, in harness and Haripant followed their example and would not disband his army, too. Mahadji's force started devastating 50 cos. country in the neighbourhood for supplies.² Mahadji attacked Paithan and brought one money lender in order to squeeze out money from him. Paithan was in the territory of the Nizam and it must be remembered that, in Moroba's affairs, Nana had applied to the Nizam, too, who, in turn, had promised to manage Purandar affairs well in his own capacity. Mahadji never liked Nana to look for outside support.³

Nana and Mahadji called Mostyn to settle the dispute arising out of the Purandar treaty, on 3rd July. Tukoji and Mahadji were pressing for the balance of money which Nana evaded. Money was to be paid in Poona, so Nana sent for all the shroff Brahmins and Gujaratis to Purandar but they all were determined not to lend a rupee.⁴ Mahadji was prepared to march against Hyder, provided he got some Mahals (districts) in Hindustan for what he would conquer in the Carnatic.⁵ It was reported on 6th July, that the English captured

1. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2392; Khare, *Adhikar Yog*, pp. 112-113, 108-109.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*; Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2425.

4. *S.P.D.D.*; vol. 19, 367-369

5. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2391 (6-7-1778) and 2392.

Kalpi.¹ On 7th July, the news of the Anglo-French war reached India and Hastings felt that, "it was no longer a time to temporize but to take speedy and decided measures". Elliot was deputed to Nagpore on 13th July.² Leslie was informed that France had declared war against England and was ordered to be in the province of Berar,³ and not to pass beyond that province.⁴ Heavy requisitions were laid on Cheytsing by the Governor-General.⁵ On 8th July, Nana was all powerful in Poona and Leslie was reported to have crossed the Jumna by about 6th July.⁶ Hyder had reduced Manaji Phakde to miserable conditions.⁷ The Governor-General despatched on 8th, letters to Bombay and Fort St. George to proceed on instant hostilities, to make the capture of Pondicherry their first object and Mahe, the second; as it was regarded from many considerations that the place was of great importance in the event of connections between the French and the Marathas or Hyder. Chandranagar had already surrendered to the English Colonel Dow.⁸ For the defence of Bengal, Raja Cheytsing was required to contribute the share of the burden of war.⁹

Holkar's diwanship was given to Gangoba's son, Dadaji Gangadhar Chandrachud and the ceremony of investiture was held, as reported on 11th July¹⁰ when he paid ten lakhs of rupees Nazer to the Peshwa.¹¹ Parashuram Patwardhan already expected a rupture with the

1. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2392.

2. Datta k.k. *op. cit.*, I.H.R.C.P. vol. XXII, (1945), p. 41 (Hastings to L. Sullivan); Gleig, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 194-207; S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 315-323.

3. Datta, k.k. *op. cit.*, p. 406.

4. Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 637.

5. Forrest, *op. cit.*, Intro. 1111.

6. S.P.D.D. vol. 19, 370-371. (Bombay to Court).

7. S.P.D.D. vol. 36, No. 332.

8. Forrest, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 640.

9. *Ibid.*, 639.

10. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2395.

11. Khare, *Adhikar Yog*, p. 114.

English by the end of the year and opined that if Shinde and Holkar were well-behaved, everything would be properly managed.¹ Moroba's family was in Mahadji's custody at Bahul by about 12th July and Mahadji had now punished Visaji for his former disagreement in the north.² Mahadji took in custody Visaji and Narsing Dhygude and beat them for money. Parashuram observed that Visaji was punished for the disgrace that he had inflicted on Mahadji in 1773. Mahadji also arrested Anandrao Balwantrao, Pandurang Khasagiwale, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Bajipant Sapre and Sakharam's host, Bajaba Purandare and collected money from them by about 12th July. Parashuram pleaded for Khasagiwale and he was released when he paid heavy fine and his Saranjam was confiscated. Visaji and Dhygude were fined, their property was confiscated and they were prisoners for life. Parashuram's efforts to seek pardon for them had no effect on Mahadji and Nana. Gopal Naik paid the fine of five lakhs of rupees, Naro Shankar's son, Trimbak Narayan paid also 10 lakhs of rupees.³ St. Lubien was detained at Thana, it was reported on 16th July;⁴ Nana had sent Rs. 2,30,000/- to Mahadji through Bapuji Naik and Abaji Naik Vanavale.⁵ Repeated letters were addressed by the English to the Peshwa for the passport for their army.⁶ On 20th July, the Governor-General received a postscript of a letter from Thomson that "fifteen sails of the line actually sailed on 13th April from the harbour of Toulon with 5000 troops."⁷ Mahadji and Tukoji and the ministers also planned a

1. Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. VII, No. 2396.

2. Khare, op. cit.; vol. VII, Nos. 2398, 2399, 2400.

3. Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 111; S.P.D.D., vol. 19A, 50-52, 62 (Lewis to Bombay), C.P.C.; vol. V, No. 1176; Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. VII, No. 2415.

4. S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, 1-2 (Consultation);

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. I, Nos. 29, 30.

6. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1010.

7. Forrest, op. cit., vol. I, p. 641.

scheme of attack on the English - the Sardars were to face the English while the ministers would march to the Carnatic.¹ The Nizam pleaded to the Governor General on 23rd July that the English were bound to him by the treaty and hence his enemy Raghoba must be treated as the enemy by the English also.²

Nana had made a present of three lakhs of rupees to Mahadji to induce him to consent to Moroba being sent to Ahmadnagar which had its effects for Mahadji recalled his troops which he had placed over Moroba and Nana himself sent 300 horse and 200 foot to take charge of him who set out, at about 9 by 24th night. Buchoba likewise was sent to Pratapgad, a fort belonging to Nana. Sakharan thus was completely set aside by Nana. On 28th, the Sardars were expected to march, soon to the Carnatic but they had pointed out that they would demand equal shares in territories in the north while the ministers insisted that they would hand over half the territory if conquered to the Nizam, by the former treaty, across the Tungabhadra and out of the remaining, the revenues collected would be certainly shared but no territory would be ceded. The Sardars were not inclined to accept.³

"Chowl and French intrigue, was well-organised bluff;⁴" and Nana and Mahadji alone understood the depth of the English planning; and hence, Mahadji drove out Lubien⁵. The Governor-General had informed Cheytsing for three battalions of sepoys and Cheytsing's reply, even was received on 30th July⁶. Mahadji was reported to

1. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2402 (21-7-1778).

2. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1018.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2404 and p.3337.

4. Forrest, Imperial Series, vol.II, p.293; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.145.

5. Sardesai, op.cit., p.142.

6. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 657.

have left Poona.¹ On 1st August, Tukoji was to the west of the Parvati Temple; Mahadji, in the Ramana of the Parvati Temple; Sakharam in Visaji Krishnaji's garden near Gultekdi and Nana was in the city proper.² Mahadji had on the 8th informed the English that the ministers had given him full powers to settle the affairs with the Company and that he intended to send a person to Bombay. Mahadji and Haripant disbanded a thousand men each.³ The Bombay Company, however, ordered for the plans and maps of the country around Poona to be prepared, on 10th August and new sepoy battalions to be recruited.⁴ Nana and Sakharam equally wanted the army in control, so Nana insisted that Patwardhan should go with Raste and others to the Carnatic.⁵ On 17th, the Governor-General approved the plan to place Raghoba in the Poona Government.⁶

Leslie reported on 24th August that Mahadji demanded from the ministers, for his aid against Raghoba, the forts of Asher and Nagar and the post of Senapati, i.e. commander-in-chief of the Maratha army. The sanads were already delivered for the two former forts but the fort-keepers refused to surrender. The ministers had not yet consented to his being the Senapati, being fearful, it would give him a power dangerous to the very being of the Brahmin Government, as by the office of the Senapati, he would have the command of the Peshwa's own forces and a right of being one of the Ashthapradhans or eight counsellors appointed by the Chatrapati for conducting the state affairs. Mahadji

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarna, vol. II, No. 97.

2. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2410, 2411.

3. S. P. D. D., vol. 19A, 83-85. (Lewis to Bombay); Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 3338.

4. Ibid., vol. 19A, 74-77 (Consultation).

5. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2423. (17-8-1778).

6. S. P. D. D. vol. 19A, 169. (G. G. to Bombay consultation).

had sent his man to Bombay.¹

The Governor-General admitted to Francis on 24th August over the discussions of Oudh and Bengal that it was not from the French themselves that he expected, then, any danger but from the neighbouring powers whom the English in attention might invite to disturb the peace of Oudh and Bengal and advised that the Commander-in-chief of the English forces should be sent to Kanpur. He again observed that it was and had been his invariable opinion that the English were liable to no danger from the French in Bengal but in the event of an alliance formed with the Marathas.²

On 30th August there was a thick rumour that Hyder was dead,³ Letters were received by the Marathas from Bussie and Nana was advised that the French in Poona should not be sent off, though nothing much can be expected from him.⁴ Nana had complete information from his spies, about the heavy preparations of the Bombay Company and hence had already reconciled Mahadji by ceding Burhanpur to him.⁵ Hastings carried his own preparations against the possibility of the Maratha-French alliance. Chandranagar and other French ports were already captured by the English. The Dutch at Hugli and Danes at Serampore were to maintain strict neutrality and while the English projected to march on Pondicherry and Mahe, Hastings perfected his preparations for the defence of Calcutta.

1. Ibid, vol. 19A, 119-122. (Leslie to Bombay).

2. Forrest, op. cit., vol. I, 658.

3. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2414, 2616.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. I, No. 31.

5. Khare, Adhikar Yog, pp. 120-121.

Goddard was to go to Nagpore but this projection for the aggrandisement of the British name and dominions did not materialise for the Court of Directors were not in favour of it.¹

Parashuram Patwardhan marched against the Carnatic on c.4th September,² and he was not sure whether Mahadji and Tukoji would join him.³ The Peshwa still evaded passports for the English army.⁴ Curious enough, the Bombay Company wrote to the Governor-General that Nana had sent the proposals for placing Raghoba in the Poona Government and that the terms were identical with those, earlier given by Moroba. However, the terms were verbally conveyed and could not be relied upon, unless, it was observed, forwarded with Nana's Shieca.⁵ Parashuram on 17th September complained that no provision was made to face the English. The English advance from the north was expected but no orders were given to the Sardars (Shinde and Holkar) to put a stop to it. Sakharam was not interested at all and there were rumours about his being sympathetic to Raghoba - he was not firm-minded at all.⁶ On 18th September, Lewis reported to Bombay that the fort keeper of Asher refused to deliver the fort to Mahadji's men, in the name of Raghoba. Nana's men on their way to Poona with 30 lakhs of rupees (?) and jewels were plundered by the fort-keeper. There was dispute between Mahadji and Nana, on the latter, having intercepted some letters, exchanged between Raghoba and Mahadji. Haripant's army was in arrears, and it was so very unfortunate, "that

1. Datta, K.K. *op.cit.*, I.H.R.C.P. vol.XXII, (1945), p.42; Gleig, *op.cit.*, vol.II, 260-275; Forrest, *op.cit.*, vol.II, 568.

2. Khare, *op.cit.*, vol.VII, No.2419.

3. *Ibid.*

4. G.P.C., vol.V, No.1080.

5. S.P.D.D; vol.19A, 155-157; (Bombay to G.G.11-9-1778).

6. Khare, *op.cit.*, vol.VII, No.2421.

the poor man was afraid of stirring out of his house".¹

Raste's brother, Gunpatrao, offered five lakhs of rupees Nazar for the Sardari and as Lakshman Raste had earlier joined Moroba, Nana intended, too, taking something from Rastes by way of punishment. Sakharam was morose². There were rumours that Mahadji and Tukoji and Bapu favoured Raghoba secretly.³ On 24th September, Raste Sardari was settled. On account of Mahadji's opposition to Sakharam, everything was procrastinated.⁴ On 20th September Mons. Le Roy arrived from Surat from Lubien, pleading to Nana that he should not pay heed to the English terms for a month and that the French assistance would certainly come within that period. Parashuram was unable to raise army due to the lack of funds. Mahadji had ordered his forces to march to Jambgaon immediately after Dasari, which had thrown Nana into great consternation who thought that in Mahadji's absence, Tukoji would raise troubles.⁵ By about 25th September, Mahadji and Sakharam did not like Parashuram's marching to the Carnatic and hence he was not paid anything finally.⁶ Sakharam wanted Bhivrao Paise to march on the Carnatic campaign, as then the army would be under his control, so Nana and Haripant persuaded Parashuram to go instead.⁷

Hornby, the Governor of Bombay, wrote to the Madras government, in October about his project of taking Raghoba to Poona⁸. The Governor-General again, decided to recall Leslie for his wild conduct and appointed Goddard to take command instead. Leslie died on 3rd

1. S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, 172-174. (Lewis to Bombay).

2. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2425.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., No. 2422.

5. S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, 173-175. (Lewis to Bombay).

6. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2426.

7. Khare, Adhikar-Yog, pp. 114-115.

8. Sardesai, Itihāsik Patravahar, No. 157.

October 1778¹. It was, previously to his death, observed that with respect to the distance of his detachment, though it might be of more utility if nearer, rendered in the then situation material service by keeping Mahadji - in the neighbourhood of whose capital, the detachment was - in awe, should he be inclined to oppose the English. This, of course, it was thought by the English he would not venture to do, when he found a respectable army of the English along with Raghoba but be one of the first to make his submission, not only from the immediate danger, he would apprehend on account of Leslie's army but in future, from his knowledge of the influence, the English had over the Emperor, which might deprive him totally of his jagirs, north of the Nerbada.²

Mahadji requested Nana to provide means for Hari Bawaji to relieve his debts and to maintain his family.³ Raste's Sardari was finally settled by about 13th October in favour of Anandao. Mahadji was not keeping good health but had recovered from slight indisposition.⁴ It was reported on 15th October, that Nana and Mahadji wrote to Mons. Bellecombe from Purandar, requesting assistance of the French, which was promised.⁵ Raghoba offered to go himself and reconcile Nana, under conditions which Baburao Kane was deputed personally to explain and for which he was to stand guarantee.⁶ The letters of compliance from the French for an alliance against the English, to Nana and Haripant were received on 10th October⁷. While Nargo

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1. Datta, k.k. op. cit., I.H.R.C.P., vol. XXII, (1945), p. 40; C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1157. (G.G. to Bhonsle); S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, 226 (Lewis to Bombay); Duff, op. cit., vol. II, p. 97.
 2. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 330.
 3. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. I, No. 51.
 4. Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. VII, No. 2427.
 5. S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, 196-198, (Lewis to Bombay).
 6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 403. (16-10-1778).
 7. S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, 206-209. (French at Pondicherry to Nana, Haripant).

Govind, Bhagwantrao Nimbalkar, Pidappa Berad together marched towards Shivgari, being instigated by Raghoba and supported by Surapurkar,¹ Mahadji wrote to the Governor-General on 20th October that he had established friendly relations between the English and the ministers and procured from the ministers the dismissal of the wakil of France and severance of all connections, with that nation. Should the enemy threaten the company from the coast, the veteran Maratha troops would be embarked to repel them: that Mahadji along with the ministers, after the rains, would settle the affairs of Hyder but the English troops from Bundelkhand must be recalled.² Mahadji again wrote to Raja Govindram that since he had contracted a friendship with col. Upton, he had done nothing that was not calculated to promote the interests of both the parties: He was preparing to march in Hindustan but the rains prevented him. The English army was creating disturbances in Bundelkhand and he was afraid that cordial relations would be disturbed.³ Mahta Sadashankar wrote to Raja Govind Ram that he had received his letter, forwarding one from the Governor-General to Mahadji and explained that Mahadji had to convey that he was always anxious for the English friendship for they were of steady disposition; but that the conduct of Bundelkhand army was surprising. In return for his services, the English army was despatched that crossed Kalpi, reduced forts and conquered territories. If his master ordered him to make war, the relationship would be broken. Mahadji

1. Khare, *GP. G. S.*, vol. VII, No. 2439.

2. *C. P. G.* vol. V, No. 1166; Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, vol. I, P. 156.

3. *C. P. G.* vol. V, No. 1168.

was prepared to undertake an expedition into Hindustan but he had to defer it in order to settle his affairs at home and punish his opponents. It was pointed out that it should be the duty of all great men to strive for the maintenance of friendship which they have once contracted.¹

Raghoba on 21st October passed to Nana a sacred oath of remaining friendly to him and to the Peshwa. Nana, too, had passed first a sacred oath to Raghoba². There was news or gossip of all sorts about all personalities by about 25th October and Nana was warned by Dhondo Bhivrao to be on his guard and not to confide too much in any one.³ No accounts could be settled and the Sardars' words of pledge were used by the ministers to pacify people. Mahadji was called for settlement and Parashuram Bhanu was ordered again to march on the campaign⁴. Mahadji had arrived in Poona on 1st August by covering about six miles a day, after having gone to Jambgaon for his marriage and thence to Bid, to pay visit to his Guru and thence, again, to Tuljapur Devi.⁵ Numerous letters from the Emperor and Abdul Ahad Khan and Najaf Khan were being received by the Marathas, inducing them to undertake an expedition into Hindustan and promising them support. The son of Hindupat informed them that the English had reduced Kalpi and Chatterpur and were to proceed to the Deccan, so Bhonsle applied for the Maratha help. He was censured for his cowardice first but now Bhonsle would offer resistance to the English

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1169.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S. vol.II, No.404.

3. Ibid, No.99.

4. Khare, op.cit, vol.VII, No.2429.

5. Khare, op.cit, vol.VII, No.2433 and p.3238.

and would act according to the advice of the Maratha chief.¹

On 26th October, Lewis in Poona was to be informed from Bombay of the scheme, the English had in agitation and was directed to hold himself in readiness to quit Poona on the first warning. He was to endeavour to send away his papers and as many of his saps as he could and if he should at last find it necessary, he was to be permitted by the Bombay Company to take the protection of Tukoji Holkar who was then encamped near Poona, with a considerable body of troops and the English had the strongest expectations, would declare for Raghoba the moment it appeared, the English had entered heartily into his cause.² And the fourth article of the Bombay Company's treaty with Raghoba ran, "Moroba, Buchoba and Tukoji having invited Raghunath Balaji Pradhan to take upon himself the Government as Regent and promised their assistance, Raghunath Balaji Pradhan doth hereby engage, upon condition of their performing their promises to his and the select committee's satisfaction and behaving like faithful obedient servants that he will show favour to them, according to their ranks and services, in settling the offices of the government and that their persons and fortunes shall be unmolested."³

On 30th October Parashuram Patwardhan, commenced his march,⁴ Goddard, it was reported on 31st, arrived at Kinlassey, a town in the territories of Ballaji, within 12 cos. of Ganga Besondar, upon the road to Husangabad Ghat on the Nerbada. Ragoram, vakil from Poona, visited

1. G.P.C. vol.V, No.1176.

2. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 323.

3. Forrest, op.cit., 334; Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, p.3317.

4. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2430.

him there, desiring to know the object of his march.¹ Raghoba raised revolt during the rains against the ministers in Maharashtra at many places and Tukoji had given a promise to Raghoba to join him in the Ghats and Chinto Vithal had explained that many Sardars would follow Tukoji's example.² On 6th November, Balarao Govind sent communications to Mahadji about the concentration of troops.³

Bhagwa-ntao Nimbalkar was completely defeated by Rambhaji Beji Nimbalkar and the five pagas of the Peshwa - Power, Jadhav, Kawade, Govind Krishna, Pandurang Baburao,⁴ - while Ranoji Ghatge Sarjerao and Yesaji Baburao Chikodikar defeated the Raja and Yesaji Shinde of Karvir by about 15th November, 1778.⁵

Parvatibai sent a message to Lewis, it was reported on 17th November that Nana and Mahadji were to send all the troops they could collect to three Ghats - Corindur, Bhore and Cassarah. If no money could be procured for Haripant's men, they were to plunder all villages between this and the Ghats. Mahadji was in town (Poona) on 17th November in the morning to inspect and examine the guns in the garrison (Topkhana). The Maratha troops would set out in four days. Parvatibai suggested to Lewis, again, to take, first, Bassein which would be means not only of Ahmadnagar declaring in Raghoba's favour but of the English being joined by at least 2000 horse.⁶ The chief of Pondicherry wrote to Nana that as per treaty between Pondicherry and the Marathas to the effect that the Peshwa would help the French

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 19A, 324-325. (Goddard to Bombay).

2. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 3377.

3. S.P.D.D. vol. 36, No. 344.

4. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2443, 2446 and p. 3369.

5. Idid. Nos. 2444, 2435, 2436.

6. S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, 301-302.

with men, money and supply and again would give permission to build a factory in Poona, and as per the promise of Nana, he would secure a grant of 20 lakhs of rupees and ten ships manned with his own sepoys to assist him if he would march on Bombay. The French had already opened up hostilities at Pondicherry and as soon as the contest was over, the Chief of Pondicherry would arrive at Bombay.¹

The Bombay army marched from Bombay as per the table :-

Colaba Camp: 22nd November, 1778.

The Army embarked: 23rd November, 1778. Bellapur taken under Cay.

Fort of Bellapur: 24th November, 1778, Egerton at Bellapur.

Bellapur: 25th November, 1778.

Panvel : 26th November, 1778.

Unloading guns: 27th November, 1778.

Colka: 5th December, 1778.²

On 28th November Lewis, the Resident at Poona, left Poona and joined Stuart in the Ghats. Raghojo Angre's officers saw Egerton at Panvel, as Raghoba's partisans. Raghoji had sent 50 foot, 25 horse and 2 elephants, though he himself was not present.³ But it was already found on 28th November that Raghoba's conduct in the whole affair was so uniformly exceptionable that Egerton was at a loss to give credit to such a supreme degree of folly, if he himself were not the eye-witness to many of his absurdities. The English officer doubtless clearly explained to him that they had gone too far then to recede and it was suggested that some other person must be substituted in his

1. C.P.C. vol.V, Nos.1206 (19-11-1778); Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 661.

2. S.P.D.D. vol.20, 295-301 (Egerton's Diary); S.P.D. vol.36, No.345.

3. S.P.D.D. vol.19A, 328-332 (Egerton to Bombay).



room if he persisted in his obstinate blindness to his own interests.¹

Raghoba had asked the fort-keeper of Avachitgad, on 23rd November to supply labour and provisions in his expedition to Poona with the military help of the British.² The Sardars left Wanavali to collect troops which Mahadji had called. The English were unloading guns at Panvel and there, in the north, had come to Bhelsa by about 3rd December 1778. There was apprehension that the Bhonsle would join the English³. Haripant also had recalled his army; and Raste and Pratinidhi who were ready to join Patwardhan were directed to join the Maratha force against the English.⁴ Sakharan complained on 5th December that the English had broken the treaty. The Governor of Bombay did not allow Mostyn to see Nana, and all transactions were stopped.⁵ Raghoba circulated a general appeal to all concerned and the people at large, on 5th December.⁶ Haripant urged on Nana to release Naro Ganesh in order to please Holkar.⁷ The Sardars (Mahadji and Tukoji) and the ministers were at Khadki till 5th December. Ramchandra Ganesh and Bajipant had been sent ahead to Talegaon. The English, from the north, had come to the Badawa Ghat and Cholera was ripe in that section. The Bhonsle had not still joined the English.⁸

The Bombay army reached Baraw on 6th December and Chowk on the 8th. The roads were impossible on the 9th December. On 10th, the army reached Callipore and on 12th December Campoli was reached, too.⁹ However, on 6th December instructions were imparted to

1. Ibid., vol. 19A, 327-329.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 405.

3. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2451.

4. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 3379.

5. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1222.

6. Forrest, Maratha Series, p. 349.

7. Sardesai, H.P.M.S. No. 49.

8. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2452.

9. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 295-301. (Egerton's Diary).

Col. Goddard to direct his march to Junnar, for there was no sufficient ground to consider Mahadji and Tukoji, the friends of the English or even the enemies and it was believed by the English that neither of them, especially the latter, would take an active part against Raghoba. Therefore Goddard was not to commit any hostile act against those chiefs, unless compelled by any act of hostility on their part.¹ But really Goddard was himself afraid of the whole force of the ministers, strengthened by that of the Nizam, against him and had, hence, suggested to the Bombay Government to cause diversion.²

Nana wrote to the Governor-General blaming him for the rupture,³ and Sakharan, too complained about the action of the Bombay Government, being "turbulent, mischievous and unfriendly" and rebuked that such a mode of conduct was inconsistent with the principles and usages of high and illustrious chiefs.⁴ However, the Governor-General assured Raghoba by 8th December that the arrival of the English army at that presidency would be productive of the greatest advantages to Raghoba's affairs,⁵ and informed him that Pondicherry was reduced by the English on 18th October⁶.

"The Bombay army comprised of (torn) artillery, 549 infantry and 2689.....Sepoys, all officers....., 500 artillery lascars."⁷

At Campoli (Khopauli), a letter was received from Dadaji Odowji at Poona to Capt. Stewart that some person had desired him to acquaint Lewis that Raghoji Angre who was a relation of Mahadji and

1. Ibid, vol. 19A, 351-353. (Instructions to Goddard).

2. Ibid, vol. 19A, 404-406. (Goddard to Bombay).

3. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1227.

4. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1226.

5. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1235.

6. Ibid.

7. S.P.D.D. vol. 19A, (Bombay to G.G.).

entirely devoted to the ministers, intended to offer Raghoba 1000 horse for his service, with a view to betray him.¹ On 15th December Carnac and Mostyn joined the Bombay army and a deserted sepoy was shot dead by the Court Martial in the English army.² On the 16th, the English were at Khandala when Raghoba remained at Chowk near Warwal.³ Mahadji had 15000 troops and Tukoji had 6000, the Peshwa's army was of 10,000 troops and together with Haripant's 25000 troops, was near the Khadki bridge. Panse and Bajipant had 2000 troops near Talegaon.⁴ On 16th December an agreement entered on 6th December was reported, between Appasahib Khanderao, the Chief of Alangirpur with Col. Thomas Goddard by which the Chief undertook to conduct the Company's army safely across Mahadji's territory and guaranteed that no one should be suffered to obstruct or molest the merchants in carrying grains and other provisions to the army.⁵ Dadaji Odowji, again, informed Capt. Stuart in the Bombay army that Mahadji and Tukoji had taken oaths to act with the ministers; that Mahadji was the first to go against the English and if he were to be worsted, Tukoji was to follow.⁶ Nana reinforced Bhivrao Yeshwant on 19th, with the Gardis. Mons. Noronha and Mahadji left Alandi and encamped at Bhosani.⁷

On 20th December Raghoba went up the Ghats.⁸ The advance wing of the Marathas of 10,000 horse, 15 pieces of cannon and a large number of the Pendharris was under the command of Bhivrao Panse, Bajipant Joshi and Ganeshpant at Wadgaon. They started harassing

1. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 345.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 20, 295-301. (Egerton's Diary).

3. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2453.

4. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2453.

5. G.P.C., vol. V, No. 1244.

6. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 350; G.P.C. vol. V, No. 1330.

7. G.P.C. vol. 36, No. 347.

8. S.P.D.D., vol. 20, 295-301. (Egerton's Diary).

the English army and obstructed its march. The Marathas had also sent 5000 horse down the Kasara Ghat to cut off the English communication with Panwell. Intelligence from Raghoba tallied with the one sent by Dadaji Odawji from Poona.¹ Goddard reached Korwai and was attacked by Balaji. Goddard was proceeding by way of Bhida and Bhopal to the Nerbada.² Bhavani Shivram was to face the English under Goddard with 5000 horse. 200/400 Rafts joined Raghoba.³ Raghoba, on the morning of Sunday, 20th December sent Naro Gopal and Trimbak Bhalerao to Carnac to inform him that the ministerial army was encamped near Poona;⁴ but Dadaji Odawji had definitely informed that the Poona army was determined to engage the English and that Tukoji had decided to assist the Marathas which Carnac still hoped and trusted to prove untrue.⁵ Raghoba's advanced party was attacked on 22nd December⁶ by a cannonade by Panse. On the second day of the attack, the English occupied the same spot and Panse had retreated. On the third day, Panse opened up the attack with guns of long ranges at Khandala and the English had to remove their camp. On the 4th day, there was no action.⁷ On the 23rd December, Mahadji asked Nana not to delay the march of the armies against the oncoming English and insisted to start on the same day as otherwise there would be a gap between the advance and the rear. And again Bhivrao's army was to be replenished.⁸ Nana informed Bhivrao that he had arrived at Talegaon with Mahadji and Tukoji and Nana sent money to Bhivrao's

1. *Ibid*, 19A, 395-397. (Poona Committee to Bombay, 20-12-1778); Khare, *op.cit*, vol. VII, No. 2457 (2000 horse).

2. *C.P.G.*, vol. V, No. 1249.

3. Khare, *op.cit*, vol. VII, No. 2453.

4. Forrest, *op.cit*, vol. I, 352.

5. *Ibid*, 354.

6. *S.P.D.D.* vol. 20, 295-296. (Egerton's Diary).

7. Khare, *op.cit*, vol. VII, Nos. 2457, 2454.

8. Sardesai, *H.P.M.S.*; No. 48.

army.¹

Jose Pedro da Camara wrote on 23th December to Martinho de Mello e Castro that Hyder was again building a large number of men-of-war and a Dutchman was employed to build a large number of the same to strengthen the harbour of Bhatkal.² The Marathas on the Borghat were finding difficulties by about 29th December to attack the English and felt that it would be better if the English would advance and come to the plains.³ The news of the English disaster in America was received by the English in India.⁴ On 31st December 1778, Lieutenant-Colonel Kay was killed at Khandala.

The English were at Lima Grove on 1st January 1779; and proceeded to Wankhala on 2nd. At the battle that ensued forth at Kerla on 4th, Stuart was killed and in the consultation that took place on 6th January Egerton gave up the command to Cockburn on account of his very bad state of health.⁵ Mostyn returned to Bombay; Tukoji refused to join Raghoba. The Marathas did not join Raghoba as Chinto Vithal had promised in Bombay and the English army of 4000 had to face 40000 Marathas.⁶ Mostyn subsequently died of ill-health and Tukoji had replied to Raghoba that as his army was meagre, he would only ruin himself by joining him as Raghoba had little hopes of success. The English supplies were crushed by the Marathas.⁷ The

1. S.P.D.; vol.36,352.(24-12-1778).

2. Surendra Sen, "Hyder Ali's fleet", I.H.Q., vol.VI, (1930), p.312, c/f (Officio das Governadores, Maco 5, No.70).

3. Khare, *op.cit.*, vol.VII, No.2455.

4. Forrest, *Selections from the State-papers of Governor-General of India, Warren Hastings*; vol.I, 166-167, 175.

5. S.P.D. vol.20, 295-301. (Egerton's Diary); Khare, *op.cit.*, vol.VII, pp.3330-3331, 3397; Parasnisi, *Itihasik Charitra*, 13, p.151; S.P.D.; vol.V, No.98.

6. Khare, *op.cit.*, vol.VII, pp.3330-3331; Khare, *Adhikar-Yog*; pp.123-124.

7. Khare, *Adhikar-Yog*, pp.123-124.

Marathas also had won over to their side the Siddi of Janjira against the English though he was always an ally of the English and their enemy.¹ Col. Egerton had started for Bombay but on hearing that a party of the Maratha horse was in the road, he returned to camp and resumed his seat at the Committee but not the command. The Committee of Secrecy wrote on his conduct as follows :- "As Col. Egerton's want of health did not prevent him from resuming his seat at the Poona Committee, it will be necessary hereafter to state the part which he took in the subsequent proceedings of that Committee; but your Committee nevertheless think proper in this place to express their unanimous opinion that the conduct of the late Colonel now Brigadier General Charles Egerton, during the late disgraceful expedition towards Poona was such as renders it highly improper that he should be continued in the command of the Company's forces at Bombay and that he be therefore dismissed from the Company's service".²

In the first fortnight of January on Friday, the English with Raghoba reached Talegaon and stayed there up to Sunday. On the night of Monday, 11th January, Raghoba with the English retreated with five platoons. The Marathas had earlier burnt the village completely and now pursued the English army on its retreat. At Wadgaon, the Marathas at dawn met some English platoons whose artillery was put out of action, even though the English soldiers fought stubbornly. Raghoba, however, effected his escape.³ Nana and Mahadji acting in

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1. Diskalkar, D.B. "George Gray's Embassy to Haider Ali", J.I.H. vol. XI, (1932), p. 312.
 2. Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, 359. (Common's Report East Indies, 1781-1782.)
 3. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 359; S.P.D.D., vol. 20, 28-29 (Thana to Bombay); Khare, op.cit. vol. VII, No. 2458; Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 125. (Shivaji pant's letter of 22-1-1779); S.P.C. vol. V, Nos. 1376-1380.

perfect concert directed every detail from their station on a hill near Wadgaon.¹ The attack continued upto 4 O'clock in the afternoon, from dawn. The Marathas used small arms. The Arabs kept the English engaged for the day and showered heavy cannonade on the English.²

The retreat at Wadgaon might have been made good with little or no loss, had not the troops whose strength consisted in their union and compactness been unfortunately divided into three bodies, too far distant to support each other, (the cause where of it, will rest with the commanding officer to explain) Capt. Hartley who commanded the rear, received all the attack. He was joined by the European battalion. They were at length ordered to retreat to the line. Why the whole line was not rather moved down to their support merits consideration. Farmer was sent first to the Durbar and Holmes afterwards to Mahadji in the hope of exciting jealousy and an opposition of interests. Nana had instructed Haripant in writing to stipulate for the detention of the army till possession had been given them of the ceded places. This was prevented by Mahadji and "can only be accounted for from his being desirous of manifesting some instance of regard for the English".³

"The great train of baggage which consisted of 12000 pack bullocks, 300 carts, a large bazar and artillery park and above 1000 coolies with gentleman's baggage, palanquin etc. was to be protected by the small English army in open country when the movements of the

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, pp. 81, 83.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 20, 29-30 (Cockburn to Bombay).

3. S.P.D.D., vol. 20, 210-215. (213-Carnac's Report).

Marathas were particularly rapid. The Maratha army now had exceeded 1,20,000 men, the English had 2800, rank and file. The order of retreat was given to the English army at 4, but was post-poned till 11 in the night and by 10, Raghoba had to be informed about the retreat which was soon conveyed to the enemy."¹ "300 seopys deserted Raghoba and in spite of every precaution one Subedar, one Jamadar, three Havildars, six Naiks and 155 men, Europeans and Sepoys and Lascars deserted and both European and Sepoys continued to do so, till after the English left Wadgaon. The army was reduced to 2138 rank and file, with 300 sick and wounded and another attack as that of 12th January would have nearly exhausted the ammunition of the English forces."²

"The English loss at Wadgaon"³

Killed 26 Sepoys and office	-	Total	31,
Wounded 74	" " "	"	96,
Missing 98	" " "	"	110,
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198			237
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and the Marathas had secured in the plunder five cannons, two Carnales and 2000 rifles and sundry from the English."⁴ "The submission to the Marathas in the Borghat was compared to the misfortune of Saratoga, in London, quarters when the news reached there, and Pechell advised Lord North who was dining with him to take care he did not make a colony."⁵

1. Ibid, vol. 20, 220-223. (Lt. Col. Cockburn's defence).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid; vol. 20, 31. (Report of Cockburn).

4. Khare, op. cit, vol. VII, No. 2459; Gleig, op. cit, vol. II, p. 229; C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1449 et. seq; Rajwade, op. cit, vol. X, pp. 141-142, No. 203.

5. Gleig, op. cit, vol. II, p. 341.

Madhoji Bhonsle reported to the Governor-General on 2nd January that Col. Goddard had arrived at Hoshangabad on 22nd December 1778, pointing out, however, that he must not advance until he received instructions from Calcutta, for his route laid through Burhanpur, a dependency of the Peshwa, where Mahadji's and Bhagirthibai's powerful army was ready to oppose the march of the English. Madhoji declared that the odds were heavy.¹ Devkar Pandit again informed the Governor-General on 2nd, that after he had obtained full information of the strength of the forces of the Poona ministers and those of Mahadji and Tukoji, he would form a plan for the march of the English detachment.²

In the Borghat, Major Dageon was proposed to the English Command and new officers were invited from Bombay. Raghoba's expectations of being joined by the chiefs of rank were completely belied and his behaviour was most impolitic. The Marathas contested every inch of ground and closed the Ghat. Raghoba, again, sent secret orders to the fort-keeper of Ahmednagar not to release Moroba till he sent orders from Poona.³ This was in direct violation to Raghoba's agreement with the English.⁴ Instead of the definite and limited scheme, it appeared to the English that they were engaged in an infinite scene of military operations, without any resources but their own, against the most respectable chiefs of the Maratha Empire and against an enemy with whom they could not hope to bring matters to the only issue from which they could obtain reasonable assurance of success

1. G.P.C. vol.V, No.1294; S.P.D.D. vol.20, 10-11 (Surat to Bombay).

2. G.P.C. vol.V, No.1295.

3. S.P.D.D. vol.20, 6-9 (Egerton and Carnac to Bombay, 6-1-1779).

4. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 358.

namely the trial of arms."¹

"During the divisions amongst the Brahmins, the English were given to understand that the Sardars (Mahadji and Tukoji) had made great accessions to their Jagirs and were the Poona Durbar once in power to enforce their demands, they would probably insist on the restitution of these, as well as the arrears due from them, for the country they held. These were considerations that would influence them to prevent the unconditional restoration of such power among the Brahmins: and therefore it seemed they were naturally led to oppose the establishment of Raghoba which great line of interest seemed then to influence them both, notwithstanding any promise or writings that they might have given relative to a junction with Raghoba".² The English wanted to assure the Sardars that they meant the Government should go in the name of Madhavrao Narayan, leaving only to Raghoba the Naibship as in the time of the minority of Madhavrao, to assure Sakharan of the Diwanship, of their support to him in the real powers of it and of the aid of their army in conjunction with Shinde and Holkar against Nana Phadnis, to offer the two Jagirdars their guarantee securing to them their Jagirs free from all demands for the arrears from the Poona Darbar."³

"The English, again, felt that the only probable mode to remove the distress was to make immediate overtures of accommodation to Shinde and Holkar and Sakharan which must be done by committing to themselves the power of negotiating from him, signifying to these different persons his consent to any agreements they might conclude

1. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, p. 359.

2. Ibid., p. 360.

3. Ibid., p. 360.

for Raghoba: that the English saw no alternative between this and an instant retreat to Khandala and that unless Raghoba consented to it, their army must perforce from the want of provisions, immediately retire in order to prevent a total distress: that the English must leave to Raghoba the mode of opening this negotiation and that during the course of it the English should be guided as much by his advice and interest as they consistently could."¹ "In this situation of affairs (as Raghoba was acquainted, the English had only 16 days provisions for their army) the Committee saw an absolute necessity of taking such measures as appeared to them eligible, without further dependence on Raghoba and had therefore sent to advise him that they were determined in the name of the English company to invite Holkar, Shinde and Sakharan to a conference and upon their showing an inclination to join the English in the present business, that the English would guarantee to them respectable Jagirs, together with all their other pretensions as officers of the Maratha State". "Raghoba allowed that Holkar appeared in arms against him and that he had that day two guns firing upon the English camp but conformable to his assurances all their shots had fallen short. He, however, earnestly requested the Committee would defer for one day writing to any of the Maratha Chiefs but Holkar, as he expected in the course of the next day a vakil from Shinde, which a letter from the Committee might probably prevent, as he would from thence infer that the English began to despair of success, which would of course encourage the whole of the

1. Ibid. p. 361.

ministerial party to hold out".¹ The Marathas were to march on 9th January² and Raghoba had sent a message to Holkar on 10th and Mahadji simultaneously had sent two secret agents to Raghoba.³

Farmer, the envoy of the English, appealed to Mahadji but the result was not more satisfactory. Mahadji said that as to the surrender of Raghoba, it mattered little and insisted that the English must settle a new treaty with the Maratha State; the one made by Col. Upton being broken by the then invasion of the English army. Farmer observed that the Marathas felt themselves in that situation with respect to the English which the Turkish wazir felt himself in with respect to Peter I, at the time, Empress Catherine sent in her jewels to the wazir.⁴ "While Raghoba was explaining to the English his scheme of total compliance with the demands of Mahadji to gain him over for the time and that afterwards he would do as he pleased; the Committee was debating on the business when a message arrived from Raghoba to Mr. Sibald who on his return acquainted the Committee that Raghoba now told him that the two men he had sent back to Shinde had been prevented from going by a party of horse and that therefore he could not expect the vakils of Shinde, that night."⁵ "But the Committee finding that it was then certain that though Holkar might not act against, yet that he could not act for them. The Committee therefore resolved that the Commander of the English army should march back towards Khandala."⁶ "The measures of the Bombay

1. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 368.

2. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2517.

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 112.

4. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, p. xix.

5. Ibid., p. 362.

6. Ibid.

Government had been obviously imprudent and impolitic, ill-concerted and badly executed. Their army had returned defeated, their treasury was exhausted, their credit insignificant and their reputation sullied."¹

The Marathas attacked between Panvel and the Ghats, too, and Lieut. Fraser who was in charge of the wounded English was under plight;² the Bombay Company by 11 asked Poona Committee to advance on Poona with vigour and sent one company of Europeans, 3 of sepoys with two field pieces and a party of artillery men under the command of Richard Earnes to clear road from Panvel to Campoli.³ William Fraser wrote on 13th, that the English army was all cut to pieces and that he had it in his power to retreat but he scorned it at the risk of his honour.⁴ The sepoys were routed by the Maratha horse on Tuesday, the 12th and threw down their arms when every man shifted to himself as he could.⁵ The ministers were expecting the Bengal detachment to advance from Khandesh,⁶ and Goddard was asked by the Bombay Company to push an expedition on 12th January while the Surat and Broach Chiefs were ordered to raise new recruits.⁷ Mahadji and Tukoji had dissuaded Nana from burning the city of Poona and Bajipant Phatak with 4000 troops had marched to Kalyan and blockaded Campoli.⁸ Nana had informed Bhivrao Panse that Shinde's fire proved ineffective owing to lack of the long-ranged guns.⁹ Guman Singh, Raja of Bundelkhand informed the Governor-General on 14th January that Goddard had arrived near Sagar.¹⁰

1. Duff, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 94.

2. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 16-17 (John Leudrum. Com. Belapur Fort, to Bombay. 11-1-1779).

3. *Ibid.*, vol. 20, 13-16.

4. *Ibid.*, vol. 20, 27-31. (Fraser to Bombay, pp. 27 28 et seq. Thana Committee to Council. 16-1-1779).

5. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 27-31. Capt. Earnes' report.

6. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1311. (Raoji to Nawab of Arcot. 12-1-1779).

7. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 21-22, 23-25. (Bombay to Goddard and G.C.)

8. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2460.

9. S.P.D. vol. 36, No. 366.

10. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1314.

"The first application from the Bombay army was made to Nana, the ostensible minister. The surrender of Raghoba's person was the only condition demanded from the English, but on finding that he had already made his terms with Shinde, Nana insisted on articles still more humiliating and at last seemed determined to accept of none but the most rigorous of all, with the detention of the whole army as hostage for performance of the terms on which their lives were spared. It was thought of applying to Mahadji whose influence in the Maratha Durbar was reputed to be considerable and whose connection then formed with Raghoba, it was hoped, would dispose him to show some such sort of regard to so faithful an ally as the English had proved themselves to Raghoba."²¹ "Holmes was sent to Mahadji. Everything immediately showed how sensibly Mahadji was flattered with this acknowledgement of his consequence and authority which was at once discovered to be supreme. Holmes on his way to Shinde's tent was stopped by a piquet guard of Nana's troops, who would have persuaded or even forced him to go to Nana, instead of Mahadji. Holmes positively declared that he would and must go immediately to the latter. The dispute lasted, till Shinde sent down a party of his own men who dispersed Nana's people and brought Holmes to him. He was received with kindness and civility and on his representation of the treatment Farmer had experienced from Nana, to whom he had before been sent and by whom he had been kept the whole day exposed in the open Bazar with no other covering than his pallanquin, from

1. S.P.D.D. vol.20, 184-185. (President's Review); vol.21, 556-564 (George Horseley to G.G.).

whence he had been obliged to write the particulars of his conversation with Nana and to wait for the answers of the Committee - Mahadji immediately sent and conducted Farmer to his own quarters and desired that he as well as Farmer would regard himself as his guest".¹ "The English were obliged to Mahadji for making the terms as easy as he could then attempt to do without he would have absolutely declared against the rest of the Maratha Chiefs and joined them, so the English thought. It was owing to him that the point of detention of the whole army as hostage was given up and by that means the English had it in their power to disavow the convention. This together with articles for the surrender of Surat Fort and Fort Victoria for the payment of expenses of the war were actually sent by Nana to Mahadji to be added to the conditions imposed on the English, Mahadji replied that he had already settled the conditions and could not then in honour think of adding more. It was true, a private promise was made to Mahadji to cede Broach to him and the share of its purgana conquered from the Nizam, yet he could not but well know, that the importance of this article could be no way effectually secured to him but by the very means he rejected, the detention of the English army as hostages."² "Mahadji concerted and determined on all matters of importance which were referred to Nana for the necessary forms of office, the Sicca being affixed of course to every paper or despatch, that Mahadji had once passed and Holkar, though treated with all external marks of respect by Mahadji, was

1. Ibid, vol. 20, 185 (President's Review).

2. Ibid, vol. 20, 186. (President's Review).

entirely at his disposal, too. Mahadji offered to send Ranekhan, his chief confident and favourite to the English. Ranekhan was treated as his brother and was respected next to himself in Mahadji's camp. Mahadji whispered to Sibald that he hoped one day to see the English forces and his acting together and he did not allow Nana to have any interference with Farmer, but through him Mahadji admitted to exclude French from all protection and countenance in the Maratha Empire and supported it against Nana".¹

On 14th Thursday, Farmer saw Mahadji, Nana and Haripant and was told to hand over Raghoba immediately.² "Farmer was as a matter of fact sent to the Maratha Camp to propose an accommodation which the English judged might be brought about by Raghoba going over to Mahadji, which he seemed determined to do, rather than run the risk of another day's march with the Marathas, as he declared his fears of its proving fatal both to him and to the English."³ By 10 o'clock in the morning of 14th January, the Committee wrote to Farmer that they did not conceive any difficulty in complying with the proposition of the ministers as Raghoba had just informed them of his desire to deliver himself up to Mahadji at 9 o'clock on 15th January with his vakils and expected that the ministers would give the English security on their part for a due performance of the treaty then proposed. Sibald would accompany Raghoba to Mahadji's camp.⁴ Cockburn reported on the possibility of taking the English army back safely: "I therefore cannot charge myself to conduct the army under

1. *Ibid*, vol. 20, 187, (*President's Review* ").

2. Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, vol. I, p. 183; Forrest, *Maratha Series*, vol. I, 368.

3. Forrest, *op. cit*, vol. I, 369.

4. *Ibid*, p. 369.

the circumstances to Bombay and humanity must prompt some other method than an attempt to retire in the face of the whole strength of the Maratha Empire with such a handful of men who must in such case be sacrificed".¹ Thomas Holmes, too was sent to Mahadji.² The English decided the main thing that they should not disturb Mahadji, he being the most responsible and they would accrue greatest benefits by pleasing him.³ Hornby also opined: "We shall gain much by his friendship and lose most by his enmity". Goddard, however, later on, opined in the opposite way. "Mahadji is a military leader, rich and owner of vast fertile territory.....we will win him by dint of arms and have treaty with Nana"⁴.

Mahadji behaved in a moderate and dignified manner, replying to the English that when Raghoba and the hostages arrived, all matters would be arranged in a friendly spirit without any rancour being exhibited to the vanquished.⁵ Farmer once again saw Mahadji showing him a blank paper - Carle Blanche - signed by the English for treaty. But Mahadji told the ministers not to take the undue advantage of the plight of the English and urged that diplomacy demanded to be moderate.⁶ The ministers did not want even to see Raghoba and Raghoba postponed his going over to Mahadji, that being inauspicious day. Mahadji was to manage Raghoba's affairs entirely.⁷

Farmer and Stuart came to Mahadji's camp on 18th January. Mahadji had contracted a special treaty with the English by which the English promised to give him Broach and 41 lakhs of rupees.⁸

1. Ibid, pp. 370-371.

2. Ibid.

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 221.

4. Ibid, p. 222.

5. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 82.

6. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 184; S.P.D.P. vol. 20, 220-223.

7. Khare, op.cit, vol. VII, No. 2462.

8. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 183.

Raghoba's retenue and camp came to Mahadji's quarters at Wadgaon and by Raghoba's special request the whole affair of his surrender was regulated by Mahadji himself without Nana's interference¹. The exact treaty runs as follows :-

16th January 1779:- "Treaty between Madhavrao Narayan Pandit Pradhan and the East India Company. Friendly relations were carried on till the late Madhavrao Ballal Pandit Pradhan. We recently captured Janjira, Salsette, Uran and other territories of the Peshwa and also took possession of Jambuser and Broach and the possessions of Gaikwar. We sided with Raghunathrao. This created much conflict between us. Afterwards Col. John Upton was sent from Calcutta with full powers. He planned an agreement which was signed both by the Peshwa and the Company. But we did not act according to it, and also we did not leave the side of Raghunathrao Dadasaheb. Taking him with us we broke the agreement, came over the Ghats in the Peshwa's territories and took initiative in fighting which made the Peshwa fight with us.

Afterwards, from Wadgaon near Indoli Talegaon came Mr. John Carnac and Colonel Charles Egerton and also Mr. Farmer from the Bombay Government. From a long time back the Peshwa and the English are on friendly relations. Recently, the enmity has grown as we did not act according to the treaty made by Col. John Upton. We, therefore, promise to act in the same way as we were doing till the death of late Madhavrao Pandit Pradhan. We have left the side of Raghunathrao Dada and will not give refuge to him. We will not abide by the enemies of the Peshwa. We hand over to you, therefore, the territories of Janjira,

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 84.

Salsette, Uran, Belapur and others which were captured by us. We again, promise to act in the same way as we were acting in the reign of the late Madhavrao Pandit Pradhan.

The treaty therefore was concluded by the Peshwa by which we are to act in the same way as we were doing in the reign of the late Madhavrao Pandit Pradhan. We, the English handover to the Peshwa, Janjira, Uran, Salsette and other territories of the Peshwa and also Jambusar and the possessions of the Gaikwar. We will not join, help or give shelter to Raghunathrao Dadasahib. We promise to act accordingly and hope the same treatment from the Peshwa. Raghunathrao Dadasahib is with us. He himself has agreed and so we hand him over to Tukoji Holkar and Mahadji Shinde. They promised to send with us Naro Ganesh, Visaji Shamrao, Balaram Govind and Rane Khan to bring here the English army from Wadgaon. You should take us to Bombay with the aid of your troops. Our English army will not molest any one in the way, we shall keep our word. We shall send back the army from Calcutta which has crossed the Nerbada and has arrived at Hoshangabad. No one will be molested. This covenant is agreed through Tukoji Holkar and Mahadji Shinde. We all should act accordingly and not break it. We, the English will act in the same way and wish that the Peshwa should not join and give shelter to the French".¹

Raghoba finally signed the treaty with the ministerial party, too.² The British authorities in India at last realised that they were backing the wrong horse in taking up the cause of Raghoba.³

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1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, pp. 80-82; Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, p. 372; Paramis, Itihasik Tipana, I, 59, 87; C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1461; S.P.D. vol. V, No. 97.
 2. Sardesai, op.cit, vol. III, p. 85.
 3. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1080; Sardesai, op.cit, vol. III, p. 77.

Diplomacy succeeds only when it is backed by armed might and Mahadji got the chance which Nana doubtless resented but could not help. From now on, Mahadji came to be acknowledged as a powerful leader, as he was already dominating much of Central India.¹ Thus his successful leadership during the three years fighting gave Mahadji a predominant voice and position in the Maratha Government which he retained practically unimpaired to the end of his days.² "The essence of the whole matter," writes Lyall, "is that the Marathas were at this period far too strong and too well united to be shaken or overawed by such forces as the English could then afford or bring against them."³

Ever since the revolution effected by Mahadji's means in June last, when Nana fled to him, the lead that Mahadji took in the administration and the condition to which he had reduced Nana to be no more than a creature of his, Mahadji had the essence of power in the Maratha State. It was Shinde who seized Moroba, Buchoba Purandare and afterwards confined them - he also had confined Holkar's Diwan and appointed another by whose means Holkar had been mere puppet at Shinde's disposal. He removed Sakharan from administration and made him prisoner in his own house.⁴ When in February 1779, Sakharan went to Wai for the marriage of his daughter, Mahadji went to Baramati for the marriage of his daughter to Ladojirao Deshmukh.⁵ Mahadji had discovered the treachery of Sakharan and as a matter of fact, Sakharan's note of treachery to Raghoba was in Mahadji's custody.⁶

1. Sardesai, op.cit., vol. III, p. 84.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 83.

4. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 188.

5. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 212.

6. Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 128; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 195-196, 200, Khare, Itihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. VII, No. 2486.

Haripant's resignation seemed to have been in compliance with Mahadji's pretensions to the office of Senapati which he demanded at same time as he insisted on cession of Ahmednagar and Assar. He was in command of the whole army, including that of Holkar, too and treated Haripant as subordinate and ridiculed him in his face in presence of Holmes, for his ill-success in his campaign against Col. Keatings in Gujarat.¹

Earlier Mahadji had made advances to Mostyn but was slighted. On Mostyn's departure same were made to Lewis and on Lewis, declining to visit him, he was determined to send his agent to Bombay, who finding to think that the English means were already taken with Raghoba too much beyond his master's views confided himself to general professions of friendships on the part of Shinde without opening himself further".² "The English felt that the cession of a territory of no consequence nor value to him was the easy price he would have to pay for their friendship as a frontier against the introduction of an European force engaged to other interests than to his, be a curb upon his delegate in the Peshwa dominions to secure his dependence and would thus enable him to give his attention and presence to his northern dominions in the proportion they demanded."³ "The intestine divisions amongst the Maratha Chiefs had effected what civil dissensions long continued have never failed to bring about in every age and country - the overthrow of the power and Dominion but that of the sword. Of this, Shinde was then in possession and did not wish to part with it. The English again thought that his intention was to remove his seat of governance

1. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 188.

2. Ibid. 191-192.

3. Ibid. 197-198.

to Poona or to establish some kind of power there subordinate to his own. The Brahmins had been always coveting French alliance; that Moreba when in power actually proceeded on it, no less than Nana by whom it seemed to have been first formed and it was remarkable that much of the intelligence Mostyn received on this subject, which was found very exact, was conveyed to him through persons closely connected with Shinde."¹

By the new arrangements Madhavrao was declared the Peshwa; Sawai Bajirao, his Naib; and Shinde and Holkar were to act in the name of Bajirao, Raghoba relinquished the government to receive a jagir. Nana and Sakharam were to conduct the government as ministers, still. But after the treaty of Wadgaon, Nana helped by Mahadji, became the sole manager of the Peshwa's government and wielded full power.² Mudhoji's overtures to peace transactions were rejected by the Poona ministers.³ Nana and Mahadji remonstrated against the new demands of the English who repudiated the treaty of Wadgaon and a new confederacy was carried out among the Nizam, Hayder and the Marathas against the English.⁴ It was reported on 20th January that Goddard reduced Dabhai.⁵ The Nawab of Bhopal reported that in spite of the opposition of Ballaji Govind, Visaji and others, Goddard had come to his territory.⁶

Mahadji on 20th January acquainted Farmer that as he was security to the Poona Durbar for the due performance of the late

1. Ibid., 190-195 (President's Review).

2. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 86.

3. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1714.

4. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1715.

5. S.P.D.D. vol. 22, 46-47. (Goddard to Bombay).

6. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1323.

treaty, he desired that Stewart and Farmer would accompany him wherever he went. The Englishmen were treated with great civility and attention. Farmer again advised Carnac and Egerton that Appaji Sivji possessed much of Mahadji's confidence and suggested to propose a particular attention, keeping everything that he might propose or mention a secret from the agent of the Durbar.¹ Nana and Sakharan derived their authority from Shinde and Holkar. This was passed in writing, all officers were informed and usual rejoicings took place. Goddard had passed with his troops peaceably through a province of Shinde on account of the passports given by Shinde.²

Thus on 19th February 1779, (1) actual affairs were in Shinde's hands and Nana posed as a tool of Shinde's power. (2) Shinde was supposed to be well inclined to the English preferably to the French but was earnest for some closer connection and alliance with the Company. (3) The Convention as far it concerned the Poona Government was not at all the object of Shinde's views since he had, in fact, made it optional with the English whether to comply with them or not. (4) The private article in his favour was not the firm object of his consideration - this and all stipulations to be treated as fund to pay the English from, in any alliances he might enter into with them without any real expense to himself. (5) Shinde had some motives of policy which rendered him unwilling that the English power and possession on this coast should be materially reduced. (6) It was for the interest of the Company and necessary for their purpose to inform themselves what Shinde's real intentions were and to take some measures as they

1. Forrest, *Maratha Series*, vol. I, 376; *S.P.D.D.* vol. 20, 38-39 (Farmer to Bombay.)

2. *S.P.D.D.* vol. 20, 191-192.

consistently could, in concert with him for the exclusion of Nana from all real and effectual power in the administration of the Maratha Empire.¹

Goddard had arrived in the Bhonsle's territory in January and started negotiating with the Bhonsle, the basis of his terms being that to declare the Bhonsle, the Raja of the Marathas. Goddard had been given all powers for transacting a full treaty with the Bhonsle.² The Poona Government had despatched their troops, too, to march towards Hoshangabad in order to oppose Goddard's march.³ However, Devakar Pandit requested the Governor-General to ask the Bombay Company to stop hostilities.⁴

When Raghoba had joined Shinde with 300 Rauts, 13 Cannons and 12 to 13 hundred Guards and with 200 servants, Sakharam was to go to Wai, the next day and the English had already counteracted the Wedgson Treaty.⁵ Ten lakhs of rupees Jagir had been given to Raghoba and he was to live at Jhansi under Shinde's guidance. Raghoba even reached Kayagad-Tanka. Hari Bawaji, Shinde's Sardar with Shinde's and the Peshwa's army of 5000 troops accompanied Raghoba.⁶ Goddard was asked by the Bombay Government to change his route on 23rd January and to march to Surat and not to reach Poona.⁷ By about 23rd and 25th January, Egerton, Carnac, Cockburn returned to Bombay from the army.⁸ Francis at Calcutta had not scrupled to propose that the English

1. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 191-192.

2. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1325.

3. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1326.

4. D.P.C. vol. V, Nos. 1327-1329.

5. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2464.

6. Ibid.

7. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 37 (Consultation).

8. Ibid. 38.

should make an object submission to the Marathas and should call back Goddard but the Governor-General persuaded Barwell to stay on and not to leave India and finally Barwell agreed to be persuaded by the advice of the Governor-General at the critical moment.¹ On 29th January an enquiry into the failure of the expedition was set up by the Bombay Government and Col. Cockburn and Egerton were censured for their cowardice.² Mahadji was paying visits to the temples and proposed to go to Purandar, thereafter.³ On 1st February the convention of Wadgaon was repudiated by the Company in a letter to reply the letter of the Peshwa, Shinde and Holkar. The Bombay Company was awaiting instructions from the Governor-General,⁴ and the President was desired in the delivery of his reply, to make use of such terms as would leave an opening for further negotiations or overtures from Mahadji, which his letter gave room to expect.⁵ The Governor-General had written to the Peshwa blaming him for all the disaster.⁶ Raghoba had a special treaty contracted with Shinde and Holkar.⁷ On 4th February, Madhoji sent presents including a horse to Goddard.⁸ Madhoji pressed for the cession of places stipulated in the treaty by the English. Mahadji wielded paramount influence in the Poona Government and demanded the return of Goddard's troops from the Company.⁹

The horrid conspiracy was entered into between Mons. Anquetil, French Consul at Surat, Chevalier St. Lubien then at Daman, some of the

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1. Forrest, Selections from the Foreign Department, vol. I, 665.
 2. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 41-44 (Consultation).
 3. Phalke, op. cit., vol. II, App. II and Nos. 6, 73 (29-1-1773).
 4. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 56-57, 64-65. (Reply to the Peshwa, Shinde and Holkar-Consultation and Bombay to the G.G.).
 5. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 385.
 6. G.P.C. vol. V, No. 1348.
 7. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2476; Parasnis, Itihasik Tipana, I-7.
 8. G.P.C. vol. V, No. 1350.
 9. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 67-69. (Farmer to Bombay).

Maratha generals and several of the Nabob's officers to burn by night the factory and to seize the castle and person of Nabob and kill the English and some Dutch. Anquital was deported on 5th February 1779.¹ Ghazi-ud-din arrived in Surat, it was reported on 6th February². The Governor-General on 9th February wrote to Shinde that he was glad that Shinde helped the English army to pass through his territories and that he supported the cause of the Bombay Government.³ The Company issued orders to remove Ghazi-ud-din to Bombay on 11th February⁴. The treaty with Mahadji was declared as shameful and scandalous by the English but the Company had to adhere to it.⁵ Raghoba had explained to Govindrao Gaikwad under what terms he had surrendered to Shinde and Holkar. His son Bajirao was to act as minister to the young Peshwa and he was no more using the seal of the Peshwa for himself.⁶ The Bengal Government resolved to help the Bombay Government by despatching hundis of 1,55,000 rupees and Goddard was to go to Bombay for consultation.⁷ "It was reported on 16th February that, Goddard's force consisted of one regiment of the Mughal Horse belonging to the Company, 500 Candahar Cavalry of the wazir's, one company of native artillery with a park of 4, 12 pounders and Howitzers, six battalions of Sepoys with 2 six pounders each. They had need, however, of tents for the officers."⁸ Raghoba was to leave for Jhansi and Nana informed Parashuram Bhau that Raghoba had repudiated all

1. Ibid, vol. 20, 71-74. (Surat Chief to Bombay, Anquital to Thana), 79-83, 83-85, 233-236.

2. Ibid, vol. 20, 74-77, 170-171 (Surat to Bombay).

3. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1355. (9-2-1779).

4. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 160-161 (Bombay to Surat).

5. Ibid, vol. 20, 89-90 (Daniel Draper's-members of Bombay Council-minute).

6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 407 (11-2-1779).

7. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvahar, No. 153.

8. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 231-232 (Surat to Bombay).

claims on the Poona State.¹ "The Company felt on 19th February that should Shinde refuse his concurrence to the march of the Bengal army to Surat, a strong detachment must be sent into the field near Surat or Broach to act in concert with Col. Goddard and to favour his march towards one or other of those places on the success of which everything then depended and all must be risked to ensure it." The Bombay Company again paid Rs. 41,000/- to Mahadji's officers as the Durbar charges and felt that it was absolutely necessary not only as a mark of the English regard to Shinde himself but as a failure in this article would make every man of his Durbar their enemy at a time when the least important of them might be able to do them some injury.³

The English attempt for peace with the Marathas through Mahadji failed as he, then, insisted on the Wadgaon Convention to be carried out in its effect.⁴ Chinnaji Bapu with 60,000 strong started for Bengal on the Dasara Day of 1779; and the Marathas devastated Dhen Kanai on their way.⁵ Mahadji established an alliance with Khanderao Pawar, too.⁶ Hastings strongly refuted Barwell's inclinations to submit forcibly to the Marathas.⁷ The people in the country side devastated by Shinde and Holkar in their march were given help by the Maratha Government, on their application.⁸ The Paraganas of Bhander, Mahu Mohani and Khalasis Fatapur in Taluka Jhansi of Datia State were given to Mahadji in military Saranjam.⁹

1. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2481.

2. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 203.

3. *Ibid.*, vol. 20, 201 (19-2-1779).

4. Abdul Ali, *op. cit.*, I.H.R.C.P. vol. XII, (1929), p. 111.

5. Mahapatra, "The despatches of Warren Hastings and the history of Dhenkanal", I.H.R.C.P. vol. XIX, (1942), p. 163.

6. Phalke, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 12.

7. Forrest, *Selections from Foreign Department*, vol. I, 181.

8. *Sat. Raj. Diar.* vol. VI, No. 734.

9. *Ibid.*, vol. IV, No. 267; Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2516.

Trimbak Narayan Raje Bahadur owed one lakh of rupees to Sakharan as bribe and Mahadji was requested to recover the amount due to him by his Government and it appears from the entry that Raghoba's son Bajirao recovered Rs.12000 from the territory of Ahalyabai, - Rs.11,940/- from that of Mahadji and Rs.23,971/- from that of Khanderao Pawar.¹ Mahadji wrote to Nana about the affairs of Ahalyabai and the disputes with Tukoji assumed such gravity that Ahalyabai requested the Peshwa to declare officially that Nathyaba, her grandson should be adopted by her as her heir.² Naro Ganesh Sonche, Karbhari of Tukoji, intrigued so much that Ahalyabai would not be on good terms. He had set Tukoji against Nana in Moroba's affairs. He was to be punished severely on that occasion but he escaped due to Mahadji's interference. In order to centralise Ahalyabai's administration, Nana instructed Mahadji that Tukoji must be declared as the appointed chief instead of Ahalyabai.³ Nana suspected that Mahadji set Ahalyabai against him.⁴ Raghoba, when was compelled to submit to Mahadji, informed the ministers that they should put an end to his life, upon which the ministers gallantly declared that, that would be beneficial to none and pleaded that once for all Raghoba should leave that thought from his mind.⁵ Amritrao married his second wife, immediately afterwards and Raghoba himself thought of marrying again.⁶ Tukoji and Mahadji were deputed to escort Raghoba to Jhansi. On the way, the armies levied Ghasdana in cash from the mahals near

1. Ibid, vol. IV, No. 161.

2. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. II, p. 12.

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. II, p. 11.

4. Ibid, pp. 9, 10.

5. Sardesai, Madhyabhag, vol. IV, 386.

6. Ibid, p. 347.

Aurangabad belonging to the Nizam, though Mahadji himself remained at Jambgaon.¹ The Nizam made a claim for the money which was respected by the Marathas.²

Remaining himself inactive, Mahadji gave his own terms to Nana, not to take Haripant in confidence as Mahadji himself disagreed with Haripant.³ The English hostage specially recommended Appaji Sambhaji, who had great influence in all the matters agitated in the Durbar of Mahadji and Tukoji, to the Company for certain pecuniary arrangements, and it was reported that Mahadji promised to recall troops sent against Goddard.⁴ The wazir, Ghazi-ud-din was discovered in the design of a Fakir and had been secured by the Nabob of Surat when Goddard was, on 16th February, to be 60 cos. away from Surat.⁵ On 25th February he had his camp at Badouly and at Foulparry near Surat, while he actually reached Surat on 1st March 1779.⁶

On 24th February, Hingane wrote to the Deccan from the Emperor's camp at Jaypur and was apprised of the defeat of the English⁷ and on 24th, it was reported that Shinde and Holkar were given congé for their march. The English at Calcutta denied the Wadgaon treaty and Raghoba marched towards Jhansi when Kharag Singh and Chinto Vithal stayed behind.⁸ Madhoji, in the meanwhile suggested that the English could engage in reducing the fort of Mandal in conjunction with his army and have an equal share of the booty, suggesting Goddard

1. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2516; *Sat. Raj. Diar*, vol. IV, No. 347.

2. *Sat. Raj. Diar*; vol. IV, 347.

3. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2516.

4. *S. P. D. D.*, vol. 20, 267-273. (Farmer to Bombay, 21-2-1779).

5. *Ibid.*, vol. 20, 243-244. (Bombay to G. G.)

6. *Ibid.*, vol. 20, 260-261, 273. (Goddard to Bombay).

7. *Hingane, Dantar*, vol. II, No. 87.

8. Khare, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2484.

to march on the Bombay side.¹ Ghazi-ud-din was on 28th February sent to Bombay while the French consul carried on intrigues at Surat.² Farmer was not allowed to go to Poona from Shinde's camp at Tajsor (?) to take possession of the company's effects left by Lewis. The Maratha Court objected to Goddard's march and became suspicious of the Bombay Company.³

Hastings nourished projects of the conquest of India⁴ and wrote to Sullivan about his accommodation with Francis. On 4th March, he wrote that Francis had conciliated not to oppose him in the prosecution of the Maratha war.⁵ Devakar Pandit pointed out to the Governor-General that the earlier plan of theirs was frustrated and it was not advisable to move an inch unless the new one was formed.⁶ It was reported by 9th March that the Governor-General paid six lakhs of rupees to Goddard to facilitate his march.⁷ Raghoba was joined by Dhavangaokar Anandgir on 7th March.⁸ Raghoba himself was at Parner on 11th March and was proceeding to Tonkya with Mahadji's army of 4000 troops under Hari Bawaji. Hari Bawaji was Mahadji's minister but at this time was obeying the orders of the ministers. Holkar was at Watgaon or Chandwad and intended to be there till the rains were over. The Marathas no more thought of a campaign against Hyder and only reinforced Parashuram Bhau by sending Appa Balwant with 5000 troops.⁹ Mahadji was to go to Tuljapur and thought then to cantone for the rains at Burhanpur. When Bhivrao Panse died,

1. C.P.C. vol.V, Nos.1382,1387.

2. S.P.D.D. vol.20, 273-275 (Surat to Bombay), 303 (11-3-1779).

3. Ibid, vol.20, 269-273. (Farmer to Bombay).

4. Seir-Mutagherin, vol.III, 96.

5. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Departments, vol.I, LVIII.

6. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1389.

7. Ibid, No.1392.

8. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol.I, No.32.

9. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1487; Khare, op.cit, vol.VII, No.2487, and p.3402; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.206.

Nana, Haripant, and Mahadji went to console the Panse family.¹ There were two reports already gathered about the treachery of Sakharam. Sakharam had written to Chinto Vithal from the Borghat and this letter found its way to Mahadji who kept it a secret till the campaign was over and then arrested Sakharam at Purandar and sent him to Sinhagad. Another report revealed the fact that Sakharam had written two notes to Raghoba and Chinto Vithal which Raghoba himself sent back to Mahadji. The property of Sakharam was confiscated.²

Mahadji and Tukoji were near Jejuri when Sakharam was kept at Sinhagad and Nana had gone to Menavali.³ On 15th March, the exchange of vows of brotherly relations against any odds between Nana and Mahadji took place at Purandar.⁴ On 16th March, Carnac minuted on the proceedings of the Select Committee at Bombay, "that having since his return from the expedition, perused the translation of the treaty and separate articles he found them couched in such terms that he certainly had objected thereto at the time of the signature, had they been literally explained to him; and indeed was the more - indifferent as to the particular wording of them, as he always bore in mind the idea, that they were of no validity and would never be ratified by his superiors."⁵ Mahadji acknowledged and approved the action taken by Nana and communicated through Chimappa Panse with regard to the negotiations proposed by Goddard. Lala Phatechand

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2488, 2489; G.P.C. vol. V, Nos. 1444, 1449; Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S. vol. II, No. 406 (Chinto's wife in imprisonment); Khare, Adhikar-Yog, p. 130.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, 2651; S.P.D. vol. 36, No. 385.

4. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 86; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 202.

5. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 372.

Munshi had been sent to Goddard.¹ Abbaji Shabji accompanied the hostages to Goddard and the Sardars declared their friendship to the English and requested a man to be sent to them but the English felt that deputing a man to Shinde, at that time, would carry the appearance of being too eager in making overtures, which might be construed in an unfavourable light and was besides particularly improper from the circumstances of Shinde's having corresponded with Goddard under the seal of the Peshwa and since the refusal of the ministers to accede to the terms Goddard had proposed, for all proposals for accommodation ought to have been first made by the Maratha Government. Abbaji Shabji returned to Shinde from Goddard to get the proposals from him.² Devakar Pandit requested the Governor-General to advise Goddard not to face war with the Marathas when Goddard had replied that he was marching to Bombay to help the Company there.³

Fort Victoria was attacked on the night of the 13th March and Goddard was reported to be in Bombay on 18th. Ghazi-ud-din left for Mecca from Bombay, on 7th June 1779.⁴ The Peshwa wrote to Goddard on 21st March 1779 asking him to go to Calcutta, according to the convention of Wadgaon.⁵ Hyder complained to the Governor-General about Mahe on 19th March,⁶ when Goddard tendered evasive replies.⁷ The Nawab of Arcot reported on 28th, that Hyder intended to join the French at Mahe against the English.⁸ Raghoba still insisted on the English help⁹ and Mudhoji contracted the treaty with the Governor-General for

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S. No. 47.

2. S.P.D.D. vol. 22, 186 (Goddard to Bombay. 17-3-1779).

3. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1397. (18-3-1779).

4. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 325-327 (Consultation and Bombay to G.G.)
vol. 21, p. 468.

5. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1403.

6. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 669, 638.

7. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1404.

8. C.P.C. vol. V, Nos. 1414, 1416.

9. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1422.

the throne of Satara.¹ Goddard was to reduce Gujarat and to reconcile the Gaikwad brothers to the Company and the Company hoped on 30th March that Mahadji would not help Nana to oppose the English.² The Bombay Company prepared itself to espouse Bhonsle's cause and instructed Goddard to write to the Bhonsle to that effect and instructions were imparted for an alliance to be sought with Mahadji for the assistance against the Nizam or Hyder as to prevent him as long as possible from declaring against the English and to spare English the time to receive instructions from the Governor-General as regards himself.³

Goddard's army refused to accept the pay for January unless accompanied by that of February and Goddard believed that thus furnished with sufficient money, the sepoys intended proceeding home. He was confident, however, that this would be checked but suggested that immediate activity for them must be provided.⁴ The English thought that Mahadji's idea seemed to be that he had already laid the English under such obligations, by the assistance he gave in extricating their troops at Wadgaon and was so secure of their jealousy of Nana's connection with the French that he might depend on one still counting his friendship and he imagined by preserving his claims on the English for the cession stipulated in the convention of Wadgaon, he should be able to maintain such an influence over the English, as to choose his own time and terms for any assistance he might expect from the English. Then he found his power in the Maratha Durbar

1. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1423.

2. S.P.D.D. vol.20, 412 (President's Minute).

3. Ibid. vol.20, 407 (President's Minute).

4. Ibid. vol.20, 405 (President's Minute).

sufficiently secured by his presence and by his command of his own and Holkar's troops near the capital and conceiving the English affair to be more urgent than his, he hoped for a more advantageous bargain by waiting till he could draw proposals from the English. He had already taken advantage of the ground they had given him to rely on a disposition in his favour, by seizing Sakharam Bapu and removing his party from all trust and power and by keeping a stricter hand than before on Nana with whom however he had little refrained from coming to extremities probably with a view to making the most of him and draining him completely of his treasures.¹ The attack on Fort Victoria was led by Moroba Bapuji, the Subedar of Suvarnadurg, nephew of Haripant and as well as his uncle. This, the English felt, was concerted by Nana with the design of obliging Mahadji to declare against the English and involving him in one common cause with him.² Mahadji, it was reported on 30th March, did answer the overtures of the President and had chosen to proceed in a moment less open and the Company felt under necessity to take over measures accordingly.³

The idea of the Grand Quadruple Alliance against the English was first mooted by Nizam Ali. He wrote to Nana and Diwaker Pandit of Nagpore, Nana had invited Mahadji from Jambgaon and Tukoji from Wadgaon and formed the plan.⁴ Mahadji had on 4th April written to Narsinh Sripat not to detain the messengers of the English passing through the Ghat.⁵ Mahadji and Tukoji attended the thread-ceremony of the Peshwa and Raghoba who was rather sick marched towards

1. S.P.D.D. vol. 20, 402-403. (President's Minute).

2. Ibid., vol. 20, 403-404. (President's Minute).

3. Ibid., vol. 20, 403.

4. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 95; Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar, No. 192.

5. S.P.D. vol. 36, No. 375.

Chaugdar. The English were preparing for war.¹ In April, Mahadji was busy with the celebration of the marriage of his daughter.² He, however, had declared that he would not move to face Goddard unless he was supplied with sufficient forces and funds.³ But the English were equally busy to face the proposed descent of Taymoor Shah, intended against the English, for they had in their treaty with the Bhonsle, a special stipulation namely article No.7, "that when the Raja was to fight the Afgans with the help of the English, the profits made in the campaign either in territory or in wealth shall be divided equally between them."⁴

Mahadji handed over Kharak Singh to Nana, who put him to death but Mahadji kept in his own custody, Chinto Vithal and Sadashiv Ramchandra, for two years more but till then Nana also did not cede him Ashirgad.⁵ Basalat Jung, the brother of the Nizam, offered to rent the Guntur Sircar to the English to save himself from the encroachments of Hyder and a treaty with him was concluded in April 1779 without the knowledge of the Nizam, whose subject Basalat Jung was. The Nizam consequently resolved to take field against the English. For this purpose he tried to win over the Peshwa, the Bhonsle and even Hyder to his side and formed a confederacy to root out the English.⁶

Mahadji, after the ceremony, went to Janbgaon,⁷ Hastings had himself accommodated with Francis over the Maratha issue. What had

1. Khare, op.cit, vol.VII, No.2492.

2. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.88; Sardesai, Uttar-bhag, vol.I, p.204; Khare, Adhikar-Yog, pp.130-132.

3. Sardesai, op.cit, vol.III, p.88.

4. Heras, op.cit, Is.C. vol.XI, (1937), pp.510-511.

5. Khare, Adhikar-Yog, p.129.

6. Diskalkar, D.B. "George Gray's Embassy to Hyder Ali," J.I.H. vol.XI, pp.311,313 (1932); Narendrakrishna Sinha, "Hyder Ali, 1721-1779 (Book-review)," J.I.H. vol.XI, (1942), p.139.

7. Sardesai, Uttar-Vibhag, vol.I, p.205.

lowered the pride of Hastings into an accommodation with Francis was the need of a united Government to meet the foreign and internal dangers which threatened the very existence of the English dominion. The speedy and successful termination of the Maratha war, he considered essential to the safety and it could only be conducted to a prosperous termination by vigorous and united action. To be free to act vigorously, he condescended to make terms with his bitter foe and he believed that Francis would be true to his engagements but in a very short time he discovered the perfidiousness of his adversary.¹ The treaty of Madras was contracted on 3rd April 1769 between Hyder and the English, when it was stipulated that in case of attack, the contracting parties would assist each other with the troops. When the Marathas had invaded Hyder in 1771, the Government of Madras had refused help to Hyder. The war was declared between France and England in 1778 and the French settlements in India were promptly attacked by the English. Pondicherry fell after a gallant resistance. The important fort of Mahe on the Malabar Coast was taken by Col. Braithwaite on 18th March 1779, notwithstanding all the protests of Hyder. This greatly annoyed Hyder to whom Mahe was a very useful post through which he obtained military stores from the Mauritius. It was again included in the territory recently conquered by him.²

The Governor-General had written to the Peshwa on 6th April, refuting the Wadgaon Convention as unauthorised,³ and Mahadji had written to the Governor-General on 17th April, informing him that he

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1. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, LVII; Gleig, op.cit., vol. II, 304.
 2. Diskalkar, op.cit., J.I.H. vol. XI, (1932), p. 311; Surandra Sen, Hyder Ali's Fleet, I.H.Q. vol. VI (1930), p. 313; Narendra Krishna Sinha, op.cit., J.I.H. vol. XXI, (1942), p. 139.
 3. C.P.C. vol. V, No. 1432; Forrest, Selections from the Foreign Department, vol. I, 670.

had helped Goddard with the provisions and hoped that the Governor-General would direct the Bombay Company to abide by the treaty.¹ But Hastings wrote to Sullivan, about Goddard's march, applauding: "What reward will our superiors bestow on the man who has been the happy instrument of retrieving the recent dishonour which had tarnished the English name? Let me receive my customary portion of censure for having projected the expedition. I expect it. But his conduct in the execution of it, which has no relation to the principles of its formation surely entitle him to universal applause".²

Mahadji and Tukoji received letters from the vakils of Taymur Shah on 17th April to inform them that the latter was shortly coming to India at the request of Shah Alam and implored that if the Sardars were friendly they would send him a petition to that effect.³ The Sardars had replied that they would join His Majesty when they would have settled their own affairs.⁴

Hari Bawaji Ketkar, the officer in charge of Raghoba asked Naroba Naik, a banker of Ujjain to keep cash money for the drafts which were being dispatched, for the expenses of Raghoba.⁵ Mahadji himself suspected that Nana had opened up secret negotiations with Raghoba, Anandibai, Gaikwad and the English who were supporting Raghoba.⁶ Vithal Sharnao wrote that Raghoba's camp was at Kasarbari with Mahadji's force round him and Raghoba himself informed the Governor-General that he had contracted treaty with the Peshwa through Mahadji and

1. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1448.

2. Gleg, op.cit., vol.II, p.273.

3. Heras, op.cit., Is.C. vol.XI, (1937), p.510.510.

4. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1449.

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne.S.H.S. vol.II, No.408.

6. Navalkar, Mahadji and Nana, p.23.

Tukoji and desired no war against the Peshwa and wished that his vakil, Chautram, may be recalled.¹ Nana was all powerful and in fact the Raja of the Deccan and Mahadji was in accord with him. The Marathas did not like the fresh negotiations. The spies of Mahadji and Nana were closely watching the movements of Raghoba.² The English at Bombay asked the Poona minister to release the hostages when Mahadji and others refused to comply. Nor would they dismiss the French men, who were either their employ or residents in their territory. Mahadji seized Dhoussa's Jagir which was in the neighbourhood of Aurangabad.³ On 29th May, Raghoba arrived on the banks of the Nerbada from whence he began his march towards the English army at Surat. The Qasid of Lala Kashmiri Mal was an eye witness to this.⁴ Raghoba was departing with his family towards Surat. Two battalions clamoured for pay. Hari Bawaji when referred to, suggested them to be dismissed. Raghoba whereupon felt offended. In the exchange of blows near Choti-Maheshwar while crossing the Nerbada, Hari Bawaji received twelve wounds of which he died and 500 to 600 men fell on both the sides. A remarkable phenomenon appeared in the night. A blazing light shone on the sky towards the South and a multitude of people saw it. It bid evil to the people of the Deccan⁵. Anandibai had joined Raghoba at Burhanpur. Hari Bawaji was earlier sick when he was attacked. Mahadji Shinde immediately after the escape of Raghoba, started collecting army.⁶

1. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1494.

2. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1510.

3. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1503.

4. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1511.

5. C.P.C. vol.V, No.1532.

6. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2503; SB.D.D. vol.21, 469-471 (Consultation), Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol.I, 387, (Goddard's letter); Rajwade, op.cit., vol.X, p.142, No.204 (Raghoba asks help from Fatesingh).

CHAPTER: VIIThe First Anglo - Maratha War - Gujrat Campaign.From 15th June 1779 to 24th June 1780.

Nana accused Mahadji of dereliction of duty and secret connivance when the latter was spending his well- earned rest in fortifying his country residence at Jambgaon. Mahadji's palace was named Madhav-vilas and the rampart, Saheb- gad, after his Muslim Guru, Shah Mansur.¹ If Burhanpur was fixed as a place for his cantonement, after having been to Pandharpur and Tuljapur and Bid, Mahadji would go there. Mahadji had given orders to celebrate Shri Saheba's anniversary and was himself preparing to leave Poona quickly.² On 22nd April, it was again reported to the Governor-General that Hyder had opened up hostilities.³

Mahadji was near Poona on 5th May.⁴ It was reported on 6th that Goddard had left Surat for Poona.⁵ The Governor-General wrote to Sakharam and the Peshwa on 7th May, declaring that the Bombay Company had no authority to carry out treaty and that if the Marathas wanted peace, they were advised to contact Goddard.⁶ Appaji Sabaji on behalf of Mahadji wrote to the Governor-General on 12th May that Salsette must be ceded to the Marathas.⁷ Nana had ordered Mahadji to march against Raghoba but the rainy season did not permit it and only helped to heighten doubts and ill-feelings. Mahadji himself felt ashamed of the whole affair.⁸ Nana refused to cede the Jagir to Mahadji because Raghoba effected his escape. Mahadji,

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.88.

2. Phalke, op.cit., vol.II, Appen.III, Nos.9,10,11,12.

3. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 669.

4. S.P.D.D., vol.21, 459. (Farmer to Bombay).

5. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1477.

6. C.P.C., vol.V, Nos.1480, 1482.

7. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1486.

8. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 210.

however, tried to explain that he was prepared to march against Raghoba. Nana finally consented to hand over the Sanads when Chinto Vithal and Sadashiv Ramchandra would be handed over to him by Mahadji. It was declared, again that Mahadji had nothing to do with Haripant. Nana told this to Mahadji through Naro Sivdev and the whole of Shinde's camp was astir with the thick rumour that Haripant and Parashuram were to attack his camp, all of a sudden. But Nana's main support was Mahadji still, even though we find Nana himself had set out to collect army.¹ The English had increased Raghoba's pension from Rs.10,000 per month to Rs.50,000 per month now.²

A letter from Calcutta was dispatched to Bombay on 24th May implying that the agreement with Mahadji must be fulfilled if he insisted on it or any substitute might be suggested by the Bombay Company.³ It was again held that the separate agreement made by the English with Mahadji stood on very different grounds. "It was not a concession extorted by the Maratha Government against its conviction of legal sufficiency in those who yielded it, but it was the price at which they purchased the safety of the army and was so absolutely their own spontaneous act that it appeared, that the ministers of Mahadji were even corrupted to influence his acceptance of it. It was true they had no authority to make such a compromise and the English might therefore refuse to ratify it but it was doubted on the part of the English whether this would avail them in the opinion of the world or they would conciliate

1. Khare, op.cit. vol.VII, No.2516.

2. Khare, Life of Nana, p.97.

3. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 674-675 and PP-676-678 (Francis' Minute).

it to the obligations of justice and honour for the retribution of the most signal (though humiliating) act of kindness that a nation could receive from the bounty of an individual, unless they could be allowed the rule of Asiatic policy in doing to all men what they knew they would under similar circumstances, do into them."¹ Thus the English bound themselves compelled in conscience and duty, to declare that unless Mahadji should have forfeited his right by any subsequent act he was entitled to the performance of his engagement and the English were to ratify it;² though, however, the English had already disavowed the convention of Wadgaon, imploring to God that they could as easily efface the infamy which their national character had sustained by the concessions inserted in it.³

It was reported on 24th May that the Governor-General had appointed Goddard as minister to negotiate peace with the Poona Durbar.⁴ The Poona Durbar had agreed to pay off the expenses of Raghoba on 4th June, according to the treaty concluded through Mahadji.⁵ On 10th June, instructions were imparted to Surat Chief not to give protection to Raghoba and Goddard was referred as the final authority in these transactions by the Bombay Company. Raghoba with his family and Amrutrao and with 500 horse and foot passed by Cubbeir Waik at Soocitterah by about 10 O'clock on 4th June, towards ⁶ Surat and reached Surat on 15th June. Vithal Shamraj, reported to Poona that Raghoba was deserted by the English; Mahadji's Sardar,

1. Ibid., 672.

2. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 672.

3. Ibid., (24-5-1779).

4. S.P.D.D., vol. 21. 465-466 (Goddard to Bombay), (G.G. to Bombay), ⁴⁶⁶⁻⁴⁶⁷ ₁₅₋₄₋₁₇₇₉

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 36, No. 357.

6. S.P.D.D., vol. 21, 480-481 (Consultation), 486-496 (Bourcher's letter) to Surat. 10-6-1779).

Devji Gauli, intended moving towards Burhanpur, via Sultanpur on the Tapti river, Nandurbar to Sonagad. Mahadji also sent drafts of Rs.25,000 on Ahalyabai for the expenses of the army and Ahalyabai made preparations for the Gujrat Campaign.¹

The Governor- General denouncing the convention of Wadgaon, declared protection for Raghoba and Goddard was given powers on 14th, to settle the terms with Mahadji if he chose to side with the English.² It was reported on 24th June that Spain declared war on England.³ The Kamavisdar of Kotah was ordered by Ahalyabai on 2nd July to remit to her notes of one lakh of rupees from the income of the district as the said amount was to be paid to the agent of Mahadji. The agent was sent to Maheshwar to recover the amount paid to Tukoji by Mahadji through a banker in the Deccan.⁴ Yeshwant Shinde of Kolhapur wrote to Nana on 4th July, agreeing on his part to carry out the stipulations of the treaty already arrived at, if the Peshwa would do the same on his part.⁵ Sir Thomas Rumbold, the Governor of Madras, with the double policy of softening the anger of Hyder and of ascertaining his real attitude towards the English, sent Schwartz, a Danish missionary working at Tanjore, with a letter from himself to Hyder. Schwartz set on, the journey, accordingly, and on 6th July reached Caroor, the frontier fort of Mysore, 40 miles west of Trichinopoly. On 6th August he resumed his journey and on 25th August he arrived at Seringapattan. Hyder was struck with the

1. Parasnis, Maheshwar Darbarchi Batamipatren, vol.I, No.1.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.21, 551-556(G.G.to Bombay) (14-6-1779).

3. Ibid, vol.23, 473.(Court to Bombay).

4. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, 111.

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, Nos.101, 102.

single mindedness and unattached piety of the missionary and he held frequent conferences with him.¹ Meanwhile Nana informed Naro Sivdev on 7th July that the messengers from Hyder destined to see Mahadji had arrived and gave instructions as how to treat the Jasuds in Mahadji's camp.²

The private consultations of Nana and Mahadji could not be fathomed and at the instance of Nana, Appaji Sabaji Pandit had been appointed Vakil at Calcutta by Mahadji. He set out on 30th May with a letter to the Governor- General. The Vakil was obviously sent to gain time as there was discontent every-where. When Mahadji was dictating the letter which Appaji was to take to Calcutta, his Munshi enquired why a new Vakil was being appointed when there were already persons to look to business, Mahadji replied that they were not acquitting themselves well of their duty and that they appeared to have attached themselves to the English. The Munshi pleaded that they were absolutely reliable persons. Mahadji charged him of complicity. Nana had summoned up Devakar Pandit.³ Mahadji had complained to the Governor- General that the Bombay Company had not respected the Wadgaon Treaty and had attacked Suvarnadurg.⁴ Raghoba, too, gave account to the Governor - General why he attacked Hari Bawaji and fled to Goddard. Hari Bawaji, he explained, killed Rai Muhammad and kharak singh, the Jamadar of the Gardis and the peon, respectively.⁵ News was received by Nana that a defeat was inflicted at Dadaicha in Khandesh upon Kesopant Datar, a partisan of Raghoba by the combined forces of Ganeshpant and

1. Diskalkar. D.B., "op.cit." J.I.H., vol.XI, (1932), pp.313-314.

2. Sardesai, kavyetihas Patren, No.244.

3. C.P.C., vol.V, Nos.1514, 1513.

4. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1513.

5. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1550.

Holkar.¹ Mahadaji and Tukoji, hearing of Raghoba's flight, marched after him up to Aurangabad. Raghoba approached Broach by forced marches and Mahadji was busy in seizing Dansa's Jagirs, who called himself an ally of Mudhoji and defied Mahadji and the Peshwa with 10,000 cavalry. Devakar Pandit set out to Poona, in reality to accommodate matters between Dansa and Mahadji or at least to keep them away from open hostilities.²

Devakar Pandit arrived in Poona and Raghoba, in spite of the pursuing army, had reached Surat. The sardars had sent several contingents towards Gujrat and had directed them to encamp at a distance of eight days journey from Surat. The Bhonsle's Vakil had left Goddard.³ The Governor-General wrote to Nana that Goddard had been sent to negotiate peace and warned him that if he did not pay heed to it, the Governor-General would not be responsible for the consequences.⁴

Raghoba's Sardars Sadashiv Ramchandra, Abaji Mahadev, Sakharam Hari, Haripant Bhide had been to Mahadji - but did not keep up the appointment on the next day.⁵ The English presented Raghoba with two palanquins and offered him Rs.1,25,000. The messengers from Raghoba arrived at Delhi with a letter for Nawab Majdu'o - Dowlah on 31st July⁶ and Raghoba was apprised of the Governor-General's intention to support him.⁷ The work of planning

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.34. (22-7-1779)

2. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1548.

3. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1551.

4. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1545.

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.34. (22-7-1779)

6. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1568.

7. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1556.

the confederacy of the big four against the English was completed by Dasarha of 1779. The English reported that Nana offered a crore of rupees to Mahadji to get back Raghoba. Mahadji did not want Haripant to stay near Nana and help him but Nana refused to comply and ultimately Nana managed to hatch up the confederacy against the English by sheer force of diplomacy. He knew the remark of Francis in Calcutta Council that the whole of India was against the English.¹

Raghoba's partisans carried on anti-state activities in Khandesh² and Khandesh was ablaze with Guljarkhan's riots in August.³ Curious enough when Mahadji himself wrote to Nana on 31st August approving the plans formed by the latter regarding the next campaign against Raghoba and the English and fixing even an auspicious day for his own march,⁴ Chimnaji Khanderao wrote on 30th August about a new conspiracy of Mahadji, Tukoji, Chinto Vithal, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Mahadev Gogte, Naro Gopal to March to Poona and murder Nana and Haripant on account of the fact that the treaty with the English was to be concluded through the Bhonsle and hence, they felt themselves slighted.⁵ The Peshwa wrote to Goddard that he had sent vakils to him for transacting peace.⁶ The Nizam wrote to Nana, informing him that as suggested by Nana, he was prepared to form an alliance against the English after the rains, hoping that Mahadji, Tukoji and the other Maratha chiefs were on Nana's side.⁷ Nana and the Peshwa wrote to the Governor - General for peace and insisted that Goddard must be instructed by the latter and that the

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 214-215.

2. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar, 163,162; Sardesai,op.cit.,vol.I,235

3. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar,162,169,165,163.

4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S.,No.50.

5. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar, No.164.

6. C.P.C. vol.V,No.1592.

7. C.P.C. vol.V,No.1594.

Bombay Company must stop the hostilities.¹ The Rajputs were stirred up by Majud-ud-daula against Mirza Najaf. Majud was also engaged in correspondence with Mahadji with the intention to join, when once he should have gained possession of the power of the Empire, in an attack on the British provinces.² Nana wrote to Mahadji that he and the Maratha State depended upon him completely and referred to the oath of brother hood that they had ceremoniously taken.³ Mahadji answered Nana's note, offering everything for the welfare of the Peshwa.⁴

The Bombay Company protested to the Governor - General against the independent powers and authority vested in Goddard by the Governor - General, on 4th September 1779.⁵ Raghoba was with his family in Surat on 6th September.⁶ His partisans were triumphant in Khandesh.⁷ The Bhonsle contracted treaty with the Peshwa on 12th September;⁸ Whereby the Bhonsle's army was to march to Bengal⁹ and the Peshwa wrote to Goddard on 14th that for the sake of his friendship, the colonel should protect his mahals from the rebellious Raghoba;¹⁰ when simultaneously Devakar Pandit requested Goddard to send Watherston to Poona for a lasting peace with the Marathas.¹¹ Beniram Pandit also hoped for a treaty of the Marathas with the English as per the information from his brother Rambhadar Pandit who was at Surat.¹² The Nizam demanded on 20th September

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1. Ibid, vol.V, No.1589.
 2. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p.126;
 3. Shinde-Shahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.36.
 4. Ibid, vol.I, No.37.
 5. S.P.D.D., vol.21, 567-571. (Bombay to G.G.), 571-574, 595-613.
 6. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar, No.166.
 7. Maheswar Darbarchi Patre, vol.I, No.2.
 8. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 320.
 9. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar, No.168.
 10. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1595.
 11. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1596.
 12. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1597.

from Mahadji, the Peshwa and the minister, the release of Sakharam and sought explanation. He was replied, however, that on account of certain hasty and impolitic actions of his, they could not set him free lest he should become a source of constant trouble and mischief to them. Sakharam was closely confined at Pratapgad,¹ at that time. The English again had solicited Hyder to join Col. Goddard if the negotiations with the Marathas failed² but Hyder himself sent an agent to Poona to form an alliance against the English and offered 40 lakhs of rupees and the tribute of 11 lakhs of rupees every year, along with the countries beyond the Tungabhadra.³ Hyder also called the chief of Mauritius to his help, offered presents to the Marathas and waited for the Monsoon to pass when he intended to root out the very existence of the English.⁴ The Nawab of Arcot gave the hint to the Governor - General that the English had to face three formidable enemies viz. the Marathas, the Nizam and Hyder suggesting that the English must immediately form an alliance with the Marathas and not with anybody else.⁵

Keshav Jagannath on 28th September wrote to Naro Sivdev for the original documents and not merely the copies of the agreement arrived at by the Peshwa's Government in connection with the delivery of Fort Asher to Mahadji Shinde.⁶ The Governor - General wrote to the Peshwa that the matters which the latter referred were worn out and that the Peshwa should look to new treaty for which

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1602.

2. Ibid, vol.V, No.1607

3. Ibid, (21-9-1779); Kasture No. "Tipu Sultan's Conspiracy against the British - 1790", J.I.H. vol.XIV, (1935), p.266.

4. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1609.

5. Ibid, vol.V, No.1607.

6. Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S; vol.II, No.103.



Goddard was then approaching.¹ Two lakhs of rupees were to be paid to Raghoba by Mahadji as per the convention of Wadgaon and Raghoba had escaped with the drafts, to that effect.² Goddard's army was to be reinforced from Bombay with 300 Europeans Infantry, two battalions of Sepoys, one hundred artillery and from Madras with three battalions of sepoy, one battalion Europeans Infantry and fifty artillery.³ By about 29th September Gulzarkhan's riots were raging high in Khandesh.⁴

Goddard informed the Bombay Company that the minister and Mahadji in conjunction with Hyder, the Nizam and Mudhoji, meant to make a general attack upon the English at the several settlements and had entered into and sealed written agreements for that purpose. Goddard prepared to resist the confederacy and the Bombay Company, too, supported his scheme.⁵ Watherston had admitted that it was a great blunder on the part of the English at Bombay to support Raghoba⁶ and Mudhoji apprised the Governor - General of the great Maratha strength.⁷ On 6th October again, Hastings told Mahadji and Nana that the English did not approve of the Wadgaon Treaty.⁸ The ministers threw all the responsibility of the Gujarat campaign and the management of Gaikwad's affairs on Mahadji and Tukoji. Mahadji opened up correspondence with Fatesingh.⁹ On 7th October Mahadji conveyed

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1620.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.35.

3. S.P.D.D., vol.21, 633-635. (Goddard to Bombay).

4. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar, No.169

5. S.P.D.D., vol.21, 635-636. (Goddard to Bombay. 30-9-1779)

6. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1624

7. Ibid, No.1623.

8. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.215.

9. Ibid, p.245.

to Nana directions about the routes and arrangements for the forces, marching through Gujarat.¹ Thakur Das delivered the Governor - General's letter to Mahadji. He sent it to Nana who after five days returned it with his comments to Mahadji. Appaji Sabaji was to be sent to Calcutta but Devakar Pandit's arrival had postponed it. Mahadji's munshi had offered himself to go but Mahadji remained silent over the suggestion. The munshi had opined that Mahadji had become arrogant and proud and that he would not hesitate to break any arrangement. Goddard opening up the negotiations with Nana and Mahadji, suggested an interview with the Poona minister. Nana, it was reported would agree if Raghoba was handed over or kept under strict surveillance. Mahadji was engaged in making fortifications.²

Gulzar (formerly on the Peshwa's side) had allied with the Fort-keeper of Ashirgad and raised 10,000 horse. Mahadji had ordered his 5000 horse to defeat him but the latter defeated Mahadji's horse. Another body of 7000 was sent by Nana which, too, suffered the same fate. A strong force then was despatched under Bahirji Rath Shinde but Raghoba also sent reinforcements to Khan. Mahadji tried to bribe the fort-keeper of Ashirgad.³ Babuji Holkar, an adherent of Raghoba, levied 7 lakhs of Rupees on Indore, removed the officers of Tukoji and raised the troops. Amrutrao had been to Bombay for negotiations on behalf of Raghoba and Nana sent army

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.51.

2. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1639.

3. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1639; Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar No.183; Rajwade, op.cit., vol.X, pp.142, 143, Nos.205, 206.

to Talegaon. Nana favoured Devakar Pandit who agreed that the English were a thorn in their side which must be got rid of.¹ Mudhoji was in constant correspondence with Mahadji, too. The English hostages were treated with honour by Mahadji and they were allowed even to amuse themselves by hunting in company of their guards.²

The treaty between the Peshwa and Hyder was arranged by Mahadji Shinde;³ and Krishnarao Narayan Joshi was sent to Hyder by the Peshwa on 22nd October.⁴ From 29th October to 2nd November the Bombay Company was not prepared for a rupture and the Committee desired for gaining truce; while Mahadji was averse to any accommodation with the English. Col. Brathwaite was to proceed to Surat with the Madras detachment. Goddard met and discussed the situation with the Bombay Committee⁵ and on 15th November settled the new scheme of attacking the Konkan.⁶ The English were fighting against Gaikwad but now also had designs on Bassein.⁷ The Bhonsle tried to secure peace for the Marathas and the English but Nana held that the Marathas must be compensated for the infringement of the treaty and insisted that the Governor - General must order Carnac to stay within the borders of Bengal and not to proceed further. Again when a personal conference between Goddard and the ministers was fixed, the colonel suddenly postponed it.⁸ Nana had

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1639.

2. Ibid., vol.V, No.1639.

3. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren. No.247

4. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.2.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.21, 687-693, 697-699, 702-704, 742.

6. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar, No.179.

7. Ibid. No.174.

8. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1653.

even sent Lakshmanrao on 1st November to Goddard when the colonel wrote to him for peace. Goddard had asked Nana to fix Surat or Poona for personal interview and Nana had replied that he was not serious about the place but was particular that the parties must come without armies.¹ Mahadji had written to Nana saying that he and Tukoji were willing to fight either Hyder, Raghoba or the English provided that Ahmedabad fort together with the territory yielding 40 lakhs of rupees were given to him. Nana replied that the ~~then~~ difficulties were Shinde's own making and would never have arisen but for his failure to keep Raghoba closely confined.² Nana and the Peshwa were at Poona with Haripant. They had agreed, it was reported, to pay 65 lakhs of rupees to the English but the English disagreed and demanded four forts and four crores of rupees. The English promised Raghoba that they would help him and still, they would accept money from the ministers. Haripant intended to march to Surat after the Dasara to punish the English, leaving the young Peshwa to defend Poona.³ Mahadji was equally busy over the settlement of demands of Tukoji, concerning the divided House of Holkars.⁴

The Maratha State finally declared on 3rd November unfavourable reply to Goddard's proposals and demanded declaration of hostilities. The English, too, deliberated a plan of offensive march, by about 15th November.⁵ Mahadji informed Nana on 9th November to meet the British opposition on various points and suggested definite

1. C.P.S., vol.V, No.1657. (Devakar to Beniram), 1658 (Mudhoji to Beniram).

2. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1655 (News from Delhi.1-11-1779).

3. Ibid.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.104.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.21, 705-720, 746-749 (Goddard to Bombay).

duties being assigned to the several Maratha Commanders. He warned him to guard Bassein immediately and hinted that he should face the English on plains. Trimbak Appaji was sent to Hyder from Mahadji's camp and was to reach Poona first on his way. Bhagirath Shinde's (The Peshwa's) army and Tukoji were to march to Gujarat while Mahadji would manage the northern parts.¹ Ghazi-ud-din had offered to reduce the Deccan for the English if he would be made the Raja of the Deccan, giving a promise that he would certainly rule in conformity with the wishes of the Governor - General.² While the English and Raghoba organised further planning,³ the Bombay Company on the 10th November disclaimed responsibilities for the approaching war with the Marathas and suggested to postpone hostilities till the junction of Capt. Popham's detachment.⁴ When Trimbak Appaji from Mahadji reached Poona on 13th November Nana insisted and Mahadji approved that Krishnarao from the Peshwa, Trimbakrao from Mahadji and Govindrao from Raste, must be one on all points that they would talk to Hyder.⁵ Mahadji suggested on 16th November measures to prevent complaints from Gaikwad on account of the damage of crops, caused by the movements of the Maratha troops.⁶ Sadashiv Dinkar forwarded to Nana on 17th November the copies of the proposed treaty with the Portuguese, with Mahadji's reply.⁷

In October Hyder had said to Schwartz, " I am of the same opinion with you; and wish that the English may be as studious of peace as you are. If they offer me the hand of peace and concord,

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos. 52, 61.

2. C.P.C., vol. V, Nos. 1598, 1660.

3. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravayahar, Nos. 177, 178

4. S.P.D.D., vol. 21, 732-736, 742-745. (Consultations)

5. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. XIX, Nos. 4, 7; Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2510.

6. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 53.

7. Ibid. Nos, 54, 55.

I shall not withdraw mine." Although Schwartz was treated well with due honour by Hyder, The mission produced no good to the Madras Government. Hyder continued to be hostile to the English¹ and even kept in prison at Calicut some English subjects.

Govindrao and Narsingrao awaited² on 21st November Mahadji's letters to start on the march. On 25th Goddard had reached Surat, after his visit to Bombay and the English were to attack Gujarat in a short time as all the necessary preparations were done. Chinto Vithal was with Mahadji and in consultation with Shinde, raised the claims of Raghupatrao against Trimbakrao Narayan Raje Bahadur of Malegaon. Again Trimbakrao Sivdev Odhekar and Pawar together were to pay five lakhs of rupees. Nana had agreed with Mahadji on all these transactions.³ On 27th, Mahadji sent to Nana letters that he received from Balaji Raghunath of Bombay. Mahadji then dispatched Bhagirath Shinde to move expeditiously towards Gujarat and asked him to write to Fatesingh to join him.⁴ Raghoba's influence had dwindled so far that it was reported on 29th November that he could not procure for himself the necessaries of life. The English could not consent to supply him with the superfluities of life, nor could they see how the Company's affairs would be benefitted by an intimate connection with a man from whose influence no advantage could be derived.⁵

Mahadji informed Nana on 3rd December that he has dispatched troops into Gujarat as desired by him. Bhagirath Shinde, Paraji Pant were sent to Gujarat while Gangaji Awad was sent to Nana and on his return, he, too, would march to Gujarat.⁶ Goddard, too had started

1. Diskalkar, "op.cit", J.I.H., vol.XI(1932), p.314.

2. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvyahar, No.180.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2514.

4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.56.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 282-283, 284-285.

6. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.57.

manouvring by about 3rd December. On 4th December Mahadji wrote to Nana that he had become a guarantee for the proper execution of the treaty concluded between the Portuguese and the Peshwa.² By about 10th December Mahadji still had not marched into Gujarat.³ It had been suggested that Mahadji had disputes over his own jagir in Khandesh.⁴ Misunderstanding and unpleasantness arose between Mahadji and Nana; and the root of the affair was some newsletters received by Mahadji from Poona describing the hostile intentions of Nana towards him, an incident typical of the frequent differences which produced annoyance and vexation between the two and which often seriously affected the interest of the Maratha State.⁵ It was also suggested that Mahadji himself was displeased over Raghoba's affairs.⁶

Ganpatrao Shivdev wrote to the Peshwa on 14th December that Raghunath Hari from Jhansi had joined Sivaji Vithal against the Jat of Gohad.⁷ The Marathas opened up the overtures and new and closer relationships with the Nizam by about 15th⁸ and Goddard explained to Mudhoji by the same date that the Marathas were not prepared to hear anything unless Raghoba and Salsette were handed over to them.⁹ It was reported on 15th December that Lakshman Rao and Nehal Chand, vakils of the Marathas to the Dutch President solicited the supply of military material from the President, to join the Maratha army to Surat and assist in seizing the castle and guaranteed freedom of trade in exchange. The Dutch were ready to destroy the English and awaited only the minister to point out the way.¹⁰ Goddard had

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1. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvyahar, No.184.
 2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos.58, 63.
 3. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvyahar, No.186
 4. Sardesai, Op.cit., No.183; Phalke, op.cit., vol.I, No.38.
 5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos.60, 59
 6. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvyahar, No.185;
 7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.39
 8. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1685.
 9. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1686
 10. S.P.D.D., vol.21, 867-870, 870-872 (Intercepted Letter), 857-867 (Goddard to Bombay).

completed his preparations and opened up negotiations with Fatesingh.¹ Nana had deputed Naro Sivdev to Mahadji to clear his misunderstanding that Nana was trying to compass the fall of Mahadji.² On 15th December again, the Marathas contracted second treaty with the Portuguese in accordance with which the fleets of the respective parties were not to attack one another at sea but to provide each other with any necessities they might require and both the parties bound themselves not to help each other's enemies.³

Hyder's son Karim Khan celebrated his marriage and the invitations were sent to the Peshwa, Mahadji and others.⁴ Naro Sivdev writing from Jambgaon on 17th December communicated to Nana, Mahadji's advice that Visaji Pant Athavale and Bhagirathrao Shinde, instead of going to Kondaibari, be at once ordered to proceed via Alimohan for the relief of Ahmedabad, against which Chandrarao Pawar was launching serious attacks. Mahadji was quite serious and sincere in his proposals of other arrangements at Kondaibari.⁵ It was reported on 10th December that Nana launched 5,000 horse and 6,000 foot in the Konkan. Raghunath Ganesh of Carsee, Fakir Sheth, a copper smith of Thana and Kanoji Row of Bellapore were entertained at Poona by Nana for schemes on Salsette. 7000 troops arrived near Bassein and 1000 troops gathered near Panvel. The soldiers in the

1. Ibid, vol.21, 857-867(Goddard to Bombay).

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S.vol.II, No.105.

3. Parasnis, Marathyanche vakil, chap.II, No.3; Diskalkar, "op.cit", J.I.H.vol.XI,(1932), p.312.

4. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX Nos.11,14(15-12-1779).

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S.vol.II, No.106.

forts who were Purbeas, were tampered.¹ Mahadji was preparing the replies for and the approvals of letters from the Nizam and the Bhonsle, from 18th to 21st December² and he on 21st approved of Nana's order to dispatch visaji Pant and Bhagirath to proceed into Gujarat via Sonagad.³ Raghoba asked his agent at Calcutta to sound Hastings' feelings whether a promise of half the territory of Gujarat would satisfy the English as a rich reward and urge them to exert in his behalf.⁴ Naro Sivdev on 25th, in acceptance of Mahadji's views requested Nana to dispatch speedy orders to Visaji Pant to proceed atonce towards Baroda crossing the Nerbada at the Ferry where Bhagirath Rao was to cross. The English had started an aggressive war in Gujarat.⁵

By about 28th December the Peshwa had contracted his treaty with Hyder⁶ and Hyder was to march against Madras.⁷ Two choices were given to Hyder by the Marathas - 1) to come to their help, 2) to harass the English at Madras. Hyder had selected the second one.⁸ Mahadji in reply to Nana's complaint about the delay of Holkar's troops and that the country was devastated by it, informed him on 29th that he had written to Holkar to hurry up his dispatch of the troops.⁹ By about 29th, the sardars had not marched into Gujarat,¹⁰ though Naro Sivdev reported on 30th, that Mahadji had

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1. S.P.D.D., vol. 21, 825-826, 852-857, 866.
 2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos. 64, 65.
 3. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 107.
 4. S.P.D., vol. 36, No. 388, Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvyahar, No. 187.
 5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 108.
 6. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. X, Nos. 235, 236; vol. XIX, Nos. 15, 16, 19; Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patre, No. 250; Seir-Mutagherin, vol. III, 125; C.P.C., vol. I, No. 1706.
 7. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. XIX, No. 18.
 8. Seir-Mutagherin, vol. III, 125.
 9. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 66.
 10. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. XIX, Nos. 23, 30, 24.

agreed to accept Nana's suggestions to proceed to Gujarat immediately.¹

Mahadji had incurred debts and the interest thereon rose very high.² Ultimatum was served on Gaikwad to pay the arrears quickly.³ Mahadji had written to Gaikwad that he was marching on the Gujarat campaign.⁴ Gaikwad's court had become a scene of intrigues and counter - moves and treachery was not ripe.⁵ It was reported on 1st January 1780 that Fatesingh was not joining Raghoba.⁶ The English army had its own financial difficulties, even though Raghoba intended to march on Baroda.⁷ Raghoba's party had secured triumphs in Gujarat, till then.⁸ The principal part of the military operations in Gujarat from the ministerial side was entrusted to Mahadji, Haripant and Tukoji. But they took care to place Holkar, of whom Nana was justly suspicious, in a situation from which he would have found it extremely hazardous to effect a junction with Raghoba.⁹

Mahadji received letters from Fatesingh¹⁰ and he thereupon intimated Nana on 6th January 1780 that he was himself preparing to start for the campaign.¹¹ The Governor - General on 7th urged the Bombay Company to attack Hyder's territory.¹² In Gujarat, the English reoccupied Olpad pargana and Goddard crossed the Tapti on 2nd January

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.109.

2. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.X, pp.140-141, No.202.

3. Ibid., pp.150-151, No.216.

4. Ibid., pp.178, 179; No.252.

5. Ibid., pp.154-157, No.221.

6. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvyahar, No.190.

7. Ibid., No.193.

8. Ibid., No.192.

9. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, pp.86-87.

10. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.67.

11. Ibid., No.68.

12. S.P.D.D., vol.24, 213-214 (G.G.to Bombay).

1780 and encamped on the opposite side. On 3rd, he resumed his march and on 4th, he arrived at the bank of the Nerbada where he stayed for 3 days and then formed two battalions 500 horse Kandahar (the wazir's army), 42 pieces of cannon and four large guns with the intention of sending them forward. Raghoba furnished his son Amrutrao with 5 lakhs of rupees and 1000 horse and as many troops and had sent him to accompany the general. Raghoba had ten battalions and four companies of Europeans. Fatesingh's vakil was in Goddard's camp and the Raja of Mandvi waited upon Goddard (Mandvi is 20 cos from Poona).¹ Surat walls were under repairs. Sooner Hansot and Ankaleshwar were occupied, too.²

In the Konkan, by a-bout 10th January 1780, the Maratha force assembled at Bankot with designs on Salsette.³ Nana had suggested that Mahadji should arrange to oppose the English march through Bundelkhand but after deliberation and taking into consideration the relative positions of the Emperor, his minister Mirza Najaf Khan, the Rana of Gohad and the English and being satisfied that Mahadji's forces were round about him, near Gwalior and the other arrangements of Mahadji there,⁴ he agreed that Mahadji must march into Gujarat immediately.⁵ Bapuji Holkar and Tukoji were marching to join Mahadji. Visaji Appaji, Bhagirath and Parasharam Pant reached Sonagad and marched towards Rajpimpali, to Kondaibari Ghat.⁶

Nana encamped with 4 to 5 thousand troops outside Poona. Lala Nihalchand, after his conference with Nana, had gone to Goddard.

1. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 25-27, 31-32 (Surat to Bombay); C.P.C., vol.V, No.1786.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., vol.22, 13-21 (Consultation).

4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos.69,70.

5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.71; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 247.

6. Ibid.

The Divan of Bhonsle had returned to Nagpore, giving Nana a promise that within six weeks, he would march towards Bengal and lay waste the whole country. Hoshangabad and its forts were to be handed over to the Bhonsle for this work. Mahadji had 60 guns of various sizes and a large quantity of powder with him. The English at Bombay were prepared, too and would proceed on Bassein though Nana had sent reinforcements there. The Peshwa, accompanied by Haripant went to visit Visaji who would be restored to his former office.¹ Goddard and Raghoba were with five battalions of sepoys and 2000 troops were reported to have been dispatched to Dali. Goddard was at Surat on 13th January. Nana kept secret the letters he received from Surat and wrote in his hand to Mahadji and did not trust others. Mahadji was aiming at an ascendancy which Nana was studiously endeavouring to prevent, yet each was so necessary to the other in the Maratha Empire, that although their ultimate views were at variance, their present interests were in union.² Mahadji Nana dispute, earlier noted, started from the Dasara of 1779 and lasted for three or four months; thus they missed five nice months to attack the English and Goddard got time for his preparation.³ Goddard wrote on 16th January to the Bombay Company, "The leisure allowed by the inactivity of the ministers, which was I conceive, been principally occasioned by the disputes between him and Shinde, has proved very convenient to the settlement of the Gujarat province which I hope may be finally concluded before any considerable body of troops can arrive from the Deccan." He again wrote on 26th

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1706.

2. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.92.

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.224.

January from Dabhai, signalling that this dispute¹ would drive Fatesingh finally to join the English though Goddard knew that Fatesingh was the most unscrupulous man himself.²

The select Committee of Madras gave instructions on 14th January to George Gray to go to Hyder for peace with the English.³ Nana, too had informed Hyder that the sardars were marching to Gujarat province. Raghoba sent Maniar Parsi and Hanmantrao to England. Burke looked after them and informed that the English at home were not in a position to help them with the army.⁴ Hastings had tried to win over by intrigues the Nizam, Hyder, Shinde, the Bhonsle and Holkar.⁵ But Mahadji and Holkar were not at all straight forward men.⁶ Till 16th January Goddard was not joined by the Mahe detachment and Fatesingh had not decided to join the English. Goddard moved from Surat to Shukla Tirth and crossed Bawa Para ford.⁷ Mahadji on 18th informed Nana that Fatesingh had taken a hostile attitude and that it had become necessary to chastise him;⁸ on the other hand Goddard reported to the Bombay Company on 19th that the English had occupied the Peshwa's mahals in Surat Athavisi and opined that no, certain judgement was to be formed of the real designs of Fatesingh, so famed for treachery and deceit as he was reported to be.⁹ The Poona-vakils from Surat had returned on 20th January.¹⁰ and the Sardars were in right earnest on account of their march while the Bhonsle, too, was prepared for his march into Bengal.¹¹ But on 21st January Nana had to urge on the Bhonsle to march

1. Forrest, Maratha series, vol.I, 391.

2. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 247.

3. Diskalkar, "op.cit," J.I.H., vol.XI(1932), p.317.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, pp.224, 154; Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patra, No.469.

5. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, pp.154, 155.

6. Ibid, p.101.

7. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 37-38 (Goddard to Bombay)

8. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.73.

9. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 39. (Goddard to Bombay)

10. Rajwade, op.cit, vol.XIX, No.41.

11. Ibid, Nos.36, 41; Khare, op.cit, vol.VII, No.2520.

quickly. Mahadji had asked for the big cannon from Poona and already the English and the Maratha foraging parties fell on each other when with Shinde's help, the Marathas got the upper hand and obliged the English to retreat. The Nizam wrote to the Bhonsle promising active help to the Maratha side, after the rains.¹ However, on 23rd the Bhonsle was informed by the English that Goddard was the master of the Bombay situation and that the talks for peace should be opened.² Mahadji wrote a letter of condolence on 24th January to Shivaji Vithal Vinchurkar, on the death of his son³ and in January, too, Mahadev Hingane wrote to the Peshwa from Delhi, recommending him to establish a friendly understanding with the Emperor and his wazir, Najaf Khan, in order that a simultaneous movement against the English in Northern and Eastern India might be effected with advantage to the Maratha State.⁴ Mons. Lali was sent by the Nizam to reinforce Adwani force but he was taken in service by Hyder.⁵ On 26th January Govind Gopal Kamtekar⁶ contracted a treaty for Fatesingh with the English.⁷ It was reported on 28th that Nana pulled down Sakharam's house and got 60 lakhs of rupees. There was also another report that Nana squeezed 16 lakhs of rupees from Moroba, at this time but this report appeared false. Gulzar Khan was in the neighbourhood of Chokah. The Nizam was prepared

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1919.

2. Ibid. No.1922.

3. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.111.

4. Ibid. No.112.

5. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2520.

6. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.102;

7. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 55-61 (Goddard to Bombay)

to pay for Chimnaji Bhonsle's army and sent a confidential agent to Devakar Pandit with a khilat of condolence on the death of his wife.¹

Hastings on 30th January was at a loss what to do, as on the speedy and successful termination of the Maratha war, he believed that the very existence of the British Empire in India depended. Again, he had no powers of carrying it on with vigour, for Francis and wheeler systematically opposed him and sir Eyre Coote was not to be depended upon, while Barwell fretted escape from the thralldom of a thankless office.²

Goddard himself had no intention for peace³ and the English had already captured Bassein and Arnala, on 30th January⁴ Earlier, on 3rd January Goddard was 6 cos. on this side of Vajreshwari when Haripant marched to Badlapur. Bajipant was 2 cos. ahead.⁵ Nana wrote to Naro Sivdev, vakil to Shinde, to arrange matters so that Shinde would be able to help him.⁶ Raghoba sought to form a front of the English and Hyder against the Ministerial party⁷ and offered a bribe of 50 lakhs of rupees to Hastings if, in return, he would undertake to reinstate him in the Peshwaship.⁸ From February to July of 1780, the Delhi Chiefs were busy with raids against the Sikhs, which were organised under Mirza Shafi.⁹ Hastings had instructed Anderson to approach Chimnaji Bhonsle

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1724.

2. Gleig, op.cit., vol.II, p.249.

3. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1726.

4. Ibid., No.1724; Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2576.

5. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2577.

6. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, III, 6.

7. S.P.D., vol.36, No.390.

8. Ibid., vol.36, No.391.

9. Hari Ram Gupta, "Diary of Mirza Shafi's campaign against the Sikhs - Feb-July 1780", I.H.R.C.P., vol.XVII, (1940), p.103. (C/f Claud Martin's collection. Per. Trans. Bri. Mus.)

to put up the case of the English very clearly before him and to inspire him with hopes to win the throne of Nagpore for himself after the demise of his father, setting aside the claim of his eldest brother, who was claimant to the throne after Mudhoji, being the eldest in the family and in return Chimnaji Bapu would help the English with large army in the wars against Hyder for which Hastings was prepared to pay about 12 to 17 lakhs of rupees as the expenses of the army to Chimnaji.¹ Mahadji had written letters to Hyder on 1st February² and the Nizam was reported to have left the English on 3rd February.³ On account of the Maratha - Hyder alliance, the Madras Government urged on an early understanding with the Marathas, on 4th February, nevertheless, actually sending reinforcement to Goddard.⁴ Mahadji had written to Fatesingh on 30th January from Kasarbari⁵ but before the other letter on 4th February could reach him, Fatesingh had signed a separate treaty with the English.⁶ Mahadji and Tukoji, on the 5th February, were encamped at Orranpore, which is reckoned to be about 60 cos. from Baroda. Mahadji had sent off his heavy artillery to Burhanpur and with ten or twelve light field pieces and about 15000 horse, was himself advancing towards Gujarat.⁷ The Maratha army was fast proceeding to the parts of the country where the English had been

1. Mahapattra N.N., "Despatches of Hastings and History of Dhenleane", I.H.R.C.P., vol.XIX, (1942), p.163.

2. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.49.

3. C.P.S., vol.V, No.1727.

4. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 242-244. (Fort St. George to Bombay)

5. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 246.

6. Ibid, 247, 246.

7. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 399; Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.52; S.P.D.D., vol.22, 103-104 (Goddard to Bombay).

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 already successful and it was reported on 5th February that
 Ganesh Vishwanath was dispatched to meet the English at Parner.²
 A letter of Mahadji to Fatesingh was intercepted on 6th, which
 revealed that Fatesingh was to stop the English and he would
 be joined by Mahadji who approached with the guns. Fatesingh in
 another letter was advised to play with the English till Mahadji
 arrived on the scene.³

Visaji Appaji wrote to Mahadji on 6th February of his
 campaign near Baroda against Gaikwad. Fatesingh sent 6 lakhs of
 rupees and Manaji Gaikwad with 3000 troops to join the English.⁴
 Mahadji's letter of 6th February to Fatesingh was received by him
 on 23rd February at Baroda⁵ and Balkrishna Anant received another
 from Mahadji for Fatesingh at Broach on the same date, with the
 same purport.⁶

Nana wrote to Hyder on 7th February again⁷ and Hyder got
 all the letters from Mahadji to be rewritten for the sake of clear
 understanding.⁸ The sardars descended into Gujarat from Kasarbari
 Ghat on 7th February⁹. Appaji Ram reported on 9th that upon minute
 inquiry that there was no antagonism in Mahadji's mind towards
 Nana and that Ranekhan and others were all supremely attached to
 Nana's interests and were loyal to the Peshwa. Balarao, Aba,
 Ranekhan and Rajji Patel all guaranteed Mahadji's loyalty towards

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.113.

2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.74.

3. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 132-133.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.40.

5. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 400.

6. Ibid, 401.

7. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.96, Rajwade
 op.cit. vol.XIX, No.56.

8. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.296.

9. Rajwade, op.cit., No.52; S.P.D., vol.36, No.393(13-2-1780).

the Peshwa and Nana, though misunderstanding was there on account of the Karbhari (Secretary) of Tukeji who was always intriguing.¹ Mahadji, on 10th, communicated to Nana his approval for passing an oath of fidelity to the Nizam, who was inclined to side with the English, for the Nizam was more inclined to attack Hyder, in conjunction with the English.²

Goddard left Dabhai and on 10th, arrived in front of Ahmedabad.³ Mahadji carried changes in his plans for the successful opposition, on account of the fact that Fatesingh was then on the English side.⁴ In the Konkan, the Maratha army of 3000 horse assembled at Bankot on 11th February⁵ and in Gujarat, on 10th February Goddard wrote to Ragho Pandit Tatya Bhikaji, the Commander of the Garrison, who was offering stout resistance, to deliver up the fort of Ahmedabad and on 12th, opened up batteries and cannonaded till 13th evening;⁶ when 17 were killed and 89 were wounded on his side.⁷ The Maratha garrison gave heroic fight before they lost Ahmedabad and Mahadji gave encouragement to all commanders to wage a grim contest.⁸ It was hinted that by 15th February Mahadji had a determination to secure the person of Raghoba by assaulting Surat.⁹ On 16th, the letters between the Dutch Chief and the Maratha vakils were intercepted by the English.¹⁰ Mahadji was 40 cos. from Surat and a surprise was intended to plunder the

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.75.

2. Ibid., No.76

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 249,250.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S.,vol.II, No.114.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.22,72.(Fort victoria to Bombay).

6. Ibid., vol.22, 96-97 (Goddard to Bombay),79-83,85(consultation, 21-2-1780); C.P.C.,vol.V, No.1858; sardesai, H.P.M.S.,No.80.

7. Ibid., vol.22, 104 (Goddard to Bombay).

8. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos.84,85.

9. Duff, op.cit.,vol.II, p.113.

10. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 74-77.(Surat to Bombay).

city of Surat and seize the person of Raghoba but the seasonable arrival of Col. Broun's Detachment from Madras placed the English above all apprehensions of any attempt of that nature. The Surat Chief called back, however, garrisons from several districts and the districts themselves were left open to ravages.¹

Gray had reached Seringapatam on 17th February but was received with cold reception and although the English prisoners were released, Hyder did not care for the English friendship and even seemed determined to take hostile actions against them.² The treaty of Hyder joining the quadruple Alliance was settled on 20th February 1780.³ When Hyder sought Mahadji's guarantee,⁴ Mahadji refused to give a written assurance and wrote to Hyder a strong remonstrance urging that papers had no greater value than a plighted word of honour. Accordingly Mahadji and Tukoji were to march to Gujarat, Khandoji Bhonsle to Bengal, the Nizam to Shikakol and Raj Mahendri and Hyder to Chinapatam (Madras.)⁵

In Gujarat, Goddard reported that Mahadji had not been satisfied by the minister, respecting the demands he made upon him, eventhough, it was reported that Nana was sending another army to his support. Goddard was surprised to see that Mahadji entered Gujarat with so small a force and thought that the fall of Ahmedabad would put a stop to his progress.⁶ Nana refuted on 18th the charges

1. Ibid., vol.22, 142-145. (Bombay to Fort William. 7-3-1780)

2. Diskalkar, "op.cit," J.I.H., vol.XI, (1932), p.318 A. (Gray's account); C.P.C., vol.V, No.1748.

3. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.95; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.217; Rajwade, op.cit., vol.X, No.235; vol.XIX, No.66, Diskalkar, "op.cit", J.I.H., vol.XI (1932), pp.318.319.

4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.83; Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.66.

5. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2523.

6. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 399; S.P.D.D., vol.22, 103-104 (Goddard to Bombay).

Mahadji levelled against him.¹ Mahadji was disheartened and Nana did not confide in him.² The Maratha sardars, however, intended to attack Ahmedabad and Surat.³

Fatesingh Gaikwad played a double game.⁴ Ghanashyam Narayan had visited Mahadji's Camp but Mahadji then supported Govindrao against Fatesingh. Mahadji wrote to the minister that if Govindrao was favoured, all the arrears would be paid while Fatesingh had nothing to pay.⁵ Narayan Govind who had visited Mahadji was to see Fatesingh and to fix up the terms.⁶ Fatesingh himself complained that Ghanashyam Narayan was instigating Mahadji against him.⁷ Hence, Haripant assured Fatesingh that nothing wrong would be done to him as long as Nana had promised to support him.⁸ The terms that were to be given to Mahadji, however, were to be decided by Balaji Naik.⁹ Fatesingh also wrote a letter of submission to Mahadji.¹⁰ The English deputed on 21st February G.Horseley to forward their overtures to Hyder;¹¹ but Hyder sent express camels to Poona and kept his troops in readiness to seize the first opportunity of extending his territory either on the side of the Carnatic or of Golconda as chance might offer. The French people about him had flattered him with the notion of an armament from the Mauritius.¹²

Mahadji on 21st, denounced the atrocities committed by Holkar's troops during their march.¹³ Mahadji had crossed Kondaibari

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1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos. 79, 59.
 2. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, pp. 225-226.
 3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 78.
 4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 261-262.
 5. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. X, pp. 159, 160; No. 227; p. 177; No. 250.
 6. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. X, p. 180; No. 255.
 7. Ibid., p. 157; No. 222.
 8. Ibid., p. 175; No. 248.
 9. Ibid., p. 159; No. 226.
 10. Ibid., p. 180; No. 254.
 11. S.P.D.D. vol. 22, 79-83, 85 (Consultation)
 12. Diskalkar, "op.cit.", J.I.H. vol. XI, (1932), pp. 329-330.
 13. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 79.

and joined Holkar, when he was encamped 6 miles from Kondaibari. He had written to Ahalyabai that, on account of the Peshwa's instructions, he proceeded to Ahmedabad. Mahadji had correspondence with the Bhonsle, from Rahori and so Chimnaji was not sent to help Raghoba. Raghoba had sent Kesopant Datar to Mahadji; at this time.¹ The Maratha forces under Mahadji and Tukoji arrived at Novah Porah on 21st and Farmer asked Mahadji whether negotiations were to be opened with Goddard or Raghoba. The army was 12 to 14 cos. from Sonagad and four to five thousand horse even advanced to that place. Mahadji had 7000 horse, 2 large and 9 small guns while Tukoji had 7000 horse, 4 large and 3 small guns. Bhagirath and Paraji Pant had 5000 horse with them and also had about 8000 ravagers. Exclusive of this, a body of 5000 horse was coming from South under Ganeshpant. The English strengthened their garrison by calling back that from Chikley.² The reinforcements to Goddard from Madras arrived at Bombay, on their way to his camp, on 24th February.³ Nana was watching Mahadji and Goddard but purposely kept himself uninformed or not thoroughly informed. Mahadji, however, was a deep man and realised that he would not secure Raghoba unless he gave a fight which was itself impossible. The English cannons were very powerful. He wanted the rainy season to set in, so that the English would be handicapped in the mud of Gujarat.⁴ Shinde and Holkar had gone down Kondaibari with the cannons by about 26th February and had reached Khadaka Behera which is 20 cos.

1. Maheshwar Darbarchi Batanipatre, vol.I, No.3.

2. S.P.D.P., vol.22, 101-103. (Surat to Bombay).

3. Ibid., 89-95. (Bombay to Goddard.)

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 252-253.

away from Surat. It was reported that Fatesingh sought Mahadji's protection at Pavagad.¹ But Fatesingh was also supporting Raghoba's cause by joining the English,² and Mahadji sent instructions to the Peshwa's commander, Ganeshpant Behere, assigning him the task of capturing Fatesingh's territory and officers as he had deserted the Maratha cause and joined the English.³

By about 28th February in other quarters, Appaji Shamji and others were creating troubles for the ministers, on behalf of the Kolhapur Raja.⁴ Goddard was at Baroda and had reduced the fort of Dakovi. While he was approaching the town, Fatesingh himself left the town and started negotiations when the General called upon him to give up Baroda (20th January).⁵ Shinde and Holkar forded the Nerbada on 29th February with upwards of 20000 horse and proceeded to the neighbourhood of Baroda where they halted.⁶ Goddard had hinted that if Mahadji wanted to punish Nana as the English, too, desired, Mahadji should suggest means to do it.⁷ Mahadji was wasting time in negotiations and wanted to keep Goddard inactive during the fair season.⁸ Appaji Sabaji, Mahadji's wakil to Goddard, insisted that Raghoba must be sent to Jhansi with 12 lakhs of rupees annually and that Sawai Madhaorao would have Bajirao II as his minister and Bajirao II would be in Mahadji's custody, till he would take him to Poona. Mahadji wanted to take Raghoba and Bajirao II with him to

1. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.62.

2. Sardesai, N.P.M.S., No.81.

3. Ibid., No.82.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.15.

5. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1767.

6. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.113.

7. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.250.

8. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.114.

Poona, what might happen of the English. Goddard, however, sent back Appaji.¹ Goddard knew that Mahadji followed the time-killing tactics. Mahadji had called Govindrao Gaikwad, Fatesingh's brother and he wanted to capture Baroda with Govindrao's help.² Seven to eight thousand horse and foot - the same army belonging to Mahadji which after defeating Gulzarkhan was stationed in Khandesh - had ravaged the paraganas between the Tapti and the Nerbada. Fatesingh and the Raja of Piplej crossed the Nerbada at the English fords at Baroda namely Baberbun, Nand and Corall. The forces of Mahadji and Tukoji came by the way of Broach and passed through the country of the Raja of Piplej by Larawah Burr and encamped at a village, Balode, opposite Caroll where they were the day earlier after-noon. The ravagers of the sardars were the vermins that destroyed the country through which the Maratha army passed and it was felt that if the country was exposed for a few days more to the fury of the Marathas, it would become a desert. Their attack on Occlesur was repulsed and the English still expected the following revenues from the different places :- Occlesur, 3000 Rupees; Hansod, 12000 Rupees; Deshborrah, 17000 Rupees; Ahmood, 35000 Rupees; Dubhoy, 10000 Rupees.³

Yeshwantrao Shinde pleaded Nana on 5th March not to trust Appaji Shyamji who was actually playing the greatest mischief.⁴ Mon.Lali, in the South had joined Hyder by about 5th March;⁵ The

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.251.

2. Ibid.

3. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 127-132. (Broach Chief to Bombay).

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.116.

5. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.73.

Marathas took prompt precautions and had sent armies in Hindustan, it was reported on 6th March, to check the new advance of the English from Benares.¹ In the Konkan, the Maratha attempt to seduce the Thana Garrison was detected on 6th March. Kasimkhan, the Subedar of the fourth battalion there was tampered by the Marathas to bribe the sepoys to agree to deliver up the fort.²

Goddard had left Major Fullarton with a detachment of 8 companies of sepoys and 2 guns within the city of Ahmedabad. The army marched from Ahmedabad on 2nd March to meet the Marathas and Fatesingh accompanied. On 8th, Goddard was within 2 miles of Baroda and 8 miles from Mahadji and Tukoji.³ Goddard had removed his heavy artillery and stores to Cambay on the 7th and the Marathas on 6th had encamped within two miles of Dabhoy on the road that led to Pranghur - 16 miles east of Baroda and leading to Malwa Province. Mahadji's advanced guard totalling thousand moved towards Mahie and encamped on 6th, near Chama - 5 cos. in front.⁴ Fatesingh had been given the Government of Ahmedabad by the English, as per the report of 7th March.⁵ Goddard was with his army at Fazalpore,⁶ south of Mahie, along with Fatesingh on 7th March, too; when Bhagirath approached him, 8 miles south of his side. Mahadji and Tukoji now had Pavagad in their rear.⁷ Mahadji on 8th released the English hostages and created a sensation

1. Ibid. No.80.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 139 and 166-167.(13-3-1780)

3. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 171-182.(Bombay to Court)

4. Ibid., vol.22, 162-164.(Goddard to Bombay)

5. Ibid. vol.22, 148-152(Goddard to Bombay)

6. Ibid., vol.22, 164-166.(Goddard to Bombay); Forrester, Maratha Series, vol.I, 401.

7. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.249.

in many quarters. This even plunged Nana into a distressful suspicion as to whether Mahadji himself was going over to the other side. It was, however, a deliberate clever move on the part of Mahadji to gain time and try to bring about the end of the war by negotiation if possible as he found himself unprepared to face the enemy immediately.¹ Goddard too was surprised to meet Farmer and Stewart² who joined him on 9th March,³ near Baroda, on the banks of the Vishwamitri and acquainted him that Mahadji did not want rupture with the English.⁴ There was the distance of 8 cos. between the two camps when the English got down the river Mahie and Mahadji expected to meet them within four days. Fatesingh was at Ahmedabad. Amrutrao was following the English camp. It was Govind Gopal Kamtekar alias Gondoba who had persuaded Fatesingh to join the English, thereby to evade the dues to the Peshwa.⁵

Lala Sevakram, the Peshwa's wakil at Calcutta, wrote that the English carried intrigues with the Bhonsle, undermining the Quadruple Alliance.⁶ "The amounts offered to the Bhonsle were at least fifty lakhs and differ only in nomenclature, presents, gratuity, loans, army expenses or bribes, whatever one may choose to call them." Nana called Raghuji and Devakar to Poona and obtained their accession to the four-party alliance. But this pledge was never fulfilled".⁷ The "astute British diplomacy (had)

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.103; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.249; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.90.

2. Sardesai, op.cit., vol.III, p.102.

3. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.113.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.249; Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 403.

5. Sardesai, op.cit., 254; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.86 (20 miles between two camps) and 88. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.265. (for life of Gondoba).

6. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, vol.III, 23; vol.IV, 20; Parasnis, Para rastrachya Darbarantil Marathyanche wakil, pp.63-68, Gleig, op.cit., vol.II, 358.

7. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.98; Sardesai, Itihasik Patravahar, No.168.

brought in an era of dissolution for the Indian Powers. The Bhonsles had always a soft corner in their hearts for Warren Hastings."¹

The ministers of Mahadji had demanded 12 lakhs of rupees for the release of Stuart and Farmer. They were brought down to 35000 rupees, at last, by Farmer, for his own release. This amount was to be paid to the different ministers of Mahadji's Durbar; part for receiving dismissal in public and the remainder, on the safe delivery of Stewart and Farmer into Goddard's hands.² Farmer, however, had to leave his Diwan and another person in Shinde's camp as security.³ Goddard's camp was near Baroda on 13th March.⁴ Mahadji's army was near Teen Talao, about 7/8 cos. but he had sent baggage and guns towards Champaner and Pavaghur. Goddard was to attack these places when Farmer informed him of the peaceful disposition of Mahadji for amicable terms with the English. Shivaji Appaji was also dispatched with the hostages to Goddard with the same purpose. Trimbak Ballerao, too, was simultaneously sent to Raghoba to effect out amicable terms. The sardars had kept their army all mounted, on the night of 8th March and the day preceding for if Goddard were not to receive Farmer's letter, he would have attacked the Marathas on that night.⁵ And it must be noted that Farmer used to write to Goddard from the camp of Mahadji, the advices of the state of affairs there, the movements of his army, together with such other useful intelligence regarding

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.98.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 188-191. (Farmer to Bombay).

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. 163-165 (Surat to Bombay); Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 402, 405, 406-407.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 163-165 (Surat to Bombay).

the intentions of the several Maratha leaders as could come within his knowledge, notwithstanding the danger to which he exposed himself.¹ Mahadji instructed on 15th March, Ganeshpant Behere to establish his influence in the Surat district and suggested to him to stop supplies that would reach the English army through Broach.²

There was a suggestion to grant Gaikwad his share of the Surat Chowth and the grant of Surat Athavisi to the English³ and the sardars for some time took no steps to oppose Goddard in his progress. It was reported again that violent disputes had arisen between Mahadji and Tukoji, on one hand and the minister, on the other, which were carried so far that the two former, were said to have intentions of returning to their respective Jagirs and making terms with the English and there was rumour that the seizure of their persons was planned by Nana (?). Nana, however, satisfied their demands.⁴ Mahadji had enquired, in the letters that he addressed to Goddard with the hostages, whether the general had intentions hostile to the Peshwa or himself. The general explained, assuring the vakil that the English had no cause of enmity whatsoever with Shinde or the Peshwa but their quarrel was with Nana and that they were ready to testify their sense of Shinde's services and to unite in every plan that might be proposed for their general benefit.⁵ The vakil who was in Shinde's confidence assured the

1. Ibid., vol. 22, 137-193. (Goddard to Bombay).

2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 87.

3. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 165-166. (14-3-1780)

4. Ibid., vol. 22, 171-182. (Bombay to Court. 16-3-1780).

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 171-182 (Bombay to Court.); 200-202 (Bombay to G.G. 31-3-1780).

general that his master was equally with them, the enemy of Nana from whom he had received the greatest ingratitude and treachery and that he was ready to treat upon such terms as might be conducive to the views and interests of both the parties, desiring to receive from the general his proposals on those grounds. Goddard referred the matter to Mahadji himself as he must be the best judge, in which manner a new settlement of the government of Poona might be effected with the most ease and advantage.¹ Mahadji tendered his terms, including all the other terms as written down at Talegaon between Raghoba and himself; except that Bajirao II should be the Diwan to the Peshwa and stipulated that as Bajirao II was only four years old, the care and management of the Government should be left entirely to himself(Mahadji); by which means the entire control and direction of the Government would come into his hands. Bajirao II was to accompany him to Poona. But the English dismissed Mahadji's vakil with the pointed and positive answer that they could not agree to put any restraint upon Raghoba or compel him to leave their dominion, and that Mahadji must compensate for the war. Mahadji wrote to Govindrao who had long resided with the Lunawarnee Raja and promised him the Gaikwad share of Gujarat. On the evening of 17th March, Govindrao had, actually arrived and was received well by Mahadji.² The negotiation was thus brought to a point within seven days, which Mahadji probably intended to have spun out into as many months; when it would have been his study to balance the Brahmin fears and jealousy against the policy

1. Ibid.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 191-193.(Goddard to Bombay); Maheshwar Darbarachi Batamipatren, vol.I, No.6.

of the English and the sanguine temperament of the Europeans.¹ Mahadji had remonstrated against Fatesingh and deprecated Nana's support to him.² A sabotage was carried on in the Peshwa's Wada (Residential quarters) on 21st March by the followers of Sakharam and Moroba.³

Hyder gave leave to Gray on 19th March and Gray left the place on 20th and returned to Madras on 30th March;⁴ and while these events were passing on the West of India, the Governor - General and Council in Bengal having disapproved of the Bombay defensive system were endeavouring to create a powerful diversion by carrying hostilities into the heart of Mahadji's territory; that he, the principal promoter, should become the greatest sufferer by them.⁵ Mahadji had tried to win over Fatesingh but failed and there was extreme severity of food and fodder in Gujarat by about 22nd March.⁶ The letter of guarantee which Hyder had solicited was not still made available, but however, Hyder was requested by the Marathas to March against the English.⁷ In the Konkan, the English carried on defensive preparation at Bankot, Fort Victoria.⁸

Goddard in Gujarat advanced on 24th March to Nittoull - 8 miles east of Baroda and had taken post, guarding himself against any

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1. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.114
 2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.88.
 3. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.85.
 4. Diskalkar, "op.cit.," J.I.H., vol.XI, (1932), p.318. (Gray's account) from Satara Museum).
 5. Duff, op.cit., vol.II, p.139.
 6. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.89.
 7. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, Nos.87, 89 (24-3-1780)
 8. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 193, 200, 284, 286, 292.

possibility of a surprise, which he was most afraid of and which Goddard studied to obtain an opportunity of attempting. From the nature of Mahadji's army and the mode of war he practised, Goddard could neither approach near enough to attack him suddenly to advantage, nor with the risk of the hazard of meeting himself by him in the field. Since the vakils of Nana namely Sadashiv Dinkar (Karmarkar ?) and Naro Sivdev Ponkshe were in Mahadji's camp, there was frequent correspondence between Nana and Mahadji but Mahadji had sent no further overtures to Goddard when his vakil had to come back from the camp of the English. Goddard definitely knew that the show of Mahadji's animosity against Nana was an entire pretext to deceive the English, and get the person of Raghoba and his son into his hands for purposes merely of his own advantage and obtaining the accomplishment of his views with the minister.¹ Goddard on 24th was near Pilloull, 4 cos. from Baroda² and on 26th, the two armies had not met.³ Goddard was at Kunlade on 27th March,⁴ in want of water and had to remove his camp to Himlade, 5 miles away; while the Marathas arrived at Camould and their number continued to increase, when the whole army was collected in its neighbourhood over three miles to the right, left and in the rear of the village. Goddard directed the discharge of his artillery and the Marathas dispersed but Goddard found it neither consistent with good policy to follow them nor could it be amended with any immediate advantage as they would continue

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 203-205 (Goddard to Bombay); Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 260.

2. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 408.

3. S.P.D., vol. 36, No. 394.

4. Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 408.

to carry them to a still greater distance.¹


Mahadji had instructed his generals in the north, not to increase the army, but Khanderao Hari and Ambaji Ingle were not on good terms, when they had opened hostilities against the Rana of Gohad. And though the war in Malwa was instigated by the Rana himself, the English sent army to help him.² In Gujarat, Govind Gopal Kuntekar, the minister of Fatesingh, was carrying intrigues and was supported from Poona by Balaji Ranade. Nana was rebuked for having facilitated the wiles of Gaikwad rather than to have cut them down at the source.³ Madras troops were to reinforce Goddard and in consequence of his application, a detachment of 500 sepoys proceeded to Sanletera Ghat.⁴ On 3rd April, Goddard was at Kimlonde⁵ and Fatesingh applied for a loan from the company which was, however, not complied with.⁶ Mamenkhan, Nawab of Cambay opened up alliance with Mahadji against the English secretly. Baloba Pandit and Pratab Mehta were Nawab's vakils and Nawab had dispatched Nanabhoy, too, on 15th April to Mahadji, who returned on 25th April.⁷

It was reported on 3rd April that Goddard with 200 Europeans, 10 Grenadier companies of sepoys, 4th and 7th Battalions of Bengal and 8th of Bombay infantry with two Twelve and ten six pounders of artillery, with regiment of Mughal Horse and Candahar Horse, divided in two lines, the rear under the command of Major Hopkins which consisted of two Battalions of sepoys with cavalry divided on either flank. Lieut. Col. Baile and Major Forbes were stationed to the front lines. They advanced

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 205 (Goddard to Bombay. 27-3-1780).
2. Maheshwar Darbarachi Batamipatren, vol. I, No. 4; C.P.C., vol. V, No. 1806.
3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 91.
4. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 213. (Surat to Bombay)
5. Forrester, Maratha Series, vol. I, 409-410.
6. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 207-209; 211-212 (Consultation); Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XIX, No. 94.
7. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 333-346, 348.

when Lieut.Col.Hartley was left to manage the last camp. Goddard on this occasion succeeded in driving the Marathas from the post. The Maratha advanced guard was commanded by Parajipant and Bhagirath Shinde when Mahadji was $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in front, ahead. The Marathas advanced with courage and resolution but were met by warm and well-directed fire and after an hour, quitted the field. 15 Candahar horse were killed and wounded, on the English side.¹ The Maratha camp was disposed on the following lines.²

Piraji Pandit, Dharrao and Govindrao.



Sadashiv Ramchandra, Chinto Vithal and some others were arrested by Mahadji as they were found to be carrying on secret intrigues with Raghoba, in the English camp.³

The Bhonsle declared fidelity to Nana on 4th April.⁴ The Maratha army in the north was plundering the territories of the Rana of Gohad.⁵ Shivaji Narayan from Shinde attended Ahalyabai's Durbar. Nana informed Mahadji on 7th that the English had started

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 225-227. (Goddard to Bombay)

2. Ibid., vol. 22, 333-346, 348.

3. Rajwade, opcit., vol. XIX, Nos. 116, 118; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos. 92, 96, Sardesai, Mayatibhas Patre, No. 258; C.P.C., vol. V, No. 1908; Maheshwar Darbarachi Batamipatren, vol. I, No. 7; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 424; Sardesai, Madhyavibhag, vol. IV, p. 281.

4. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravahar, No. 203.

5. C.P.C., vol. V, No. 1806.

negotiations and hinted that the English were killing time till the troops from Calcutta joined them. Hence, Nana instructed to defeat the English in Gujarat speedily. But Mahadji's army was labouring under tremendous financial difficulties,¹ though Mahadji was furnished from Ujjain. Ahalyabai had refused to finance Tukoji.² Ahalyabai had taken to task Rukhmabai, consort of Tukoji for quarrelling on the word of the Kamavisdar, with Janakibai Pawar. Rukhmabai was reminded of the former cordial relations existing between Holkar and Pawar and was asked to return everything taken from the Pawars.³

The English in the Konkan were to reduce Kalwa and Belapur and thought of raising new bastions.⁴ Parsik, Belapur and Panvel were occupied, from 12th to 15th April (when on 11th May, earlier, the Bombay army had captured Kalyan).⁵ It seemed that Goddard's special planning in Gujarat failed miserably.⁶ The Raja of Kolhapur had sent agents to Nana, requesting him to adjust matters amicably,⁷ but he also wrote to Hyder to help the attack against the ministerial party.⁸ On 15th April, Mahadji was near Pavagad⁹ and Goddard was at Cantoul, feeling the need to pay allowances to Raghoba.¹⁰

There was an attempt to assassinate Nana and Haripant at Poona and similar one was made in Mahadji's camp, too. Naro Gopal, Mahadji Pant Gogate, Trimbak Bhalerao used to send Persian letters

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1. Maheshwar Durbarachi Batamipatren, vol. I, No. 5.
 2. Ibid, No. 6.
 3. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol. I, No. 115. (12-4-1780)
 4. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 213-220. (Consultation, 3-4-1780).
 5. Ibid, vol. 22; 227-234, 238-244, 249-251; Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XII, No. 25.
 6. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, pp. 255-256.
 7. Shindeshahi Nalkavne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 117.
 8. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patre, No. 251.
 9. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 95.
 10. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 280-282. (Goddard to Bombay).

to the English, inviting them to attack. These letters were seized¹ and hence Sadashiv Ramchandra and Chinto Anant Devasthali were kept in Fort Mandossari. They were again seized in their act of escape to the English and thence sent to Ujjain.² Mahadji, on 18th agreed to pay Dahak Pati - one tenth of the aggregate income - on his Saranjam for meeting the crisis which had threatened the very existence of the Maratha State.³ Mahadji again, directed that the money received from Hyder on his account should be utilised by the Poona Government.⁴ He advised Nana to turn to the best advantage Hyder's signal triumphs over the English and expressed that no peace with the English could be lasting unless their power was completely crushed.⁵ New treaty with Kolhapur was contracted which cancelled all the terms of the former treaty made by Mahadji, except the payment of 11 lakhs of rupees, on the part of the Raja of Kolhapur.⁶ But on 20th, Mahadji expressed his protest against the back - biting and lack of confidence shown in him by the ministerial party at Poona. He threatened even to resign his command if his services were not approved.⁷ But on 21st April, Nana's agent from Gujarat reported that due to the assiduous efforts of Mahadji, the English were practically exhausted.⁸ On 24th, Fatesingh and Govindrao were both reported to have joined the English.⁹ The English due to shortness of supplies were falling back on Baroda, when the Maratha attempt to surprise the English

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.101; C.P.C., vol.V, No.1875; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.272.

2. Ibid.

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.93.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.41.

5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.94.

6. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patre, No.252.

7. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.97.

8. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.119.

9. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2528.

near Savli again failed owing to Mahadji having lost the way in the darkness.¹ Goddard was unable to come to grips with the Marathas and experienced growing distress. Twenty miles round Goddard's camp were completely destroyed; there was no grass for subsistence of cattle; even the leaves of such trees as might have nourished them were mostly stripped off. So it was necessary for him to send a strong party for the protection of the foragers - of two battalions of sepoy with four six pounders under Capt. Campbell when the Marathas came down upon them by 11 O'clock.² Only Tukoji attacked when a severe action took place with the considerable losses on both sides.³ A near relation of Tukoji who enjoyed his confidence fell and the Marathas dared not advance. The English halted at Schouly till midnight and returned next morning safe.⁴ Hyder on 25th April enquired why the Asher Fort which was given to Mahadji was not still handed over to him⁵ and he complained on 25th that the letter of guarantee from Mahadji was not received by him.⁶

The Emperor of Delhi solicited the Peshwa's help⁷ and Hingane suggested a plan for the Indian Chiefs to form a confederacy against the English. Mahadji or Haripant would march to manage the northern affairs, permanently.⁸ The Bhonsle marched to Cuttack, Hyder to Madras and the Nizam to Sikakola and the Emperor himself

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.118; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos.98,99; Rajwade, op.cit. vol.XIX, Nos.105,106; S.P.D.D., vol.22, 289-291 (Goddard to Bombay).

2. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 289,291. (Goddard to Bombay).

3. Ibid. and Foot note No.6.

4. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 289-291. (Goddard to Bombay).

5. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.101

6. Ibid., Nos.104,110,111; Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren, No.269.

7. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XII, p.3, No.4.

8. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XII, pp.3-5, No.5.

was to attack the Wazir and hence ordered his artillery to be ready.¹ Devrao Mahadev Hingane was given Kotah in Saranjam by Mahadji but was actually given nothing for five years and so he had accompanied Mahadji up to Kondaibari.² M.Bussie also wrote to Nana for an alliance against the English.³ But the English, Shuju-ud-daula's son, Najafkhan and Jayanagar were in alliance themselves.⁴

Mahadji and Tukoji faced Goddard in his march,⁵ who was on 25th near Camtool.⁶ The Poona authorities, perhaps thought of sending Tukoji to the Konkan but Tukoji had his dispute with Ahalyabai.⁷ Mahadji desired that there should be no discord of that nature and asked Naro Sivdev to proceed to Maheshwar for setting right the dispute between Tukoji and Ahalyabai and the disorders of the Holkar State, an object for the attainment of which Baburao Vaidya had been specially deputed from Poona.⁸ The Bombay Company wanted, again to reduce Bassein before the monsoon⁹ and Nana wanted to clear up the misunderstanding of Mahadji and warned Mahadji that if his letters expressing discontent were by chance taken by the English, it would be dangerous to the interests of the Maratha State.¹⁰

In the treaty of the Peshwa with Hyder, Hyder was not given the Vijapur Jagirs.¹¹ In May 1780, the Nizam attempted to

1. Ibid, pp.5-7;Nos.6-7.

2. Ibid, pp.9-10,No.10.

3. Ibid,vol.X,pp.181-182,No.257.

4. Ibid,vol.X,pp.189-190,No.265.

5. Ibid,vol.X,p.134,No.193.

6. Forrest,Maratha Series,vol.I,413.

7. Rajwade,op.cit.,vol.X,pp.187-189,Nos.263,264.

8. Shindeshahi Rajkarne,S.H.S.,vol.II.No.120.

9. S.P.D.D.,vol.22,251-255;266-267,268-269.(Bombay to Court).

10. Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patren,No.253;Sardesai,Uttarvibhag,vol.I,271.

11.Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi,I,2.

form a confederacy of Najafkhan, the Emperor, Hyder and the English. The sardars were to keep Raghoba all powerful. To undermine this confederacy, Nana was asked from the Maratha side to win the Nizam by diplomacy.¹ Najaf and the Emperor were prepared to be against the English provided the Sardars - Mahadji and Tukoji - would not have a separate treaty with the English on account of monetary considerations. Hingane with Najafkhan thus formed the great confederacy finally against the English.² On 1st May, Mahadji wrote to Hyder the necessary letter of guarantee for the new engagement entered with him by the Peshwa's government.³ Nana was warned by Appajiram not to carry on negotiations with the enemy over the head of Mahadji who, he added, felt the neglect bitterly and hence could not be expected to put his heart in the work.⁴ In this war, there was more reliance on diplomacy instead of recourse to arms. For Nana's vakils on 2nd May directly saw Gaikwad and the English, whereupon, receiving this news, Mahadji wrote angrily to Nana. Fatesingh sent two vakils to Ahalyabai, Tukoji and Mahadji, too.⁵

Trimbakrao Narayan then recently pacified was ordered to March against Gulzarkhan.⁶ On 5th May, the Emperor of Delhi had not given the Jagir to Hyder, as per the advice of Hingane.⁷ There was utter collapse of an orderly Government among the Marathas and Nana raided the properties of all the Gaikwads, as per the

1. Ibid, I, 3; C.P.C., vol. V, No. 1857.

2. Ibid, I, 4; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. II, 42.

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 100.

4. Ibid, No. 101.

5. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 265.

6. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvahar, No. 201.

7. Parasnis, op.cit., I, 1.

instructions from Mahadji.¹ On 7th May, the Bombay detachment was sent back and Goddard suggested that Bassein should be reduced by the English by about the end of July or the beginning of August.² Goddard, on 9th, marched from Harspore to Carnan, on road to Bowapore Ghat and Mahadji with whole army advanced to Bullapore on the banks of the Dahder river, 3 miles away from Major Forbes. To check the Marathas on 11th, Goddard rejoined Forbes in the morning and on the same day, Mahadji retreated to his former encampment, in the neighbourhood of Wagorea, 16 miles east of Dubhoy, where he was as usual. On 16th, Goddard came to Bowapore Ghat camp, applied to Gambier for the supplies and on 22nd, Forbes with two battalions marched to surprise the body of the Marathas under Bhagirath and Piraji on the Nerbada, 6 miles above Sivnore. The Marathas with 5000 horse met him. But the fruits of their rapines fell in the English hands and they retreated to Teen Talao, 10 cos from Bowapore Ghat and 3 from Dubhoy. Lieut. Welsh marched from Bowapore Ghat on 17th, with cavalry, Candahar Horse and the 7th Battalion of the sepoys towards Surat to drive Ganeshpant with 4000 horse, 300 foot, 3 field-pieces at Badouilly; on 22nd Welsh moved from Cuttore to surprise Ganesh; at 4, entered the Maratha camp with only the cavalry and the Marathas fled, leaving everything to the English. After this action of Zinnore, the English occupied Parnera and Indragad.³

Mahadji was clamouring for the submission of the accounts on the part of Hana for the sum of 10 lakhs of rupees, which he

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 263.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 310-312. (Goddard to Bombay. 7-5-1780).

3. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 353-357. (Goddard to Bombay).

thought he had received from Hyder. Nana finally submitted the accounts of 3½ lakhs of rupees, Zabitakhan, the Commander of the Nizam was dead.¹ The English attack on the Knokan was fully launched from 8th May,² and Mahadji was directing Nana that two Talukas confiscated from Sakharam Bapu's property and which were handed to Balwantrao Gopal and about which there were disputes, should be transferred to his (Shinde's) Jagirs.³ In Gujarat, the English were driven to Baroda,⁴ and Sir Eyre Coote wrote to the Governor-General, on 15th May, forwarding the important suggestion of Goddard for diversion of the Marathas by an attack on Mahadji Shinde.⁵ Mahadji himself was busy in forcing the collection of debts of one lakh of rupees⁶ and Hyder had not received the letter of guarantee, dispatched by Mahadji and hence postponed the auspicious day fixed for his march,⁷ declaring that as long as he did not receive the letter from Mahadji, he was not sure of his success.⁸ By about 21st March, however, Hyder had received Mahadji's letter of guarantee.⁹

By about 19th, the English in Gujarat felt the scarcity of food stuff in the very camp itself¹⁰ and Mahadji had assured Nana of his doubts being absolutely cleared up.¹¹ On 20th May, it was reported that Raghoba was in Surat. Amrutrao, Fatesingh and the English were at some 4 miles west of Pavagad. The sardars were

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1. Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patren, No.254.
 2. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 286, 293-294, 306-310, 312-314, 217(10 to 16 May 1780); Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 255-256.
 3. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.42.
 4. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, Nos.110, 119, 124, 136, 142, 183.
 5. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 742, 738.
 6. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.22, No.71.
 7. Sardesai Kavyatihar Patren, No.s255, 257; Rajwade, op.cit. vol.19, No.11.
 8. Sardesai, op.cit., No.257.
 9. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.19, Nos.121, 129, 131, 166, 169, 170.
 10. S.P.D., vol.36, No.395.
 11. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.102.

at 3 miles east of Pavagad. The Marathas, too, felt the scarcity of grass and water though the cannons were sent from Ujjain. Mahadji was attacked three or four times by the English but the English were repulsed. Anandibai advised Raghoba to march straight to Poona. Mahadji's letters to Raghoba and the English were intercepted by Tukoji and hence, perhaps Mahadji did not face the English and posted Tukoji to bear the burden. The English went ahead of Baroda by 5 cos. and Mahadji planned to meet them in battle, ahead of Baroda.¹

Peace was also disturbed in the North.² The Bhonsle marched towards Bengal.³ There were curious rumours spread by about 21st May that the Sardars had joined Raghoba and that Mahadji himself was dead and it was officially declared that there was no truth or sense in that.⁴ When Mahadji was earlier postponing to write the letter of guarantee, Nana had submitted that "Asheri" matter would not spoil great events.⁵ Parashuram Bhaui had defeated the Raja of Kolhapur. The English of Bombay were checked and Hyder wrote to Mahadji a letter of assurance.⁶ On 24th May, Mahadji did not intend to cross the Reva and the English had cantoned for the rains in Surat. Mahadji refused to cantone at Kondalbari. He was requested at least to select Burhanpur and Nana had declared, too often, that he had no misunderstanding with Mahadji, who, whoever, refused to abide by his advice.⁷

1. Maheshwar Darbarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.7.

2. Ibid.

3. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.123.

4. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.125.

5. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren; No.258.

6. Ibid., No.259.

7. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.265 c/f Kavyetihas Patren, Nos.261, 263, 266, 301).

Nana declared finally that Mahadji could himself do best and that his were only suggestions¹ and Nana explained to Hyder the difficulties of transport that were experienced in receiving letters from Mahadji.²

On 26th, Hartley safely arrived at Bombay and the Governor - General dispatched two lakhs of rupees for the army. The English formed designs against Parneyra.³ Mahadji's new plan failed because Tukoji was not on good terms with Ahalyabai. It was this divided house of Holkar which all along crippled the Maratha efforts to resist the English.⁴ Nana and Mahadji again were repeatedly urging the Bhonsles of Nagpore to march but the English money made them inactive and a golden opportunity was lost since Mahadji himself was impatient to advance from Bundelkhand upon Bengal in support of the Bhonsles if they would make the effort. But Devakar Pandit died on 16th July 1781.⁵ Mahadji in Gujarat, in the meanwhile, supplied Govindrao Gaikwad with money and troops and dispatched him to take possession of Baroda and Mahadji himself entertained designs on Calcutta.⁶

In June 1780, the English had dispatched their vakils to take over issues with the Maratha leaders.⁷ Mudhoji Bhonsle advised the Governor - General that the rainy season was fast approaching but the armies from all quarters were marching towards the borders of the English territories. The Governor - General wanted to negotiate peace with the Peshwa.⁸ On 3rd June,

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.265 c/f Kavyetihas Patren, 261, 263, 264, 265, 301).

2. Ibid. c/f Kavyetihas Patren, No.266.

3. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 317-318 (Bombay to Goddard).

4. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.106.

5. Ibid. p.107.

6. Ibid. p.105.

7. S.P.D., vol.36, No.398.

8. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1902.

Appajiram informed Nana of Mahadji's decision to retire to Ujjain for cantoning during the monsoon, rejecting the advice pressed upon him by Nana to take his quarters at Burhanpur or at Kondalbari on the borders of Gujarat and Khandesh.¹

The English were at Rewa, near Bhadoch, (South of Rewa) and the Sardars were near the spring of Waghode near Dabhoi, on 5th June.² The sardars confiscated the property of Bule, who died without leaving any heir.³ Goddard was able to do nothing due to the sudden appearance of the Marathas on his line of the march. The cautious plan of conduct adopted by them put it totally out of his power to effect anything decisive and necessitated the postponement of an attack on Bassein. The English proposed to form new battalions at Bombay, Salsette, Surat, Broach, and large bodies of irregulars at two latter settlements incorporated with them, to prevent the Marathas from straightening the land and the island, too much for supplies of Belapur, Parsik, and the town of Kalyan. The rice for Bombay was to be dispatched from Madras and Bengal.⁴ Appajiram on 7th, communicated to Nana, Mahadji's intention to proceed to Ujjain for the monsoon camp.⁵ But Mahadji was asked first to replace Fatesingh by Govindrao in the Gaikwad family as its chief.⁶ Mahadji had not closed his correspondence with Fatesingh but still had Govindrao by his side.⁷ The Sardars were 20 cos. from Pavagad, 10 cos from Bori at Dahod, on 11th June. The English

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.103.

2. Maheshwar Darbarachi Batamipatre, Vol.I, No.8.

3. Ibid.

4. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 326-330 (Bombay to G.G.); Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.40.

5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.104.

6. Rajwade, op.cit., vol.XIX, No.144

7. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.264.

reached Surat. Govindrao was acclaimed by the sardars and was left with 1000 troops near Pavagad and the Sardars themselves leaving Dahod, came to Zaba and collected the revenue, out of which, they gave two lakhs of rupees to Govindrao. Mahadji was on his way to Ujjain and Tukoji, too, was on his route to Indore. Mahadji recalled Bhagirathrao and Parajipant,¹ and gave a promise to Nana that he would not devastate the districts of the Nizam on his march to Kondaibari.² Nana, however, repeatedly suggested Kondaibari, 50 miles west of Dhulia (10 miles away from modern Chinchpada railway station, in the eastward directions) for Mahadji's cantonment, referring specially to the changing conditions. Kolhapur had revolted, too.³ Parnera and Indragad were taken by Welsh on 30th May. 21 guns and a quantity of grain were taken by Welsh, on that occasion. Goddard arrived in cantonment on 7th June and Col. Brown with the Madras detachment arrived two days earlier.⁴ Mahadji's army arrived at Badnawar on 17th June.⁵ Mahadji wrote to Hingane, on his way to Ujjain that he had marched, in that direction in order to settle the Emperor's affairs.⁶ The English had sent presents to the Wazir and the English and the Emperor himself expected the Marathas after the rains.⁷ while Nana

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1. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 331-333. (Goddard to Bombay); Sardesai, Kavyetihās Patren, No. 267; Maheshwar Darbarachi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 9; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, pp. 263-264; C.P.C., vol. V, Nos. 1947, 1955.
 2. Shindekahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. I, No. 49.
 3. Sardesai, Kavyetihās patren, No. 268, 269; C.P.C., vol. V, No. 1954; S.P.D.D. vol. 23, 397-408.
 4. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 357-360 (Surat to Bombay).
 5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 105; Sardesai, Kavyetihās Patren, No. 269.
 6. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. II, p. 49; C.P.C.; vol. V, No. 1908.
 7. Rajwade, op.cit., vol. XII, pp. 6-8, No. 7.

confined his attention to the movements and intrigues of Raghoba. Mahadji realised the wider aspect of national existence and directed his thoughts to the best way of winning the war and the very existence of the English power in India came to be threatened.¹ To divide the Maratha strength and divert it from Gen. Goddard, Hastings determined to dispatch a small force to protect the territory of the Rana of Gohad, lying on the Jumna, 60 miles south-east of Agra, from the encroachment of Mahadji. The detachment under the command of Major Popham advanced in February and expected to meet the Marathas from Gohad region. It was, however, felt that the force was too small to materially divert the Maratha strength and it was therefore proposed that a larger force under Major Carnac should be sent to invade Mahadji's country and to attack his capital. This proposal was vigorously apposed by Francis and Wheeler on 19th June.² They believed that the desire, Mudhoji Bhonsle proposed of becoming the mediator of peace between the English and the Marathas seemed likely to be sincere because it was founded in the consideration of his own interests and because it was conformable to the language which he had uniformly held to the English, and taking over the situation as it stood, they declared it to be their most deliberate opinion that a peace was indispensably necessary to save the India Company and every interest connected with theirs, from the greatest distress, if not certain ruin.³

1. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 104.

2. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, LV.

3. Ibid, p. 693; Forrest, Selections from State Papers of Governors-General of India - W. Hastings; I, 176.

CHAPTER - VIII

THE FIRST ANGLO - MARATHA WAR - MALWA CAMPAIGN

(From 24th June 1780 To 13th October 1781)

The Sardars encamped at Badnera on 21st June and Mahadji reached Ujjain on 24th June. Bapuji Holkar being dissatisfied with Tukoji, went over to Mahadji. Mahadji sent army to Jaipur. Ahalyabai and Tukoji were not on good terms and Bapuji had returned. Mahadji called Govind Krishna to Ujjain. There was rumour that Mahadji had instigated Tukoji against Ahalyabai for money but Mahadji was not interested in the affairs of the Holkar family. Mahadji had taken over from Govind Krishna his right for Jaipur which he had given to the latter, earlier. For eight days, Mahadji was on the bank of the Chamel and no body from his camp was prepared to stay back with Govindrao in Gujarat.¹ Hingane wanted a loan of Rs.10,000 from Balaji Govind.² The English promised to pay money to the Emperor but Hingane persuaded him to refuse and the Emperor demanded not money but army from the Peshwa.³ When the English and the Rana of Gohad were triumphant, the Emperor was planning to march against the English.⁴ As per Nana's advice, the Emperor wrote to the Nizam and the Bhonsle to join the Peshwa against the English.⁵ But Hingane complained to Nana that his financial position was worse than before.⁶ Mahadji instructed Hingane to secure Najaf's sympathies against the

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, pp.274-275, Maheshwar Darbarachi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.10.

2. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi, I, //

3. Ibid, I, 5 (21-6-1780).

4. Ibid, I, 6.

5. Ibid, I, 7.

6. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi, I, 8.

English and Hingane was provided for, in Kotah. The Emperor wrote to the Rohillas and the Sikhs to join him against the English.¹ Najaf was afraid of the advances of Mahadji in Hindustan in his heart - and the Emperor was prepared secretly to allow Mahadji or Haripant, management of the affairs of Delhi, with two lakhs of rupees pension per month for himself, if Najaf would be driven out.²

Hyder by about 25th June had expelled the factors of Onova³ and Hastings on 26th June had declared that the rainy season was no impediment to the English troops but a great one to the Maratha army, which consisted only of cavalry. The objection made to the expenses, he admitted was a material one, but a vigorous assertion, he remarked could not be made without expense, nor could the war be either concluded honourably or prosecuted successfully without such an exertion. Feeble measures and advances for peace would but add to the strength and presumption of their adversaries, discourage their friends and perhaps would induce them to become parties against the English. The resources of the English Government, exhausted as they were, were yet then equal to every probable contingency of the war if it was conducted on a consistent plan and that not barred by desultory votes of council on every measure for its prosecution.⁴ At all events, the latitude given to Carnac left him at liberty to pursue whatever plan he thought proper, but if instead of proceeding towards Mahadji, the march of his detachment should, once be directed

1. Ibid. 9.

2. Ibid. 10.

3. S.P.D.D., vol.23; 470-472.(Onore Factory to Bombay).

4. Forrest, Selection from Foreign Department, vol.I, LV, pp.701 et seq.

by the opposite route to the Capital of Bundalkhand, he would naturally conclude that the possession of that country was the true and only object.¹

Nana had sent finally Mahadji's letter of guarantee to Hyder on 26th June,² and Hastings had already declared: "That the manifest advantage of having two armies acting in concert and dividing the attention of the enemy between them, would be lost, if they were not both in the field at the same time."³ Hastings had paid up two lakhs of rupees for the Malwa expedition.⁴ Nana received the news from Bombay that the English at Calcutta by about 29th June, offered 50 lakhs of rupees to Mahadji, out of which 30 lakhs of rupees had been already dispatched and Nana told Naropant to investigate matters secretly.⁵ Goddard had suggested to the Bombay Company that Mahadji and Tukoji had repaired to Ujjain and Indore respectively, where, they should be detained in the North, while the Bombay English would pursue their schemes at leisure and with less interruptions to the Southward. The Dutch were intriguing with the Marathas, too.⁶ But on 27th, Francis had again raised his reasons for the Malwa expeditions,⁷ not admitting the validity of a pretence for invading Bundelkhand and solicited peace, at once, with the Marathas,⁸ declaring that the expedition to Poona indeed was a disgrace which, but for the generosity or forbearance of the Marathas, might have left Bombay defenceless.⁹

1. Ibid. pp. 694-695.

2. Sardesai, kavyetihās Patren, No. 270.

3. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 700-702.

4. Ibid. 701.

5. Sardesai, kavyetihās Patren, No. 271.

6. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 370-371. (Goddard to Bombay).

7. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 702-703.

8. Ibid. 694-695.

9. Ibid.

On 1st July, it was reported that Mahadji had arrived at Ujjain and Tukoji, too, had reached Indore. Holkar's minister had been to Ujjain for the pacification of strained relations of Tukoji with Ahalyabai. The Sardars still were pressed to proceed to the Deccan. The English had paid two lakhs of rupees to Fatesingh. Govindrao Gaikwad's sister came to Maheshwar.¹ The English company was unwilling to proceed against the Nawab of Cambay.² Skirmishes were fought between Govindrao and Fatesingh. Raghoba's clerk, earlier sent to the Bhonsle, had stayed for a day, too, at Maheshwar. Ahalyabai had dispatched army against Golsarkhan and negotiations with Raghoba were renewed.³ Ahalyabai had but warned the Poona Government against the rise of the English.⁴ Ramaji Bapu from Raghoba's party harassed Ahalyabai's districts in July. Different sardars were moving against him and Mahadji dispatched his sardars to the Devi (Ahalyabai), too, on that account. Govindrao was given rupees 25,000 by Mahadji and Tukoji and Khando Awaji, on his behalf, talked to Mahadji. Shivaji Vithal was recalled by Mahadji.⁵ The English were afraid as they did not know that their government had a single friend or ally in India in the true sense of friendship and alliance, which supplied the power of giving assistance and a disposition to give it.⁶ Carnac was actually given instructions for his march on 13th July.⁷ Francis and Wheeler declared that the war with the Marathas, at more than two years after its commencement and after every rupee the English

1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.11.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 364-367. (Bombay to Surat and Goddard)

3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.12.

4. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.118. (12-7-1780).

5. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.13.

6. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, p.706.

7. Ibid. p.710.



had reserved in the treasury or had since been able to collect, had been spent in the support of it, was, at that day, as far from a conclusion as ever. New expeditions were proposed to answer the same effects, which were promised from former measures of the same nature and, as it appeared to them, with no better prospect of success; of such success, at least, as would be likely to make any further efforts unnecessary.¹ As the main arguments of his opponents were drawn from the low state of the treasury and the inability of the Government to support the expense of the expedition, Hastings, after pointing out that the pay and batta of the troops would be the same whether they remained in their original quarters or marched to the capital of Mahadji, stated, "the contingencies of the detachment are therefore, the only expense that can be reasonably charged to the expedition. These I state far below two lakhs of rupees. That sum I offer to contribute to this disbursement. I have already deposited it within a small amount in the hands of the Sub-Treasurers and I beg that the Board will permit it to be accepted for that purpose."²

Mahadji's army was in a distressed condition and he looked to the Dasara day to reorganise his forces. There was a rumour on 17th July that Mudhoji Bhonsle was proceeding to Poona.³ One agent and a clerk sent by Farmer to Poona to bring medicine and other articles were arrested under charge of espionage. Mahadji, however, gave a note by about 19th July with Keso Anant to release them.⁴

1. Ibid, p.705.

2. Ibid, iv

3. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1946.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarni: S.H.S. vol.I, No.44.

Visaji had deposed the old Raja and placed one of his descendants on the throne of Gohad. Gangadhar, the Faujdar of Kalpi did not cooperate with Visaji as he had good relations with the Raja, but now hearing that Mahadji was at Ujjain, he went over to his side. He then invited Mahadji to station his army near kachuakar. The Rana, too wanted Capt. Palmer at Gohad as Mahadji had come back to Hindustan.¹ Mudhoji had his dispute with Nana over Mandla and Nana was not prepared to cede Mandla to Mudhoji Bhonsle unless Chimnaji Bhonsle opened hostilities with the English of Bengal.² The plan given by Nana was not followed by Chimnaji Bhonsle for the Bhonsle desired friendship with the English to be respected. Manaji Bapu Bhonsle was to attack Mandla with 3000 troops.³ The Governor-General took precautions about the march of the Maratha army at Cuttuck⁴ and instructed Carnac to carry war into the territories of Mahadji and Tukoji.⁵

On 23rd July, the party of the troops sent against Gulzarkhan had been recalled.⁶ Nana felt that Mahadji's policy was spoiling the whole game, in July, when practically it was at its height.⁷ Nana wrote to Mahadji to acquaint himself with his further moves.⁸ But Nana was prepared to depend on Mahadji's suggestions.⁹ The Nabab of Arcot reported that the English found their enemy too strong, even in the Konkan.¹⁰ Mahadji explained to Nana that his

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1948.

2. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1908.

3. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1950.

4. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 714.

5. Ibid.

6. Shindeshahi Raikarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.121.

7. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren, No.273.

8. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, pp.273-275.

9. Ibid.

10. C.P.C., vol.V, No.s1952, 1953.

presence was vitally necessary at Ujjain in order to meet the growing pressure of the English in Malwa and Bundelkhand and to prevent the Bengal army from passing through these regions to join their comrades under Goddard in Gujarat. Again there was the alliance formed among the English, the Rana of Gohad and the Jats against the Marathas.¹ It was reported on 28th July that Hyder had invaded the Carnatic.² Special letters were sent to Mahadji at Ujjain when the Kasids (runners) were told on 29th that if the letters would be delivered speedily they would get prizes.³ Mahadji had said that he would save Poona by staying in Malwa.⁴ Captain Popham in conjunction with the Rana of Gohad was directed to Malwa by the English.⁵

The President of Bombay opined that peace either formally or substantially should be the first object of the English. The second and hardly of less importance to the Bombay Government than the first, was to send back the troops of the other presidencies which they had no means to maintain unless by the supplies from Bengal which they were plainly told, were no longer to be depended on. All the English hopes and expectations of a peace by the Treaty with Nana and Mahadji jointly or separately with either, had been at an end.⁶

Nana had examined Mahadji's policy of rejecting kondaibari, critically.⁷ On 1st August Mahadji's son-in-law, Deshmukh, was disgraced when his Jagir was confiscated by Nana and Mahadji pleaded that Nana should treat him as his own relation.⁸ Sadashiv Dinkar wrote to

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.106.

2. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1952; S.P.D.D., vol.23, No.477 (St. George to Bombay); Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.289.

3. Shindeshahi Raikarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.45.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.289; Sardesai, H.P.M.S.; No.107.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 397-398.

6. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 397-398.

7. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren, No.274 (2-8-1780)

8. Shindeshahi Raikarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.46.

Nana on 2nd August to arrange amicably the dispute of Deshmukh so that Mahadji would not feel aggrieved.¹ Nana instructed Mahadji, advising on the letter of Purshottam Mahadev Hingane, vakil at Delhi, to set the Emperor and Najaf Khan against the English and that the sardars must concentrate in Khandesh, insisting still on kondaibari as Mahadji's base for operation.²

The secret passage to the Gwalior Fort was pointed out to Popham by some thieves.³ While Popham himself never referred to the robbers in his personal account,⁴ Gwalior Fort was captured by him within the space of two hours only and only 20 men were wounded and none was killed on the English side, though Bapuji, the Maratha Governor was killed and most of the principal officers of the Maratha garrison were wounded.⁵ A tribe of banditti from the territory of the Rana of Gohad had been accustomed to rob about the town and once in the dead of the night had climbed up the rock and got into the fort. This intelligence had been communicated by them to the Rana who often thought of availing himself of it, but was fearful of undertaking such an enterprise of moment with his own troops.⁶ Popham was tempted by his spies and had the least assistance from the Rana. Capt. Bruce on 3 mid-night with 200 grenadiers and light infantry approached with Popham following with 20 artillery men, 40 grenadiers and two battalions of sepoys. Another section of two guns and one little squadron was under

1. Ibid., S.H.S., vol. I, No. 47.

2. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren, No. 275.

3. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p. 127.

4. Bhandarkar D.R., "Capture of the Gwalior Fort in 1780", I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 52 et seq.

5. Rawlinson H.G. "Two captures of Gwalior Fort," I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 20.

6. Ibid., p. 19.

Capt. Maclery, who was asked to march at 2 o'clock in case of failure to cover retreat and in case of success to prevent Ambaji and his troops from escaping. The camp of the English remained guarded by one battalion and the remaining artillery in command of Capt. Mayattice. At day break, the English got themselves under the walls where wooden ladders were placed against a scarped rock, 16 feet high. A party mounted and clambered up 50 feet, in height of a steep and rugged hill to foot of the wall which was 30 feet high. The spies climbed the wall and fixed the rope ladders which were immediately mounted with unspeakable alacrity by the troops. They were discovered by the garrison and attacked with the warmth. The Marathas however numerous were instantly repulsed by smartness and regularity of the English force. The whole English party within short time was within the Fort. Capt. Maclery did not arrive and Ambaji escaped.¹

The Governor-General on 27th, wrote a letter to the court of Directors, sent it to a Danish ship which was on that day on her departure and a duplicate by the Portuguese ship which was ready then to sail. Next day, letters were dispatched to Rear Admiral of the Red and C-in-c of H.M.'s ships in India at Fort St. George. Popham was made "Major"² for having captured the Fort of Gwalior the pearl in the necklaces of the castles of Hind-(Taj-ul-Maasar)³ for the English on 4th August 1780.

Mahadji was asked to hear peaceful negotiations from the English if the Emperor and Najaf Khan were not relieved in the treaty conditions.⁴ Mahadji also reported to Hyder that the English

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 23, 487-488; Gleig, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 310-311; Oturkar, op.cit., No. 170. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 124.

2. Bhandarkar, "op.cit.," I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 52.

3. Duff, op.cit., vol. II, p. 420 c/f Gwalior State Gazetteer, vol. I, p. 228.

4. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren, No. 275; C.P.C., vol. V, No. 2043.

and the Nawab of Arcot were afraid of combines and proposed peace with the Peshwa while they tried to win over Hyder by offering him to divide the Maratha territory half to half.¹ Mahadji (strange enough) wrote on 3rd August about his meeting with Nana and guaranteed his friendliness.²

After the fall of Gwalior, however, Mahadji was reinforced by Ahalyabai's troops and Bhavanrao Dhonddev from Poona. Mahadji wrote to Nana not to contract peace and himself boldly attacked the English.³ Hyder gave the Marathas, too, a warning against the diplomacy of the English and urged the Peshwa, the Nizam and Mahadji to unite with him.⁴ Nana passed the news to Mahadji that the English were opening offensive after the rains and declared that he entirely relied on Mahadji, as he was, the pillar of the Maratha State.⁵

The Peshwa promised to abide always by the treaty established with Hyder and plans were suggested by Nana for Mahadji's approval there of. As per the Peshwa's treaty with Hyder, of 9th August, 1780, earlier, Hyder's general Sadarkhan attacked the Company's post at Dharma-Patan. The English company was now at war with Hyder.⁶ Mahadji lamented the loss of Gwalior, which he said was the result of leaving the northern dominions unprotected while concentrating the whole Maratha force in Gujarat. He, however, himself offered to check the enemy on the northern front.⁷ He, in forceful language, further explained the necessity on 13th August of his encampment in Malwa

1. Ibid. No.277.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.48.

3. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.110.

4. Oturkar, op.cit., No.171.

5. Sardesai, kavyetihās patren, No.276.(6) Shindeshahi Raj; S.H.S., II, 122

6. Sardesai, Itihasik patravyahar, No.205; S.P.D.D., vol.23, 465-468, (Tellicherry to Bombay. 10-8-1780); Sardesai, kavyetihās patren, No.278.

7. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.108.

and asked Sadashiv Dinkar to impress upon Nana how essential it was to check the English advance through Malwa to the South.¹ Nana expressed his entire confidence in Mahadji and praised him for his services to the Maratha state.²

Ganeshpant Behere marched in the konkan and Mahadji himself thought of visiting Bid and Tuljapur.³ The Bombay Company by about 17th August experienced great monetary difficulties to conduct war and Hyder had refused to entertain Hosley's embassy.⁴ Raghoba was engrossed in new preparations⁵ and Chimnaji's slow march aroused suspicion about his fidelity to the Maratha State.⁶ After the council in Calcutta had arisen, Hastings received a challenge on 17th August from Francis which was accepted. On the morning of 17th, the duel was fought and Francis was shot through body by Hastings.⁷

The Maratha forces in the konkan had cantoned at Talegaon.⁸ Nana wrote to Mahadji on 18th August about blockading the English from all quarters.⁹ Mahadji insisted on staying in Malwa and guarding, against the English.¹⁰ Appajiram, however, on 20th August drew a rather dismal picture of Mahadji's love of peace and pleasure in the midst of a serious campaign with no clear intention of immediately meeting the danger ahead.¹¹ Ganeshpant Behere was sent against the English who joined Gulzar khan's brother in Songur.¹² Hyder suggested

1. Ibid., No.109; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, pp.274-275.

2. Ibid., No.110.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2559.

4. S.P.D.D., vol.23, 432-436. (Bombay to G.G.).

5. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravahar, No.206.

6. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1959.

7. Forrest, selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, lix; Forrest, selections from State papers of Governor-General of India-W.Hastings vol.I, 189; parasnis, Marathyanche vakil; chap.III, 3.

8. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren, No.279.

9. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.283.

10. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.111.

11. Ibid., No.113.

12. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren, Nos.280, 279.

to Nana to set the Emperor against the English.¹ The vakil from the English, Fazl Ali, forwarded his terms to the Emperor and Hingane asked for the Peshwa's army to be immediately sent to the north.² The Governor-General congratulated the Rana of Gohad on the capture of Gwalior and sent the news to the Emperor, the Wazir, the Nizam, Najafkhan, Mudhoji and Dewakar Pandit.³ Col. Baillie arrived at Cuttuck on 11th August and Bhavani Pandit (Appasahib) saw him on 13th August and Naru Pandit, the Peshwa's vakil at Nagpore, asked permission there to go back to Poona as the Bhonsles had friendly relations with the English.⁴ Devakar Pandit himself wanted to see the Governor-General but postponed, as the Nizam would be displeased and Mahadji being a member of the Peshwa's government would have to be informed and he might not quite relish it. The Bhonsles were worried about the expenses of the army.⁵

Rumour was spread on 23rd August that the English attacked Ujjain and Mahadji was himself at Ujjain. The English were felt to be every where.⁶ Nana wrote to Hyder that the English in the konkan were defeated.⁷ The Governor-General in Council sent instructions to Popham on 24th August that Gwalior must be retained as a British post.⁸ Hyder had warned the Marathas that as soon as he attacked the English, they would start negotiations with the Peshwa and explicitly maintained that the Peshwa would never hear of any treaty unless first Hyder himself was consulted.⁹ Mahadji on 27th August ordered

1. Ibid.

2. Parasnis, Maratha politics in Delhi, I, 13, 12.

3. C.P.C., vol. V, Nos. 1966, 1968, 1974.

4. Ibid., No. 1977.

5. C.P.C., vol. V, No. 1979.

6. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2560.

7. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren, No. 281.

8. Bhandarkar, "op.cit.", I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 53.

9. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren, No. 284.

the detachment at Ashirgad to join Bhagirath Shinde and jointly to pursue Gulzar Khan Pathan.¹

Hartley's detachment was on 28th August placed under Goddard's command to cover the attack on Bassein. Battering cannons were ready to join Goddard, and Goddard was to bring the Madras Battalion of European Infantry; the Madras Artillery, consisting together of about 600 men, 4 battalions and 4 grenadiers companies of Bengal sepoys and two Battalions of Madras sepoys.² On 5th September the secret information given by Muhamad Ali of Bombay to Govindrao of Kalyan was sent to Nana which apprised him of the preparation of the Bombay Company for Bassein.³

Nana informed Mahadji on 3rd September that he was free to do whatever he liked, only that he must look to the Peshwa's interest.⁴ Fresh contingents were sent by the Sardars for restoring order in the province round about Jhansi by taking over the management from Raghoba and his followers.⁵ On 3rd September Devakar Pandit informed the Governor-General that the Marathas extended their sway upto the very borders of Afganistan.⁶ Tukoji submitted to Ahalyabai but narrated to Naro Shankar how he believed Mahadji propagated against him in all quarters. Balarao from Shinde was expected at Maheshwar and he was accompanied by Shivaji Narayan.⁷ Balarao Govind thereafter went to Maheshwari, stayed there for 1½ months and returned to Ujjain.⁸

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.114.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.23, 441-444.(Consultation).

3. Sardesai, Itihasik patravvabar, No.207.

4. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren, No.283.

5. S.P.D., vol.36, No.397.

6. Heras, "op.cit." Is.C., vol.XI(1937), p.510.

7. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.14.

8. Ibid, Nos.18,20,21; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.II, p.14.

On 5th September the Rana of Gohad thanked the Governor-General¹ and the Marathas were preparing in right earnest for the post-rain operations against the English.² Goddard had come to Bombay.³ There was a rumour on 7th, that Mahadji intended proceeding up to Gwalior.⁴ The Rana of Gohad complained to the Governor-General on 7th September that the fort of Gwalior was his ancestral property and hence the English had no claim on it.⁵ On 8th, Goddard went back to Surat to bring down the army for the siege of Bassein.⁶ The ambassador of Holkar Durbar wrote to Ahalyabai from the Court of Hyderabad that Amrutrao had gone to the Bhonsle at Nagpore though the Bhonsle had not still then allowed him an interview. Hyder was against any submissive peace with the English. Chapman was in the Poona Court and the Peshwa was resolved to have the initiative of the peace-terms from Hyder.⁷ Sivram Narayan Thatte was sent to khandesh who squeezed Rs.1750 there but Mahadji on 11th September instructed to get the money back.⁸

Francis took his seat again at the Council in Calcutta on 11th September.⁹ For the English, the matter of the greatest importance was the preservation of the State, from the formidable league formed for the destruction of it. News had reached the Council from Madras that Hyder had entered the Carnatic, destroyed an army and had driven Sir Hector Munroe to the walls of Fort St. George. Sir Edward Hughes sent tidings of his having received

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1985.

2. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren, No.235.

3. Ibid.

4. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.15.

5. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1989.

6. S.P.D.D., vol.23. 464. (Bombay to Broach).

7. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhana, vol.I, No.119. (10-9-1780)

8. Shindeshahi Raikarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.50.

9. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 715.

undoubted intelligence that seven sail of the line and seven thousand land forces had left France and were intended to co-operate with the enemies of the English in India. Thirty thousand Maratha Horse were encamped on the Western front of Bengal, an invasion of Bihar by the Marathas was also expected. The Nizam proposed hostility. Najaf Khan threatened Oudh and the forces of Mahadji threatened Korah and Allahabad while Goddard was opposed by the whole power of Poona.¹ While Francis maintained that Goddard never wrote of diversion,² Hastings supplied the proof.³ Goddard's letter to Sir Eyre Coote was dated 28th March and was recorded in the Governor-General's consultation on 29th May and was referred by Hastings in his minute of 12th June, earlier.⁴ Barwell intended of escaping from a thankless office.⁵ John Day was, however, responsible for carrying out a compromise between Hastings and Francis.⁶

Naro Sivdev, from Mahadji's camp at Ujjain on 13th September suggested to Nana, on 12th September to pursue seriously Manaji Shinde.⁷ Goddard's response to the negotiations for peace through the Bhonsle was not encouraging by about 13th September. Though, however, the Governor-General's letters bore sentiments of closest friendship,⁸ Raghoba's letters to Nana were intercepted and Goddard stopped his pension. Raghoba had sent all his relatives to Songad by about 13th September.⁹ Haripant came to Poona and the Peshwa was taken to Purandar as the English army was reported to have come to Borghat,

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1. Ibid, vol. I, Lxii; Forrest, selections from State papers-W. Hastings; vol. I, 195.
 2. Ibid, p. 739.
 3. Ibid, p. 743.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid, Lx.
 7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 124.
 8. C.P.C., vol. V, Nos. 1994, 1995.
 9. Ibid, No. 1996.

20 cos. from Poona. The Nizam's help was solicited by the Poona Government and Dhousa, too was approached by the same purpose. Mudhoji was prepared to help Poona provided Mandla was acceded to him.¹ Mahadji had suggested to Tukoji to stay near the Peshwa and himself proposed to settle the disturbances in the north. Tukoji was engaged in the siege of Sultanpur and Gulzarkhan in Khandesh when defeated, fled to Raghoba.² Mahadji declared that Tukoji was inefficient and on 14th September suggested his desire to meet Nana and Nana instructed that the Sardars should come to Khandesh for that purpose, without armies.³ Nana was encamped at Kirkee and was thinking of leaving that place to meet Mahadji.⁴ Nana still insisted that Kondaibari was a better place from the point of strategic importance,⁵ but Mahadji suggested that in order to bring the English to terms, they must be attacked in Bengal.⁶

It was reported on 16th September that Sir Edward Hughes came up against Hyder's army and Fort St. George recalled the Madras army. Hyder wrested the English possessions and the Admiral urged on peace with the Marathas and expected the Bombay Company to transact it.⁷ Nana wrote to Hyder on 16th that he should be on guard for the English were diplomatic and treacherous.⁸ Raghoba was in Surat and the English were not paying his full expenses. Anandibai proceeded to Baroda to win over Govindrao Gaikwad to her cause. Three hundred Arabs came to Maheshwar to seek employment.⁹ Raghoba and the English had entered

1. I.H.I., No.1997.

2. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatren, vol.I, No.16.

3. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren, Nos.286,287.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.285.

5. Sardesai kavyetihas patren, No.287.

6. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.288.

7. S.P.D.D., vol.23, 708-714; Sardesai, kavyetihas patren, No.292.

8. Sardesai, op.cit., No.288.

9. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.17.

into a secret negotiation with the fort-keeper of Saler.¹ Mahadji advised Nana to reinforce Behere and ask Holkar to take up his post at Kondaibari, so as to prevent the enemy from descending into Malwa and attacking him in the rear.²

Madras applied for help to Calcutta and it was decided that Calcutta should send the succour, inspite of the opposition of Francis, to the tune of 15 lakhs of rupees, in specie and also a large detachment of European Infantry and Artillery under Lient. General Sir Eyre Coote, the victor of Wandiwash and then the C-in-c in India and a member of the supreme Council in Calcutta, who was marked " as the only possible instrument " at this crisis to " stand forth and vindicate in own person the rights and honour of the British arms. "³ The spirit, judgement and decision of Hastings shone forth. At a Council meeting, he declared it was not a time " for either long deliberations at home or the formal and tedious process of negotiations abroad. " The crisis demanded, " the most instant, powerful and even hazardous exertion of the Government to avert the event portended by so many concurrent difficulties. "⁴ Francis and wheeler objected on the ground that Bengal was their first object, that the danger was at their door, and consequently they could spare no troops and not half the supply of treasure which Hastings proposed to send to Madras. Sir Eyre Coote concurred with the Governor-General and the casting-vote of Hastings preserved India to Great Britain.⁵ The C-in-c was requested to proceed himself immediately to the coast and take the command of the army on that establishment. An immediate

1. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren, No.289.

2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.115.

3. Kalikinkar Datta, "The First two Anglo-Mysore wars and Economic drain of Bengal," J.I.H., vol.XX, (1941), pp.18-19.

4. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, .vol.I, Lxii.

5. Forrest, op.cit., vol.I, Lxii.

offer of peace also was to be made to the Marathas, incorporating the exchange of acquisitions, maintenance of Raghoba, the alliance of the English and the Peshwa against Hyder and the French and the hostility to be stopped for one year for settling the treaty. Mahadji was to be the mediator for this treaty.¹

Nana called Patwardhan to his rescue.² The French attacked the English ship which had gone to Sevendrug and the Marathas had stripped it off.³ Nana before starting to meet Mahadji wanted certain definite promises and wanted Naropant to inquire secretly into the whole affair.⁴ On 30th September Mahadji wrote to Haripant promising to return to the Deccan with Tukoji.⁵ Naropant too gave the guarantee to Nana of good counsel on Mahadji's part.⁶ The Chief of Surat solicited the permission of Mahadji for the collection of good tobacco for the pipe (Gudgudi) of Goddard, who was very fond of it.⁷ Ahalyabai had refused the provision of Dak (post) from Mahadji's camp to Burhanpur.⁸ J. Hartley in the Konkan reduced Serolee, south of Bawa Malang, and leaving there Major Hopkins on 2nd October, returned to Kalyan. In the action at Bawa Malang, 300 troops were defeated by the English.⁹ Mullarao Bapu wrote to Nana on 2nd October about his plight at Bassein. He was himself weak and not perfect in health. He had not there for his army, even the leaves to dine upon; and he himself expected that the English would finish the

1. Ibid, pp. 718, 722; Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, IV, 20; Gleig, op.cit., vol. II, 331.

2. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2562. (26-9-1780)

3. Ibid, No. 2563.

4. Sardesai, kavyetihās patren, No. 290.

5. S.P.D., vol. 36; No. 399.

6. Sardesai, kavyetihās patren, No. 291.

7. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane, VI, 31.

8. Ibid, V, 31.

9. S.P.D., vol. 23; 521-523, 529-530.

whole business at Bassein within seven days.¹ Visaji from Bassein again wrote to Nana that the Arabs belonging to the guards of Raghopant were in want of an officer to command them, in action and that Raghopant himself had gone to the Mallang Fort. The Arabs pressed for the money and fought amongst themselves when once 10/12 men were wounded, 5/7 houses of the subjects were plundered and women and children suffered to. He pointed out that without having such troops that would obey strictly, the matters would not be better.²

On account of Nana's suggestion, Mahadji reinforced Govindrao Gaikwad and sent him into Gujarat from Malwa with a party of troops collected from various quarters and he was already on 3rd, waiting for a ford on the Mahie to cross into Gujarat.³ Govindrao was to be joined by his Deccani followers shortly from Poona.⁴ Mahadji declared that his preparations for renewing operations were completed and urged on the Bhonsle and Holkar to exert themselves whole heartedly.⁵ Mahadji assured Haripant that his doubts and suspicions were cleared by Waro Shankar and requested him to evince the same cordiality towards him as before.⁶ Mahadji again accepted Nana's suggestion on 3rd October to meet him in Khandesh but asked him to keep the whole subject a close secret. He, however, would first complete his plans in the north.⁷

Seven companies of the first Circar Battalions were in mutiny at Visagapattam.⁸ In the north, Hingane requested Nana to persuade

1. Ibid., vol. 23, 538-539. (Intercepted Letter)

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 23, 538 (Intercepted letter of Visaji from Bassein to Nana).

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 116.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 128.

5. Ibid., No. 117.

6. Ibid., No. 118.

7. Ibid., No. 119.

8. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 733.

Balarao Govind and Gangadhar Govind to pay him.¹ On 8th October Raghoba was not allowed to entertain troops as he was not considered as an ally of the English. The Company was the principal in the Maratha War and only three villages of twelve to fifteen thousand rupees per year were to be given to him.² The Governor-General addressed the Bombay Company, informing about the determination to offer peace and friendship to the Marathas, enclosing a copy of the treaty and to suspend all hostilities on the receipt of a requisition in writing and informed that like orders were given by the Peshwa to his officers. But the Governor-General suggested in the meanwhile a vigorous prosecution of the war.³ The company was to raise a loan of Rs.4½ lakhs on the 5% interest within two months.⁴ Raghoba was to set out after the Dasarha and it was reported on 10th October; that Goddard was at Bombay.⁵ Nana had collected 50,000 horse and decided too, to march on Dasarha.⁶ When the English attacked Bassein, Nana sent reinforcement of 5000 gardis foot, with artillery and 4000 well horsed cavalry.⁷ On 11th October the Marathas had retreated from Kalyan.⁸ However, the Governor-General had sent to Mahadji the treaty on 12th October ceding all to the Marathas and hoping that Mahadji would ratify it. The Governor-General had expressed that Mahadji had shown great courage and ability in commanding the Maratha force against the English, hoping that he would then display still greater

1. Parasnis, Maratha politics in Delhi, vol.I, 15.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.23; 531-533.(Consultation).

3. Ibid, vol.23; 661-662.(G.G.to Bombay 9-10-1780).

4. C.P.C., vol.V, No.2019.

5. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, 19.

6. Raghubir Singh, "The Persian Akbarat," (1779-1818), " I.H.R.C.P., vol. XVI, (1939), p.142.

7. Ibid.

8. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2564.

tact and wisdom in getting the treaty ratified.¹ The Governor-General sent same to the Peshwa and Nana declared that the treaty would be finalised with Mudhoji's guarantee.² The Governor-General proposed a new confederacy of the Marathas, the English, the Nizam and the Bhonsle against Hyder.³

Chinto Vithal along with others was being dispatched to Poona from Ujjain, under proper escort but he effected his escape. After a great deal of search and tremendous exertions he was found in a house at Ujjain and was arrested and given in shackles into the charge of guards. Then could Mahadji breathe a sigh of relief.⁴ Chinto was confined, then in the fort of Satara where he died in June 1783.⁵ His wife and daughter, at this time (13th October 1780) put an end to their lives by taking poison.⁶

Hyder secured triumphs over the English⁷ and the Governor-General sent Sir Eyre Coote and informed the Peshwa, Devakar, Mudhoji and Nana, accordingly.⁸ "But here the policy of the English seemed confusing. The English who had astonished all the powers of Asia by their vigilance, their activity and above all by the promptitude with which they had begun their military operations had not presented one man to oppose the progress of their enemy who had come from a hundred leagues distance to attack them. Those who led two years ago, 40,000 combatants before Pondicherry, who during all the times of their last war with Hyder placed on foot two large armies who

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.2022.

2. C.P.C., vol.V, Nos.2023,2024; S.P.D.D., vol.23; 717-720(Copy of the Treaty).

3. C.P.C., vol.V, Nos.2026.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.126(13-10-1780), 125; Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.23.

5. Ibid, vol.II, No.127; Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.20.

6. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.120; Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.21.

7. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2565.

8. C.P.C., vol.V, No.s 2035-2039.

in one word maintained on that side 30 battalions of the sepoys, undoubtedly were greatly dazzled by the reputation they had made, had either given to their forces some secret destination or disposed of their troops for certain operations."¹ "The mistake was irreparable. In a country in revolution and above all since there were powerful and ambitious neighbours, the English ought to have a corps always ready to march at the first need and sufficiently large for covering the frontiers. The different posts which Hyder had occupied by means of his cavalry, had then taken away from the English all the means of assembling a large force. It had brought an end to their prosperity."² The Emperor from Delhi wrote to the Sardars and Ahalyabai for the alliance against the English. Raghoba sent Gulzar-khan with new force to Khandesh.³ On 23rd September news had come to the Governor-General, of the loss of Col. Baillie's detachment. General Munroe precipitated flight from the face of Hyder.⁴

Hyder received an intelligence of the English force of 500 Europeans and three to four thousand sepoys, detached his son with 15,000 horse from his siege of Arcot, who was chastised. Hyder himself then completed the blockade of Arcot and set off to reinforce his son, with all his force, French corps and some guns and joined his son. He attacked the English troops at several onsets. A complete overthrow took place and upwards of 200 horse were cut to pieces and 300 Europeans were taken prisoners among whom was Col. Baillie who had received three wounds and nearly 30 officers. The Portuguese had designs on Bassein. Their frigate went to Daman to

1. Sarkar Jadunath, "Hyderali's invasion of the Eastern Carnatic, 1780," *Is. C.*, vol. XV, (1941), p. 222.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Maheshwar Darbarchi Batamipatre*, vol. I, No. 21.

4. *Gleig, op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 323.

suppress the insurrection there by Raghoba's partisans.¹ Hyder wrote to Capt. Thomas Prendergast, commandant, asking for a suspension of arms and to capitulate, saying, "I wish that all the world should come to me without reservation and without conditions".² On 10th September Col. Baillie had marched from northward to join Sir Hector Munroe at Canjeevaram; after being reinforced by a detachment from Canjeevaram under Col. Fletcher. Receiving the news of his defeat, now, Sir Munroe retired from Canjeevaram to the Mount.³

Hastings lamented that the Maratha war had been and was called his, God knows, why. He was forced into it, he explained. The inefficiency of the Bombay Company he thought, shattered all his hopes of terminating the Maratha war as he had intended to do.⁴ Hartley, however, advanced to Chowk.⁵ But the English at Khopawali retreated to Tala on account of the fact that the Marathas were reinforced adequately.⁶ Nana asked whether Tukoji also was proceeding to see him and suggested that the delay in his meeting with the Sardar, would have had effects.⁷ Ahalyabai protested strongly against Mahadji and Tukoji,⁸ and suspected that Haripant, too, sided with Tukoji. Ahalyabai and the Peshwa's vakil talked about the settlement of Jagir.⁹ It was again settled between Mahadji and Nana on 30th October that Mahadji would cease clamouring for removal of Haripant and Nana agreed to accord a Jagir to

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 580-581; 613-614.

2. Sarkar, "Op.cit", Is.G. vol. XV, (1941), p. 223.

3. S.P.D.D. vol. 23; 613-614.

4. Gleig, op.cit, vol. II, 325.

5. S.P.D.D. vol. 23; 543-545, 579; 589-590; 608-609; 624-630; 644-645.

6. Khare, op.cit, vol. VII, No. 2567.

7. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren; No. 293.

8. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 25.

9. Ibid, vol. I, No. 24. (30-10-1780).

Mahadji in Bundelkhand.¹ Nana, too, had refuted the charge that he wanted to confiscate Ahalyabai's jagirs.² Instead of settling the dispute of Holkars; Nana and Mahadji relied upon third-rate gossip-mongers.³

M.de Montgomery, 3rd captain, had come out to arrange terms with Hyder. His insinuating manner (and it might have some political reason) had at last persuaded Hyder to agree that only the English troops should issue up glacis of the fort with the honours of the war, that they should there pile up their arms and that immediately afterwards, they should take the road to Madras with their effects, all that subject to the express condition that they would not bear arms against him during the rest of the war.⁴ The English troops which were in the fort of Arcot issued at 11 o'clock in the morning in the manner to which they had agreed. There were six officers, 153 musketeers and 300 sepoy.⁵ "The accounts they gave of the strength, good order, bravery and activity of Hyder's army were fully alarming. His approaches at the siege were carried on with all that regularity as if superintended by the most skilful engineers and his artillery at the same time was numerous and so well served as repeatedly to have dismounted over guns on the batteries."⁶

Mahadji suggested several moves to Nana in order to overcome the English and awaited Nana's replies on 4th November.⁷ Tukoji left Indore to see Ahalyabai who refused to allow him to come with

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 227.

2. Sardesai, Kavytihas patra, No. 294.

3. Ibid, 229; Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 25.

4. Sarkar, "op.cit," Is.C., vol. XV, (1924), p. 228.

5. Sarkar, "op.cit.," Is.C., vol. XV, (1941), p. 228.

6. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I; Lxxvi.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 123.

thousands of soldiers and wrote to Mahadji about it. Visaji Shamrao from Indore promised Herkubai that he would bring Mahadji to Maheshwar. Mahadji was involved also in the affairs of Dhar. Fatesingh Gaikwad's vakil, Mahipant Malhar had come to Ujjain,¹ with a letter demanding military help.² Mahadji gave drafts of 20 lakhs of Rs. to Ahalyabai and Hyder, too, paid tribute to the Peshwa.³ Mahadji was to march and had already sent his army to Gwalior when four more platoons joined the English there. On 9th November the English were near Gohad and Narwar. Mahadji still suggested a meeting with Nana. Holkar had started from Indore, though nothing was determined about his march. Nana was advised to start from Kirkee.⁴ Ahalyabai had written to the Peshwa about Tukoji.⁵ Tukoji and Naro Ganesh had gone without officially visiting Maheshwar, on their campaign in Khandesh against Gulzarkhan and Chandrarao Pawar. Ahalyabai wrote further that Tukoji and Naro Ganesh ought not to have insulted her so much.⁶ Mahadji on 9th November accorded his approval to the plans formed by the Poona ministry to oppose the English expedition from Bombay, in the vicinity of Kalyan and agreed to meet Nana in Khandesh as intimated.⁷ Govind Gopal Kamtekar, Divan of Fatesingh Gaikwad, who was considered to be responsible for the defection of Fatesingh and was considered to be a great source of evil, was arrested and confined at Borsad, along with his twenty followers.⁸

The Governor-General had finally refuted the charge levelled

1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I, No. 26.

2. Phalke, op. cit., vol. II, No. 29.

3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I, No. 27.

4. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2568.

5. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; vol. I, p. 15.

6. Ibid., pp. 16, 17.

7. Sardesai, H. P. M. S., No. 121; Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S. H. S., vol. II, No. 129.

8. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S. H. S., vol. II, No. 130.

by Francis¹ and on 11th November Sir Eyre Coote arrived in the Carnatic.² Mudhoji wrote to Nana on 31st November, "The English must be overwhelmed on all sides. Unless they are once severely punished, no power would remain in peace. Even the Emperor of Delhi and his minister, Najaf Khan wished very much that the English must be crushed."³ Nana complained that he had been to Kirkee for 3½ months but could hear nothing from Mahadji and that Goddard had captured everything in the Konkan except Bassein.⁴ Hyder threatened the English possessions in the Carnatic and Sir Eyre Coote urged on peace with the Marathas on 15th November again.⁵

The army under Goddard arrived near Bassein on 12th November.⁶ Mahadji was at Ujjain on 17th November and tried to persuade Tukoji not to proceed to the Deccan as the affairs in Hindustan would require his presence there. Fatesingh forwarded overtures to Ahalyabai and the Sardars.⁷ It was reported on 20th November that Shinde's clerks, Shivaji Narayan and Bhagwantrao were in Maheshwari for the settlement of dispute over revenue matters concerning Tukoji. Nana had been to Jambgaon to pacify Mahadji who had come there. Tukoji was also dissatisfied with the Peshwa and Mahadji intended to reconcile him, too.⁸ Ambaji Ingle was to face the English at Gwalior. Ahalyabai sought Mahadji's interference to check Tukoji who was supported by Haripant and the Peshwa. Tukoji's army was prepared to fight against Mahadji and even the Peshwa but not against Ahalyabai.⁹ On 24th,

1. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department; vol. I, 743, 735.

2. Ibid. 745.

3. Diskalkar D.B; "op.cit," J.I.H., vol. XI, (1932), p. 312.

4. Sardesai, Kavyotilhas patren; No. 295; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 122.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 720-722. (Coote to Bombay).

6. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 611-612. (Bombay to G.G.).

7. Maheshwar Darabarchi Bataminatre; vol. I, No. 29.

8. Ibid. No. 30.

9. Ibid. No. 31; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 124.

Mahadji was reported again at Ujjain.¹

Devarao Hingane explained that though Mahadji sanctioned Kotah in Jagir to him, he had received nothing for five years.² The Emperor was urged on to march but the English vakils, too, promised presents to the Emperor on 25th November.³ Mahadji prepared himself to oppose the English regiments marching through Bundelkhand.⁴ Mahadji had postponed his march into the Deccan and appointed Ramji Patil to explain the situation personally to Nana.⁵ On 28th November Mahadji forwarded the Devas brothers' dispute to Nana for the final decision.⁶ Mahadji was satisfied over the issue of the desertion of Satvaji Bhonsle from the State of Kolhapur and his consequent decision to join the Poona party.⁷ By about 29th November curious reports were in circulation about the arrest of Mahadji and Ahalyabai.⁸ Harkubai was Malharrao Holkar's Khandarani (wife of the sword). "Mavashibai" - (Harkubai?) was with Ahalyabai and Maniram, father-in-law of Sumersingh, was her Karbhari. He had taken Sumersingh's jagirs and property. The Poona minister insisted that Harkubai must confiscate Maniram's jagirs but Maniram avoided Bai's presence. He even smuggled ten lakhs of rupees for her. Naro Ganesh and Maniram were on good terms. Then the minister of Poona confiscated Harkubai's inam village, itself. Maniram was responsible for Raghoba's intrigues in the Holkar family and Naro Ganesh, Maniram and Tukoji had formed a conspiracy.

1. Ibid.

2. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; vol.I;17,18.

3. Ibid.; 17.

4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.123.

5. Ibid., No.124.

6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.II; No.131.

7. Ibid., No.132.

8. S.P.D., vol.36; No.403.

However, Ahalyabai insisted that the Jagir of Harkubai must be released.¹ Mahadji and Ahalyabai, in conference, decided that Mahadji must go to Ujjain and send army at Sipri against the English and should start by the auspicious day of Vasant Panchami to see the Peshwa. Ahalyabai had special love for the young Peshwa.²

On 1st December the English army in Hindustan came near Siprikolar. Mahadji sent Ambaji Ingle against the English and Ingle even defeated two platoons. Tukoji now demanded that Mahadji ^{should} not interfere with the family of Holkars, which view Ahalyabai refused to entertain and charged instead Tukoji himself for the failures of House of the Holkars.³ Mahadji showed perfect unconcern for Bassein, which caused great distress to Appajiram.⁴ Mahadji explained that the growing pressure of the English advance in Malwa required all his energies to meet the danger and that when Shivaji Vithal, who was already called by him, would arrive, he would set out himself for the Deccan.⁵ Mahadji explained the dire need of the hour to Haripant, too.⁶

Hastings opened negotiations with the Dutch in India on 2nd December.⁷ Goddard was two miles before the walls of Bassein on 3rd December and opened batteries on 9th and 10th, while on 11th by 10 O'clock in the morning, the message of surrender was offered but as no message had come by about 7, to the terms of Goddard, he had resumed hostilities. At 9, Nagopant with the garrison was told to march out, leaving the arms and the garrison was permitted to go in safety. One officer was wounded, 12 men were killed and wounded,

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.II, p.18.

2. Ibid; Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.135. (Ahalyabai told Mahadji to march to the Deccan).

3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol.I, No.32; Sardesai, H.P.M.S. No.125.

4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.125.

5. Ibid, No.126.

6. Ibid, No.127.

7. Gleig, op.cit., vol.II, 336.

including four Europeans and one Subedar of sepoy.¹ 128 serviceable guns and 62 unserviceable guns were collected by the English.²

Nana had referred on 5th December that Mahadji and Tukoji had already started on their march.³ Hyder had occupied Arcot.⁴ Nana pleaded on 11th that the Emperor and Najaf must then cross the Ganges. Najaf was willing to comply though the Emperor refused, soliciting that some one Maratha Sardar must come to that side. The Emperor really wanted to get rid of Najaf and enquired why the Nizam had joined the English and not Hyder.⁵ Nana and the Peshwa wrote to Indore on 14th December⁶ and Ahalyabai asked Mahadji to proceed to Kondaibari to protect the Peshwa's dominions, assuring him that she would alone do all that was necessary in respect of all political and military affairs of the north.⁷ The Dhar disputes were, again, not settled and the matters were referred to Nana.⁸

Goddard relieved Hartley at Vijrabai and in the action of 12th December Ramchandra Ganesh was killed. Goddard was prosecuting hostilities to bring pressure on the Marathas before initiating peace talks.⁹ Raghoba wrote to Jalimsinghaji of Kotah on 14th December that he was setting out for Hindustan and would reach Kotah soon.¹⁰ Hyder marched to Madras and the English opened talks with the Nizam and the Bhonsle. Jaipur was devastated by Najaf's forces.¹¹ Madhavrao Gangadhar was called back by Ahalyabai on 17th December

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 638-642; 646-647; 652, 655-660.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 729.

3. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patre; No. 296.

4. S.P.D.D., vol. 23, 733. (Goa to Bombay).

5. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi, I, 21; Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 137.

6. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. II, p. 15.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 135.

8. Ibid., No. 133.

9. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 689-692; 697-698; 701-702; 704-716.

10. Phalke, op. cit., vol. II, No. 5.

11. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; I, 20. (19-12-1780)

from Mahadji's court, who gave him robes of honour. Mahadji himself explained to Harkubai his inability to go to Maheshwari as he had to check the English in Malwa. Mahadji again believed that Tukoji was not supported by Nana but by Visaji and Haripant.¹

The Bombay Company felt on 22nd December the necessity of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion.² However, the English attacked Arnala.³ Ahalyabai on 27th December expected Mahadji within two days and Mahadji was already given Rs.40,000 but Ahalyabai was dissatisfied with him because he did not intend to march to the Deccan.⁴ The Maratha fleet captured an English merchantman.⁵ Mahadji was at Maheshwar from 28th December 1780 to 2nd January 1781 and Ranekhan had accompanied him there.⁶ A letter was addressed to Nana on 24th December referring to the confiscation of the property of Sitoji Deshmukh by the Maratha State.⁷

It was reported on 29th December 1780 that Keso Krishna Datar and Chandrarao Pawar were defeated at Ramala.⁸ Parashuram had reached Bhilwadi because his mother breathed her last there.⁹ The Mamlat of Kotah was settled and Ahalyabai requested Mahadji on 30th December to see that the Raja, Jalimsinghaji made the requisite payment.¹⁰ Naro Sivdev, on behalf of Ahalyabai requested Nana to restrain Tukoji from appropriating the receipts of revenues from certain villages in the Deccan which were really assigned to Ahalyabai.¹¹

1. Maheshwar Darebarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.33.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.23; 723-724.(Consultation).

3. Ibid., 733-736, 738.

4. Maheshwar Darebarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.34.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.24; 3-4. (Goa to Bombay). (28-12-1780).

6. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; vol.II, p.17; Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I No.136.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.I; No.52.

8. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2569.

9. Ibid., No.2570.

10. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I; No.122.

11. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.134.

The French warships appeared in Indian Waters and this information was forwarded to Nana by Mahadji on 31st December. Mahadji advised Nana to move the troops to Borghat and Kondaibari to counteract Goddard's activities, suggesting that the French should attack Calcutta.¹ Ahalyabai was not prepared to accept Nana's suggestion and to hand over her power to any one else and Mahadji inclined to support her cause.² The Governor-General addressed letters of peace to the Bhonsle and (through the Bhonsle) to the Peshwa, Nana, Mahadji and Nawab Muba Nizul-Mulk, for confederacy against Hyder.³

Mahadji's Bakshi wrote to Col. James Morgan that he had received his letter and that he, in compliance with the order of Shinde, would immediately go to see him and had deputed Meghshyan Pandit to wait upon the Colonel and to represent everything to him.⁴

Holkar's dispute was not settled⁵ and in their diabolical indulgence in domestic disputes, the Marathas, it was said, forgot the English and the only man who seemed to have been aware of them was Mahadji Shinde.⁶ It is an instance of the inscrutable ways of Providence that, during a period when some of the most capable Englishmen were set out to India, there were some of the most shortsighted and self seeking people, responsible in the Maratha affairs.⁷ The most momentous issues were at stake, and the most alarming situations had arisen.⁸ The fortunes of the English in India had

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.128.

2. Ibid. No.129.(31-12-1780).

3. C.P.C., vol.V, Nos.2070, 2072, 2069, 2071.

4. Ibid. vol.V, No.2073.

5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.132.

6. Sinha H.N., "Main Currents of 18th Century Indian History," J.I.H., vol.IX,(1930), p.48.

7. Ibid.

8. C.P.C., vol.V; p.Vii.

fallen to their lowest water-mark.¹ The Peshwa had pointed out to the Emperor the danger of all pervading English² and the Peshwa's army was invited to Delhi lest the English would go there.³ But the Emperor was afraid of joining the open revolt against the English till Mahadji defeated them and entered the Doab.⁴ Balaji Govind and Jhansikar followed high-handed policy and did not care to see Mahadji.⁵ The *Kanunama* was given by the Emperor to the Peshwa.⁶ Balaji Govind did not pay Hingane and Raghunath Hari excused himself in the same way, pointing out that the province was left to Mahadji and that he himself had left nothing with him.⁷

On 1st January 1781, Mahadji had come to Minahus and 16 goats were purchased for his feast. In the secret talks of Ahalyabai, Mahadji and Rane Khan, Mahadji was requested to go to the Deccan while he himself wanted to return to Ujjain.⁸ The treachery of Tukoji and Maniram who received secret letters from Raghoba was brought to light by Ahalyabai on 4th January 1781.⁹ The Bhonsle was trying to adjust the terms of the Governor-General to suit the Maratha expectations.¹⁰ Mahadji himself wrote to the Governor-General that "two hearts joined together may pull down a hill;" and pointed out that the English must negotiate peace, that he knew the Governor-General had sent the treaty to Poona and wished that God would grant that the war, by some means, might be brought to a close.¹¹ The Bhonsle declared on 9th January

1. Chaturvedi Ram Nishore, "The Educational Activities and progress before the mutiny," *J.I.H.*, vol. XVIII, (1939), p. 322 C/f Calcutta Review, vol. III, (1840), p. 213.

2. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol. III, p. 223.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

4. Rajwade, *op. cit.*, vol. XII, pp. 22, 23; No. 26; 38, No. 55; pp. 38, No. 56;

5. *Ibid.*, vol. XII, pp. 23-24, No. 27.

6. *Ibid.*, vol. XII, p. 25, No. 30; p. 25, No. 31.

7. *Ibid.*, vol. XII, pp. 26-27, No. 32.

8. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, Nos. 35, 38, 39; Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhana, vol. I, No. 123.

9. *Ibid.*, vol. I, No. 36.

10. C.P.C., vol. VI, Nos. 7, 8.

11. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 10.

that since no further time could be wasted in waiting for a reply from the Governor-General, he had no alternative but to execute the plan which the Nizam and the Peshwa had already settled.¹ Devakar explained that as the articles of the treaty, in question, were ambiguous, he could not go to Poona.² It was pointed out also that in the days of Madhavrao Peshwa, he had made his brother Narayan and Janoji Bhonsle swear life-long friendship for each other. The latter procured the release of Raghoba but Raghoba treacherously murdered Narayan, it was explained and the Bhonsle could not do anything for Raghunath.³ Devakar would, however, set out for Poona and would write to Mahadji and the Nizam and would devise means to accuse Hyder.⁴

Ahalyabai, again, complained against Tukoji on 10th January 1781 about the collection of the revenues and admitted that she had paid 20 lakhs of rupees to Mahadji, in the preceeding year.⁵ On 18th January Baburao Bhaskar, one of the employees under the Peshwa, in the north, wrote to Nana, offering his services in establishing peace with Warren Hastings whose confidential adviser General Stables was one of the best friends of the writer, through whom he said, peace could be easily arranged.⁶

On 18th January 1781, Arnala Fort, in the Konkan was in the hands of the English⁷ and the English had re-opened hostilities in Khandesh. Ahalyabai sent presents to the Peshwa on 19th January.⁸

1. Ibid., No. 11.

2. Ibid., No. 12.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, Nos. 37, 39.

6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 141.

7. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 28-29.

8. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 41.

The English had secured 91 guns at Arnala.¹ However, the Bombay Company on 20th January took up the issue of peace overtures to the Marathas, as per the letters to and from Goddard and Fort St. George.² On 21st January Mahadji assured Hyder of the firm attitude of the Maratha Court in the war against the English and asked Hyder not to relax his efforts against them.³ Nana, too, wrote to him about the supremacy of the Marathas⁴ and pointed out that one Englishman had been to Haripant but was driven out and suggested that Hyder should follow the same policy.⁵ Nana explained to him, again, not to distrust Nizam's policy as Hyder, the Nizam and the Peshwa were one against the English,⁶ though he referred to him the treachery of the Nizam and the Bhonsle.⁷

On 22nd January 1781, the English, in the north, had captured Sipri and had advanced towards Bhilsa and Sironj. Events were preventing Mahadji from taking a rapid dash on Surat as suggested by Nana.⁸ Nana approved Mahadji's plan and Mahadji informed him that he was moving towards the Gwalior Sector to oppose the enemy and drive the English back to Bengal.⁹

Goddard on 30th January advanced to Titwala and Badlapur and after having engaged the enemy on 31st, advanced to Khopawali. He then occupied the Borghat and simultaneously opened peace negotiations.¹⁰ The Nizam and the Bhonsle remained without doing

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 53-59. (Goddard to Bombay).

2. Ibid.; vol. 24; 91-97, 106, 108-110, 112-116, 119-120, 122-123.

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 130.

4. Sardesai, Kavyetihās patren, No. 302.

5. Ibid.; No. 303.

6. Ibid.; No. 304.

7. Ibid.; Nos. 305, 307.

8. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol. II; No. 142.

9. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 131.

10. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 67-69 (31-1-1781), 76-78 (4-1-1781), 83-87 (Campoli, 8-2-1781), 97, (9-2-1781) Borghat-13-2-1781; 145-146 (9-3-1781) Badlapur.

anything¹ and Mahadji rebuked the Nizam for remaining silent. Mahadji dispatched Girmajipant to the Rana of Gohad;² and Naro Sivdev conveyed to Nana from Sujalpur, Mahadji's fear as to how, the English would advance right upto Burhanpur, if he were to withdraw from Malwa.³ Ranekhan had remonstrated against Mahadji's callous inactivity in the face of the onrushing English and Mahadji becoming alive to his responsibility, made the necessary preparations to proceed to the front with all possible haste.⁴ Sultankhan from the Emperor appeared in Mahadji's camp and proposed a combined campaign against the aggressive English.⁵ Naro Sivdev was also under the necessity of pointing out to Mahadji how his ancestors worked and died in the cause of their master, who then was baffled by various enemies. Mahadji, thereupon promised to exert himself to the utmost of his abilities.⁶ The Maratha negotiations with Delhi were making little progress and the English were advancing, owing to the feeble opposition offered by Mahadji.⁷ Nana had set all the land power against the Naval power of the English and on 4th February wrote a letter to Cheytsingh.⁸ Mahadji also had explained the plan of driving out the English from Bengal to Cheytsingh, Raja of Benaras, at the same time,⁹ when Cheytsingh's Karbhari, B-abu Subhansingh had received all these letters. Till that time, Cheytsingh had not revolted against Hastings.¹⁰

It was decided by about 4th February 1781 that Holkar and Patwardhan should march in the Konkan, against the English, there.¹¹

1. Sardesai, Uttar-vibhag; vol.I, p.213.

2. Shindeshahi Naikarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.165.

3. Ibid; No.149.

4. Ibid; No.138.

5. Ibid; No.139.

6. Ibid; No.140.

7. Sardesai; H.P.M.S.; No.135.

8. Sardesai, Kavyatihar patra; No.306.

9. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; Vol.I, p.311.

10. Ibid.

11. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2579.

The outstanding accounts with the Pawars of Dewas and with Shivaji Vithal Vinchurkar were settled by about 6th February.¹ Mahadji was informed by Naro Sivdev about the death of Ramchandra Ganesh and the fall of Bassein due to the treachery of Visaji Keshav Lale. Mahadji said thereupon that he would retrieve the position.² Nana now suggested to Mahadji to make a dash into the English territory of Bengal and the Doab but Mahadji explained that the season was far too advanced for the execution of the plan during that year but pointed out that he would certainly do it, after the rains.³ The Poona Durbar on 8th February emphasized cordial and friendly relations in all the state matters between the two ruling families of Holkar and Shinde.⁴

The English in the Konkan ascended the Ghat on 10th February and Haripant and Tukoji retreated to a little extent where upon the citizens of Poona fled to different quarters and the Peshwa was taken to Purandar.⁵ Nana knew that the French fleet had come to Mauritius and declared to Hyder on 11th February that the Peshwa and Hyder should adhere to the treaty in spite of all the rumours of the English overtures.⁶ It was reported on 13th February that a Musalman arrived in the Maratha camp with a verbal message from Sir Edward Hughes to the effect that the Governments of Bengal and Bombay had violated the peace and waged war with the Maratha State and that, he, the admiral was vested with full powers and was desirous of putting an end to the hostilities by restoring to them what had been taken and therefore wished to be acquainted

1. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2579.

2. Shindeshahi Raikarne, S.H.S., vol.II; No.143.

3. Ibid; No.144.

4. Ibid; No.145.

5. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane; vol.I, No.124.

6. Khare; op.cit., vol.VII, No.2582.

7. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren; No.308.

with their complaints. No answer was given and the man was ordered to quit immediately.¹ Mahadji on 14th pushed his base of operation in order to retard the English progress.² Sironj had been captured by the English.³

The Governor-General found fault with the Bhonsle for withholding the treaty with the khilats and letters to the Peshwa, Nana and Mahadji. But the Governor-General was acquainted with the fact that the treaty was sent to Mahadji but that there was no reply.⁴ Capt. Watherston wrote to Goddard from Poona on 15th February about his own efforts.⁵ Holkar was helping the minister with 15000 horse.⁶ The English in the Konkan were at Tala on 15th February; which is a place near Khandala.⁷ On 16th, Haripant and Holkar were at Karla, on the other side. Hyder proposed to finish up the Nizam's power after the English while Goddard intended finishing Hyder's power after the Marathas.⁸ Mahadji had sent the draft of his letter of guarantee to Hyder, declaring that he would not accept a treaty with the English, before consulting Hyder.⁹ The Bhopal chief was prepared to pay 3 lakhs of rupees to the English for Bhelsa but Bhelsa was then Mahadji's Jagir and Mahadji had started from Ujjain on his march to Gwalior.¹⁰ In the Konkan, Raste refused to reinforce Haripant if less than 10,000 troops were given to him, there.¹¹ In the south, 27 platoons from

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 95.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 146.

3. Ibid.

4. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 78.

5. Forrest, Maratha Series; vol. I, 469.

6. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 99. (Bombay to G.G.)

7. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2584.

8. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2585.

9. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 133.

10. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2594; Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 134.

11. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2586.

the French had joined Hyder against the Madras Government.¹ Nana had been to Parashuram Bhaui's camp and in conference with him, decided that Parashuram should join Haripant.² Watherstone wrote to Goddard from Poona on 24th February³ and Macarney, Eyre Coote, John Macpherson wrote to Sir Edward Hughes about their difficulties.⁴ Nana had finally decided to refer matter, regarding Holkar-shahi disputes, to Mahadji and ridiculed Naro Ganesh.⁵ It was reported on 28th February that Mahadji reached Bhelsa with forced marches and was near Khankhed and the English advanced from Sipri to Sironj and halted at Sironj, hearing of Mahadji's march. Nana gave instructions to Naro Sivdev to be very careful about the secret overtures of the English.⁶ Naro Sivdev was asked by Nana to request Mahadji to make the payment of ten lakhs of rupees, due from him to the Government. Mahadji gave the same answer as before that the correct accounts should be first submitted to him.⁷ The English advance was arrested beyond Sironj by Mahadji,⁸ but the dread of the surprise attack by night kept Mahadji on watch and move and it prevented him from transacting any routine business. The affairs of Zainabad, again had irritated Mahadji.⁹ Mahadji was preparing himself for an attack on the English at or near Sironj and hoped to secure a decisive victory.¹⁰ Sir Eyre Coote, in a critical situation himself on 2nd March, urged on an immediate

1. Ibid, No.2588; C.P.C., vol.VI, No.82.

2. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2589.

3. Forrest, Maratha series; vol.I, 470.

4. Ibid, 461.

5. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren; No.309; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.II, 19, 20, 21.

6. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren; No.310.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.147.

8. Ibid; No.148.

9. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.143.

10. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.150.

peace with the Marathas. Hyder was, however, prepared to spend any thing to keep the Marathas against the English.¹ On 3rd March, Mahadji marched from Sarang-puri but still had not actually reached Bhelsa proper, while his Sardars were facing the English. Mahadji had 10,000 soldiers under him but was not helped by the Rajas or Ahalyabai who could not pay the troops. Mahadji expected that the Bhopal chief would be treacherous.² Mahadji informed Nana on 3rd that he had brought the enemy, on that day, at Sironj.³

Goddard in the Konkan had caused much grief to the Marathas.⁴ But still, Goddard's attempts to open negotiations were rejected by Nana.⁵ Nana had rejected the proposals of the Governor-General too.⁶ Raghunath Patwardhan captured on 5th March, 1000/1500 bulls of the English.⁷

Mahadji's army with a train of artillery arrived at Sironj. Carnac's stock was exhausted and he was determined to retreat. Mahadji cannonaded for seven days to draw the English from the town which was the resource of provisions. On 7th March, Carnac issued out secretly by midnight but Mahadji did not follow till the day-break. Mahadji by the day time attacked the English from all sides and the attack pursued for two days. On the third day, Carnac reached a town, Mohanpore.⁸ Col. Carnac was now surrounded by Mahadji and was attacked for seven days successively and he was

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 206-211. (Coote to Bombay and Goddard).

2. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I, No. 42.

3. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 136.

4. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2595.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 130-131. (Goddard-Nana Correspondence)

6. Ibid; 130-133.

7. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2596; Sardesai, Kavvetihas patren, No. 311; Parnis, Itihasik Tipane; III, 28, 18.

8. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 288-289; (Carnac to Malet, Resident at Cambay).

retreating.¹ Mahadji deplored that the season was far too advanced to carry the war in the English territory.² The Emperor of course had no army to join Mahadji but would not join the English, at any cost.³

Mahadji wrote to Nana on 19th March, concerning the affairs of Hydr.⁴ Naro Shivdev and Sadashiv Dinkar were all by about 11th March, in Mahadji's camp and started to return to the Deccan, after taking Mahadji's leave.⁵ Peace was rejected by the Poona minister on 12th March, again and the English in the Konkan were on the defensive.⁶ The Bhopal Chief, on 13th, urged on the English, again, to secure Bhelsa from Mahadji.⁷ Sir Eyre Coote explained that there was quantity for 12 days for the Europeans and one day for the sepoys and followers, on 14th March and that the draft bullocks were so weak that as hardly to be equal to draw the guns for one day's march, from want of food.⁸ Mahadji refused to March on Surat and leave the command to lesser hands in Malwa. Nana urged on Mahadji to settle the accounts for Naro Shivdev was clamouring.⁹ Mahadji himself thought of attacking decisively the English in Malwa. Mahadji sent back the English wakil on 17th March. Najafkhan promised to finish the Sikh affairs and thence to join

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1. S.P.D., vol. 36, No. 401; Duff, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 139-140; Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 27, No. 33; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos. 137, 138; Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 153; Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2607.
 2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 139.
 3. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 27, No. 33.
 4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 151.
 5. Ibid., vol. II, No. 152.
 6. S.P.D., vol. 24; 156-164. (Goddard to Bombay).
 7. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2603.
 8. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department; vol. I; 766.
 9. Sardesai, kavyetihās Patren; Nos. 312, 315.

the Marathas but the English too had promised him 50 lakhs of rupees, which, he however refused to accept.¹

Hughes sent an intelligent Brahmin to reside at Poona, whom he paid at the rate of Rs.200/- per month.² But the only result was to convince the Commodore that the Marathas did not intend to contract peace.³ Hastings deplored that Clavering, Francis and Monson had attacked every measure which he had taken mainly because he had taken it and reversed every branch of his policy mainly because it was his,⁴ while Hughes and others, arrogated to themselves a power which belonged to the Governor-General and Council and addressed a formal letter to the minister at Poona declaring that not the Company alone but the King (of England) as well had ordered the suspension of hostilities, and the conclusion of peace and pledging the Governor-General and Council to support their pacific views.⁵ Sir Edward Hughes paid Rs.3000 " to an intelligent Moorman well acquainted at Poona secretly to carry letters from him to Nana and to bring back his answer, as well as to endeavour by every means in his power to induce the Marathas to a peace with the English Company on the terms offered them by the Governor-General and Council of Bengal and employed him in his service between 4th January and 10th March when finally the man was seized" by the Marathas.⁶

1. Hingane Daptar; vol.II, No.88.

2. Dodwell, Hastings' letters to John Macpherson; Nos.178, p.3; No.167, p.107; p.XXVI.

3. Ibid. (Hughes to Hillsborough); Nos.167, p.107.

4. Ibid. p.XIX.

5. Ibid. p.XXVII; S.P.D.D., vol.25, 611-617. (Bombay to Court. 10-9-1781)

6. Ibid. p.XXVI.

On 19th March, Mahadji was in between Gohad and Gwalior. Cheytsingh sided with Mahadji and Hastings went back to Calcutta.¹ Khanderao Pawar joined Mahadji; and Nana asked him to proceed to the Deccan as his services would be more useful there.² On 20th, Hyder wrote to the Marathas not to contract treaty with the English, promising that he would himself proceed to the Konkan and secure Bassein and Salsetta for them.³ Patwardhan had been successful over the English in the Konkan and Mahadji himself promised to proceed to the Deccan after finishing the English affairs, in Malwa, who had already retreated two cos.⁴ Mahadji followed harassing tactics against the English and wrote to Nana to follow same against the English in the Konkan.⁵

The Emperor and Najaf were in Delhi. The English army was stationed at Lucknow and Kanpur. The English had spread upto Gwalior. Rane Khan on 22nd, came to Sironj with the State army and Mahadji, joining him, rounded the English.⁶ Hingane was endeavouring to set the Emperor against the English.⁷ The English had fled to Chanderi and Nana wrote about Mahadji's success to Hyder.⁸ The various kamavisdars had begun to evade payment of revenue, owing to the disturbed conditions of the district.⁹ On 25th, Mahadji with his army was encamped between Gohad and Gwalior and his family was at Ujjain. He wished to see his Guru, who had forbidden him to go further. Mahadji opened up his campaign against Gohad.¹⁰

1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I, No. 43.

2. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren; No. 313.

3. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2608.

4. Ibid; vol. VII, No. 2605.

5. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 140.

6. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; I, 22.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. I, No. 53.

8. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren; No. 314.

9. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 141.

10. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I; No. 44.

Mahadji was engaged for night and day over the work of carrying on the fight against the English and there was no opportunity for Naro Shivdev to show the letters addressed to him and to obtain replies from him.¹

Hyder's army occupied the country from Trevide to Chillambam being in a direct line upwards of 36 miles and from the former place to Pondicherry it was possessed by large bodies of horse, so that the English were completely surrounded.² On 27th, Goddard's plan of remaining on the defensive was accepted and his suggestion to maintain a post at the head of the Ghats was not accepted by the English authorities.³ On 29th, Nana gave directions to Mahadji about the advance of the English and the Bhopal Chief.⁴

Carnac again marched out and in vain attempted to bring out an engagement, halted for several days to refresh and Mahadji was within 3 cos. with baggage. Seven cos. in the rear, on 24th night, the detachment of the Company, counter-marching during the night, got in the van of Mahadji's army unexpectedly. Carnac surprised and reached the first camp where Mahadji was, pursued the Marathas to their second, drove them 3 cos. further and across " Sind " where the English took the artillery and by 9 o'clock were masters of 10 pieces of cannon, all their tumbrils, two elephants and greatest part of the stores, ammunition and baggage, leaving the Marathas in utmost disorder.⁵ Eleven high-rank soldiers of Mahadji, 20 Bargirs and Siledar with 50 horse were

1. Shiadeshabhi Rajkarna; S.H.S., vol.II, No.154.

2. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department; vol.I; 761.

3. S.P.D.D., vol.24; 164-167. (Consultation).

4. Sardesai, kavyetihās patren; No.316.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.24; 288-289 (Carnac to Malet, Resident at Cambay) and 265, 268, 269; (News from Malet); Sardesai, R.P.M.S., Nos. 142, 146, 147.

killed and 6 officers, 200 Bargirs, Siledar with 100 horse were wounded, on Mahadji's side. On the English side, 3 officers, 25 Candahar horse, one Subedar, twenty Europeans were killed, with 100 more wounded.¹ Carnac wrote that he was pursued by Mahadji and was distressed for the provisions when Mahadji cannonaded him in his march and in his camp and was exceedingly troublesome; so that it was not improbable that Mahadji was led into this scrape by his boldness.² Mahadji, however, continued to pursue the English with harassing tactics.³

Jalimsingh of Kotah came to Shahabad with the military aid to Mahadji on 31st March.⁴ There was increasing tension between Mahadji and the men fighting under him.⁵ The English had six platoons, with two from Gohad, 14 cannons, 3 Garmala, 200 Candahar Horse; while Mahadji had 10 cannons, one garmala, Khanderao Hari's cannon. Visajipant marched to Mandla. Balaji Govind and Gangadhar Govind did not propose to help Mahadji but the Raja of Datia had started to succour him and Mahadji sent Mir Ali Naki Khan's son to the Emperor and Najaf for active help.⁶ The English were reinforced by 3 platoons, 9 cannons and 5 elephants from Kanpur. They had left Kanchirai, 18 cos. further to Narwar. Mahadji heard that the big guns of his and some 415 elephants were kept at Kulares by the English and hence, dispatched Bapuji Malhar from Ambaji Ingle's command with 2000 horse, along with 2000 Gosavins and a thousand Bargirs. Bapuji burnt the market of Kulares but Bapuji had no guns

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. I, No. 54.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 268-269. (News from Malet).

3. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 146.

4. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., Nos. 142, 155, 156.

5. Ibid; No. 152.

6. Ibid, Nos. 153, 154.

while the English inside the city, cannonaded heavily. Sadashiv Malhar was asked to reinforce Bapuji; and Khanderao Hari was dispatched to Bhelsa. 200 horse came from Bhopal for employment to Mahadji who now attached them to Khanderao Hari.¹ Pandurang Raghunath reported that, at Kulares, the English regiment sustained a severe defeat.²

Lord Mac Cartney, John Macpherson, General Coote and Admiral Hughes wrote to Poona for peace in the summer which Hastings did not know, in the beginning.³ Holkar joined Parashuram in the Konkan⁴ under the Ghat and they burst into the Konkan when Goddard's detachment was hard-pressed at Panvel.⁵ The supplies were cut by Tukoji and Goddard had to call for reinforcement.⁶ On 5th April, Tukoji informed Haripant that he himself and Parashuram would join him on the next day morning.⁷ The English had an agreement with the Bhonsle on 6th April⁸ and Hastings referred to it as having joined over the Bhonsle and broken the confederacy.⁹ Najaf died on 6th April 1781.¹⁰

Mahadji suggested on 7th April 1781 that the Peshwa should live on Purandar as he (the Peshwa) suffered from small-pox and Mahadji eagerly awaited news that he was well.¹¹ Goddard's army

1. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 145.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 163.

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; vol. I; p. 399.

4. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2613, 2616.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 191-194. (Goddard to Bombay)

6. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I, No. 46; Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2618; S.P.D.D., vol. 24, 191-194.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. II; No. 156.

8. Forrest; Selections from State papers of the Governors-General of India-W. Hastings; vol. I, 257.

9. Ibid; 257, 258, 259.

10. Sarkar; Fall of the Mughal Empire; vol. III, p. 227.

11. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. I; No. 55.

was in a critical situation in the Konkan, at Chowk and a strong detachment to his help was to be sent from Bombay.¹

Barwe who was in correspondence with Mahadji, requested him to persuade Ahalyabai not to send him to Poona.² Hingane reported that the Emperor's army, after defeating the Sikhs would enter into the Deab.³ Mahadji wrote on 17th April to Hyder that the Marathes had overcome the English all around.⁴ Tukoji and Parashuram were at Kasara on 19th April and Goddard with his company was at Chowk on 22nd April, and was at Panvel from 24th April to 4th May. On 21st April, 28 were killed and 266 were wounded in Goddard's camp and on 23rd April, 30 were killed and 147 were wounded and 7 were missing.⁵ Mahadji had sent his wakil to Delhi on 23rd April.⁶ Nana sent two letters to Mahadji - one from Goddard himself and the other from the English Naval Officer and awaited replies.⁷ Sadashiv Dinkar informed Nana on 27th April, of Mahadji having received a secret communication from some unknown person, mentioning how Nana felt awfully jealous of Mahadji's victories and explained that the news naturally irritated Mahadji.⁸

There was desertion in Col. Pearse's detachment, army at Calcutta and Anderson was sent in deputation to Cuttack.⁹ The

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1. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; (195-196. (Consultation); Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 148; Sardesai; New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 109; Parasnis; Itihasik Wipaka, III, 18, 23; Dodwell, Hastings' Letters, p. 142; Sardesai, Kavyetihās patrān; Nos. 318, 327; Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2620, 2623, 2625-34.
 2. Moheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 45.
 3. Parasnis; Maratha Politics in Delhi; I, 23.
 4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 149.
 5. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 245-246, (Goddard to Bombay); 202-203; 211-213; 215-216 237-246; 265-266; 275-277; 281-285; Sardesai; Kavyetihās patrān; 319, 327.
 6. Shirdeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 159.
 7. Sardesai; Kavyetihās patrān; No. 320.
 8. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 150.
 9. Cleig, op. cit., vol. II, 356. (Hastings to Scot, his representative in London, 23-4-1781).

Bhonsles, perhaps, Hastings thought, would contend themselves with making conquests with the English means, on Mahadji's territory and for their encouragement in such a design, he had offered to send forces against Burhanpur and Asher, the two capital fortresses of the province of Khandesh and with concluding a treaty of defensive alliance with them.¹ The fort of Asher was not yet surrendered to Mahadji, as previously arranged. It was not ordered to be made over to him from the Peshwa's control.² Hastings now declared that he was most grievously disappointed about Major Carnac; and Col. Muir was instantly dispatched³ and to prevent the hazard of competition, orders were sent to Carnac to deliver his command to Col. Muir and to let Col. Muir receive it.⁴ Col. Muir was earlier the Commander of Fattergarh detachment.⁵ After all Col. Carnac's campaign had with all its errors fulfilled its proposed object, by drawing the whole attention of Mahadji from the new conquest in Gujarat and from Gen. Goddard. It had been virtually the cause of the revolution of Bassein, the possession of the passes which led to Poona and of the quiet collection, of a large but unknown revenue by the English.⁶ Messrs. Livins, Murray, and Ducarell took it in their heads to reform the English state and they endeavoured to convince Wheeler that Hastings would lead to certain ruin and that nothing could prevent it but the recall of Carnac and Pearse and

1. Ibid; 362; Forrest, Selections from the State Papers of Governors-General-W. Hastings; vol. I, 250; Parasnis; Maratha vakils; Chap. III, 4.

2. Sat. Rai. Diar; vol. IV, 271.

3. Gleig, op. cit., vol. II, 362.

4. Ibid; 365, 366, 367.

5. C. P. C., vol. VI, No. 45.

6. Gleig, op. cit., vol. II, 366.

the offer of peace to the Marathas on any terms which they should prescribe.¹

The fort of Gwalior was ceded to the Rana of Gohad by the English on 28th April.² The Raja of Kolhapur, in the Deccan, was not prepared to leave Manaji Shinde and the English wakil stayed there.³ Mahadji refused to attack as Nana suggested and turned his attention to Gohad.⁴ Hastings suggested " Let the Government of Berar declare itself in English favour, its influence will not fail to draw after it the Peshwa's administration, which subsists only by the power of its allies and nominal dependents; for it has neither wealth nor resources left, having yielded a territory of eighty lakhs to Hyder, the province of Candish to Scindia, Aurangabad (If I mistake not) to Nizam Ally and lost both Guzrat and Cocan to the English."⁵ Sadashiv Dinkar reported to Nana that the news of the peace overtures to Mahadji by the English was not true.⁶ Mahadji, in May, approved the proposal of Nana, of deputing a mediator to settle the dispute between Tukoji and Ahalyabai.⁷ Mahadji had not determined the cantonment of the Maratha army for the Monsoon and depended upon the movements of the English.⁸ By about 2nd May, Hade, Bundela, Jhansi, Khechi, Chanderi, Dabai had joined Mahadji and only the Rana of Gohad had remained aloof.⁹

The management of the districts of Jainabad and Majrad was entrusted to Naro Krishna Darve with the consent of Mahadji, after

1. Ibid; 384.

2. Ibid; 380.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2621.

4. Sardesai; kavyetihās patren; No.321.

5. Forrest; selections from state papers; vol.I, 222, 250.

6. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No.162.

7. Ibid; No.164.

8. Ibid; No.157.

9. Ibid.

2nd May.¹ The English surprised Ambuji Ingle on 2nd May, though with no serious results.² The English in the Konkan had by about 2nd May, Bassein, Arnala, Kalyan, Belapur and Uran.³ Mahadji tried to bring the Rana of Gohad to his side through the efforts of Gangadhar Govind and he had won already to his side, Jalimsingh of Kotah through Lalaji Ballal.⁴ Nana wrote that all unpleasing letters must not be shown to Mahadji.⁵ Parashuram refused to pay the Dahakpatti and Nana pointed out on 8th, that even Mahadji and Tukeji had paid but still Parashuram insisted on the refusal to pay anything.⁶ The Bhonsle concluded that though the English were few in number, they had shown conspicuous valour in their war against Hyder, the Peshwa and Mahadji. The troops of Mahadji and Tukeji were out to march but they would not become aggressive till the English were inactive.⁷ The Governor-General wrote to the Bhonsle on 14th May that he was prepared to conclude a treaty with all other chiefs through him;⁸ but Devakar Pandit declared that the skill and tact with which Goddard fought the invincible troops of Mahadji and Tukeji for a period of six months would do credit to Rustum and Istandyar but it would not be advisable for him to retreat. So he would get down and attack Poona. Ministers becoming desperate, would set fire to the town and reduce it to ashes and abandoning all hopes of saving their country, property and the families, would plunge into warfare for a fight to the finish; people so determined might accomplish anything and their

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.161.

2. Ibid; No.160.

3. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvahar; No.212.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.II; No.162.

5. Sardesai; kavyetihas patren; No.322.

6. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2624.

7. C.P.C., vol.VI; No.156.

8. Ibid; vol.VI; No.157.

opponent would not be able to get lightly over them. The Nizam, the French and Hyder would not sit quiet. Mahadji with 50,000 horse and numerous chiefs would do all that lied in their power and again, Mahadji weilded a great influence at the court of Delhi.¹ The Bhonsle's army had a skirmish with the English and the Wazir's wakil was in Mahadji's camp. The English wakil also had been in his camp when Mahadji was in between Gohad and Gwalior. Mahadji had asked Ahalyabai to collect revenue and advised her to send dues to the Peshwa and by his order, to Tukoji.² The Peshwa returned to Saswad on 15th May and had honoured Parashuram Bhanu.³

Naro Sivdev reported to Nana that there was a secret understanding between Balaji Govind and the English⁴ and Mahadji held anxious deliberations with his Diwan Balaram Govind, on the gravity of the situation and the scanty means at his disposal in opposing the English advance.⁵ Nana wrote to Mahadji on 17th, that the Maratha State depended on him, that the things were pressing, and suggested that something with deep caution had to be done and that Naro Shivdev would explain everything personally to Mahadji.⁶ Rane-khan urged on war with the English round about Sironj.⁷ Sadashiv Dinkar pleaded Nana on 17th to realise Mahadji's difficulties and not to exasperate him by an unpleasant remonstrance.⁸ The Emperor's army on 19th, marched against Zabitakhan in the Doab.⁹ Mahadji,

1. Ibid. No.158.

2. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol.I, No.47.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2622.

4. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol.II; No.164.

5. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No.159.

6. Sardesai; Kavyatihar patren; No.323.

7. Ibid; No.326.

8. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.160.

9. Parasnis; Maratha Politics in Delhi; I, 24.

on 24th, sent Naro Shivdev to represent himself in the talks about Holkarshahi disputes; and the Peshwa, too, had sent Baburao Vishwanath. All were determined to hand over a Nemruk to Ahalyabai which she, however, refused. The English, even though well-reinforced, were defeated by Mahadji and had returned to Kalpi where they were now firm.¹ Dowlatrao Ghorpade wrote to the Governor of Madras on 24th May and the English offered the fort of Gouty to break the Maratha - Hyder relations.² The English also tried to win over Parashuram, for the fort of Gouty to be taken from Hyder, but he replied in the same tune as Dowlatrao and rejected the alliance.³ Mahadji was not falling back during the Monsoon but was resolved to canton where he was, facing the English.⁴

On 23rd April, Col. Parkar was killed and Goddard remained at Panvel till 20th May. The minister had declared that Hyder must be included in whatever treaty that might be made with the Poona Government and the Bombay Company transmitted this information to the Governor-General.⁵ Mahadji on 20th, instructed Ahalyabai to dispatch Abaji Naik with 40/50 lakhs of Rs. to him. Mahadji's wife (Sangamnerkar) had died at Ujjain. The wakil from Gohad by name Vireshwar Pant had come to Mahadji.⁶ Mahadji's Muslim Sardar was defeated⁷ and the English were reported to have a disagreement with the Wazir.⁸

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1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I; No. 48.
 2. Parasnis D.B., "Original Correspondence between the English and the Marathas," I.H.R.C.P., vol. V, (1923); p. 96; at seq.
 3. Ibid; pp. 96-97.
 4. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 161.
 5. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 292-303. (Bombay to Court.)
 6. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I; Nos. 49, 50, 51.
 7. Ibid, Nos. 50, 51.
 8. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; vol. I, 28.

If Mahadji would be triumphant at Gwalior, the Emperor would accept his protection.¹ Nana and Mahadji, however, informed the Emperor on 31st that they did intend to contract the treaty with the English.² Anupgiri Gosavi had been sent to Jaypur and when Nana wrote that some sardar from Delhi ought to help Mahadji, Hamdani was also requested to that effect.³ The French had joined Hyder.⁴ If the Emperor did, however, wish to fight against the English, he would never have displeased the Sikhs. Nana knowing this, insisted that the Emperor's army must march to the Doab⁵ and wrote about the instant dispatch of Inam-Pranam to Mahadji when he was only given Kaulnama at Sipri Kolares. The Maratha army was to go to Calcutta along with the Emperor's troops and hence the Kaul-nama was postponed. Mahadji had designs on Bengal and the Emperor was to join him at Itawa, in the Doab.⁶ But Hall, the English wakil was received in Delhi⁷ and Hingane was attacked by Latapat Alikhan Khoja, as per the instructions from the English.⁸

Mahadji was displeased with Nana for the vacillating policy observed by Nana on the subject of a reconciliation being obstructed between Ahalyabai and Tukoji. Mahadji disowned all responsibility about it.⁹ Mahadji on 1st June forwarded the case of Visaji Krishna against the encroachment of a gardner who confiscated his property.¹⁰ Mahadji on 2nd June was pre-

1. Ibid. 29.

2. Ibid. 30.

3. Ibid. 33.

4. Ibid. 34.

5. Ibid. 35.

6. Ibid. 36.

7. Ibid. 33, 39.

8. Ibid. 39, 40.

9. Sarvesai; H.P.M.S., No. 168.

10. Skandeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. I, No. 56.

paring for a final action with the English.¹ Naval expedition of 40 men-of-war against the English was sent by the French, Dutch and other European powers.² Ahalyabai still wanted to refer to Mahadji, the instructions sent by the Peshwa.³ The dust storms preceding the Monsoon were reported by about 5th June.⁴ To Nana's query as to whether Mahadji would go to Poona that year, Mukund Joshi answered in the negative.⁵ The Sikhs had defeated the Emperor's forces and the English took seven lakhs of rupees from the Rana of Gohad as the price of the fort of Gwalior, which was handed over to the Rana by them.⁶ The Governor-General wrote to Goddard on 11th June that the peace overtures were to be renewed and the protection to Raghuba was to be withdrawn and the cession of Bassein not to be insisted upon.⁷ Nana approved of Mahadji's plan of quartering his troops in front of the English regiments, during the rainy season.⁸ It was reported on 17th June, that Ragho Malhar was appointed Mahadji's Diwan.⁹

An action was fought with the English foraging party by Mahadji's forces (which was reported on 18th June) at Minahar in which a severe defeat was sustained by the English.¹⁰ Four guns,

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1. Ibid; vol.II, Nos.166,167.
 2. S.P.D., vol.36, No.411.
 3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol.I, Nos.52,56,57.
 4. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.168.
 5. Parasnis; Itihasik Tipane, VI,22.
 6. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol.I, No.53.
 7. S.P.D., vol.25; 397-401(G.G. to Goddard).
 8. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.169.
 9. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No.165.
 10. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.170; Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol.I, Nos.56,58.

an elephant and several pallanquins were taken from the Marathas but 4 to 5 hundred Europeans were killed.¹ Dharrao Shinde's clerk was released by the English.² Mahadji congratulated Nana upon the victory of the Marathas in the Konkan and advised him on 20th to canton the Maratha armies at Talegaon and to pursue the advantage obtained over Goddard.⁴ Mahadji sent on 28th, some four to five thousand Gosavis brought from Jhansi to Ranekhan.⁵ " On 1st July, Mahadji inflicted a severe defeat on Col. Muir near Sipri and established his camp on what is known as the Budha-pahad in the vicinity of Jhansi. Col. Muir encamped at Sipri with less than forty miles distance between the two."⁶ In this battle, Mahant Daryagiri and Mahadji's brother-in-law, Tulaji Jadhav, were killed.⁷

The exemption from excise taxes on the purchase of guns and wines at Burhanpur was claimed by the Nizam and was granted by Mahadji on 3rd July, with an addition that the Nizam should grant the same exemption to the Marathas at Aurangabad.⁸ The district of Mahatpur had been resettled and brought under plough.⁹ The English army in the Konkan cantoned at Kalyan and Goddard returned to Bombay. The Governor-General contracted a treaty with the Bhonsle that 1000 cavalry would join Col. Pearse against Hyder and Gurdah Mandla would be reduced jointly.¹⁰ Raghoba

1. S.P.D.D.; vol. 25; 365-366; vol. 25; 363-365. (Consultation)
(Also letters from Surat and Raghoba.)

2. Shindeshahi Raikarni; S.H.S., vol. II; No. 171.

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 166.

4. Ibid; No. 167.

5. Sardesai; Kavyetihas patron; No. 323.

6. Sardesai, "New History of the Marathas"; vol. III, p. 110.

7. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipana; VI, 32.

8. Shindeshahi Raikarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 173.

9. Ibid, 172.

10. S.P.D.D., vol. 25; 354-358 (G.G. to Bombay); 356-357 (7-5-1781); 357-358 (10-5-1781).

complained that he did not know the Governor-General's views and promised that he would pay all the expenses borne by the English, afterwards.¹

Carnac wrote to Col. Morgan himself and repeatedly to Col. Muir from Sironj; Morgan had ordered Muir to join Carnac, on 10th March 1781. On 14th March 1781, Muir was 4 cos of Sipri and 16 cos from Carnac, who seemed too late to have discovered his error and to fly from Col. Muir, whose junction would ofcourse deprive him of the command. This evasion would not avail for on the knowledge of Col. Morgan's orders, the Governor-General in Council confirmed and approved them.² Col. Carnac had returned to Gwalior and Col. Muir had taken his command.³ Raghunath Hari, Subhedar of Jhansi, wrote to the Governor-General that Rajdar Gujar on the advice of the Raja of Datur, has joined Mahadji with 2000 horse and foot and from there, he had been dispatched to an outpost to attack the English. His uncle, having taken leave of Mahadji, returned home to look after the family. Mahadji had given Raghunath Hari's country to him, on account of Raghunath Hari's friendship with the English. Rajdar had already assembled the troops and taken possession of the said country. Carnac informed Raghunath Hari that only Col. Muir could move in the matter. Now, Raghunath Hari sought instructions from the Governor-General.⁴

A defeat was inflicted on Manaji Shinde by the troops of Pratinidhi and Mahadji was gratified to hear it.⁵ Raja of

1. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 195 (5-7-1781)

2. Gleig, op.cit., vol. II, 365.

3. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 196. (5-7-1781)

4. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 196.

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. II, 174; Sardesai, Kavyetihās patron; No. 330.

Kolhapur had revolted by about 6th July.¹ Mahadji by about 7th July, had shifted his encampment on account of the rains and flooded rivers.² He intended to canton at the Budha-pahad, facing the English. Rumour was spread that Diwan Ragho Malhar and Aba Chitnis would be left in charge of the army and Mahadji would come back to Ujjain. Mahadji had opened negotiations with the Sikhs and the Emperor of Delhi.³ Yenkattraman Shastri from Raghoba visited Ahalyabai and it was declared that Raghoba no more was favouring the English aid.⁴ But the English, too were supported by the Indian Chiefs.⁵ For instance, the Rana of Gohad renewed his alliance with the English against Mahadji on the 9th July.⁶ On 15th July, Mahadji was near Panchati and the English were at Sheshai; and Mahadji would canton at Ronoda, with the Kalisindi river between them. Mahadji still followed the harassing tactics.⁷ The Rana of Gohad sent grains etc. to Col. Muir's army. Mahadji's army, hearing this, directed itself against the Rana. The army in this march comprised of 7000 Gosavis, and equal number of horse and 15000 sepoys with guns - in all about 30,000 troops. Bajirao Barwe, brother-in-law of Raghoba by his first wife; and Subhanji Bhonsle killed and defeated Bhapkir's brother and nephew, at 3 cos from Sangam at Sudderwell. 1000/1500 horse intended to join Raghoba and Manaji Phakde wanted to canton at Wallore and awaited Raghoba's instructions.⁸ Baburao Bhaskar requested Nana to confer

1. Gardesai, Kavvetilhas patren, No. 330.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 175.

3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 55.

4. Ibid, vol. I, No. 54.

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 176.

6. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 56.

7. Ibid, vol. I, No. 58.

8. S.P.D.P., vol. 25, 365-366 (Letters from Surat and Raghoba).

upon him the management of some districts in Bundelkhand¹. Mahadji recommended on 18th July to Nana for granting an exemption of payment of the debt to Yadavrao Pawar who was at the time, on active service under Mahadji.² Mahadji himself had to undergo hardships and troubles in opposing the English constantly at a stretch for several months.³ When Nana forwarded Goddard's letter to Mahadji, Mahadji suggested on 27th July to call Goddard to Poona and pointed out that he would himself proceed to Poona when Goddard would actually arrive there.⁴ On 23rd July, Mahadji had replied Nana's letter suggesting Mahadji to march on Bengal. Mahadji explained that he had told in the very beginning that the Bhonsles were bought by the English and hence had suggested that the Bhonsle and Nana would manage the home front - which was not approved. Narwar, Shikandara, Gohad supported the English, so Mahadji had sent Sadashiv Malhar and Gangadhar Govind Bundeale and Shivram Hari Jhansikar, from Laheria to Narwar. Imbaji Ingle was, too, near Shikandara. As the Marathas had not cantoned for the rains, all the states understood that they were determined to finish the affairs of the English. But nobody was prepared to join the Marathas in the rains and Mahadji himself was unprepared for the campaign. He but surely wanted to attack Bengal and suggested to Nana to keep up friendly relations with Hyder and the Nizam. If once Mahadji would defeat Carnac, he would get clear field up to Bengal. Mahadji had declared that the

1. Shindeshahi Raikar; S.H.S., vol.II, No.201.

2. Ibid., S.H.S., vol.II, No.177.

3. Ibid., No.173.

4. Ibid.; vol.I, Nos.57, 58.

English were dishonest and treacherous and that no talks for treaty should be entertained. Tukoji would not be able to attack Bengal and if once the talks for the treaty with the English, were opened, Hyder's sympathies would be lost.¹ Raghoba had opened up overtures to the minister on 24th July.² While Mahadji was forming alliances against the English,³ the Governor-General, too, desired to continue hostilities.⁴ Earl of Hillsborough wrote to Raghoba on 31st July, that his agents in London were referred to the principal Directors of the East India Company.⁵ The country from Pathargad to the Ganges and from the Doab to Calcutta was all in confusion and Loyal Singh of Kanauj, Farukabad and Manipur chiefs were ready to join the Marathas in the Doab and only awaited Mahadji's instructions.⁶

Baburao Vaidya left Maheshwari on 2nd August for Poona.⁷ Goddard reached Surat but Raghoba refused to set out unless he was provided with army. Mahadji cantoned at Shahabaga near the Budhapahad and the English were at Sipri-Kolares on 2nd August.⁸ The Governor-General expressed that Devakar Pandit should immediately set out to meet him at Benares for properly explaining to him the Bhonsle's views and secret designs.⁹ Mahadji negotiated with the Rana of Gohad for bringing out an evacuation of Malwa by the English. The Rana suggested cease-fire for the Marathas and the

1. Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*; vol. I, pp. 343, 346.

2. *S.P.D.D.*; vol. 25, 363-365. (Consultation).

3. *Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre*; vol. I, No. 59.

4. *S.P.D.D.*, vol. 25; 371-373. (Bombay to Court).

5. Harikar Das, "Peshwa Raghunath Rao's agents in England," *J.I.H.*, vol. X, (1931), p. 27.

6. Parnis, *Maratha Politics in Delhi*; vol. I, 45.

7. *Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre*; vol. I, No. 60.

8. *Ibid.*; vol. I, Nos. 61, 62.

9. *C.P.C.*, vol. VI, No. 203.

English as well but Mahadji with the clear grasp of the situation, told him just to manage his own affairs, to cut himself away from the English and stop his supplies to them; otherwise Mahadji himself would attack the Rana with 20,000 troops (that were approaching from the Deccan to reinforce him) along with the English.¹ Khuman Singh was desirous of obtaining Jetpur through the Maratha help.²

Hastings charged the calamity of the want of money felt by Col. Carnac's detachment to Cheytsingh's account as it was certain that his reliance on his faith and his breach of it, were the principal causes that no other provisions had been made for the detachment and that it suffered such want in consequence;³ and Hastings was sure that his subsequent excuses and delays in the payment of the residue of the subsidy were caused by the belief that he was no longer able to enforce it and possibly for such was the report that a few months would close the period of his administration altogether.⁴ The number of troops required from Cheytsingh was 2000 and afterwards was reduced to the demand of 1500 and lastly to 1000 but with no more success. Cheytsingh offered 250 horse but furnished none.⁵ Cheytsingh maintained a correspondence with the Marathas and other powers who either were or might eventually become the enemies of the English State and he was collecting and had prepared every provision for open revolt, waiting only for a proper season to declare it which

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarne: S.H.S., vol. II, Nos. 182, 181, 194; C.P.C., No. 311. (Treaty of Rana with Mahadji-26-7-1781).

2. Ibid; No. 205.

3. Forrest, Selections from State-papers of Governors-General of India. Warren Hastings: vol. I, 119.

4. Ibid, 131; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag: vol. I, 355 (Pedigree of Cheytsingh)

5. Ibid: 132; Sardesai; H.P.M.S., Nos. 170, 171, 172; C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 219; Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi: vol. I, 61, 27; Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department: vol. I, 799 and Lxiv.

was to depend either on the arrival of the French Armada or on the Maratha invasion.¹ Cheytsingh must have had at least two crores of rupees and the mere guard whom he kept about his person for the purposes of mere show, extended by several hundreds the total amount of the force which he had been requested to employ against the common enemy of his and the English.²

" These instances of contumacy and disobedience, criminal as they were in themselves and aggravated by the extreme and known distress of the superior state, to which he owed not only personal fealty but every voluntary aid which all the resources of his Zamindari could contribute, appeared to Hastings of less consideration as such, than as they were evidences of a deliberate and systematic conduct, aiming at the total subversion of the authority of the Company and the erection of his independency on its ruins."³ On 13th August Hastings was at Benares, where on account of the recourse to arms over the dispute with Cheytsingh, he had to escape to Chunargad.⁴

Delhi authorities were postponing active help to Mahadji and their troops would only join him, after the rains.⁵ However the Emperor was pleased to hear the Maratha triumphs over the English.⁶ Khandoji Bhonsle wrote on 15th August about his hopes to devastate Bengal and Hastings had paid ten lakhs of rupees to the Nizam;⁷ and Nana believed that the Bhonsle by about 15th

1. Forrest; Selections from State papers of Governors-General of India- Warren Hastings, vol.I,133.

2. Gleig,op.cit.,vol.II, 399.

3. Forrest, op.cit.,vol.I, 133.

4. Parasnis, Maratha vakils; chap.III,

5. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi;vol.I,59.

6. Ibid;vol.I, 57, 56, 49.

7. Ibid, vol.I,No.52.

August even must have entered into Calcutta. The Delhi forces were expected, too, to reach Calcutta within two months.¹ Nana was preparing to reinforce Mahadji at Kolares.² The English offered 50 lakhs of rupees to the Emperor who, however, explained to Hingane that he was more careful about the Maratha interests than even the Peshwa himself was.³

Hastings wrote to Mrs. Hastings to set her mind at ease in reference to his own personal safety, and what was more remarkable still as bearing testimony to his rare strength of nerve, as well as to the command which he never ceased to exercise over all the faculties of his mind, he sent through the same channel, instructions to Col. Muir.⁴ These instructions were in reply to a letter which found its way to Hastings from Col. Muir, who commanded the army employed against Mahadji Shinde, informing Hastings of the overtures made by him to Mahadji for a separate peace. This had been one of the objects of his journey to that quarter but eagerly as he had sought such an event, he was proportionably mortified to learn with what facility it might have been accomplished and how unseasonably the English domestic misfortunes had happened to defeat so fair a prospect of it. He had no money nor credit equal to the supply of rupees 3000 and by an unfortunate train of official perplexities, which had happened some time preceding that, both Major Popham's regiment, the Rangers, and all

1. Ibid., vol. I, No. 51.

2. Ibid., vol. I, No. 50.

3. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; vol. I, 48, 47, 41, 42, 44.

4. Gleig; op. cit., vol. II, p. 412.

the corps of the garrison of Chunar were four months in arrears." Ford and the Munshi of the English from the English camp of Col. Grainger Muir at Shesai approached Mahadji and handed over the peace treaty to him, on 16th August 1781. Accordingly, Mahadji was to 1) arrange treaty between the English and the Peshwa and 2) same with Hyder. If Hyder disagreed, Mahadji was to join the English, if not to remain neutral and not to join Hyder. 3) Mahadji was not to enter the Doab, 4) to protect the Chanderi Raja without squeezing money and to expel his Diwan Raja Dhar who rebelled against his master, 5) to have peaceful relations with Gohad, if he proves treacherous then Mahadji was to do whatever he liked in his case; 6) Mahadji was not to attack Narvar after the departure of the English and Sipri, Kolares and Shesai would be ceded to Narvar. Col. Muir was vested with all the powers to contract the treaty with Mahadji, for Hastings. Mahadji pointed out his interference at the Wadgaon convention and lamented that the English had not respected it. He insisted that the English must cede Salsette, Ahmadabad, Bassein and Kalyan to the Peshwa. Muir required Hastings' sanction for these terms now and pleaded that Mahadji should give him time, so that he would write, anew, to the Governor-General which, however, Mahadji approved. Mahadji again explained that Sipri, Kolares and Shesai were the places of Jadhav and hence, Narvar had no claim thereof. It was agreed that the Marathas, however, would not harass Narvar. Mahadji had agreed not to enter the Doab and was prepared to write to Hyder and await

1. Forrester, Selections from State-papers of Governors-General of India, Warren Hastings; vol. I, 173; S.P.D.D., vol. 25, 543-545; Forrester, Maratha Series, vol. I, 457, 458, 459; C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 313.

his reply. Chanderi would be protected, too. The English agreed to take 4½ lakhs of rupees and the remainder from the earlier stipulations and leave the Rana of Gohad to manage his own affairs.¹ On 18th, proclamation was issued at Benares, deposing Raja Chaytsingh.² The English facing Mahadji offered to retire to Itawa.³ An armistice for 18 days was suggested by Col. Muir.⁴ In addition, Mahadji clearly conveyed to Muir and Hastings that he claimed an entirely free hand in managing the affairs of north India, particularly of the Emperor. Hastings immediately conceded all the points claimed by Mahadji and thus paved the way for the final treaty of Salbai.⁵

There was news on 25th, that Hastings was going to Madras personally to supervise the operations.⁶ Ragheba not agreeing with the English, left Surat and reached Galya-Kambha where Goddard went to reconcile him.⁷ Mahadji was given hints

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 169; C.P.C., vol. VI, Nos. 215, 267; Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, pp. 3653-3657; S.P.D.D., vol. 25, 545 (G.G. to Goddard), 543-545. (Terms); Duff, op.cit., vol. II, 145; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 343, 347; Sarkar Jadunath, "The English Residents with Mahadji Scindia," I.H.R.C.P., vol. XI, (1928), pp. 11; Banerji B.N., "Last days of Raja Chaytsingh," I.H.R.C.P., vol. XI (1928), p. 168; Abdul Ali, "Mahadji Scindia of Gwalior," I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 112; Seir Mutaqherin, vol. III, p. 137.
2. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 212; Forrest, op.cit., vol. I, 794-795, 814.
3. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 183.
4. Ibid, vol. II, No. 184; Sardesai, H.P.M.S.; No. 171.
5. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol. III, p. 112.
6. Shindeshahi Raikarne, vol. II, No. 204.
7. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2638.

to take proper precautions in the negotiations as Goddard had betrayed earlier.¹ Mahadji accepted Nana's suggestion that Hyder's wakil in Mahadji's camp be induced to write to his master only such news as was desirable that Hyder should know.² News of Cheytsingh's rebellion of 16th August was forwarded to Mahadji by Gangadhar Govind in September and Hastings was reported to be wounded or killed.³ Naro Shivdev suggested to Nana that this crucial moment must be selected for opening an immediate offensive against the English as the rising of Cheytsingh had roused the spirit of the oppressed powers in northern India and requested Nana to send a large force from the Deccan to support Mahadji.⁴ If Mahadji were to proceed to the Doab in time, he would have been financed and accompanied by Cheytsingh and Wazir because Cheytsingh had opened negotiations with Mahadji through Kingane.⁵ Again, had Cheytsingh been gifted with ever so moderate a share of active courage, he would have dared everything at that moment to get possession of the person of the Governor-General and with such a hostage in his power, he might have dictated his own terms, if he lacked hardihood to go further, by throwing himself at once into the arms of the Marathas.⁶

The dispute among the Pawars was referred to Mahadji on 3rd September.⁷ Pandurang Govind, Sripat Moreshwar, Ramchandra Krishna Datar, Vasudev Dhond Dev, Nilkhanth Shinde Manolikar, Bahirji Ghorpade Gajendragadkar were in the prisons of Hyder

1. Shindeshahi Raikar, S.H.S., vol.II, No.186.

2. Ibid; S.H.S., vol.II, No.187.

3. Ibid; No.188.

4. Ibid; No.190.

5. Parasnisi, Maratha Politics in Delhi, vol.I, 62.

6. Gleig, op.cit., vol.II, 411.

7. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren; No.331.

who now released them on payment of money.¹ Nana was advised on 5th by Naro Shivdev to keep strong parties in Khandesh to prevent the English from rendering succour to the forces in Malwa.² Rana of Gohad forwarded his overtures to Mahadji.³

Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote and Sir Edward Hughes, all held that Hyder could not be driven out of the Carnatic until peace had been made with the Marathas⁴ and John Macpherson himself thought that Hastings was standing too obstinately upon terms.⁵ But what appearance must these advances had worn in the eyes of the astute minister at Poona? Could anything have been devised more completely to convince him that the English were in sore need of peace and must soon submit to any terms that he pleased to impose on them? And further, where as at Calcutta, the chief of the English settlements was proposing peace on equal terms, there was a great officer of the king of England making proposals.⁶ What wonder, that the Marathas at Poona turned a deaf ear to the English proposition and could hardly be induced by Mahadji himself to ratify the peace which he had made secretly with Hastings.⁷ Fort St. George had urged on immediate peace with the Marathas on 11th September 1781.⁸

1. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2639.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.II; No.185; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.172 (Mahadji to Haripant).

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.171.

4. Dodwell, Hastings' letters to John Macpherson; p.XXV; Das Gupta A.P., "Treaty of Mangalore," I.H.Q., vol.VI, (1930), p.436.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid. XXVI; S.P.D.D., vol.25, 611-617. (Bombay to Court); Sardesai, New History of Marathas; vol.III, 114.

7. Ibid. XXVII.

8. S.P.D.D., vol.25; 549-551; 577-578; Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 460.

Mahadji was near Narvar, near the Budha-Hill on 13th September. Muir had sent the copy to Hastings at Benares and Goddard at Bombay. Hastings sent this happy news to England and Europe. Mahadji does not seem to be selfish in this transaction as he was writing all minor details to Poona for two months and Nana also seems to never have minded this special treaty and had approved the plan of Mahadji.¹ In his letter to Goddard of 11th September from Chunar, the Governor-General had maintained that Mahadji offered to negotiate peace with the Peshwa and required that a certain time be allowed for that purpose and the Governor-General further explained that Mahadji made overtures on terms nearly conformable to his wishes.² Mahadji, however, clearly disowned his having made advances to the English for peace and asked Nana to protect his rear.³

Hingane proposed to take the Emperor in Diwali (November) to Agra and join Mahadji.⁴ The Governor-General turned down on 24th September Goddard's plan for the ensuing campaign for want of finances and asked the Bombay Company not to go beyond their defensive plan.⁵ Again, Mahadji wrote to Naro Shivdev to advise Nana not to entertain overtures of peace from the English, as they had been driven into a position of hopeless embarrassment and would soon make an unconditional surrender if the resistance continued unrelaxed⁶ and urged

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; vol. I, 355.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 25; 545 (Governor-General to Goddard); G.P.G., vol. VI, No. 275.

3. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 173.

4. Parasnis; Maratha Politics in Delhi; vol. I; 63.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 25, 601-603, (G.G. to Bombay).

6. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 174.

that the troops should be moved to Surat.¹ Mahadji and Ahalyabai used to say often that if the central power at Poona was to be smashed, where would go the satellite powers of Shinde and Holkar.² Mahadji had advised Nana not to rely on the Bhonsle, and explained that he himself would manage the campaign of Malwa and Bengal and that Nana and Tukoji must only manage to save the Deccan but Nana had disapproved this ^{as} 1) would make Mahadji very powerful and 2) if Mahadji were to enter Bengal, there would be the inevitable clash between Mahadji and the Bhonsle which would have ruined the Marathas.³ Hastings knew this, too and was afraid that if Cheytsingh were to give monetary help to Mahadji, the Marathas would attack Bengal and hence Hastings had been to Benares to come closer to Mahadji.⁴ As regards Bhan Begam of Gadh, Hastings had surmised, "Death and destruction is the least menace as she evidently and it is confidentially said, avowedly espoused the cause of Raja Cheytsingh and united in the idea and plan of a general extirpation of the English race and power in Hindustan."⁵ Hastings had found too that the artillery of Cheytsingh and carriages made at Ramnagar were almost equal to those of the English. The cartridges and portfires compounded were equal in skill and their powder was even better.⁶ Cheytsingh was given military help by Balaji Govind and Mahadji himself.⁷ Cheytsingh's army had met Mahadji's army and then Cheytsingh had marched to

1. Ibid: Nos. 175, 176.

2. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 313.

3. Ibid: 314.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 315.

5. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, Lxxiv, Lxxvii; Gleig, op. cit., vol. I, 456; C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 235.

6. Ibid: Lxvi.

7. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvahar, No. 215.

Benares, at the time when Hastings went to Calcutta from Benares.¹ Cheytsingh had promised to pay all the arrears of the army of Shivaji Vithal and Ambaji when they would join him. The Nagas were already in Cheytsingh's camp at Jauney.² Cheytsingh fled to Mahadji and Hastings rewarded Veniram and Vishwanbhar, the vakils of the Bhonsle for having protected and saved his life.³

Nana had sent to Mahadji the terms which he thought appropriate, for peace with the English, in October 1781.⁴ Sakharam Bapu died on 20th October⁵ and Ragheba led a life of utter moral degradation.⁶ The Governor-General advised Rana of Gohad on 13th October to exert himself in making peace with the Poona minister, and in carrying out the directions of Col. Muir for restoring peace to the country. That would increase his prosperity and be a cause of great satisfaction to the Governor-General himself. He was again directed to refer to Maj. Palmer and Tafezzul Hussain Khan.⁷ On 16th October Ahalyabai was again under the necessity of complaining against Tukoji who defied her orders and wishes and behaved in an insulting manner towards her.⁸ She had deputed Baji Vithal Mama to the Poona Durbar to settle the dispute of the Holkar fief. Tukoji maintained that with the management of the Saranjam estate in the hands of Ahalyabai, the

1. Ibid. No. 216.

2. Banerji, "op.cit.," I.H.R.C.P., vol. XI, (1928); pp. 168-169; Forrest, Selections from State Papers of Governor's General of India, Warren Hastings, vol. I, 178.

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 316; Seir Mutasheer, vol. III, 140, 141.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. I, 59.

5. Parasnis, Itihasik Tipane; Chap. V; No. 13.

6. Ibid. Chap. I; No. 8.

7. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 243.

8. Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S.H.S., vol. II, Nos. 191, 178.

army had been starving and hence he was, unable to fulfill the several demands of service made by the state on him.¹ Mahadji wrote on 17th October to Nana to inflict severe punishment on Gulzar Khan so that he might not create trouble again.²

Col. Muir finally concluded the treaty on the following terms with Mahadji Shinde on 13th October 1781:-

Treaty concluded by Colonel Muir on the part of the English Company, and Maha Rajah Subadar Madho Raw on his own part.

Mr. Warren Hastings, Governor - General of Bengal, in virtue of the powers vested in him by the Governor - General and Council of Bengal, having fully empowered Colonel Muir to settle a treaty of peace between the Mahah Rajah and the Company in this manner : that whatever he may conclude on the part of the Company shall be binding on the said Governor - General and Council; and the Mahah Rajah and the Colonel being both desirous of peace, have concluded one on the following terms:-

Article I:

Peace and friendship being solidly established between both parties, each will remain to their agreement.

Article II:

Within the space of eight days from the sealing of the treaty by both the parties, both armies shall at one time begin their march. Colonel Muir with his camp shall return to the territory of the Nabob Vizeer, and the Mahah Rajah with his army to his own country.

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 178.

2. Ibid., No. 177.

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Article III:

It should be approved, the Mahah Raja will mediate a peace with Hyder Ally Khan and the Company, and also a peace between the Peshwa and the Company. If peace should take place in consequence, it is well; if not the English Gentlemen are left at liberty to act as they please, and the Mahah Rajah will give no interruption.

Article IV:

Colonel Muir restores to the Mahah Rajah the territories belonging to him on this side of the Jumnah, of which the Company have possessed themselves, and the Mahah Rajah agrees not to invade the country of Lok-inder Ranah Chattersing Behadre, of Gwalior which is now in his possession, or the territory of Mehilp Rajah Ramsing Jug-inder Behadre now also subject to him provided he, the said Ranah, shall not behave improperly.

Article V:

The Mahah Rajah will restore Ram Chundir Rajah of Chundery now under the protection of Colonel Muir to his government, and will make no demand on him whatever. The Mahah Rajah will take the whole of the said Rajah's country from his treacherous Diwan Radiyo Deher, who rebelled against him, and he will restore it all to him except what has for a length of time been subject to the Peshwah and the Mahah Rajah will expel the said Radiyo Deher.

The above articles are ratified by the seals and signature of Colonel Muir on the part of the Company, and the Mahah Rajah on his own part, on the 13th of October, 1781, answering to the 24th of Showal 1195 Higerah.¹

1. W. Hastings, A narrative of the Insurrection which happened in the Zemedyary of Benares in the month of August 1781 and of the transactions of the Governor-General in that District with an Appendix of authentic papers and Affidavits;
Appendix - Part I, No. 4E, pp. 58-59.

APPENDIX - "A".

Copy of a letter from the Governor-General to Colonel Muir dated the 29th August 1781.

The treachery of Rajah Cheytsing has compelled me to retreat to this place, where I wait to reduce this Zemendary, a work I trust of no great difficulty or time. I have received a letter from you mentioning that Scindia has offered terms of peace. I hereby give you full powers in the name of the Governor-General and Council to conclude a treaty with him on the following instructions. I have sent you credentials in form. I do not repeat them in this on account of the dangers of the road, but in case of their miscarriage this letter must serve in their stead. Act accordingly, and I will ratify it. Agree with him either for an alliance of mutual defence or neutrality. If he desires to include the Peshwa, you may agree to a treaty of peace with the Peshwa, and an alliance against Hyder Ally Khan and all common enemies, or of peace simply, on the conditions of restoring all that we have acquired during the war, except Ahmedabad and the territory conquered for Rajah Futtah - Sing Gayewar, and the fortress of Gwallior and the fort and territory of Lahar, that we will never assist Ragonaut Row, nor interfere in his concerns, nor admit him into our forts or factories, but we will not deliver him into the hands of any one. Let a time be allowed him to repair to a place of security. We will yield what is ours, and what we can in honour grant, but we will never suffer our treaties to be infringed nor our faith to be violated. Reserve for us Bassein, if you can, even if it should be necessary to yield in exchange for it all the lands obtained by the treaty with

Colonel Upton, except Salsette and the other ceded islands, and the ceded nicity of Broach. But do not insist on the reservation of Bassein to the hindrance of peace. We want nothing from them but their alliance against Hyder Ally Khan and that we dispense with. Be careful that the agreement do not contain anything hostile to the Government of Berar, or hurtful to our connection with it. Obtain the restoration of the Chundery Rajah, and secure, as far as you may have the means of interest of the Rajah of Nurwar, and any other chiefs who have been active in our cause. Include the Rana of Gohade and Futteh Sing Gaicwar in the peace. To prevent future provocations of hostility let it be agreed to exclude the French and all other European nations from the Ports and Dominions of the Marathas. If a treaty has already taken between General Goddard and the Maratha State, the present treaty must in such case be void; but you may assure Scindia that no peace can or shall be made to his prejudice. Send, if you think proper, a confidential person to Mahadjee Scindia. If he will engage on the above terms he must conclude them now. I am making my final arrangements, and if the time is lost, a treaty with him may be forever precluded, by them. Obviate any conclusions which he may draw from the present scene. It regards myself personally, and myself at this time but little. Cheit Sing, by the sudden massacre of some of the sepoys of my guard, which diminished it to the final number of 400 men, shut up with me in the close suburbs of Benaris, might have effected my destruction. I escaped the dangers, and the troops are assembling daily, to which he can afford no opposition. While the effect of these instructions is passing to Scindia the Rajah's total exclusion ought to be accomplished. I hope it will.

Warren Hastings.

1. Appendix "A":

Warren Hastings- A narrative of the Insurrection which happened in the Zameedary of Banaris in the month of August, 1781 and of the transactions of the Governor-General in that District, with an Appendix of authentic paper and Affidavits - Appendix No. 4-A; pp. 50-51, part I.

...

APPENDIX - "B".

Copy of a letter from the Governor-General to Colonel Muir.
dated Chunar- the 10th of September, 1781, to Colonel Muir.

Sir,

I have lately sent you dispatches in duplicate, containing instructions and full powers for negotiating and conducting a treaty of peace with Mahadjee Scindia, either for himself separately, or with a reservation in favour of the Peshwa, in case it should be agreed to include him as a party in the treaty. I have since received intelligence that one of my dispatches has been intercepted, and it is not unlikely that the other may meet with the same fate. I have also sent a second letter of the same substance with the first, but without credentials. As the present opportunity promises a more safe conveyance, I now send you a duplicate of my letter of instructions, together with a more full and regular commission than it was before in my power to forward you.

I had yesterday the pleasure to receive your letter of the 17th ultimo, the one which you mention to have written on the 13th has not reached me. I imagine it has fallen into the hands of Chiet Sing's people. It is with great satisfaction I observe, from the deputation of Chimnaje Row, that Mahadjee Scindia has in some degree anticipated the overtures of this Government, and that the general expressions of a desire of peace used at his first interview with Mr. Ford indicate a disposition so consonant with our own.

If Scindia should urge the return of your detachment beyond the boundaries of his dominions, I see no objection to this condition being granted. On the contrary I desire it. There can be no use for the continuance of the detachment after peace is concluded; nor will there be anything in the smallest degree dishonourable in agreeing to its return.

The objects of its equipment were to direct Mahadjee Scindia from the operations on the other side of India or to withdraw him from the alliance of the Ministers of the Peshwa, and these objects having been effected, its return becomes a natural consequence.

We are under no engagement to protect the present dominions of the King, nor those of Nudjitt Khan and the Rajah of Jaynagar; and if peace is settled betwixt Mahadjee Scindia and us, I do not desire that he should be restrained in carrying into execution any plans which he may have formed against them, at the same time I think it necessary to caution you against inserting anything in the treaty which may expressly mark either our knowledge of his views, or concurrence in them. It will be sufficient for us, and Scindia ought to be satisfied with the attitude implied in it, if he is only restricted in the treaty from making encroachments on our own territories and those of our allies, the Nabob Vizeer, the Rajah of Ghode, and Futteh Sing Gayewar. For these, an express provision must be made. He must in direct terms engage, that he will never invade or in respect molest them, as we will in the same manner stipulate with respect to his territories.

In my letter of the 29th ultimo, I instructed you to obtain the restoration of the Chundery Rajah and to secure the interests of the Rajah of Nurwar, and any other Chiefs who have been active in our

cause. This object I must now leave to your discretion, as it is not in my power to send you such explicit instructions as I could have wished, not having access at present to your and Colonel Camac's letter, which point out the nature and extent of our connections which each of these Rajahs, and the claims which their past services may have given them to our protection. In discussing their interests, we must make a distinction betwixt actual and implied engagements. No actual engagements whatever exist between us and any of these Rajahs. Such of them however as have taken an active part in our cause are entitled to some degree of consideration. You who are on the spot can best judge of their several merits and will attend to them as far as you may be able without hindering the more important objects of your negotiations.

It seems probable that few difficulties will arise in settling a separate treaty with Mahadjee Scindia, and this is the object which I have principally at heart. Let it not be impeded or retarded by the obstacles which may occur in adjusting the more complicated matters remaining in dispute betwixt us and the Peshwa. A peace with one must soon produce a peace with the other. Let an opening be left for it in the treaty with Scindia on the terms, I have mentioned, and though these terms comprehend in our favour every object which we could desire, yet they are on the whole so advantageous to the Peshwa, that, I think, his ministers will acquiesce in them rather than continue a precarious and expensive war, deprived of the support and alliance of Mahadjee Scindia.

It will be necessary to stipulate, that in case they shall not accede to the proposed terms of peace, Mahadjee Scindia shall not directly or indirectly assist them, or suffer any of his tributories

or subjects to assist them, with men or money, or arms or any other means of carrying on the war against us.

This must either be expressly stipulated, or so clearly and strongly implied, that no doubt shall remain regarding it.

On the event of a peace being settled with the Peshwa, it will perhaps be thought proper to recall General Goddard's detachment, and their best route lies through Mahadjee Scindia's territories with a view to such an event you will stipulate with Mahadjee Scindia, that he shall allow them a free passage, and assist them in procuring provisions and other necessaries on the road.

I enclose a letter which I have written to Scindia informing him of the powers which I have delegated to you and desire that you will urge him to an immediate decision on the propositions which you have to make to him. Inform him that any delay or evasion on his part may preclude an accommodation for ever and that by your answers I shall be regulated in entering into another plan of connections which will not only prove an insuperable bar to the views he has at present formed on the northern provisions but draw such a powerful attack on his own territories as must infallibly end in his expulsion and ruin.

If, after the conclusion and execution of the separate treaty with Mahadjee Scindia, he should desire to promote a peace between us and the Peshwa, I will appoint a person with full powers to negotiate the same through the channel of his introduction and mediation.

I am etc.

Warren Hastings.

1. Appendix "B": Warren Hastings - op.cit., Appendix No. 4-B, pp. 52-54, Part I.

APPENDIX - "C".

- (1) Sec. and Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.VII,p.120.

"We therefore judge it a most fit opportunity for acquiring Salsette by sending them the assistance they desire though it must be remarked we do not mean to interfere further than to make up matters between the family and Nizam Ally by our appearances and good offices unless the latter should obstinately persist in refusing our mediation and at the same time to establish the power of the family properly with the Marathas themselves but at no rate to engage against the Moguls in general". Consultation of 13th approved,dated 13th December 1761.

- (2) Sec.& Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.IX,p.18.

"Lord Clive foresaw that such an alliance might for a time be necessary and says in his 8th paragraph whatever power may be added to the Marathas by lessening that of Hyder Ally,may be recovered hereafter by an alliance with the Subah of Deccan,who will soon begin to think coolly of his own interest".

Dated: 28-9-1767.

- (3) Sec.& Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.IX,p.22.

"You may rely on our doing everything we can,consistent with our situation upon this coast,to promote the success of your operations against him and the Subah,and shall immediately pursue such measures as may appear to us most eligible for answering your intentions in respect to the Marathas,which we shall be better enabled to do from a difference which is likely to arise between Madhavrao and his uncle Raghoba and which we shall do our utmost to foment and embrace any other opportunity which may offer for

drawing off their attention from the Carnatic".

Dated: 30-9-1767.

(4) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.IX,pp.30-31.

"The people say there will be no peace between them. Raghoba is waiting for Janojee Bhonslaw and Madjee Scindia. His officers Soorajee mull lot and Muslanger Gonsavie and Mohamud ally Cawn have taken a place Gansley belonging to Madhavrao; a few is preparing to go against Soorjee Mull Lot and Morlanguer Gonsawie under the command of Naro Sankar - Madhavrao himself has an intention to go against Carnatick". Secret intelligence -

Dated 20-10-1767.

(5) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.IX,p.63.

"Tukajee Holkar, Naro Shankar, the son of Vithal Sewdeu and Magjee Scindia, commanders of about 50,000 horse are the officers appointed for the part of Indostan, the three first are at present here. nor are their forces yet joined, but it is said they will set out in a very few days, as by advices arrived two days past, the Maratha forces there under Magjee Scindia have met with a small defeat by the Jatts."

Dated: 5-12-1767.

(6) Sec.& Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol. XII,p.10.

"The Vazier on his part has been full of his usual possession..... has suffered the neighbouring powers to be crushed without advancing a man to their assistance and entertained a correspondence with the enemy under a pretence altogether frivolous".

Dated: 2-1-1771.

- (7) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XIV,pp.63-64.

"In short this great empire now rests upon Raghoba's single life,should he by any accident be taken off,the whole must go to destruction,and as many petty governments be formed as there are forts,until some superior power by degrees reduces them. However things draw fast to a crisis and at the end of the morning I shall be better able to judge how far he is likely to succeed."

Dated: 7-9-1773.

- (8) Sec. and Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XV,pp. 25-28.

"The force of the Marathas in the adjacent countries by land is at present very inconsiderable,even Poona,their capital is,as the Resident advises,fatally improvided with forces".

Dated: 14-2-1774.

- (9) Sec. and Pol.Dept.Diary: vol.XV,pp.25-28.

"Their naval force consists of 5 ships and 13 Hetch Grabs with about one hundred Gallivats,which are generally stationed as follows: 3 Grabs and 20 Gallivats at Bassein and Salsette, 1 Grab and 5 Gallivats at Sevendrug, 14 Grabs and 50 or 60 Gallivats at Gheriah, 5 Gallivats at Choul and 5 at Dabul, each of the 3 Mast Grabs have on board 150 Sepoys besides Lascars,the Hetch Grabs 100 and the Gallivats 75 Sepoys each."

Dated: 15-2-1774.

- (10) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XV; p.90.

"Raghoba safely arrived at Indoor; where Tukoji Holkar and Mahadji Scindia have promised him assistance, and in consequence have blocked up the passes of the Gots to stop the progress of the Ministerial Army and have wrote Hurry Pant that if he advanced into their country,they will from that moment treat him

as an enemy, since this the Ministers have seized on all the Districts belonging to these officers on this side of the Nerbadah.....will only serve to exasperate them the more and bind them the firmer to Raghoba's interest."

Dated: 24- 5-1774.

(11) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XVI A; pp.42-43.

"The forces we shall send upon the service will consist of 80 European Artillery, 350 European infantry Sepoys 800 Miscars 160 which with their officers and non-commissioned officers will more than complete the number of 1500 men. We shall also send a proper and complete train of artillery and stores, such part of this force as goes from hence shall set out so as to arrive at the Bar of Surat in time for New Moon Springs."

Dated: 12-2-1775.

(12) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XVI-A; pp. 98-99.

"The Chief-officers of Raghoba's army are, Appajee Mahadev, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Saccaram Hurry, Ministers Govindrow Gaikwar and Conderow Guykwar from whom he has heard to the following purpose: We are much surprised to find that after our having fought so well with the army of Hurry Punt Purkia that you are missing, nor do we know where to send you, this going as chance may direct, however we have now collected all our Forces amounting to about 16000, mostly Horse, also our Ammunition at the fort of Coppergujge which is about 50 coss from Cambay and there shall remain until we receive your orders".

Dated: 4-3-1775.

(13) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XVI-A, pp. 156-157.

"Ministerial army - the morning of the 19th- five coss from this side of Copperwange and 45 from Cambay - the 17th Accounts were received from Jambooser of our Force being on their passage to Cambay. That a body of 5000 Horse commanded by whom he did not know marched about the 17th with great number of cattle, women and Ca.....towards the Deccan. Saccaram Bapoo from an assurance that Raghoba and his party were totally demolished after the late battle had wrote to Hurry Pant Furkia to send Mahadji Scindia to Poona to settle accounts with the Sircar.....Knowledge of Mahadji Scindia he was disgusted and having received orders from the King resolved to quit the Ministerial Army and was actually preparing for that purpose before he left the army. That Tukoji Holkar did not appear warm in the Ministerial Cause- Futtensing's Army was encamped 5 or 6 coss distant.....Hurry Pant Furkia that Hurry Pant Furkia gave out he intended to march his army to Neriad to meet us and gave us battle if we chose - From all these circumstances it is very natural to deduce that Conderow and Govindrow with this army are staunch and Zealous friends to Raghoba and will most readily embrace the first opportunity and prudent moment of forming a junction with us. That the heads of the Ministerial auxiliaries are most of them heartily tired of supporting the pretensions of they know not whom..... That the usage of Mahadji Scindia has not only drawn him from the party but must also open the eyes of others who cannot expect better treatment in the end. These matters

added to our having so warmly espoused Raghoba his interest must in my opinion, in a short time effectually loosen the Ministerial combination".

Dated: 21-3-1775.

- (14) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XVI A; pp. 189-190.

"Use your utmost endeavours to induce Raghoba to move towards Poona, which we think will be the most effectual means of bringing the war to a speedy issue."

Dated: 3-5-1775.

- (15) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XVI A; pp. 205-206.

"Whenever it may be resolved and agreed between Raghoba and yourself to march, to encamp or to make any other movement with the Army, you are to signify the same to the Commanding Officer of our forces in writing and he is ordered to obey".

Dated: 24-5-1775.

- (16) Sec. & Pol. Diary : Vol. XVI A; pp. 275-276.

"Futtesing after parting with Furkia continued to amuse Raghoba with promises of submitting himself to him, and by that means found an opportunity of throwing himself into Broduah with a few of his best Horse".

Dated: 31-10-1775.

- (17) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XVI B, pp. 452-453.

"There is reason to suspect the Nabob is tampering with the Ministerial party and the Nizam to our prejudice, he has lately wrote to the latter observing to him how the English took Bengal, Arcot and Ca . therefore should they be suffered to place Raghoba in Poona, the riches of that town must fall into their hands, all the powers and countries from Calcutta to Cape

Comerin must be subject to the English, therefore now is the time to frustrate them and that he may depend they will be both on the Nizam and himself in a short time".

Dated: 31-10-1775.

- (18) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XVII A; p. 505.

"That he shall reside at Benares and money on country to the amount of five lakhs of rupees will be settled, on this condition that he does not again cause any sedition or disturbance in the country, nor have improper correspondence with any person and not change his residence without my knowledge".

Dated: 22-8-1776.

- (19) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XVII A; p. 561.

"Sadoba who instead of ascending the Ghott he intended (and which we were within a coss or two off at a place called Sherualy) went to Bore Ghot, about 18 coss to the norseward, where he met with a powerful opposition from the enemy notwithstanding which, he reached the summit with very little loss, his success was entirely owing to his own resolution, for observing some of his people retreating, he quitted his palanquin and without waiting to put on his slippers, headed them himself, sword in hand, the consequence was, a general retreat of the enemy, after leaving a considerable force to secure the pass, he marched to Badge Matchy Fort, where he had a strong Garrison, and intends marching from thence in a few days, and tells me that he expects to be in Poona shortly and of having very powerful reinforcements from some considerable men there who were before in doubt of the identity of his person. His army is daily increasing, he the other day was joined by Yincotrow, a near

relation, with 500 Horse and an elephant."

Dated: 17-10-1776.

- (20) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XVII A, pp. 614-615.

"We cannot suppose any person who has been in the least conversant with the natives of Asia can be so totally unacquainted with their genius and disposition as not to allow that treachery and perfidy are their peculiar characteristics and most particularly so of the Marathas who are the most treacherous and perfidious of all Asiatics. No one possessed of this knowledge can suppose for a moment that Raghoba's life would not be in danger were he to trust himself in the power of the Ministers his professed enemies who must dread even the possibility of his further elevation and surrounded as he would be by persons entirely at their devotion."

Dated: 30-11-1776.

- (21) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XVIII, p. 90.

"On the 8th instant Chevalier St. Lubien had his audience of the Peshwa, at which the principal ministers were present, where he delivered his credentials, being letters from the King and Ministers of France and made a present. I cannot help here observing the difference of his reception and mine on this occasion. Sacaram Bapoo and Nana Furnise going without the Tent-walls to receive him as he alighted from an elephant the Durbar had supplied him with and introduced him into the Durbar but they only sent Madhavrao Jadourai and Byroo Pant to receive and introduce me. Indeed in every respect they pay the greatest attention to the French."

Dated: 19-5-1777.

- (22) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XVIII,pp. 115-117.

"Dadarao Nagarow,the Nabob of Arcot's Vackeel informed me of news of Mons.Lubien being arrived at Poona and having taken upon himself the Title of Ambassador from the French Nation..... Lubien was not authorized to come here either from Europe or Pondicherry. He therefore imagined Lubien had taken upon him the title of ambassador in hopes of doing something for himself. I have reason to believe there is some truth in this report,as he does not seem to be so much caressed by this Durbar as he was before Dadarow made them acquainted with this news and indeed I am informed by several people that he now appears to be very uneasy at this situation".

Dated: 13-7-1777.

- (23) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XVIII; pp.123-125.

"If he gives sufficient hopes of success Mons.Dumas will be immediately dispatched with the above force,which he will land before the English Establishments on this and the Coromandel Coasts,and reduce them jointly with the Marathas,who are to strike the first stroke".

Dated: 20-7-1777.

- (24) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XX,pp.67-69.

"Practical conduct has been to benefit by the division of the Brahmins and it must be acknowledged that he was pursued this line ably and invariably. From a servant of the Peshwa in the time of Madhavrao obedient to the orders of his master and holding his jagir but by sufference he is now become the effectual governing power in the State in every material act even of the Durbar originated from him by the influence which he seems to

possess over Holcar. The Maratha dominions from the northern borders of Candesh as far as they extend Northward with all the force appertaining to that tract of country are at his command - Burhanpur and Asser are his."

Dated: 4-2-1779.

(25) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XXII, pp. 171-182.

"Scindia wishing to know whether our intentions were of a hostile or friendly nature to the Peshwa or himself. In answer to this the general explained the grounds of the present war assuring the vakil that the English had no cause of enmity whatever with Scindia or the Peshwa but that their quarrel was with Nanah the Minister and that they were ready to testify their sense of Scindia's services and to unite in any plan that might be proposed for their general benefit".

Dated: 16-3-1780.

(26) Sec. & Pol. Dept. Diary: Vol. XXVIII; pp. 325-326.

"We cannot help being alarmed at your declaration that you shall wait for instructions from us in consequence of Hyder's death before you take any steps for the performance of the late treaty, should the Marathas as is not improbable now think proper to ratify it; and that you beg to suggest that great advantages may be made to the Company by exchange with the Marathas of any acquisitions you may make in the Bednur Country - we yet hope you will however consider the fatal consequences that may attend to Company's interests by a refusal to execute the conditions of the treaty concluded with the Maratha State to which no advantage in contemplation could in any degree afford an adequate return. We shall expect your literal and immediate observance of

possess over Holcar. The Maratha dominions from the northern borders of Candesh as far as they extend Northward with all the force appertaining to that tract of country are at his command - Burhanpur and Asser are his."

Dated: 4-2-1779.

(25) Sec. & Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XXII,pp.171-182.

"Scindia wishing to know whether our intentions were of a hostile or friendly nature to the Peshwa or himself. In answer to this the general explained the grounds of the present war assuring the vakil that the English had no cause of enmity whatever with Scindia or the Peshwa but that their quarrel was with Nanah the Minister and that they were ready to testify their sense of Scindia's services and to unite in any plan that might be proposed for their general benefit".

Dated: 16-3-1780.

(26) Sec.& Pol.Dept.Diary: Vol.XXVIII; pp.325-326.

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every article of the treaty the execution of which depends on you especially that which stipulates for the cession of those territories which have been conquered from the Marathas and are to be restored to them within the space of two months from the period upon the treaty shall be completed - we think it incumbent on us to declare that we will not suffer the deviation of a little from the literal performance of the treaty by which the National faith pledged by the Government or the general peace of India may be either immediately or eventually affected."

Dated: 8-3-1783.



MAHADEJI SHINDE.

A Political Career in India.

(Early Phase).

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CHAPTER - VIII

THE FIRST ANGLO - MARATHA WAR - MALWA CAMPAIGN

(From 24th June 1780 To 13th October 1781)

The Sardars encamped at Badnera on 21st June and Mahadji reached Ujjain on 24th June. Bapuji Holkar being dissatisfied with Tukoji, went over to Mahadji. Mahadji sent army to Jaipur. Ahalyabai and Tukoji were not on good terms and Bapuji had returned. Mahadji called Govind Krishna to Ujjain. There was rumour that Mahadji had instigated Tukoji against Ahalyabai for money but Mahadji was not interested in the affairs of the Holkar family. Mahadji had taken over from Govind Krishna his right for Jaipur which he had given to the latter, earlier. For eight days, Mahadji was on the bank of the Chamel and no body from his camp was prepared to stay back with Govindrao in Gujarat.¹ Hingane wanted a loan of Rs.10,000 from Balaji Govind.² The English promised to pay money to the Emperor but Hingane persuaded him to refuse and the Emperor demanded not money but army from the Peshwa.³ When the English and the Rana of Gohad were triumphant, the Emperor was planning to march against the English.⁴ As per Nana's advice, the Emperor wrote to the Nizam and the Bhonsle to join the Peshwa against the English.⁵ But Hingane complained to Nana that his financial position was worse than before.⁶ Mahadji instructed Hingane to secure Najaf's sympathies against the

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, pp.274-275. Maheshwar Darbarachi Batamintre, vol.I, No.10.

2. Parasnai, Maratha Politics in Delhi, I, 11.

3. Ibid, I, 5 (21-6-1780).

4. Ibid, I, 6.

5. Ibid, I, 7.

6. Parasnai, Maratha Politics in Delhi, I, 8.

English and Hingane was provided for, in Kotah. The Emperor wrote to the Rohillas and the Sikhs to join him against the English.¹ Najaf was afraid of the advances of Mahadji in Hindustan in his heart - and the Emperor was prepared secretly to allow Mahadji or Haripant, management of the affairs of Delhi, with two lakhs of rupees pension per month for himself, if Najaf would be driven out.²

Hyder by about 25th June had expelled the factors of Onova³ and Hastings on 26th June had declared that the rainy season was no impediment to the English troops but a great one to the Maratha army, which consisted only of cavalry. The objection made to the expenses, he admitted was a material one, but a vigorous assertion, he remarked could not be made without expense, nor could the war be either concluded honourably or prosecuted successfully without such an exertion. Feeble measures and advances for peace would but add to the strength and presumption of their adversaries, discourage their friends and perhaps would induce them to become parties against the English. The resources of the English Government, exhausted as they were, were yet then equal to every probable contingency of the war if it was conducted on a consistent plan and that not barred by desultory votes of council on every measure for its prosecution.⁴ At all events, the latitude given to Carnac left him at liberty to pursue whatever plan he thought proper, but if instead of proceeding towards Mahadji, the march of his detachment should, once be directed

1. Ibid. 9.

2. Ibid. 10.

3. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 470-472. (Onore Factory to Bombay).

4. Forrest, Selection from Foreign Department, vol. I, LV, pp. 701 et seq.

by the opposite route to the Capital of Bundelkhand, he would naturally conclude that the possession of that country was the true and only object.¹

Nana had sent finally Mahadji's letter of guarantee to Hydr on 26th June,² and Hastings had already declared: "That the manifest advantage of having two armies acting in concert and dividing the attention of the enemy between them, would be lost, if they were not both in the field at the same time."³ Hastings had paid up two lakhs of rupees for the Malwa expedition.⁴ Nana received the news from Bombay that the English at Calcutta by about 29th June, offered 50 lakhs of rupees to Mahadji, out of which 30 lakhs of rupees had been already dispatched and Nana told Naropant to investigate matters secretly.⁵ Goddard had suggested to the Bombay Company that Mahadji and Tukoji had repaired to Ujjain and Indore respectively, where, they should be detained in the North, while the Bombay English would pursue their schemes at leisure and with less interruptions to the Southward. The Dutch were intriguing with the Marathas, too.⁶ But on 27th, Francis had again raised his reasons for the Malwa expeditions,⁷ not admitting the validity of a pretence for invading Bundelkhand and solicited peace, at once, with the Marathas,⁸ declaring that the expedition to Poona indeed was a disgrace which, but for the generosity or forbearance of the Marathas, might have left Bombay defenceless.⁹

1. Ibid. pp. 694-695.

2. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren, No. 270.

3. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 700-702.

4. Ibid. 701.

5. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren, No. 271.

6. S.P.D.D., vol. 22, 370-371. (Goddard to Bombay).

7. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 702-703.

8. Ibid. 694-695.

9. Ibid.

On 1st July, it was reported that Mahadji had arrived at Ujjain and Tukoji, too, had reached Indore. Holkar's minister had been to Ujjain for the pacification of strained relations of Tukoji with Ahalyabai. The Sardars still were pressed to proceed to the Deccan. The English had paid two lakhs of rupees to Fatesingh. Govindrao Gaikwad's sister came to Maheshwar.¹ The English company was unwilling to proceed against the Nawab of Cambay.² Skirmishes were fought between Govindrao and Fatesingh. Raghoba's clerk, earlier sent to the Bhonsle, had stayed for a day, too, at Maheshwar. Ahalyabai had dispatched army against Gulsarkhan and negotiations with Raghoba were renewed.³ Ahalyabai had but warned the Poona Government against the rise of the English.⁴ Ramaji Bapu from Raghoba's party harassed Ahalyabai's districts in July. Different sardars were moving against him and Mahadji dispatched his sardars to the Devi (Ahalyabai), too, on that account. Govindrao was given rupees 25,000 by Mahadji and Tukoji and Khando Awaji, on his behalf, talked to Mahadji. Shivaji Vithal was recalled by Mahadji.⁵ The English were afraid as they did not know that their government had a single friend or ally in India in the true sense of friendship and alliance, which supplied the power of giving assistance and a disposition to give it.⁶ Carnac was actually given instructions for his march on 13th July.⁷ Francis and Wheeler declared that the war with the Marathas, at more than two years after its commencement and after every rupee the English

1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.11.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 364-367. (Bombay to Surat and Goddard)

3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.12.

4. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I, No.118. (12-7-1780).

5. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.13.

6. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, p.706.

7. Ibid. p.710.



had reserved in the treasury or had since been able to collect, had been spent in the support of it, was, at that day, as far from a conclusion as ever. New expeditions were proposed to answer the same effects, which were promised from former measures of the same nature and, as it appeared to them, with no better prospect of success; of such success, at least, as would be likely to make any further efforts unnecessary.¹ As the main arguments of his opponents were drawn from the low state of the treasury and the inability of the Government to support the expense of the expedition, Hastings, after pointing out that the pay and batta of the troops would be the same whether they remained in their original quarters or marched to the capital of Mahadji, stated, "the contingencies of the detachment are therefore, the only expense that can be reasonably charged to the expedition. These I state far below two lakhs of rupees. That sum I offer to contribute to this disbursement. I have already deposited it within a small amount in the hands of the Sub-Treasurers and I beg that the Board will permit it to be accepted for that purpose."²

Mahadji's army was in a distressed condition and he looked to the Dasara day to reorganise his forces. There was a rumour on 17th July that Mudhoji Khonsle was proceeding to Poona.³ One agent and a clerk sent by Farmer to Poona to bring medicine and other articles were arrested under charge of espionage. Mahadji, however, gave a note by about 19th July with Keso Anant to release them.⁴

1. *Ibid.*, p. 705.

2. *Ibid.*, iv

3. *E.P.G.*, vol. V, No. 1948.

4. *Chindeshahi Bakhshane*: S.H.S. vol. I, No. 44.

Visaji had deposed the old Raja and placed one of his descendants on the throne of Gohad. Gangadhar, the Faujdar of Kalpi did not cooperate with Visaji as he had good relations with the Raja, but now hearing that Mahadji was at Ujjain, he went over to his side. He then invited Mahadji to station his army near kachuakar. The Rana, too wanted Capt. Palmer at Gohad as Mahadji had come back to Hindustan.¹ Mudhoji had his dispute with Nana over Mandla and Nana was not prepared to cede Mandla to Mudhoji Bhonsle unless Chimnaji Bhonsle opened hostilities with the English of Bengal.² The plan given by Nana was not followed by Chimnaji Bhonsle for the Bhonsle desired friendship with the English to be respected. Manaji Bapu Bhonsle was to attack Mandla with 3000 troops.³ The Governor-General took precautions about the march of the Maratha army at Cuttuck⁴ and instructed Carnac to carry war into the territories of Mahadji and Tukoji.⁵

On 23rd July, the party of the troops sent against Gulzarkhan had been recalled.⁶ Nana felt that Mahadji's policy was spoiling the whole game, in July, when practically it was at its height.⁷ Nana wrote to Mahadji to acquaint himself with his further moves.⁸ But Nana was prepared to depend on Mahadji's suggestions.⁹ The Nabab of Arcot reported that the English found their enemy too strong, even in the Konkan.¹⁰ Mahadji explained to Nana that his

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1948.

2. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1908.

3. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1950.

4. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 714.

5. Ibid.

6. Shindeshahi Raikarna, S.H.S., vol.II, No.121.

7. Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patren, No.273.

8. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, pp.273-275.

9. Ibid.

10. C.P.C., vol.V, No.s1952, 1953.

presence was vitally necessary at Ujjain in order to meet the growing pressure of the English in Malwa and Bundelkhand and to prevent the Bengal army from passing through these regions to join their comrades under Goddard in Gujarat. Again there was the alliance formed among the English, the Rana of Gohad and the Jats against the Marathas.¹ It was reported on 28th July that Hyder had invaded the Carnatic.² Special letters were sent to Mahadji at Ujjain when the Kasids (runners) were told on 29th that if the letters would be delivered speedily they would get prizes.³ Mahadji had said that he would save Poona by staying in Malwa.⁴ Captain Popham in conjunction with the Rana of Gohad was directed to Malwa by the English.⁵

The President of Bombay opined that peace either formally or substantially should be the first object of the English. The second and hardly of less importance to the Bombay Government than the first, was to send back the troops of the other presidencies which they had no means to maintain unless by the supplies from Bengal which they were plainly told, were no longer to be depended on. All the English hopes and expectations of a peace by the Treaty with Nana and Mahadji jointly or separately with either, had been at an end.⁶

Nana had examined Mahadji's policy of rejecting kondaibari, critically.⁷ On 1st August Mahadji's son-in-law, Deshmukh, was disgraced when his Jagir was confiscated by Nana and Mahadji pleaded that Nana should treat him as his own relation.⁸ Sadashiv Dinkar wrote to

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.106.

2. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1952; S.P.D.D., vol.23, No.477 (St. George to Bombay); Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.289.

3. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.45.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.289; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.107.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 397-398.

6. S.P.D.D., vol.22, 397-398.

7. Sardesai, Kavyatithas Patren, No.274 (2-8-1780)

8. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.46.

Nana on 2nd August to arrange amicably the dispute of Deshwarth so that Mahadji would not feel aggrieved.¹ Nana instructed Mahadji, advising on the letter of Purshottam Mahadev Hingane, wakil at Delhi, to set the Emperor and Hajaf Khan against the English and that the sardars must concentrate in Khandesh, insisting still on kondaibari as Mahadji's base for operation.²

The secret passage to the Gwalior Fort was pointed out to Popham by some thieves.³ While Popham himself never referred to the robbers in his personal account,⁴ Gwalior Fort was captured by him within the space of two hours only and only 20 men were wounded and none was killed on the English side, though Bapuji, the Maratha Governor was killed and most of the principal officers of the Maratha garrison were wounded.⁵ A tribe of banditti from the territory of the Rana of Gohad had been accustomed to rob about the town and once in the dead of the night had climbed up the rock and got into the fort. This intelligence had been communicated by them to the Rana who often thought of availing himself of it, but was fearful of undertaking such an enterprise of moment with his own troops.⁶ Popham was tempted by his spies and had the least assistance from the Rana. Capt. Bruce on 3 mid-night with 200 grenadiers and light infantry approached with Popham following with 20 artillery men, 40 grenadiers and two battalions of sepays. Another section of two guns and one little squadron was under

1. Ibid., S.H.S., vol. I, No. 47.

2. Sardesai, Kavyetihas natren, No. 275.

3. Keene, Fall of the Mughal Empire, p. 127.

4. Bhandarkar D.R., "Capture of the Gwalior Fort in 1780", I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 52 et seq.

5. Rawlinson H.G. "Two captures of Gwalior Fort," I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 20.

6. Ibid. p. 19.

Capt. Maclery, who was asked to march at 2 o'clock in case of failure to cover retreat and in case of success to prevent Ambaji and his troops from escaping. The camp of the English remained guarded by one battalion and the remaining artillery in command of Capt. Mayattice. At day break, the English got themselves under the walls where wooden ladders were placed against a scarped rock, 16 feet high. A party mounted and clambered up 50 feet, in height of a steep and rugged hill to foot of the wall which was 30 feet high. The spies climbed the wall and fixed the rope ladders which were immediately mounted with unspeakable alacrity by the troops. They were discovered by the garrison and attacked with the warth. The Marathas however numerous were instantly repulsed by smartness and regularity of the English force. The whole English party within short time was within the Fort. Capt. Maclery did not arrive and Ambaji escaped.¹

The Governor-General on 27th, wrote a letter to the court of Directors, sent it to a Danish ship which was on that day on her departure and a duplicate by the Portuguese ship which was ready then to sail. Next day, letters were dispatched to Rear Admiral of the Red and C-in-c of H.M.'s ships in India at Fort St. George. Popham was made "Major"² for having captured the Fort of Gwalior the pearl in the necklaces of the castles of Hind-(Taj-ul-Massar)³ for the English on 4th August 1780.

Mahadji was asked to hear peaceful negotiations from the English if the Emperor and Najaf Khan were not relieved in the treaty conditions.⁴ Mahadji also reported to Hyder that the English

1. S.P.D.P., vol. 23, 487-488; Gleig, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 310-311; Oskaner, op.cit., No. 170. Shindeshahi Rajkarna, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 124.

2. Bhandarkar, "op.cit.," I.H.R.C.P., vol. XII, (1929), p. 52.

3. Duff, op.cit., vol. II, p. 420 c/f Gwalior State Gazetteer, vol. I, p. 238.

4. Sardesai, Kavyetihas patren, No. 275; C.P.C., vol. V, No. 2043.

and the Nawab of Arcot were afraid of combines and proposed peace with the Peshwa while they tried to win over Hyder by offering him to divide the Maratha territory half to half.¹ Mahadji (strange enough) wrote on 3rd August about his meeting with Nana and guaranteed his friendliness.²

After the fall of Gwalior, however, Mahadji was reinforced by Ahalyabai's troops and Bhavanrao Dhonddev from Poona. Mahadji wrote to Nana not to contract peace and himself boldly attacked the English.³ Hyder gave the Marathas, too, a warning against the diplomacy of the English and urged the Peshwa, the Nizam and Mahadji to unite with him.⁴ Nana passed the news to Mahadji that the English were opening offensive after the rains and declared that he entirely relied on Mahadji, as he was, the pillar of the Maratha State.⁵

The Peshwa promised to abide always by the treaty established with Hyder and plans were suggested by Nana for Mahadji's approval there of. As per the Peshwa's treaty with Hyder, of 9th August, 1780, earlier, Hyder's general Sadarkhan attacked the Company's post at Dharma-Patan. The English company was now at war with Hyder.⁶ Mahadji lamented the loss of Gwalior, which he said was the result of leaving the northern dominions unprotected while concentrating the whole Maratha force in Gujarat. He, however, himself offered to check the enemy on the northern front.⁷ He, in forceful language, further explained the necessity on 13th August of his encampment in Malwa

1. Ibid. No.277.

2. Shindeshahi Raikarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.48.

3. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.110.

4. Oturkar, op.cit., No.171.

5. Sardesai, Kavyatihar patren, No.275.(6) Shindeshahi Rai, S.H.S., II, 122.

6. Sardesai, Itihasik patravahar, No.205; S.P.D.P., vol.23, 435-466, (Tellicherry to Bombay. 10-8-1780); Sardesai, Kavyatihar patren, No.278.

7. Sardesai, K.P.M.S., No.108.

and asked Sadashiv Dinkar to impress upon Nana how essential it was to check the English advance through Malwa to the South.¹ Nana expressed his entire confidence in Mahadji and praised him for his services to the Maratha state.²

Ganeshpant Behere marched in the konkan and Mahadji himself thought of visiting Bid and Tuljapur.³ The Bombay Company by about 17th August experienced great monetary difficulties to conduct war and Hyder had refused to entertain Hosley's embassy.⁴ Raghoba was engrossed in new preparations⁵ and Chinnaaji's slow march aroused suspicion about his fidelity to the Maratha State.⁶ After the council in Calcutta had arisen, Hastings received a challenge on 17th August from Francis which was accepted. On the morning of 17th, the duel was fought and Francis was shot through body by Hastings.⁷

The Maratha forces in the konkan had cantoned at Talegaon.⁸ Nana wrote to Mahadji on 18th August about blockading the English from all quarters.⁹ Mahadji insisted on staying in Malwa and guarding, against the English.¹⁰ Appajiram, however, on 20th August drew a rather dismal picture of Mahadji's love of peace and pleasure in the midst of a serious campaign with no clear intention of immediately meeting the danger ahead.¹¹ Ganeshpant Behere was sent against the English who joined Gulzar Khan's brother in Songur.¹² Hyder suggested

1. Ibid., No.109; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, pp.274-275.

2. Ibid., No.110.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2559.

4. S.P.D.D., vol.23, 432-436. (Bombay to G.O.).

5. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravahar, No.206.

6. C.P.C., vol.V, No.1959.

7. Forrest, selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, lix; Forrest, selections from State papers of Governor-General of India-W.Hastings vol.I, 189; parasnis, Marathyanche vakil; chap.III, 3.

8. Sardesai, Kavyetihas natren, No.279.

9. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.283.

10. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.111.

11. Ibid., No.113.

12. Sardesai, Kavyetihas natren, Nos.280, 279.

to Nana to set the Emperor against the English.¹ The wakil from the English, Fazl Ali, forwarded his terms to the Emperor and Hingane asked for the Peshwa's army to be immediately sent to the north.² The Governor-General congratulated the Rana of Gohad on the capture of Gwalior and sent the news to the Emperor, the Wazir, the Nizam, Najafkhan, Mudhoji and Dewakar Pandit.³ Col. Baillie arrived at Cuttuck on 11th August and Bhavani Pandit (Appasahib) saw him on 13th August and Nana Pandit, the Peshwa's wakil at Nagpore, asked permission there to go back to Poona as the Bhonsles had friendly relations with the English.⁴ Dewakar Pandit himself wanted to see the Governor-General but postponed, as the Nizam would be displeased and Mahadji being a member of the Peshwa's government would have to be informed and he might not quite relish it. The Bhonsles were worried about the expenses of the army.⁵

Rumour was spread on 23rd August that the English attacked Ujjain and Mahadji was himself at Ujjain. The English were felt to be every where.⁶ Nana wrote to Hyder that the English in the Konkan were defeated.⁷ The Governor-General in Council sent instructions to Popham on 24th August that Gwalior must be retained as a British post.⁸ Hyder had warned the Marathas that as soon as he attacked the English, they would start negotiations with the Peshwa and explicitly maintained that the Peshwa would never hear of any treaty unless first Hyder himself was consulted.⁹ Mahadji on 27th August ordered

1. *Ibid.*

2. Parasnis, *Maratha politics in Delhi*, I, 13, 12.

3. *C.P.C.*, vol. V, Nos. 1966, 1968, 1974.

4. *Ibid.*, No. 1977.

5. *C.P.C.*, vol. V, No. 1979.

6. Khare, *op.cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2560.

7. Sardesai, *Kavyatiharas patra*, No. 281.

8. Bhandarkar, "op.cit.," *I.H.R.C.P.*, vol. XII, (1929), p. 53.

9. Sardesai, *Kavyatiharas patra*, No. 284.

the detachment at Ashirgad to join Bhagirath Shinde and jointly to pursue Gulzar Khan Pathan.¹

Hartley's detachment was on 28th August placed under Goddard's command to cover the attack on Bassein. Battering cannons were ready to join Goddard, and Goddard was to bring the Madras Battalion of European Infantry; the Madras Artillery, consisting together of about 600 men, 4 battalions and 4 grenadiers companies of Bengal sepoy and two Battalions of Madras sepoy.² On 5th September the secret information given by Muhammad Ali of Bombay to Govindrao of Kalyan was sent to Nana which apprised him of the preparation of the Bombay Company for Bassein.³

Nana informed Mahadji on 3rd September that he was free to do whatever he liked, only that he must look to the Peshwa's interest.⁴ Fresh contingents were sent by the Sardars for restoring order in the province round about Jhansi by taking over the management from Raghuba and his followers.⁵ On 3rd September Devakar Pandit informed the Governor-General that the Marathas extended their sway upto the very borders of Afghanistan.⁶ Tukoji submitted to Ahalyabai but narrated to Naro Shankar how he believed Mahadji propagated against him in all quarters. Balaram from Shinde was expected at Maheshwar and he was accompanied by Shivaji Narayan.⁷ Balaram Govind thereafter went to Maheshwar, stayed there for 1½ months and returned to Ujjain.⁸

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 114.

2. S.P.D., vol. 23, 441-444. (Consultation).

3. Sardesai, Itihasik pattravahar, No. 207.

4. Sardesai, kavyatihna patra, No. 283.

5. S.P.D., vol. 36, No. 397.

6. Heras, "op.cit." Is.C., vol. XI (1937), p. 510.

7. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatra, vol. I, No. 14.

8. Ibid, Nos. 18, 20, 21; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. II, p. 14.

On 5th September the Rana of Gohad thanked the Governor-General¹ and the Marathas were preparing in right earnest for the post-rain operations against the English.² Goddard had come to Bombay.³ There was a rumour on 7th, that Mahadji intended proceeding up to Gwalior.⁴ The Rana of Gohad complained to the Governor-General on 7th September that the fort of Gwalior was his ancestral property and hence the English had no claim on it.⁵ On 8th, Goddard went back to Sur-at to bring down the army for the siege of Bassein.⁶ The ambassador of Holkar Durbar wrote to Ahalyabai from the Court of Hyderabad that Amrutrao had gone to the Bhonsle at Nagpore though the Bhonsle had not still then allowed him an interview. Hyder was against any submissive peace with the English. Chapman was in the Poona Court and the Peshwa was resolved to have the initiative of the peace-terms from Hyder.⁷ Sivram Narayan Thatte was sent to Khandesh who squeezed Rs.1750 there but Mahadji on 11th September instructed to get the money back.⁸

Francis took his seat again at the Council in Calcutta on 11th September.⁹ For the English, the matter of the greatest importance was the preservation of the State, from the formidable league formed for the destruction of it. News had reached the Council from Madras that Hyder had entered the Carnatic, destroyed an army and had driven Sir Hector Munroe to the walls of Fort St. George. Sir Edward Hughes sent tidings of his having received

1. G.P.C., vol.V, No.1985.

2. Sardesai, Kavyatihar patra, No.285.

3. Ibid.

4. Maheshwar Darnabarchi Bataminatra, vol.I, No.15.

5. G.P.C., vol.V, No.1989.

6. S.P.D.D., vol.23. 464. (Bombay to Broach).

7. Molkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhana, vol.I, No.119. (10-9-1780)

8. Shivdeshahi Raikarne, S.H.S., vol.I, No.50.

9. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, 715.

undoubted intelligence that seven sail of the line and seven thousand land forces had left France and were intended to co-operate with the enemies of the English in India. Thirty thousand Maratha Horse were encamped on the Western front of Bengal, an invasion of Bihar by the Marathas was also expected. The Nizam proposed hostility. Najaf Khan threatened Oudh and the forces of Mahadji threatened Kora and Allahabad while Goddard was opposed by the whole power of Poona.¹ While Francis maintained that Goddard never wrote of diversion,² Hastings supplied the proof.³ Goddard's letter to Sir Eyre Coote was dated 28th March and was recorded in the Governor-General's consultation on 29th May and was referred by Hastings in his minute of 12th June, earlier.⁴ Barwell intended of escaping from a thankless office.⁵ John Day was, however, responsible for carrying out a compromise between Hastings and Francis.⁶

Naro Sivdev, from Mahadji's camp at Ujjain on 13th September suggested to Nana, on 12th September to pursue seriously Nanaji Shinde.⁷ Goddard's response to the negotiations for peace through the Bhonsle was not encouraging by about 13th September. Though, however, the Governor-General's letters bore sentiments of closest friendship,⁸ Raghoba's letters to Nana were intercepted and Goddard stopped his pension. Raghoba had sent all his relatives to Bonga by about 13th September.⁹ Haripant came to Poona and the Peshwa was taken to Purandar as the English army was reported to have come to Borghat,

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1. Ibid., vol. I, Lxii; Forrest, selections from State papers-W. Hastings, vol. I, 195.
 2. Ibid., p. 739.
 3. Ibid., p. 743.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid., Lx.
 7. Shindeshahi Rakhane, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 124.
 8. C.P.C., vol. V, Nos. 1994, 1995.
 9. Ibid., No. 1996.

20 cos. from Poona. The Nizam's help was solicited by the Poona Government and Dhousa, too was approached by the same purpose. Mudhoji was prepared to help Poona provided Mandla was acceded to him.¹ Mahadji had suggested to Tukoji to stay near the Peshwa and himself proposed to settle the disturbances in the north. Tukoji was engaged in the siege of Sultanpur and Gulzarkhan in Khandesh when defeated, fled to Raghoba.² Mahadji declared that Tukoji was inefficient and on 14th September suggested his desire to meet Nana and Nana instructed that the Sardars should come to Khandesh for that purpose, without armies.³ Nana was encamped at Kirkee and was thinking of leaving that place to meet Mahadji.⁴ Nana still insisted that Kondaibari was a better place from the point of strategic importance,⁵ but Mahadji suggested that in order to bring the English to terms, they must be attacked in Bengal.⁶

It was reported on 16th September that Sir Edward Hughes came up against Hyder's army and Fort St. George recalled the Madras army. Hyder wrested the English possessions and the Admiral urged on peace with the Marathas and expected the Bombay Company to transact it.⁷ Nana wrote to Hyder on 16th that he should be on guard for the English were diplomatic and treacherous.⁸ Raghoba was in Surat and the English were not paying his full expenses. Anandibai proceeded to Baroda to win over Govindrao Gaikwad to her cause. Three hundred Arabs came to Maheshwar to seek employment.⁹ Raghoba and the English had entered

1. IMI, No.1997.

2. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatren, vol.I, No.16.

3. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren, Nos.286,287.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.235.

5. Sardesai kavyetihas patren, No.287.

6. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, p.233.

7. S.P.D.D., vol.23, 708-714; Sardesai, kavyetihas patren, No.292.

8. Sardesai, op.cit., No.288.

9. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol.I, No.17.

into a secret negotiation with the fort-keeper of Saler.¹ Mahadji advised Nana to reinforce Behere and ask Holkar to take up his post at Kondaibari, so as to prevent the enemy from descending into Malwa and attacking him in the rear.²

Madras applied for help to Calcutta and it was decided that Calcutta should send the succour, inspite of the opposition of Francis, to the tune of 15 lakhs of rupees, in specie and also a large detachment of European Infantry and Artillery under Lieut. General Sir Eyre Coote, the victor of Wandiwash and then the C-in-c in India and a member of the supreme Council in Calcutta, who was marked " as the only possible instrument " at this crisis to " stand forth and vindicate in own person the rights and honour of the British arms. "³ The spirit, judgement and decision of Hastings shone forth. At a Council meeting, he declared it was not a time " for either long deliberations at home or the formal and tedious process of negotiations abroad. " The crisis demanded, " the most instant, powerful and even hazardous exertion of the Government to avert the event portended by so many concurrent difficulties. "⁴ Francis and wheeler objected on the ground that Bengal was their first object, that the danger was at their door, and consequently they could spare no troops and not half the supply of treasure which Hastings proposed to send to Madras. Sir Eyre Coote concurred with the Governor-General and the casting-vote of Hastings preserved India to Great Britain.⁵ The C-in-c was requested to proceed himself immediately to the coast and take the command of the army on that establishment. An immediate

1. Sardesai, kavyetihas patren, No.289.

2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.115.

3. Kalikinkar Datta, "The First two Anglo-Mysore wars and Economic drain of Bengal," J.I.H., vol.XX, (1941), pp.18-19.

4. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol.I, Lxii.

5. Forrest, op.cit., vol.I, Lxii.

offer of peace also was to be made to the Marathas, incorporating the exchange of acquisitions, maintenance of Raghoba, the alliance of the English and the Peshwa against Hyder and the French and the hostility to be stopped for one year for settling the treaty. Mahadji was to be the mediator for this treaty.¹

Nana called Patwardhan to his rescue.² The French attacked the English ship which had gone to Sevandrug and the Marathas had stripped it off.³ Nana before starting to meet Mahadji wanted certain definite promises and wanted Naropant to inquire secretly into the whole affair.⁴ On 30th September Mahadji wrote to Haripant promising to return to the Deccan with Tukoji.⁵ Naropant too gave the guarantee to Nana of good counsel on Mahadji's part.⁶ The Chief of Surat solicited the permission of Mahadji for the collection of good tobacco for the pipe (Gudgudi) of Goddard, who was very fond of it.⁷ Ahalyabai had refused the provision of Dak (post) from Mahadji's camp to Burhanpur.⁸ J. Hartley in the Konkan reduced Serolee, south of Bawa Malang, and leaving there Major Hopkins on 2nd October, returned to Kalyan. In the action at Bawa Malang, 300 troops were defeated by the English.⁹ Mullarao Bapu wrote to Nana on 2nd October about his plight at Bassein. He was himself weak and not perfect in health. He had not there for his army, even the leaves to dine upon; and he himself expected that the English would finish the

1. *Ibid*, pp. 718, 722; Parasnis, *Itihasik Tipane*, IV, 20; Gleig, *op.cit.*, vol. II, 331.

2. Khare, *op.cit.*, vol. VII, No. 2562. (26-9-1780)

3. *Ibid*, No. 2563.

4. Sardesai, *kavyetihās patren*, No. 290.

5. *S.P.D.*, vol. 36; No. 399.

6. Sardesai, *kavyetihās patren*, No. 291.

7. Parasnis, *Itihasik Tipane*, VI, 31.

8. *Ibid*, V, 31.

9. *S.P.D.*, vol. 23; 521-523, 529-530.

whole business at Bassein within seven days.¹ Visaji from Bassein again wrote to Nana that the Arabs belonging to the guards of Raghopant were in want of an officer to command them, in action and that Raghopant himself had gone to the Mallang Fort. The Arabs pressed for the money and fought amongst themselves when once 10/12 men were wounded, 5/7 houses of the subjects were plundered and women and children suffered to. He pointed out that without having such troops that would obey strictly, the matters would not be better.²

On account of Nana's suggestion, Mahadji reinforced Govindrao Gaikwad and sent him into Gujarat from Malwa with a party of troops collected from various quarters and he was already on 3rd, waiting for a ford on the Mahie to cross into Gujarat.³ Govindrao was to be joined by his Deccani followers shortly from Poona.⁴ Mahadji declared that his preparations for renewing operations were completed and urged on the Bhonsle and Holkar to exert themselves whole heartedly.⁵ Mahadji assured Haripant that his doubts and suspicions were cleared by Naro Shankar and requested him to evince the same cordiality towards him as before.⁶ Mahadji again accepted Nana's suggestion on 3rd October to meet him in Khandesh but asked him to keep the whole subject a close secret. He, however, would first complete his plans in the north.⁷

Seven companies of the first Circar Battalions were in mutiny at Visagapattam.⁸ In the north, Hingane requested Nana to persuade

1. Ibid, vol. 23, 538-539. (Intercepted Letter)

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 23, 538 (Intercepted letter of Visaji from Bassein to Nana).

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 116.

4. Shindeshahi Sakarna, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 128.

5. Ibid, No. 117.

6. Ibid, No. 118.

7. Ibid, No. 119.

8. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 733.

Balarao Govind and Gangadhar Govind to pay him.¹ On 8th October Raghoba was not allowed to entertain troops as he was not considered as an ally of the English. The Company was the principal in the Maratha War and only three villages of twelve to fifteen thousand rupees per year were to be given to him.² The Governor-General addressed the Bombay Company, informing about the determination to offer peace and friendship to the Marathas, enclosing a copy of the treaty and to suspend all hostilities on the receipt of a requisition in writing and informed that like orders were given by the Peshwa to his officers. But the Governor-General suggested in the meanwhile a vigorous prosecution of the war.³ The company was to raise a loan of Rs.4½ lakhs on the 5% interest within two months.⁴ Raghoba was to set out after the Dasarha and it was reported on 10th October; that Goddard was at Bombay.⁵ Nana had collected 50,000 horse and decided too, to march on Dasarha.⁶ When the English attacked Bassein, Nana sent reinforcement of 5000 gardis foot, with artillery and 4000 well horsed cavalry.⁷ On 11th October the Marathas had retreated from Kalyan.⁸ However, the Governor-General had sent to Mahadji the treaty on 12th October ceding all to the Marathas and hoping that Mahadji would ratify it. The Governor-General had expressed that Mahadji had shown great courage and ability in commanding the Maratha force against the English, hoping that he would then display still greater

1. Parasnis, Maratha politics in Delhi, vol.I, 15.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.23; 531-533.(Consultation).

3. Ibid., vol.23; 561-562.(G.O.to Bombay 9-10-1780).

4. C.P.C., vol.V, No.2019.

5. Maheshwar Darabarchi Butaminatre, vol.I, 19.

6. Raghbir Singh, "The Persian Akbarat," (1779-1818), "I.H.R.C.R., vol. XVI, (1939), p.142.

7. Ibid.

8. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2564.

tact and wisdom in getting the treaty ratified.¹ The Governor-General sent same to the Peshwa and Nana declared that the treaty would be finalised with Mudhoji's guarantee.² The Governor-General proposed a new confederacy of the Marathas, the English, the Nizam and the Bhonsle against Hyder.³

Chinto Vithal along with others was being dispatched to Poona from Ujjain, under proper escort but he effected his escape. After a great deal of search and tremendous exertions he was found in a house at Ujjain and was arrested and given in shackles into the charge of guards. Then could Mahadji breathe a sigh of relief.⁴ Chinto was confined, then in the fort of Satara where he died in June 1783.⁵ His wife and daughter, at this time (13th October 1780) put an end to their lives by taking poison.⁶

Hyder secured triumphs over the English⁷ and the Governor-General sent Sir Eyre Coote and informed the Peshwa, Devakar, Mudhoji and Nana, accordingly.⁸ "But here the policy of the English seemed confusing. The English who had astonished all the powers of Asia by their vigilance, their activity and above all by the promptitude with which they had begun their military operations had not presented one man to oppose the progress of their enemy who had come from a hundred leagues distance to attack them. Those who led two years ago, 40,000 combatants before Pondicherry, who during all the times of their last war with Hyder placed on foot two large armies who

1. C.P.C., vol.V, No.2022.

2. C.P.C., vol.V, Nos.2023,2024; S.P.D.D., vol.23; 717-720(Copy of the Treaty).

3. C.P.C., vol.V, Nos.2026.

4. Shindeshahi Raikar, S.H.S., vol.II, No.126(13-10-1780), 125; Maheshwar Darabarchi Bataminatre, vol.I, No.23.

5. Ibid, vol.II, No.127; Maheshwar Darabarchi Bataminatre, vol.I, No.20.

6. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.120; Maheshwar Darabarchi Bataminatre, vol.I, No.21.

7. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2565.

8. C.P.C., vol.V, Nos.2035-2039.

in one word maintained on that side 30 battalions of the sepoys, undoubtedly were greatly dazzled by the reputation they had made, had either given to their forces some secret destination or disposed of their troops for certain operations."¹ "The mistake was irreparable. In a country in revolution and above all since there were powerful and ambitious neighbours, the English ought to have a corps always ready to march at the first need and sufficiently large for covering the frontiers. The different posts which Hyder had occupied by means of his cavalry, had then taken away from the English all the means of assembling a large force. It had brought an end to their prosperity."² The Emperor from Delhi wrote to the Sardars and Ahalyabai for the alliance against the English. Baghoba sent Gulzar-khan with new force to Khamlesh.³ On 23rd September news had come to the Governor-General, of the loss of Col. Baillie's detachment. General Munroe precipitated flight from the face of Hyder.⁴

Hyder received an intelligence of the English force of 500 Europeans and three to four thousand sepoys, detached his son with 15,000 horse from his siege of Arcot, who was chastised. Hyder himself then completed the blockade of Arcot and set off to reinforce his son, with all his force, French corps and some guns and joined his son. He attacked the English troops at several onsets. A complete overthrow took place and upwards of 200 horse were cut to pieces and 300 Europeans were taken prisoners among whom was Col. Baillie who had received three wounds and nearly 30 officers. The Portuguese had designs on Bassein. Their frigate went to Daman to

1. Sarkar Jadunath, "Hyderali's invasion of the Eastern Carnatic, 1780," *Is.C.*, vol. XV, (1941), p. 222.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Maheshwar Darbarchi Batamipatre*, vol. I, No. 21.

4. *Gleig, op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 323.

suppress the insurrection there by Raghoba's partisans.¹ Hyder wrote to Capt. Thomas Prendergast, commandant, asking for a suspension of arms and to capitulate, saying, "I wish that all the world should come to me without reservation and without conditions".² On 10th September Col. Baillie had marched from northward to join Sir Hector Munroe at Canjeevaram; after being reinforced by a detachment from Canjeevaram under Col. Fletcher. Receiving the news of his defeat, now, Sir Munroe retired from Canjeevaram to the Mount.³

Hastings lamented that the Maratha war had been and was called his, God knows, why. He was forced into it, he explained. The inefficiency of the Bombay Company he thought, shattered all his hopes of terminating the Maratha war as he had intended to do.⁴ Hartley, however, advanced to Chowk.⁵ But the English at Khopavali retreated to Tala on account of the fact that the Marathas were reinforced adequately.⁶ Nana asked whether Tukoji also was proceeding to see him and suggested that the delay in his meeting with the Sardar, would have bad effects.⁷ Ahalyabai protested strongly against Mahadji and Tukoji,⁸ and suspected that Haripant, too, sided with Tukoji. Ahalyabai and the Peshwa's vakil talked about the settlement of Jagir.⁹ It was again settled between Mahadji and Nana on 30th October that Mahadji would cease clamouring for removal of Haripant and Nana agreed to accord a Jagir to

1. S.P.D.P., vol. 23; 580-581; 613-614.

2. Sarker, "Op.cit", I.A.S. vol. XV, (1941), p. 228.

3. S.P.D.P., vol. 23; 613-614.

4. Gleig, op.cit, vol. II, 325.

5. S.P.D.P. vol. 23; 543-545, 579; 589-590; 608-609; 624-630; 644-645.

6. Khare, op.cit, vol. VII, No. 3567.

7. Sardesai, Kavyatilak Patra; No. 293.

8. Manohar Darabarchi Betasipatra, vol. I, No. 25.

9. Ibid, vol. I, No. 24. (30-10-1780).

Mahadji in Bundelkhand.¹ Nana, too, had refuted the charge that he wanted to confiscate Ahalyabai's jagirs.² Instead of settling the dispute of Holkars; Nana and Mahadji relied upon third-rate gossip-mongers.³

M.de Montgomery, 3rd captain, had come out to arrange terms with Hyder. His insinuating manner (and it might have some political reason) had at last persuaded Hyder to agree that only the English troops should issue up glacis of the fort with the honours of the war, that they should there pile up their arms and that immediately afterwards, they should take the road to Madras with their effects, all that subject to the express condition that they would not bear arms against him during the rest of the war.⁴ The English troops which were in the fort of Arcot issued at 11 o'clock in the morning in the manner to which they had agreed. There were six officers, 153 musketeers and 300 sepoy.⁵ "The accounts they gave of the strength, good order, bravery and activity of Hyder's army were fully alarming. His approaches at the siege were carried on with all that regularity as if superintended by the most skilful engineers and his artillery at the same time was numerous and so well served as repeatedly to have dismounted over guns on the batteries."⁶

Mahadji suggested several moves to Nana in order to overcome the English and awaited Nana's replies on 4th November.⁷ Tukoji left Indore to see Ahalyabai who refused to allow him to come with

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, p. 227.

2. Sardesai, Kavrtihas patra, No. 294.

3. Ibid, 229; Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 25.

4. Sarkar, "op.cit.", Is. C., vol. XV, (1928), p. 228.

5. Sarkar, "op.cit.", Is. C., vol. XV, (1941), p. 228.

6. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I; lxxvi.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarni, S. H. S., vol. II, No. 123.

thousands of soldiers and wrote to Mahadji about it. Visaji Sharnao from Indore promised Herkubai that he would bring Mahadji to Maheshwar. Mahadji was involved also in the affairs of Dhar. Fatesingh Gaikwad's wakil, Mahipant Malhar had come to Ujjain,¹ with a letter demanding military help.² Mahadji gave drafts of 20 lakhs of Rs. to Ahalyabai and Hyder, too, paid tribute to the Peshwa.³ Mahadji was to march and had already sent his army to Gwalior when four more platoons joined the English there. On 9th November the English were near Gohad and Narwar. Mahadji still suggested a meeting with Nana. Holkar had started from Indore, though nothing was determined about his march. Nana was advised to start from Kirkee.⁴ Ahalyabai had written to the Peshwa about Tukoji.⁵ Tukoji and Naro Ganesh had gone without officially visiting Maheshwar, on their campaign in Khandesh against Gulzar Khan and Chandraseo Pawar. Ahalyabai wrote further that Tukoji and Naro Ganesh ought not to have insulted her so much.⁶ Mahadji on 9th November accorded his approval to the plans formed by the Poona ministry to oppose the English expedition from Bombay, in the vicinity of Kalyan and agreed to meet Nana in Khandesh as intimated.⁷ Govind Gopal Kaste kar, Divan of Fatesingh Gaikwad, who was considered to be responsible for the defection of Fatesingh and was considered to be a great source of evil, was arrested and confined at Borsad, along with his twenty followers.⁸

The Governor-General had finally refuted the charge levelled

1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamintre; vol. I, No. 26.

2. Phalke, op. cit., vol. II, No. 29.

3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamintre; vol. I, No. 27.

4. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2558.

5. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; vol. I, p. 13.

6. Ibid., pp. 16, 17.

7. Sardesai, H. P. M. S., No. 121; Shindebahi Raikarne; S. H. S., vol. II, No. 129.

8. Shindebahi Raikarne; S. H. S., vol. II, No. 130.

by Francis¹ and on 11th November Sir Eyre Coote arrived in the Carnatic.² Mudhoji wrote to Nana on 31st November, "The English must be overwhelmed on all sides. Unless they are once severely punished, no power would remain in peace. Even the Emperor of Delhi and his minister, Najaf Khan wished very much that the English must be crushed."³ Nana complained that he had been to Kirkee for 3½ months but could hear nothing from Mahadji and that Goddard had captured everything in the Konkan except Bassein.⁴ Hyder threatened the English possessions in the Carnatic and Sir Eyre Coote urged on peace with the Marathas on 15th November again.⁵

The army under Goddard arrived near Bassein on 12th November.⁶ Mahadji was at Ujjain on 17th November and tried to persuade Tukoji not to proceed to the Deccan as the affairs in Hindustan would require his presence there. Patesingh forwarded overtures to Ahalyabai and the Sardars.⁷ It was reported on 20th November that Shinde's clerks, Shivaji Narayan and Bhagwantrao were in Maheshwari for the settlement of dispute over revenue matters concerning Tukoji. Nana had been to Jambgaon to pacify Mahadji who had come there. Tukoji was also dissatisfied with the Peshwa and Mahadji intended to reconcile him, too.⁸ Ambaji Ingle was to face the English at Gwalior. Ahalyabai sought Mahadji's interference to check Tukoji who was supported by Haripant and the Peshwa. Tukoji's army was prepared to fight against Mahadji and even the Peshwa but not against Ahalyabai.⁹ On 24th,

1. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, 743, 735.

2. Ibid., 745.

3. Diskalkar D.B; "op.cit," J.I.H., vol. XI, (1932), p. 312.

4. Sardesai, Navvotikha Natran; No. 295; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 122.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 720-722. (Coote to Bombay).

6. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 611-612. (Bombay to G.G.).

7. Maheshwar Darabherchi Batamistras; vol. I, No. 29.

8. Ibid. No. 30.

9. Ibid. No. 31; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 124.

Mahadji was reported again at Ujjain.¹

Devareo Hingane explained that though Mahadji sanctioned Kotah in Jagir to him, he had received nothing for five years.² The Emperor was urged on to march but the English vakils, too, promised presents to the Emperor on 25th November.³ Mahadji prepared himself to oppose the English regiments marching through Bundelkhand.⁴ Mahadji had postponed his march into the Deccan and appointed Ramji Patil to explain the situation personally to Nana.⁵ On 28th November Mahadji forwarded the Devas brothers' dispute to Nana for the final decision.⁶ Mahadji was satisfied over the issue of the desertion of Satvaji Bhonsle from the State of Kolhapur and his consequent decision to join the Poona party.⁷ By about 29th November curious reports were in circulation about the arrest of Mahadji and Ahalyabai.⁸ Harkubai was Malharrao Holkar's Khanda-rani (wife of the sword). "Mavashibai" - (Harkubai?) was with Ahalyabai and Maniram, father-in-law of Sumersingh, was her Karbhari. He had taken Sumersingh's jagirs and property. The Poona minister insisted that Harkubai must confiscate Maniram's jagirs but Maniram avoided Bai's presence. He even smuggled ten lakhs of rupees for her. Naro Ganesh and Maniram were on good terms. Then the minister of Poona confiscated Harkubai's inam village, itself. Maniram was responsible for Baghoba's intrigues in the Holkar family and Naro Ganesh, Maniram and Tukoji had formed a conspiracy.

1. Ibid.

2. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; vol.I;17,18.

3. Ibid.; 17.

4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.123.

5. Ibid., No.124.

6. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.II; No.131.

7. Ibid., No.132.

8. S.P.D., vol.36; No.403.

However, Ahalyabai insisted that the Jagir of Harkubai must be released.¹ Mahadji and Ahalyabai, in conference, decided that Mahadji must go to Ujjain and send army at Sipri against the English and should start by the auspicious day of Vasant Panchami to see the Peshwa. Ahalyabai had special love for the young Peshwa.²

On 1st December the English army in Hindustan came near Siprikolar. Mahadji sent Ambaji Ingle against the English and Ingle even defeated two platoons. Tukoji now demanded that Mahadji not interfere with the family of Holkars, which view Ahalyabai refused to entertain and charged instead Tukoji himself for the failures of House of the Holkars.³ Mahadji showed perfect unconcern for Bassein, which caused great distress to Appajiram.⁴ Mahadji explained that the growing pressure of the English advance in Malwa required all his energies to meet the danger and that when Shivaji Vithal, who was already called by him, would arrive, he would set out himself for the Deccan.⁵ Mahadji explained the dire need of the hour to Haripant, too.⁶

Hastings opened negotiations with the Dutch in India on 2nd December.⁷ Goddard was two miles before the walls of Bassein on 3rd December and opened batteries on 9th and 10th, while on 11th by 10 O'clock in the morning, the message of surrender was offered but as no message had come by about 7, to the terms of Goddard, he had resumed hostilities. At 9, Nagopant with the garrison was told to march out, leaving the arms and the garrison was permitted to go in safety. One officer was wounded, 12 men were killed and wounded,

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.II, p.18.

2. Ibid; Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol.II, No.135. (Ahalyabai told Mahadji to march to the Deccan).

3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamintre; vol.I, No.32; Sardesai, H.P.H.S. No.125.

4. Sardesai, H.P.H.S., No.125.

5. Ibid, No.126.

6. Ibid, No.127.

7. Gleig, op.cit., vol.II, 336.

including four Europeans and one Subedar of sepoy.¹ 128 serviceable guns and 62 unserviceable guns were collected by the English.²

Nana had referred on 5th December that Mahadji and Tukoji had already started on their march.³ Hyder had occupied Arcot.⁴ Nana pleaded on 11th that the Emperor and Najaf must then cross the Ganges. Najaf was willing to comply though the Emperor refused, soliciting that some one Maratha Sardar must come to that side. The Emperor really wanted to get rid of Najaf and enquired why the Nizam had joined the English and not Hyder.⁵ Nana and the Peshwa wrote to Indore on 14th December⁶ and Ahalyabai asked Mahadji to proceed to Kondaibari to protect the Peshwa's dominions, assuring him that she would alone do all that was necessary in respect of all political and military affairs of the north.⁷ The Dhar disputes were, again, not settled and the matters were referred to Nana.⁸

Goddard relieved Hartley at Vijrabai and in the action of 12th December Ramchandra Ganesh was killed. Goddard was prosecuting hostilities to bring pressure on the Marathas before initiating peace talks.⁹ Raghoba wrote to Jalimsinghaji of Kotah on 14th December that he was setting out for Hindustan and would reach Kotah soon.¹⁰ Hyder marched to Madras and the English opened talks with the Nizam and the Bhonsle. Jaipur was devastated by Najaf's forces.¹¹ Madhavrao Gangadhar was called back by Ahalyabai on 17th December

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 638-642; 646-647; 652, 655-660.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 729.

3. Sardesai, *Kavyatihar mata*; No. 296.

4. S.P.D.D., vol. 23, 733. (Goa to Bombay).

5. Parasnis, *Maratha Politics in Delhi*, I, 21; *Shindeshahi Rajkarni*; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 137.

6. Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*, vol. II, p. 15.

7. *Shindeshahi Rajkarni*; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 135.

8. *Ibid.*, No. 133.

9. S.P.D.D., vol. 23; 689-692; 697-698; 701-702; 704-716.

10. Phalke, *op. cit.*, vol. II, No. 5.

11. Parasnis, *Maratha Politics in Delhi*, I, 20. (19-12-1780)

from Mahadji's court, who gave him robes of honour. Mahadji himself explained to Harkubai his inability to go to Maheshwari as he had to check the English in Malwa. Mahadji again believed that Tukoji was not supported by Nana but by Visaji and Haripant.¹

The Bombay Company felt on 22nd December the necessity of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion.² However, the English attacked Arnala.³ Ahalyabai on 27th December expected Mahadji within two days and Mahadji was already given Rs.40,000 but Ahalyabai was dissatisfied with him because he did not intend to march to the Deccan.⁴ The Maratha fleet captured an English merchantman.⁵ Mahadji was at Maheshwar from 28th December 1780 to 2nd January 1781 and Raneekhan had accompanied him there.⁶ A letter was addressed to Nana on 24th December referring to the confiscation of the property of Sitoji Deshmukh by the Maratha State.⁷

It was reported on 29th December 1780 that Keso Krishna Datar and Chandrarao Pawar were defeated at Ranala.⁸ Parashuram had reached Bhilwadi because his mother breathed her last there.⁹ The Mamlat of Kotah was settled and Ahalyabai requested Mahadji on 30th December to see that the Raja, Jalimsinghaji made the requisite payment.¹⁰ Haro Sivdev, on behalf of Ahalyabai requested Nana to restrain Tukoji from appropriating the receipts of revenues from certain villages in the Deccan which were really assigned to Ahalyabai.¹¹

1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamintre, vol.I, No.33.

2. S.P.D.D., vol.23; 723-724.(Consultation).

3. Ibid., 733-736, 738.

4. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamintre, vol.I, No.34.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.24; 3-4. (Ooa to Bombay). (28-12-1780).

6. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; vol.II, p.17; Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.I No.136.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol.I; No.52.

8. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2569.

9. Ibid., No.2570.

10. Solkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane, vol.I; No.122.

11. Shindeshahi Rajkarne, S.H.S., vol.II, No.134.

The French warships appeared in Indian Waters and this information was forwarded to Nana by Mahadji on 31st December. Mahadji advised Nana to move the troops to Borghat and Kondaibari to counteract Goddard's activities, suggesting that the French should attack Calcutta.¹ Ahalyabai was not prepared to accept Nana's suggestion and to hand over her power to any one else and Mahadji inclined to support her cause.² The Governor-General addressed letters of peace to the Bhonsle and (through the Bhonsle) to the Peshwa, Nana, Mahadji and Nawab Muba Wazul-Mulk, for confederacy against Hyder.³

Mahadji's Bakshi wrote to Col. James Morgan that he had received his letter and that he, in compliance with the order of Shinde, would immediately go to see him and had deputed Meghshyam Pandit to wait upon the Colonel and to represent everything to him.⁴

Holkar's dispute was not settled⁵ and in their diabolical indulgence in domestic disputes, the Marathas, it was said, forgot the English and the only man who seemed to have been aware of them was Mahadji Shinde.⁶ It is an instance of the inscrutable ways of Providence that, during a period when some of the most capable Englishmen were set out to India, there were some of the most shortsighted and self seeking people, responsible in the Maratha affairs.⁷ The most momentous issues were at stake, and the most alarming situations had arisen.⁸ The fortunes of the English in India had

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 128.

2. Ibid., No. 129. (31-12-1780).

3. C.P.C., vol. V, Nos. 2070, 2072, 2059, 2071.

4. Ibid., vol. V, No. 2073.

5. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 132.

6. Sinha H.H., "Main Currents of 18th Century Indian History," J.I.H., vol. IX, (1930), p. 48.

7. Ibid.

8. C.P.C., vol. V; p. VII.

fallen to their lowest water-mark.¹ The Peshwa had pointed out to the Emperor the danger of all pervading English² and the Peshwa's army was invited to Delhi lest the English would go there.³ But the Emperor was afraid of joining the open revolt against the English till Mahadji defeated them and entered the Doab.⁴ Balaji Govind and Jhansiker follow-ed high-handed policy and did not care to see Mahadji.⁵ The *Karnama* was given by the Emperor to the Peshwa.⁶ Balaji Govind did not pay Mingane and Baghunath Hari excused himself in the same way, pointing out that the province was left to Mahadji and that he himself had left nothing with him.⁷

On 1st January 1781, Mahadji had come to Minahas and 16 goats were purchased for his feast. In the secret talks of Ahalyabai, Mahadji and Ranokhan, Mahadji was requested to go to the Deccan while he himself wanted to return to Ujjain.⁸ The treachery of Tukoji and Maniram who received secret letters from Raghoba was brought to light by Ahalyabai on 4th January 1781.⁹ The Bhonsle was trying to adjust the terms of the Governor-General to suit the Maratha expectations.¹⁰ Mahadji himself wrote to the Governor-General that "two hearts joined together may pull down a hill;" and pointed out that the English must negotiate peace, that he knew the Governor-General had sent the treaty to Poona and wished that God would grant that the war, by some means, might be brought to a close.¹¹ The Bhonsle declared on 9th January

1. Chaturvedi Ram Nishore, "The Educational Activities and progress before the mutiny," *J.I.H.*, vol. XVIII, (1939), p. 322 C/f *Calcutta Review*, vol. III, (1840), p. 213.

2. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol. III, p. 225.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

4. *Rajwade*, op. cit., vol. XII, pp. 22, 23; No. 28; 38, No. 55; pp. 38, No. 56;

5. *Ibid.*, vol. XII, pp. 23-24, No. 27.

6. *Ibid.*, vol. XII, p. 25, No. 30; p. 25, No. 31.

7. *Ibid.*, vol. XII, pp. 26-27, No. 32.

8. *Maheshwar Darnaharchi Batinipatre*; vol. I, Nos. 35, 38, 39; *Holkarabahi Itihasachi Sadhana*, vol. I, No. 123.

9. *Ibid.*, vol. I, No. 36.

10. *C.P.C.*, vol. VI, Nos. 7, 8.

11. *C.P.C.*, vol. VI, No. 10.

that since no further time could be wasted in waiting for a reply from the Governor-General, he had no alternative but to execute the plan which the Nizam and the Peshwa had already settled.¹ Devakar explained that as the articles of the treaty, in question, were ambiguous, he could not go to Poona.² It was pointed out also that in the days of Madhavrao Peshwa, he had made his brother Narayan and Janoji Bhonsle swear life-long friendship for each other. The latter procured the release of Raghoba but Raghoba treacherously murdered Narayan, it was explained and the Bhonsle could not do anything for Raghunath.³ Devakar would, however, set out for Poona and would write to Mahadji and the Nizam and would devise means to accuse Hyder.⁴

Ahalyabai, again, complained against Tukoji on 10th January 1781 about the collection of the revenues and admitted that she had paid 20 lakhs of rupees to Mahadji, in the preceding year.⁵ On 18th January Baburao Bhaskar, one of the employees under the Peshwa, in the north, wrote to Nana, offering his services in establishing peace with Warren Hastings whose confidential adviser General Stables was one of the best friends of the writer, through whom he said, peace could be easily arranged.⁶

On 18th January 1781, Arnala Fort, in the Konkan was in the hands of the English⁷ and the English had re-opened hostilities in Khandesh. Ahalyabai sent presents to the Peshwa on 19th January.⁸

1. Ibid., No. 11.

2. Ibid., No. 12.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, Nos. 37, 39.

6. Shivajeshahi Ralkarna, S.E.S., vol. II, No. 141.

7. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 28-29.

8. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 41.

The English had secured 91 guns at Arnala.¹ However, the Bombay Company on 20th January took up the issue of peace overtures to the Marathas, as per the letters to and from Goddard and Fort St. George.² On 21st January Mahadji assured Hyder of the firm attitude of the Maratha Court in the war against the English and asked Hyder not to relax his efforts against them.³ Nana, too, wrote to him about the supremacy of the Marathas⁴ and pointed out that one Englishman had been to Haripant but was driven out and suggested that Hyder should follow the same policy.⁵ Nana explained to him, again, not to distrust Nizam's policy as Hyder, the Nizam and the Peshwa were one against the English,⁶ though he referred to him the treachery of the Nizam and the Bhonsle.⁷

On 22nd January 1781, the English, in the north, had captured Sipri and had advanced towards Bhilsa and Sironj. Events were preventing Mahadji from taking a rapid dash on Surat as suggested by Nana.⁸ Nana approved Mahadji's plan and Mahadji informed him that he was moving towards the Gwalior Sector to oppose the enemy and drive the English back to Bengal.⁹

Goddard on 30th January advanced to Titwala and Badlapur and after having engaged the enemy on 31st, advanced to Khopavali. He then occupied the Borghat and simultaneously opened peace negotiations.¹⁰ The Nizam and the Bhonsle remained without doing

1. S.P.D.P., vol. 24; 53-59. (Goddard to Bombay).

2. Ibid. vol. 24; 91-97, 106, 108-110, 112-116, 119-120, 122-123.

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 130.

4. Sardesai, Kavvetihas natren, No. 302.

5. Ibid. No. 303.

6. Ibid. No. 304.

7. Ibid. Nos. 305, 307.

8. Chindasabhi Raikerna, G.H.S., vol. II; No. 142.

9. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 131.

10. S.P.D.P., vol. 24; 57-59 (31-1-1781), 76-78 (4-1-1781), 83-87 (Campoli, 8-2-1781), 97, (9-2-1781) Borghat-13-2-1781; 145-146 (9-3-1781) Badlapur.

anything¹ and Mahadji rebuked the Nizam for remaining silent. Mahadji dispatched Girmajipant to the Rana of Gohad;² and Naro Sivdev conveyed to Nana from Sujalpur, Mahadji's fear as to how, the English would advance right upto Burhanpur, if he were to withdraw from Malwa.³ Ranekhan had remonstrated against Mahadji's callous inactivity in the face of the onrushing English and Mahadji becoming alive to his responsibility, made the necessary preparations to proceed to the front with all possible haste.⁴ Sultankhan from the Emperor appeared in Mahadji's camp and proposed a combined campaign against the aggressive English.⁵ Naro Sivdev was also under the necessity of pointing out to Mahadji how his ancestors worked and died in the cause of their master, who then was baffled by various enemies. Mahadji, thereupon promised to exert himself to the utmost of his abilities.⁶ The Maratha negotiations with Delhi were making little progress and the English were advancing, owing to the feeble opposition offered by Mahadji.⁷ Nana had set all the land power against the Naval power of the English and on 4th February wrote a letter to Chaytsingh.⁸ Mahadji also had explained the plan of driving out the English from Bengal to Chaytsingh, Raja of Benaras, at the same time,⁹ when Chaytsingh's Karbhari, B-abu Subhansingh had received all these letters. Till that time, Chaytsingh had not revolted against Hastings.¹⁰

It was decided by about 4th February 1781 that Holker and Patwardhan should march in the Konkan, against the English, there.¹¹

1. Sardesai, Uttar-vibhag; vol.I, p.213.

2. Shindeshahi Nakarnas, S.H.S., vol.II, No.165.

3. Ibid; No.149.

4. Ibid; No.138.

5. Ibid; No.139.

6. Ibid; No.140.

7. Sardesai; H.P.M.S.; No.135.

8. Sardesai, Kavyatishas natran; No.306.

9. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; Vol.I, p.311.

10. Ibid.

11. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2579.

The outstanding accounts with the Pawars of Dewas and with Shiveji Vithal Vinchurkar were settled by about 6th February.¹ Mahadji was informed by Haro Sivdev about the death of Ramchandra Ganesh and the fall of Bassein due to the treachery of Visaji Keshav Lale. Mahadji said thereupon that he would retrieve the position.² Nana now suggested to Mahadji to make a dash into the English territory of Bengal and the Doab but Mahadji explained that the season was far too advanced for the execution of the plan during that year but pointed out that he would certainly do it, after the rains.³ The Poona Durbar on 8th February emphasized cordial and friendly relations in all the state matters between the two ruling families of Holkar and Shinde.⁴

The English in the Konkan ascended the Ghat on 10th February and Haripant and Tukoji retreated to a little extent where upon the citizens of Poona fled to different quarters and the Peshwa was taken to Purandar.⁵ Nana knew that the French fleet had come to Mauritius and declared to Hyder on 11th February that the Peshwa and Hyder should adhere to the treaty in spite of all the rumours of the English overtures.⁶ It was reported on 13th February that a Musalman arrived in the Maratha camp with a verbal message from Sir Edward Hughes to the effect that the Governments of Bengal and Bombay had violated the peace and waged war with the Maratha State and that, he, the admiral was vested with full powers and was desirous of putting an end to the hostilities by restoring to them what had been taken and therefore wished to be acquainted

1. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2579.

2. Shindeshahi Raikarna, S.H.S., vol.II; No.143.

3. Ibid; No.144.

4. Ibid; No.145.

5. Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhana, vol.I, No.124.

6. Khare; op.cit., vol.VII, No.2582.

9. Sardesai, Kavyetihas natren; No.308.

with their complaints. No answer was given and the man was ordered to quit immediately.¹ Mahadji on 14th pushed his base of operation in order to retard the English progress.² Sironj had been captured by the English.³

The Governor-General found fault with the Bhonsle for withholding the treaty with the khilats and letters to the Peshwa, Nana and Mahadji. But the Governor-General was acquainted with the fact that the treaty was sent to Mahadji but that there was no reply.⁴ Capt. Watherston wrote to Goddard from Poona on 15th February about his own efforts.⁵ Holkar was helping the minister with 15000 horse.⁶ The English in the Konkan were at Tale on 15th February; which is a place near Khandala.⁷ On 16th, Haripant and Holkar were at Karla, on the other side. Hyder proposed to finish up the Nizam's power after the English while Goddard intended finishing Hyder's power after the Marathas.⁸ Mahadji had sent the draft of his letter of guarantee to Hyder, declaring that he would not accept a treaty with the English, before consulting Hyder.⁹ The Bhopal chief was prepared to pay 3 lakhs of rupees to the English for Bhelsa but Bhelsa was then Mahadji's Jagir and Mahadji had started from Ujjain on his march to Gwalior.¹⁰ In the Konkan, Baste refused to reinforce Haripant if less than 10,000 troops were given to him, there.¹¹ In the south, 27 platoons from

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 95.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarne; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 146.

3. Ibid.

4. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 78.

5. Forrest, Maratha Series; vol. I, 469.

6. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 99. (Bombay to G.G.)

7. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2584.

8. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2585.

9. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 133.

10. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2594; Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 134.

11. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2586.

the French had joined Hyder against the Madras Government.¹ Nana had been to Parashuram Bhanu's camp and in conference with him, decided that Parashuram should join Haripant.² Watherstone wrote to Goddard from Poona on 24th February³ and Macarney, Eyre Coote, John Macpherson wrote to Sir Edward Hughes about their difficulties.⁴ Nana had finally decided to refer matter, regarding Holkar-shahi disputes, to Mahadji and ridiculed Naro Ganesh.⁵ It was reported on 28th February that Mahadji reached Bhelsa with forced marches and was near Khanhed and the English advanced from Sipri to Sironj and halted at Sironj, hearing of Mahadji's march. Nana gave instructions to Naro Sivdev to be very careful about the secret overtures of the English.⁶ Naro Sivdev was asked by Nana to request Mahadji to make the payment of ten lakhs of rupees, due from him to the Government. Mahadji gave the same answer as before that the correct accounts should be first submitted to him.⁷ The English advance was arrested beyond Sironj by Mahadji,⁸ but the dread of the surprise attack by night kept Mahadji on watch and move and it prevented him from transacting any routine business. The affairs of Zainabad, again had irritated Mahadji.⁹ Mahadji was preparing himself for an attack on the English at or near Sironj and hoped to secure a decisive victory.¹⁰ Sir Eyre Coote, in a critical situation himself on 2nd March, urged on an immediate

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1. Ibid., No.2588; C.P.C., vol.VI, No.82.
 2. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2589.
 3. Forrest, Maratha series; vol.I, 470.
 4. Ibid., 461.
 5. Sardesai, Kavyetihas natren; No.309; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.II, 19, 20, 21.
 6. Sardesai, Kavyetihas natren; No.310.
 7. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol.II, No.147.
 8. Ibid.; No.148.
 9. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.143.
 10. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol.II, No.150.

peace with the Marathas. Hyder was, however, prepared to spend any thing to keep the Marathas against the English.¹ On 3rd March, Mahadji marched from Sarang-puri but still had not actually reached Bhelsa proper, while his Sardars were facing the English. Mahadji had 10,000 soldiers under him but was not helped by the Rajas or Ahalyabai who could not pay the troops. Mahadji expected that the Bhopal chief would be treacherous.² Mahadji informed Nana on 3rd that he had brought the enemy, on that day, at Sironj.³

Goddard in the Konkan had caused much grief to the Marathas.⁴ But still, Goddard's attempts to open negotiations were rejected by Nana.⁵ Nana had rejected the proposals of the Governor-General too.⁶ Raghunath Patwardhan captured on 5th March, 1000/1500 bulls of the English.⁷

Mahadji's army with a train of artillery arrived at Sironj. Carnac's stock was exhausted and he was determined to retreat. Mahadji cannonaded for seven days to draw the English from the town which was the resource of provisions. On 7th March, Carnac issued out secretly by midnight but Mahadji did not follow till the day-break. Mahadji by the day time attacked the English from all sides and the attack pursued for two days. On the third day, Carnac reached a town, Mehanlpore.⁸ Col. Carnac was now surrounded by Mahadji and was attacked for seven days successively and he was

1. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 206-211. (Coote to Bombay and Goddard).

2. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre, vol. I, No. 42.

3. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 136.

4. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2595.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 130-131. (Goddard-Nana Correspondence)

6. Ibid; 130-133.

7. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2596; Sardesai, Kavyatiharas-patras, No. 311; Parnis, Itihasik Tipane; III, 28, 18.

8. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 288-289; (Carnac to Malet, Resident at Camboy).

retreating.¹ Mahadji deplored that the season was far too advanced to carry the war in the English territory.² The Emperor of course had no army to join Mahadji but would not join the English, at any cost.³

Mahadji wrote to Nana on 19th March, concerning the affairs of Hyderabad.⁴ Naro Shivdev and Sadashiv Dinkar were all by about 11th March, in Mahadji's camp and started to return to the Deccan, after taking Mahadji's leave.⁵ Peace was rejected by the Poona minister on 12th March, again and the English in the Konkan were on the defensive.⁶ The Bhopal Chief, on 13th, urged on the English, again, to secure Bhelsa from Mahadji.⁷ Sir Eyre Coote explained that there was quantity for 12 days for the Europeans and one day for the sepoys and followers, on 14th March and that the draft bullocks were so weak that as hardly to be equal to draw the guns for one day's march, from want of food.⁸ Mahadji refused to march on Surat and leave the command to lesser hands in Malwa. Nana urged on Mahadji to settle the accounts for Naro Shivdev was clamouring.⁹ Mahadji himself thought of attacking decisively the English in Malwa. Mahadji sent back the English wakil on 17th March. Najafkhan promised to finish the Sikh affairs and thence to join

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1. S.P.D., vol. 36, No. 401; Duff, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 139-140; Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 27, No. 33; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos. 137, 138; Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 153; Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2607.
 2. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 139.
 3. Rajwade, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 27, No. 33.
 4. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 151.
 5. Ibid., vol. II, No. 152.
 6. S.P.D., vol. 24; 156-164. (Goddard to Bombay).
 7. Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, No. 2603.
 8. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department; vol. I; 766.
 9. Sardesai, Kavyetihas Patren; Nos. 312, 315.

the Marathas but the English too had promised him 50 lakhs of rupees, which, he however refused to accept.¹

Hughes sent an intelligent Brahmin to reside at Poona, whom he paid at the rate of Rs.200/- per month.² But the only result was to convince the Commodore that the Marathas did not intend to contract peace.³ Hastings deplored that Clavering, Francis and Monson had attacked every measure which he had taken mainly because he had taken it and reversed every branch of his policy mainly because it was his,⁴ while Hughes and others, arrogated to themselves a power which belonged to the Governor-General and Council and addressed a formal letter to the minister at Poona declaring that not the Company alone but the King (of England) as well had ordered the suspension of hostilities, and the conclusion of peace and pledging the Governor-General and Council to support their pacific views.⁵ Sir Edward Hughes paid Rs.3000 " to an intelligent Moorman well acquainted at Poona secretly to carry letters from him to Nana and to bring back his answer, as well as to endeavour by every means in his power to induce the Marathas to a peace with the English Company on the terms offered them by the Governor-General and Council of Bengal and employed him in his service between 4th January and 10th March when finally the man was seized⁶ by the Marathas.

1. Hingane Dantar; vol.II, No.88.

2. Dodwell, Hastings' letters to John Macpherson; Nos.173, p.3; No.167, p.107; p.XXVI.

3. Ibid. (Hughes to Hillsborough); Nos.167, p.107.

4. Ibid. p.XIX.

5. Ibid. p.XXVII; S.P.D.R., vol.25, 611-617. (Bombay to Court, 10-9-1781)

6. Ibid. p.XXVI.

On 19th March, Mahadji was in between Gohad and Gwalior. Cheytsingh sided with Mahadji and Hastings went back to Calcutta.¹ Khanderao Pawar joined Mahadji; and Nana asked him to proceed to the Deccan as his services would be more useful there.² On 20th, Hyder wrote to the Marathas not to contract treaty with the English, promising that he would himself proceed to the Konkan and secure Bassein and Salsetta for them.³ Patwardhan had been successful over the English in the Konkan and Mahadji himself promised to proceed to the Deccan after finishing the English affairs, in Malwa, who had already retreated two cos.⁴ Mahadji followed harassing tactics against the English and wrote to Nana to follow same against the English in the Konkan.⁵

The Emperor and Najaf were in Delhi. The English army was stationed at Lucknow and Kanpur. The English had spread upto Gwalior. Ranshnan on 22nd, came to Sironj with the State army and Mahadji, joining him, rounded the English.⁶ Hingane was endeavouring to set the Emperor against the English.⁷ The English had fled to Chanderi and Nana wrote about Mahadji's success to Hyder.⁸ The various kamavisdars had begun to evade payment of revenue, owing to the disturbed conditions of the district.⁹ On 25th, Mahadji with his army was encamped between Gohad and Gwalior and his family was at Ujjain. He wished to see his Gura, who had forbidden him to go further. Mahadji opened up his campaign against Gohad.¹⁰

1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I, No. 43.

2. Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patren; No. 313.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2608.

4. Ibid; vol. VII, No. 2605.

5. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 140.

6. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; I, 22.

7. Shirdeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. I, No. 53.

8. Sardesai, Kavyatihar Patren; No. 314.

9. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 141.

10. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I; No. 44.

Mahadji was engaged for night and day over the work of carrying on the fight against the English and there was no opportunity for Naro Shivdev to show the letters addressed to him and to obtain replies from him.¹

Hyder's army occupied the country from Trevide to Chillambra being in a direct line upwards of 36 miles and from the former place to Pondicherry it was possessed by large bodies of horse, so that the English were completely surrounded.² On 27th, Goddard's plan of remaining on the defensive was accepted and his suggestion to maintain a post at the head of the Ghats was not accepted by the English authorities.³ On 29th, Nana gave directions to Mahadji about the advance of the English and the Bhopal Chief.⁴

Carnac again marched out and in vain attempted to bring out an engagement, halted for several days to refresh and Mahadji was within 3 cos. with baggage. Seven cos. in the rear, on 24th night, the detachment of the Company, counter-marching during the night, got in the van of Mahadji's army unexpectedly. Carnac surprised and reached the first camp where Mahadji was, pursued the Marathas to their second, drove them 3 cos. further and across " Sind " where the English took the artillery and by 9 o'clock were masters of 10 pieces of cannon, all their tumbrils, two elephants and greatest part of the stores, ammunition and baggage, leaving the Marathas in utmost disorder.⁵ Eleven high-rank soldiers of Mahadji, 20 Bargirs and Siledar with 50 horse were

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol.II, No.154.

2. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department; vol.I; 761.

3. S.P.D.D., vol.24; 154-157. (Consultation).

4. Sardesai, Kavyatitha natra; No.316.

5. S.P.D.D., vol.24; 288-289 (Carnac to Malet, Resident at Camboy) and 285, 288, 289; (News from Malet); Sardesai, H.P.M.S., Nos. 142, 145, 147.

killed and 6 officers, 200 Bargirs, Siledar with 100 horse were wounded, on Mahadji's side. On the English side, 3 officers, 25 Candahar horse, one Subedar, twenty Europeans were killed, with 100 more wounded.¹ Carnac wrote that he was pursued by Mahadji and was distressed for the provisions when Mahadji cannonaded him in his march and in his camp and was exceedingly troublesome; so that it was not improbable that Mahadji was led into this scrape by his boldness.² Mahadji, however, continued to pursue the English with harassing tactics.³

Jalissingh of Kotah came to Shahabad with the military aid to Mahadji on 31st March.⁴ There was increasing tension between Mahadji and the men fighting under him.⁵ The English had six platoons, with two from Gohad, 14 cannons, 3 Carnals, 200 Candahar Horse; while Mahadji had 10 cannons, one garmala, Khandrao Hari's cannon. Visajipant marched to Mandla. Belaji Govind and Gangadhar Govind did not propose to help Mahadji but the Raja of Datia had started to succour him and Mahadji sent Mir Ali Naki Khan's son to the Emperor and Najaf for active help.⁶ The English were reinforced by 3 platoons, 9 cannons and 5 elephants from Kanpur. They had left Kanchirai, 18 cos. further to Harwar. Mahadji heard that the big guns of his and some 415 elephants were kept at Kulares by the English and hence, dispatched Bapuji Malhar from Ambaji Ingle's command with 2000 horse, along with 2000 Gossavins and a thousand Bargirs. Bapuji burnt the market of Kulares but Bapuji had no guns

1. Shindeshahi Rulkarne; S.H.S., vol. I, No. 54.

2. S.P.B.R., vol. 24; 268-269. (News from Malet).

3. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 146.

4. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., Nos. 142, 155, 156.

5. Ibid. No. 152.

6. Ibid., Nos. 153, 154.

while the English inside the city, cannonaded heavily. Sadashiv Malhar was asked to reinforce Bapuji; and Khanderao Hari was dispatched to Bhelsa. 200 horse came from Bhopal for employment to Mahadji who now attached them to Khanderao Hari.¹ Pandurang Raghunath reported that, at Kulares, the English regiment sustained a severe defeat.²

Lord Mac Cartney, John Macpherson, General Coote and Admiral Hughes wrote to Poona for peace in the summer which Hastings did not know, in the beginning.³ Holkar joined Parashuram in the Konkan⁴ under the Ghat and they burst into the Konkan when Goddard's detachment was hard-pressed at Panvel.⁵ The supplies were cut by Tukoji and Goddard had to call for reinforcement.⁶ On 5th April, Tukoji informed Haripant that he himself and Parashuram would join him on the next day morning.⁷ The English had an agreement with the Bhonsle on 6th April⁸ and Hastings referred to it as having joined over the Bhonsle and broken the confederacy.⁹ Najaf died on 6th April 1781.¹⁰

Mahadji suggested on 7th April 1781 that the Peshwa should live on Purandar as he (the Peshwa) suffered from small-pox and Mahadji eagerly awaited news that he was well.¹¹ Goddard's army

1. Sardesai; H.P.W.S., No. 145.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 163.

3. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; vol. I; p. 399.

4. Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2613, 2616.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 191-194. (Goddard to Bombay)

6. Maheswar Parabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I, No. 46; Khare, op.cit., vol. VII, No. 2619; S.P.D.D., vol. 24, 191-194.

7. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II; No. 156.

8. Forrest; Selections from State papers of the Governors-General of India-W. Hastings; vol. I, 257.

9. Ibid; 257, 258, 259.

10. Barker; Fall of the Mughal Empire; vol. III, p. 227.

11. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. I; No. 55.

was in a critical situation in the Konkan, at Chowk and a strong detachment to his help was to be sent from Bombay.¹

Barwe who was in correspondence with Mahadji, requested him to persuade Ahalyabai not to send him to Poona.² Hingane reported that the Emperor's army, after defeating the Sikhs would enter into the Deccan.³ Mahadji wrote on 17th April to Hyder that the Marathas had overcome the English all around.⁴ Tukoji and Parashuram were at Kasara on 19th April and Goddard with his company was at Chowk on 22nd April, and was at Panvel from 24th April to 4th May. On 21st April, 28 were killed and 266 were wounded in Goddard's camp and on 23rd April, 30 were killed and 147 were wounded and 7 were missing.⁵ Mahadji had sent his wakil to Delhi on 23rd April.⁶ Nana sent two letters to Mahadji - one from Goddard himself and the other from the English Naval Officer and awaited replies.⁷ Sadashiv Dinkar informed Nana on 27th April, of Mahadji having received a secret communication from some unknown person, mentioning how Nana felt awfully jealous of Mahadji's victories and explained that the news naturally irritated Mahadji.⁸

There was desertion in Col. Pearse's detachment, army at Calcutta and Anderson was sent in deputation to Cuttack.⁹ The

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1. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; (195-196. (Consultation); Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 148; Sardesai; New History of the Marathas; vol. III, p. 109; Parasnis; Itihasik Wignna; III, 18, 23; Dodwell, Hastings' Letters; p. 142; Sardesai, Kavyatithas natron; Nos. 318, 327; Khare, op. cit., vol. VII, Nos. 2520, 2523, 2525-26.
 2. Mahashwar Darabarchi Bataginatra; vol. I, No. 45.
 3. Parasnis; Maratha Politics in Delhi; I, 23.
 4. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 149.
 5. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 245-246, (Goddard to Bombay); 202-203; 211-213; 215-216; 237-246; 265-266; 275-277; 285-286; Sardesai; Kavyatithas natron; 319, 327.
 6. Shindeshahi Rajkarn; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 159.
 7. Sardesai; Kavyatithas natron; No. 320.
 8. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 150.
 9. Cleig, op. cit., vol. II, 356. (Hastings to Scot, his representative in London, 23-4-1781).

Bhonsles, perhaps, Hastings thought, would contend themselves with making conquests with the English means, on Mahadji's territory and for their encouragement in such a design, he had offered to send forces against Burhanpur and Asher, the two capital fortresses of the province of Khandesh and with concluding a treaty of defensive alliance with them.¹ The fort of Asher was not yet surrendered to Mahadji, as previously arranged. It was not ordered to be made over to him from the Peshwa's control.² Hastings now declared that he was most grievously disappointed about Major Carnac; and Col. Muir was instantly dispatched³ and to prevent the hazard of competition, orders were sent to Carnac to deliver his command to Col. Muir and to let Col. Muir receive it. Col. Muir was earlier the Commander of Fattergarh detachment.⁴ After all Col. Carnac's⁵ campaign had with all its errors fulfilled its proposed object, by drawing the whole attention of Mahadji from the new conquest in Gujarat and from Gen. Goddard. It had been virtually the cause of the revolution of Bassein, the possession of the passes which led to Poona and of the quiet collection, of a large but unknown revenue by the English.⁶ Messrs. Livins, Murray, and Ducarell took it in their heads to reform the English state and they endeavoured to convince Wheeler that Hastings would lead to certain ruin and that nothing could prevent it but the recall of Carnac and Pearse and

1. Ibid.; 362; Forrest, Selections from the State Papers of Governors-General W. Hastings; vol. I, 250; Parasnis; Maratha vakils; Chap. III, 4.

2. Sat. Raj. Diar; vol. IV, 271.

3. Gleig, op. cit., vol. II, 362.

4. Ibid.; 365, 366, 367.

5. C. P. C., vol. VI, No. 45.

6. Gleig, op. cit., vol. II, 366.

the offer of peace to the Marathas on any terms which they should prescribe.¹

The fort of Gwalior was ceded to the Rana of Gohad by the English on 23th April.² The Raja of Kolhapur, in the Deccan, was not prepared to leave Manaji Shinde and the English wakil stayed there.³ Mahadji refused to attack as Nana suggested and turned his attention to Gohad.⁴ Hastings suggested " Let the Government of Berar declare itself in English favour, its influence will not fail to draw after it the Peshwa's administration, which subsists only by the power of its allies and nominal dependents; for it has neither wealth nor resources left, having yielded a territory of eighty lakhs to Hyder, the province of Candish to Scindia, Aurangabad (if I mistake not) to Nizam Ally and lost both Gujrat and Cooch to the English."⁵ Sadashiv Dinkar reported to Nana that the news of the peace overtures to Mahadji by the English was not true.⁶ Mahadji, in May, approved the proposal of Nana, of deputing a mediator to settle the dispute between Tukoji and Ahalyabai.⁷ Mahadji had not determined the cantonment of the Maratha army for the Monsoon and depended upon the movements of the English.⁸ By about 2nd May, Hade, Bundela, Jhansi, Khechi, Chanderi, Dabai had joined Mahadji and only the Rana of Gohad had remained aloof.⁹

The management of the districts of Jainabad and Najrad was entrusted to Naro Krishna Darve with the consent of Mahadji, after

1. Ibid: 384.

2. Ibid: 380.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2621.

4. Sardesai; Kavyatibhas patren; No.321.

5. Forrest; selections from state papers; vol.I, 222, 250.

6. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No.162.

7. Ibid: No.164.

8. Ibid: No.157.

9. Ibid.

2nd May.¹ The English surprised Ambuji Ingle on 2nd May, though with no serious results.² The English in the Konkan had by about 2nd May, Bassein, Arnala, Kalyan, Belapur and Uran.³ Mahadji tried to bring the Rana of Gohad to his side through the efforts of Gangadhar Govind and he had won already to his side, Jalim Singh of Kotah through Lalaji Ballal.⁴ Nana wrote that all unpleasant letters must not be shown to Mahadji.⁵ Parashuram refused to pay the Dahakpatti and Nana pointed out on 6th, that even Mahadji and Tukoji had paid but still Parashuram insisted on the refusal to pay anything.⁶ The Bhonsle concluded that though the English were few in number, they had shown conspicuous valour in their war against Hyder, the Peshwa and Mahadji. The troops of Mahadji and Tukoji were out to march but they would not become aggressive till the English were inactive.⁷ The Governor-General wrote to the Bhonsle on 14th May that he was prepared to conclude a treaty with all other chiefs through him;⁸ but Devakar Pandit declared that the skill and tact with which Goddard fought the invincible troops of Mahadji and Tukoji for a period of six months would do credit to Rustum and Istandyar but it would not be advisable for him to retreat. So he would get down and attack Poona. Ministers becoming desperate, would set fire to the town and reduce it to ashes and abandoning all hopes of saving their country, property and the families, would plunge into warfare for a fight to the finish; people so determined might accomplish anything and their

1. Shindeshahi Raikarna; S.H.S., vol.II, No.161.

2. Ibid; No.160.

3. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravvahan; No.212.

4. Shindeshahi Raikarna; S.H.S., vol.II; No.162.

5. Sardesai; kavyatithas patren; No.323.

6. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2624.

7. C.P.C., vol.VI; No.156.

8. Ibid; vol.VI; No.157.

opponent would not be able to get lightly over them. The Nizam, the French and Hyder would not sit quiet. Mahadji with 50,000 horse and numerous chiefs would do all that lied in their power and again, Mahadji weilded a great influence at the court of Delhi.¹ The Bhonsle's army had a skirmish with the English and the Wazir's wakil was in Mahadji's camp. The English wakil also had been in his camp when Mahadji was in between Gohad and Gwalior. Mahadji had asked Ahalyabai to collect revenue and advised her to send dues to the Peshwa and by his order, to Tukoji.² The Peshwa returned to Saswad on 15th May and had honoured Parashuram Bhou.³

Naro Shivdev reported to Nana that there was a secret understanding between Balaji Govind and the English⁴ and Mahadji held anxious deliberations with his Diwan Balarao Govind, on the gravity of the situation and the scanty means at his disposal in opposing the English advance.⁵ Nana wrote to Mahadji on 17th, that the Maratha State depended on him, that the things were pressing, and suggested that something with deep caution had to be done and that Naro Shivdev would explain everything personally to Mahadji.⁶ Rana-khan urged on war with the English round about Sironj.⁷ Sadashiv Dinkar pleaded Nana on 17th to realise Mahadji's difficulties and not to exasperate him by an unpleasant remonstrance.⁸ The Emperor's army on 19th, marched against Zabitekhan in the Doab.⁹ Mahadji,

1. Ibid. No.158.

2. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol.I, No.47.

3. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2622.

4. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol.II; No.164.

5. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No.159.

6. Sardesai; Kavyatitha patren; No.323.

7. Ibid. No.326.

8. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.160.

9. Parasnis; Maratha Politics in Delhi; I, 24.

on 24th, sent Nare Shivdev to represent himself in the talks about Holkarshahi disputes; and the Peshwa, too, had sent Baburao Vishwanath. All were determined to hand over a Nemruk to Ahalyabai which she, however, refused. The English, even though well-reinforced, were defeated by Mahadji and had returned to Kelpi where they were now firm.¹ Dowlatrao Ghorpade wrote to the Governor of Madras on 24th May and the English offered the fort of Gouty to break the Maratha - Hyder relations.² The English also tried to win over Parashuram, for the fort of Gouty to be taken from Hyder, but he replied in the same tune as Dowlatrao and rejected the alliance.³ Mahadji was not falling back during the Monsoon but was resolved to canton where he was, facing the English.⁴

On 23rd April, Col. Parker was killed and Goddard remained at Panvel till 20th May. The minister had declared that Hyder must be included in whatever treaty that might be made with the Poona Government and the Bombay Company transmitted this information to the Governor-General.⁵ Mahadji on 20th, instructed Ahalyabai to dispatch Abaji Naik with 40/50 lakhs of Rs. to him. Mahadji's wife (Sangamnerkar) had died at Ujjain. The wakil from Gohad by name Vireshwar Pant had come to Mahadji.⁶ Mahadji's Muslim Sardar was defeated⁷ and the English were reported to have a disagreement with the Wazir.⁸

1. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I; No. 48.

2. Parasnis D.B., "Original Correspondence between the English and the Marathas," I.H.R.C.P., vol. V, (1923); p. 96; at seq.

3. Ibid; pp. 96-97.

4. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No. 161.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 24; 292-303. (Bombay to Court.)

6. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatre; vol. I; Nos. 49, 50, 51.

7. Ibid, Nos. 50, 51.

8. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; vol. I, 28.

If Mahadji would be triumphant at Gualier, the Emperor would accept his protection.¹ Nana and Mahadji, however, informed the Emperor on 31st that they did intend to contract the treaty with the English.² Anupgiri Gosavi had been sent to Jaypur and when Nana wrote that some sardar from Delhi ought to help Mahadji, Hamdani was also requested to that effect.³ The French had joined Hyder.⁴ If the Emperor did, however, wish to fight against the English, he would never have displeased the Sikhs. Nana knowing this, insisted that the Emperor's army must march to the Doab⁵ and wrote about the instant dispatch of Inam-Pranam to Mahadji when he was only given Kaulnama at Sipri Kelares. The Maratha army was to go to Calcutta along with the Emperor's troops and hence the Kaul-nama was postponed. Mahadji had designs on Bengal and the Emperor was to join him at Itawa, in the Doab.⁶ But Hall, the English wakil was received in Delhi⁷ and Hingane was attacked by Latapat Alikhan Khoja, as per the instructions from the English.⁸

Mahadji was displeased with Nana for the vacillating policy observed by Nana on the subject of a reconciliation being obstructed between Ahalyabai and Tukoji. Mahadji disowned all responsibility about it.⁹ Mahadji on 1st June forwarded the case of Visaji Krishna against the encroachment of a gardner who confiscated his property.¹⁰ Mahadji on 2nd June was pre-

1. Ibid. 29.

2. Ibid. 30.

3. Ibid. 33.

4. Ibid. 34.

5. Ibid. 35.

6. Ibid. 36.

7. Ibid. 33, 39.

8. Ibid. 39, 40.

9. Sardesai; M.P.M.S., No. 168.

10. Bindeshahi Rajkurni; S.H.S., vol. I, No. 96.

paring for a final action with the English.¹ Naval expedition of 40 men-of-war against the English was sent by the French, Dutch and other European powers.² Ahalyabai still wanted to refer to Mahadji, the instructions sent by the Peshwa.³ The dust storms preceding the Monsoon were reported by about 5th June.⁴ To Hana's query as to whether Mahadji would go to Poona that year, Mukund Joshi answered in the negative.⁵ The Sikhs had defeated the Emperor's forces and the English took seven lakhs of rupees from the Rana of Gohad as the price of the fort of Gwalior, which was handed over to the Rana by them.⁶ The Governor-General wrote to Goddard on 11th June that the peace overtures were to be renewed and the protection to Raghoba was to be withdrawn and the cession of Bessein not to be insisted upon.⁷ Hana approved of Mahadji's plan of quartering his troops in front of the English regiments, during the rainy season.⁸ It was reported on 17th June, that Ragho Malhar was appointed Mahadji's Divan.⁹

An action was fought with the English foraging party by Mahadji's forces (which was reported on 18th June) at Minhar in which a severe defeat was sustained by the English.¹⁰ Four guns,

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1. Ibid; vol.II, Nos.166,167.
 2. S.P.D., vol.36, No.411.
 3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatra; vol.I, Nos.52,56,57.
 4. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.168.
 5. Parasnis; Itihasik Tipana, VI,22.
 6. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatra; vol.I, No.53.
 7. S.P.D., vol.25; 397-401 (G.G. to Goddard).
 8. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.169.
 9. Sardesai; H.P.M.S., No.165.
 10. Shindeshahi Raikarne; S.H.S., vol.II, No.170; Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatra; vol.I, Nos.56,58.

an elephant and several pallequins were taken from the Marathas but 4 to 5 hundred Europeans were killed.¹ Dharwad Shinde's clerk was released by the English.² Mahadji congratulated Nana upon the victory of the Marathas in the Konkan and advised him on 20th to canton the Maratha armies at Talegaon and to pursue the advantage obtained over Goddard.³ Mahadji sent on 28th, some four to five thousand Gosevis brought from Jhansi to Ranakhan.⁴ On 1st July, Mahadji inflicted a severe defeat on Col. Muir near Sipri and established his camp on what is known as the Budha-pahad in the vicinity of Jhansi. Col. Muir encamped at Sipri with less than forty miles distance between the two.⁵ In this battle, Mahant Daryagiri and Mahadji's brother-in-law, Tulaji Jadhav, were killed.⁶

The exemption from excise taxes on the purchase of guns and wines at Burhanpur was claimed by the Nizam and was granted by Mahadji on 3rd July, with an addition that the Nizam should grant the same exemption to the Marathas at Aurangabad.⁷ The district of Mahatpur had been resettled and brought under plough.⁸ The English army in the Konkan cantoned at Kalyan and Goddard returned to Bombay. The Governor-General contracted a treaty with the Bhonsle that 1000 cavalry would join Col. Pearse against Hyder and Gurdah Mandla would be reduced jointly.⁹ Raghoba

1. S.P.D.D.; vol. 25; 365-366; vol. 25; 363-365. (Consultation) (also letters from Surat and Raghoba.)

2. Shinde's clerk Ralkarni; S.H.S., vol. II; No. 171.

3. Sardesai, H.P.H.S., No. 166.

4. Ibid; No. 167.

5. Sardesai; Lawretihan outren; No. 323.

6. Sardesai, "New History of the Marathas; vol. III, p. 110.

7. Parsonis, Itihāsik Tipānī; VI, 32.

8. Shinde's clerk Ralkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 173.

9. Ibid, 172.

10. S.P.D.D., vol. 25; 354-358 (G.G. to Bombay); 356-357 (7-5-1781); 357-358 (10-5-1781).

complained that he did not know the Governor-General's views and promised that he would pay all the expenses borne by the English, afterwards.¹

Carnac wrote to Col. Morgan himself and repeatedly to Col. Muir from Sironj; Morgan had ordered Muir to join Carnac, on 10th March 1781. On 14th March 1781, Muir was 4 cos of Sipri and 16 cos from Carnac, who seemed too late to have discovered his error and to fly from Col. Muir, whose junction would ofcourse deprive him of the command. This evasion would not avail for on the knowledge of Col. Morgan's orders, the Governor-General in Council confirmed and approved them.² Col. Carnac had returned to Gwalior and Col. Muir had taken his command.³ Raghunath Hari, Subhedar of Jhansi, wrote to the Governor-General that Rajdar Gujar on the advice of the Raja of Datur, has joined Mahadji with 2000 horse and foot and from there, he had been dispatched to an outpost to attack the English. His uncle, having taken leave of Mahadji, returned home to look after the family. Mahadji had given Raghunath Hari's country to him, on account of Raghunath Hari's friendship with the English. Rajdar had already assembled the troops and taken possession of the said country. Carnac informed Raghunath Hari that only Col. Muir could move in the matter. Now, Raghunath Hari sought instructions from the Governor-General.⁴

A defeat was inflicted on Maraji Shinde by the troops of Pratinidhi and Mahadji was gratified to hear it.⁵ Raja of

1. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 196 (5-7-1781)

2. Gleig, op. cit., vol. II, 365.

3. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 196. (5-7-1781)

4. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 196.

5. Shindechahi Rajkarni; B.H.S., vol. II, 174; Sardesai, Kavretihan patron; No. 330.

Kolhapur had revolted by about 6th July.¹ Mahadji by about 7th July, had shifted his encampment on account of the rains and flooded rivers.² He intended to canton at the Budha-pahad, facing the English. Rumour was spread that Diwan Ragho Malhar and Abu Chitnis would be left in charge of the army and Mahadji would come back to Ujjain. Mahadji had opened negotiations with the Sikhs and the Emperor of Delhi.³ Yankatraman Shastri from Raghoba visited Ahalyabai and it was declared that Raghoba no more was favouring the English aid.⁴ But the English, too were supported by the Indian Chiefs.⁵ For instance, the Rana of Gohad renewed his alliance with the English against Mahadji on the 9th July.⁶ On 15th July, Mahadji was near Panchati and the English were at Sheshai; and Mahadji would canton at Ronoda, with the Kalisindi river between them. Mahadji still followed the harassing tactics.⁷ The Rana of Gohad sent grains etc. to Col. Muir's army. Mahadji's army, hearing this, directed itself against the Rana. The army in this march comprised of 7000 Gosavis, and equal number of horse and 1500 sepoy with guns - in all about 30,000 troops. Bajirao Barve, brother-in-law of Raghoba by his first wife; and Subhanji Bhonsle killed and defeated Bhupkar's brother and nephew, at 3 cos from Sangam at Suddervell. 1000/1500 horse intended to join Raghoba and Manaji Phakde wanted to canton at Wallore and waited Raghoba's instructions.⁸ Baburao Bhaskar requested Nana to confer

1. Gardes-i-kavyatihar nakhra, No. 330.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 175.

3. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamivatra; vol. I, No. 55.

4. Ibid; vol. I, No. 54.

5. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 176.

6. Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamivatra; vol. I, No. 56.

7. Ibid; vol. I, No. 58.

8. S.H.S., vol. 25, 368-366 (Letters from Surat and Raghoba).

upon him the management of some districts in Bundelkhand¹. Mahadji recommended on 18th July to Nana for granting an exemption of payment of the debt to Yadavrao Pawar who was at the time, on active service under Mahadji.² Mahadji himself had to undergo hardships and troubles in opposing the English constantly at a stretch for several months.³ When Nana forwarded Goddard's letter to Mahadji, Mahadji suggested on 27th July to call Goddard to Poona and pointed out that he would himself proceed to Poona when Goddard would actually arrive there.⁴ On 23rd July, Mahadji had replied Nana's letter suggesting Mahadji to march on Bengal. Mahadji explained that he had told in the very beginning that the Bhonsles were bought by the English and hence had suggested that the Bhonsle and Nana would manage the home front - which was not approved. Narwar, Shikandara, Gohad supported the English, so Mahadji had sent Sadashiv Malhar and Gangadhar Govind Bundela and Shivram Hari Jhansikar, from Laheria to Narwar. Imbaji Ingle was, too, near Shikandara. As the Marathas had not cantoned for the rains, all the states understood that they were determined to finish the affairs of the English. But nobody was prepared to join the Marathas in the rains and Mahadji himself was unprepared for the campaign. He but surely wanted to attack Bengal and suggested to Nana to keep up friendly relations with Ryder and the Nizam. If once Mahadji would defeat Carnac, he would get clear field up to Bengal. Mahadji had declared that the

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 201.

2. Ibid., S.H.S., vol. II, No. 177.

3. Ibid., No. 178.

4. Ibid.; vol. I, Nos. 57, 58.

English were dishonest and treacherous and that no talks for treaty should be entertained. Tukoji would not be able to attack Bengal and if once the talks for the treaty with the English, were opened, Hyder's sympathies would be lost.¹ Raghoba had opened up overtures to the minister on 24th July.² While Mahadji was forming alliances against the English,³ the Governor-General, too, desired to continue hostilities.⁴ Earl of Hillsborough wrote to Raghoba on 31st July, that his agents in London were referred to the principal Directors of the East India Company.⁵ The country from Pathargad to the Ganges and from the Doab to Calcutta was all in confusion and Loyal Singh of Kanauj, Farukabad and Manipur chiefs were ready to join the Marathas in the Doab and only awaited Mahadji's instructions.⁶

Baburao Vaidya left Maheshwari on 2nd August for Poona.⁷ Goddard reached Surat but Raghoba refused to set out unless he was provided with army. Mahadji cantoned at Shahabaga near the Bulha-pahad and the English were at Sipri-Kolares on 2nd August.⁸ The Governor-General expressed that Devakar Pandit should immediately set out to meet him at Benares for properly explaining to him the Bhonsla's views and secret designs.⁹ Mahadji negotiated with the Rana of Gohad for bringing out an evacuation of Malwa by the English. The Rana suggested cease-fire for the Marathas and the

1. Sardesai, *Uttarvibhag*; vol. I, pp. 343, 346.

2. *S.P.D.P.*; vol. 25, 363-365. (Consultation).

3. *Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatra*; vol. I; No. 59.

4. *S.P.D.P.*; vol. 25; 371-373. (Forney to Court).

5. Harikar Das, "Peshwa Raghunath Rao's agents in England," *J.I.H.*, vol. X, (1931), p. 27.

6. Panania, *Maratha Politics in Delhi*; vol. I, 45.

7. *Maheshwar Darabarchi Batamipatra*; vol. I, No. 60.

8. *Ibid*; vol. I, Nos. 61, 62.

9. *S.P.D.P.*; vol. VI, No. 203.

English as well but Mahadji with the clear grasp of the situation, told him just to manage his own affairs, to cut himself away from the English and stop his supplies to them; otherwise Mahadji himself would attack the Rana with 20,000 troops (that were approaching from the Deccan to reinforce him) along with the English.¹ Khuman Singh was desirous of obtaining Jetpur through the Maratha help.²

Hastings charged the calamity of the want of money felt by Col. Carnac's detachment to Cheytsingh's account as it was certain that his reliance on his faith and his breach of it, were the principal causes that no other provisions had been made for the detachment and that it suffered such want in consequence;³ and Hastings was sure that his subsequent excuses and delays in the payment of the residue of the subsidy were caused by the belief that he was no longer able to enforce it and possibly for such was the report that a few months would close the period of his administration altogether.⁴ The number of troops required from Cheytsingh was 2000 and afterwards was reduced to the demand of 1500 and lastly to 1000 but with no more success. Cheytsingh offered 250 horse but furnished none.⁵ Cheytsingh maintained a correspondence with the Marathas and other powers who either were or might eventually become the enemies of the English State and he was collecting and had prepared every provision for open revolt, waiting only for a proper season to declare it which

1. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol. II, Nos. 182, 181, 194; C.P.C., No. 311. (Treaty of Rana with Mahadji-26-7-1781).

2. Ibid; No. 205.

3. Forrest, Selections from State-papers of Governors-General of India. Martin Hastings; vol. I, 119.

4. Ibid, 131; Sardesai, Uttaryibhas; vol. I, 355 (Pedigree of Cheytsingh).

5. Ibid, 132; Sardesai; H.P.M.S., Nos. 170, 171, 172; C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 219; Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; vol. I, 61, 27; Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department; vol. I, 799 and Lxiv.

was to depend either on the arrival of the French Armada or on the Maratha invasion.¹ Cheytsingh must have had at least two crores of rupees and the mere guard whom he kept about his person for the purposes of mere show, extended by several hundreds the total amount of the force which he had been requested to employ against the common enemy of his and the English.² "These instances of contumacy and disobedience, criminal as they were in themselves and aggravated by the extreme and known distress of the superior state, to which he owed not only personal fealty but every voluntary aid which all the resources of his Zamindari could contribute, appeared to Hastings of less consideration as such, than as they were evidences of a deliberate and systematic conduct, aiming at the total subversion of the authority of the Company and the erection of his independency on its ruins."³ On 13th August Hastings was at Benares, where on account of the recourse to arms over the dispute with Cheytsingh, he had to escape to Chunargad.⁴

Delhi authorities were postponing active help to Mahadji and their troops would only join him, after the rains.⁵ However the Emperor was pleased to hear the Maratha triumphs over the English.⁶ Khandoji Bhonsle wrote on 15th August about his hopes to devastate Bengal and Hastings had paid ten lakhs of rupees to the Nizam;⁷ and Nana believed that the Bhonsle by about 15th

1. Forrest; Selections from State papers of Governors-General of India- Warren Hastings, vol.I, 133.

2. Gleig, op.cit., vol.II, 399.

3. Forrest, op.cit., vol.I, 133.

4. Parasnis, Maratha yakils; chap.III,

5. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi; vol.I, 59.

6. Ibid; vol.I, 57, 56, 49.

7. Ibid, vol.I, No.52.

August even must have entered into Calcutta. The Delhi forces were expected, too, to reach Calcutta within two months.¹ Hama was preparing to reinforce Mahadji at Kolares.² The English offered 50 lakhs of rupees to the Emperor who, however, explained to Hingane that he was more careful about the Maratha interests than even the Peshwa himself was.³

Hastings wrote to Mrs. Hastings to set her mind at ease in reference to his own personal safety, and what was more remarkable still as bearing testimony to his rare strength of nerve, as well as to the command which he never ceased to exercise over all the faculties of his mind, he sent through the same channel, instructions to Col. Muir.⁴ These instructions were in reply to a letter which found its way to Hastings from Col. Muir, who commanded the army employed against Mahadji Shinde, informing Hastings of the overtures made by him to Mahadji for a separate peace. This had been one of the objects of his journey to that quarter but eagerly as he had sought such an event, he was proportionably mortified to learn with what facility it might have been accomplished and how unseasonably the English domestic misfortunes had happened to defeat so fair a prospect of it. He had no money nor credit equal to the supply of rupees 3000 and by an unfortunate train of official perplexities, which had happened some time preceding that, both Major Popham's regiment, the Rangers, and all

1. *Ibid.*, vol. I, No. 51.

2. *Ibid.*, vol. I, No. 50.

3. Parasnis, *Maratha Politics in Delhi*; vol. I, 48, 47, 41, 42, 44.

4. Gleig; *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 412.

the corps of the garrison of Chunar were four months in arrears." Ford and the Munshi of the English from the English camp of Col. Grainger Muir at Shesai approached Mahadji and handed over the peace treaty to him, on 16th August 1781. Accordingly, Mahadji was to 1) arrange treaty between the English and the Peshwa and 2) same with Hyder. If Hyder disagreed, Mahadji was to join the English, if not to remain neutral and not to join Hyder. 3) Mahadji was not to enter the Doab, 4) to protect the Chanderi Raja without squeezing money and to expel his Diwan Raja Dhar who rebelled against his master, 5) to have peaceful relations with Gohad, if he proves treacherous then Mahadji was to do whatever he liked in his case; 6) Mahadji was not to attack Narvar after the departure of the English and Sipri, Kolares and Shesai would be ceded to Narvar. Col. Muir was vested with all the powers to contract the treaty with Mahadji, for Hastings. Mahadji pointed out his interference at the Wadgaon convention and lamented that the English had not respected it. He insisted that the English must cede Salsette, Ahmadabad, Bassein and Kalyan to the Peshwa. Muir required Hastings' sanction for these terms now and pleaded that Mahadji should give him time, so that he would write, anew, to the Governor-General which, however, Mahadji approved. Mahadji again explained that Sipri, Kolares and Shesai were the places of Jadhav and hence, Narvar had no claim thereof. It was agreed that the Marathas, however, would not harass Narvar. Mahadji had agreed not to enter the Doab and was prepared to write to Hyder and await

1. Forrest, Selections from State-papers of Governors-General of India, Warren Hastings; vol. I, 173; S.P.D.D., vol. 25, 543-545; Forrest, Maratha Series, vol. I, 457, 458, 459; C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 313.

his reply. Chanderi would be protected, too. The English agreed to take 4½ lakhs of rupees and the remainder from the earlier stipulations and leave the Rana of Gohad to manage his own affairs.¹ On 18th, proclamation was issued at Benares, deposing Raja Cheytsingh.² The English facing Mahadji offered to retire to Itawa.³ An armistice for 18 days was suggested by Col. Muir.⁴ In addition, Mahadji clearly conveyed to Muir and Hastings that he claimed an entirely free hand in managing the affairs of north India, particularly of the Emperor. Hastings immediately conceded all the points claimed by Mahadji and thus paved the way for the final treaty of Salbai.⁵

There was news on 25th, that Hastings was going to Madras personally to supervise the operations.⁶ Raghoba not agreeing with the English, left Surat and reached Galya-Kambha where Goddard went to reconcile him.⁷ Mahadji was given hints

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.169; C.P.C., vol.VI, Nos.215,267; Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, pp.3655-3657; S.P.D.D., vol.25, 545 (G.G.to Goddard), 543-545.(Terms); Duff, op.cit., vol.II, 145; Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol.I, 343,347; Sarkar Jadunath, "The English Residents with Mahadji Scindia," I.H.R.C.P., vol.XI, (1928), pp.11; Banerji B.N., "Last days of Raja Cheytsing," I.H.R.C.P., vol.XI (1928), p.168; Abdul Ali, "Mahadji Scindia of Gwalior," I.H.R.C.P., vol.XII, (1929), p.112; Seir Mutagheria, vol.III, p.137.
2. C.P.C., vol.VI, No.212; Forrest, op.cit., vol.I, 794-795, 814.
3. Shindeshahi Raikar, S.H.S., vol.II, No.183.
4. Ibid, vol.II, No.184; Sardesai, H.P.M.S.; No.171.
5. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, vol.III, p.112.
6. Shindeshahi Raikar, vol.II, No.204.
7. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2638.

to take proper precautions in the negotiations as Gaddard had betrayed earlier.¹ Mahadji accepted Nana's suggestion that Hyder's wakil in Mahadji's camp be induced to write to his master only such news as was desirable that Hyder should know.² News of Cheytsingh's rebellion of 16th August was forwarded to Mahadji by Gangadhar Govind in September and Hastings was reported to be wounded or killed.³ Naro Shivdev suggested to Nana that this crucial moment must be selected for opening an immediate offensive against the English as the rising of Cheytsingh had roused the spirit of the oppressed powers in northern India and requested Nana to send a large force from the Deccan to support Mahadji.⁴ If Mahadji were to proceed to the Deccan in time, he would have been financed and accompanied by Cheytsingh and Wazir because Cheytsingh had opened negotiations with Mahadji through Hingane.⁵ Again, had Cheytsingh been gifted with even so moderate a share of active courage, he would have dared everything at that moment to get possession of the person of the Governor-General and with such a hostage in his power, he might have dictated his own terms, if he lacked hardihood to go further, by throwing himself at once into the arms of the Marathas.⁶

The dispute among the Pawars was referred to Mahadji on 3rd September.⁷ Pandurang Govind, Sripat Moreashwar, Ramchandra Krishna Datar, Vasudev Dhond Dev, Wilkhanth Shinde Manolikar, Bahirji Ghorpade Gajendragadkar were in the prisons of Hyder

1. Shindeshahi Raikar, S.H.S., vol. II, No. 186.

2. Ibid; S.H.S., vol. II, No. 187.

3. Ibid; No. 188.

4. Ibid; No. 190.

5. Parasnis, Maratha Politics in Delhi, vol. I, 62.

6. Gleig, op.cit., vol. II, 411.

7. Sardesai, Kavyatihar vatren; No. 331.

who now released them on payment of money.¹ Hans was advised on 5th by Waro Shivdev to keep strong parties in Khandesh to prevent the English from rendering succour to the forces in Malwa.² Rana of Gohad forwarded his overtures to Mahadji.³

Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote and Sir Edward Hughes, all held that Hyder could not be driven out of the Carnatic until peace had been made with the Marathas⁴ and John Macpherson himself thought that Hastings was standing too obstinately upon terms.⁵ But what appearance must these advances had worn in the eyes of the astute minister at Poona? Could anything have been devised more completely to convince him that the English were in sore need of peace and must soon submit to any terms that he pleased to impose on them? And further, where as at Calcutta, the chief of the English settlements was proposing peace on equal terms, there was a great officer of the king of England making proposals.⁶ What wonder, that the Marathas at Poona turned a deaf ear to the English proposition and could hardly be induced by Mahadji himself to ratify the peace which he had made secretly with Hastings.⁷ Fort St. George had urged on immediate peace with the Marathas on 11th September 1781.⁸

1. Khare, op.cit., vol.VII, No.2639.

2. Shindeshahi Rajkarni; S.H.S., vol.II; No.185; Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.172 (Mahadji to Haripant).

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No.171.

4. Dodwell, Hastings' letters to John Macpherson; p.XXV; Das Gupta A.P., "Treaty of Mangalore," I.H.Q., vol.VI, (1930), p.436.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.; XXVI; S.P.D.D., vol.25, 611-617. (Bombay to Court); Sardesai, New History of Marathas; vol.III, 114.

7. Ibid.; XXVII.

8. S.P.D.D., vol.25; 549-551; 577-578; Forrest, Maratha Series, vol.I, 460.

Mahadji was near Narvar, near the Budha-Hill on 13th September. Muir had sent the copy to Hastings at Benares and Goddard at Bombay. Hastings sent this happy news to England and Europe. Mahadji does not seem to be selfish in this transaction as he was writing all minor details to Purna for two months and Nana also seems to never have minded this special treaty and had approved the plan of Mahadji.¹ In his letter to Goddard of 11th September from Chunar, the Governor-General had maintained that Mahadji offered to negotiate peace with the Peshwa and required that a certain time be allowed for that purpose and the Governor-General further explained that Mahadji made overtures on terms nearly conformable to his wishes.² Mahadji, however, clearly disowned his having made advances to the English for peace and asked Nana to protect his rear.³

Hingane proposed to take the Emperor in Diwali (November) to Agra and join Mahadji.⁴ The Governor-General turned down on 24th September Goddard's plan for the ensuing campaign for want of finances and asked the Bombay Company not to go beyond their defensive plan.⁵ Again, Mahadji wrote to Naro Shivdev to advise Nana not to entertain overtures of peace from the English, as they had been driven into a position of hopeless embarrassment and would soon make an unconditional surrender if the resistance continued unrelaxed⁶ and urged

1. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag; vol. I, 355.

2. S.P.D.D., vol. 25; 545 (Governor-General to Goddard); G.P.S., vol. VI, No. 275.

3. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 173.

4. Parasnis, Marathe Politics in Delhi; vol. I; 63.

5. S.P.D.D., vol. 25, 601-603, (G.G. to Bombay).

6. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 174.

that the troops should be moved to Surat.¹ Mahadji and Ahalyabai used to say often that if the central power at Poona was to be smashed, where would go the satellite powers of Shinde and Holkar.² Mahadji had advised Nana not to rely on the Bhonsle, and explained that he himself would manage the campaign of Malwa and Bengal and that Nana and Tukoji must only manage to save the Deccan but Nana had disapproved this 1) would make Mahadji very powerful and 2) if Mahadji were to enter Bengal, there would be the inevitable clash between Mahadji and the Bhonsle which would have ruined the Marathas.³ Hastings knew this, too and was afraid that if Chaytsingh were to give monetary help to Mahadji, the Marathas would attack Bengal and hence Hastings had been to Benares to come closer to Mahadji.⁴ As regards Bhan Begam of Gadh, Hastings had surmised, "Death and destruction is the least menace as she evidently and it is confidentially said, avowedly espoused the cause of Raja Chaytsingh and united in the idea and plan of a general extirpation of the English race and power in Hindustan."⁵ Hastings had found too that the artillery of Chaytsingh and carriages made at Ramnagar were almost equal to those of the English. The cartridges and portfires compounded were equal in skill and their powder was even better.⁶ Chaytsingh was given military help by Balaji Govind and Mahadji himself.⁷ Chaytsingh's army had met Mahadji's army and then Chaytsingh had marched to

1. Ibid: Nos. 175, 176.

2. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 313.

3. Ibid: 314.

4. Sardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 315.

5. Forrest, Selections from Foreign Department, vol. I, Lxxiv, Lxxvii; Gleig, op.cit., vol. I, 456; C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 235.

6. Ibid: Lxvi.

7. Sardesai, Itihasik Patravahar, No. 215.

Benares, at the time when Hastings went to Calcutta from Benares.¹ Cheytsingh had promised to pay all the arrears of the army of Shivaji Vithal and Ambaji when they would join him. The Nagas were already in Cheytsingh's camp at Jaunoy.² Cheytsingh fled to Mahadji and Hastings rewarded Veniram and Vishwanbhar, the vakils of the Bhonsle for having protected and saved his life.³

Nana had sent to Mahadji the terms which he thought appropriate, for peace with the English, in October 1781.⁴ Sakhar Bapu died on 20th October⁵ and Raghoba led a life of utter moral degradation.⁶ The Governor-General advised Nana of Gohad on 13th October to exert himself in making peace with the Poona minister, and in carrying out the directions of Col. Muir for restoring peace to the country. That would increase his prosperity and be a cause of great satisfaction to the Governor-General himself. He was again directed to refer to Maj. Palmer and Tsfazzul Hussain Khan.⁷ On 16th October Ahalyabai was again under the necessity of complaining against Tukoji who defied her orders and wishes and behaved in an insulting manner towards her.⁸ She had deputed Baji Vithal Nana to the Poona Durbar to settle the dispute of the Holkar fief. Tukoji maintained that with the management of the Saranjam estate in the hands of Ahalyabai, the

1. Ibid. No. 216.

2. Banerji, "op.cit;" I.H.R.C.P., vol. XI, (1923); pp. 168-169; Forrest, Selections from State Papers of Governor's General of India, Warren Hastings, vol. I, 178.

3. Kardesai, Uttarvibhag, vol. I, 316; Sair Mutagherin, vol. III, 140, 141.

4. Shindeshahi Raikarni; S.H.S., vol. I, 59.

5. Parasnis, Itihāsik Tinane; Chap. V; No. 13.

6. Ibid. Chap. I; No. 8.

7. C.P.C., vol. VI, No. 243.

8. Shindeshahi Raikarni, S.H.S., vol. II, Nos. 191, 178.

army had been starving and hence he was, unable to fulfill the several demands of service made by the state on him.¹ Mahadji wrote on 17th October to Nana to inflict severe punishment on Gulzar Khan so that he might not create trouble again.²

Col. Muir finally concluded the treaty on the following terms with Mahadji Shinde on 13th October 1781:-

Treaty concluded by Colonel Muir on the part of the English Company, and Maha Rajah Subadar Madho Rao on his own part.

Mr. Warren Hastings, Governor - General of Bengal, in virtue of the powers vested in him by the Governor - General and Council of Bengal, having fully empowered Colonel Muir to settle a treaty of peace between the Mahah Rajah and the Company in this manner : that whatever he may conclude on the part of the Company shall be binding on the said Governor - General and Council; and the Mahah Rajah and the Colonel being both desirous of peace, have concluded one on the following terms:-

Article I:

Peace and friendship being solidly established between both parties, each will remain to their agreement.

Article II:

Within the space of eight days from the sealing of the treaty by both the parties, both armies shall at one time begin their march. Colonel Muir with his camp shall return to the territory of the Nabob Vizier, and the Mahah Rajah with his army to his own country.

1. Sardesai, H.P.M.S., No. 178.

2. Ibid., No. 177.